THE INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF ETHICS

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THE INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF ETHICS

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THE ETHICS OF MANDEVILLE

A. K. ROGERS

In dealing with the development of English ethics, it has been customary for the historian to turn aside long enough to give a somewhat perfunctory notice to the one-time notorious author of the *Fable of the Bees*. To what extent the digression is justified is usually not made very plain. Certainly the influence Mandeville can be shown to have had on subsequent speculation is at best a devious one, except as his name became a byword and a hissing to all proper-minded thinkers; and even among recent critics, therefore, who have had a chance to outgrow the prejudices which he excited in his own day, the more common impression seems to be that he was a rather eccentric and shallow-minded writer of no permanent importance, who reaped a far greater fame than he deserved by exploiting an economic sophism.

That this last judgment is a hasty one will be evident to the unbiased reader who takes the trouble to go through Mandeville's pages with any care—a practice which there is reason to suspect has not been universal. Along with a sense of humor and a keen satirical touch—Mandeville may still be read with at times an almost undiluted amusement—he is the possessor of a mind both vigorous and versatile, and on the whole of a surprisingly modern cast. It has to be admitted that his value for ethics is more equivocal. It is not an easy matter, even, to decide just what it is he has set out to do, and what he thinks he has accomplished. Nevertheless, the

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chances seem to be that he is a considerably more significant figure than the customary notices would imply, though this significance may need to be looked for in a direction rather different from the one in which it is commonly sought.

The general drift of Mandeville's original thesis is sufficiently suggested in his subtitle, *Private Vices Public Benefits*. The story is that of a flourishing colony of bees who had been infected with the virus of reform, and who, having all become sober, frugal, and honest overnight, found to their dismay that they also had destroyed initiative and prosperity, deprived the needy of employment, and in general reduced the community to a state of virtuous, but stupid and comfortless, poverty. And out of this thesis, primarily an economic one, Mandeville also seems to draw an ethical conclusion as well—that virtue, namely, is a specious product approaching closely to hypocrisy, and that so-called virtuous acts are really due not to reason, or social feeling, or a disinterested sense of duty, but to the hidden working of certain vices, and in particular the vice of pride—in one place he defines the moral virtues as the political offspring which flattery begot upon pride—which keep in check the more unsocial passions by their counterforce. To quote, for example, Mandeville's receipt for that highly prized virtue, martial courage:

> First, take care they are persuaded of the justice of their cause; for no man fights heartily that thinks himself in the wrong; then show them that their altars, their possessions, wives, children, and everything that is near and dear to them is concerned in the present quarrel, or at least may be influenced by it hereafter; then put feathers in their caps, and distinguish them from others, talk of public-spiritedness, the love of their country, facing an enemy with intrepidity, despising death, the bed of honor, and such like high-sounding words, and every proud man will take up arms and fight himself to death before he will turn tail, if it be by daylight.

That a theory such as this can be derived from Mandeville's pages is undoubted. What is not so evident is the real motive back of it. Are we, for example, with most of his con-

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temporaries, to take Mandeville simply as an atheist and voluptuary engaged in encouraging vice and running down everything that is good and lovely? Or is he, possibly, a forerunner of the new industrialism, with ideas about the road to national prosperity and wealth? Is he a sober philosopher, like Hobbes, with a considered psychological theory of conduct which he is desirous of presenting to the learned? Or may it not be that he is a satirist pure and simple, interested just in setting forth a not too-favorable opinion of his fellowmen for the diversion of polite readers? Any of these hypotheses can be defended, and probably there is an element of truth in most of them. Meanwhile, there is still another interpretation not quite identical with any of these. And if this last interpretation is justifiable, it has at least the advantage that it might enable us to assign to Mandeville an ethical significance otherwise a little difficult to maintain.

Mandeville is usually credited, or discredited, with the belief that man is no more than a theater of the passions, and that virtue consists accordingly in actions which, while they simulate a noble disinterestedness, and a zeal for religion and the public service, are in reality only a hidden indulgence of one passion at the expense of another. We are courageous because we get angry and forget our fears, honorable because we do not dare to face public condemnation, industrious from necessity or avarice, public-spirited because it is in this way that our vanity can most easily be fed. But along with these there are other not infrequent utterances of a quite different sort. Strictly, he does not say that the overcoming of one passion by another is all there is to virtue. It is not virtue, but only its counterfeit. And the real virtue which it counterfeits is precisely the conquest of our passions by reason and true religion at the cost of genuine effort and self-denial.

There are two hypotheses on which the apparent discrepancy here might be explained. It is always possible that Mandeville in these latter statements is not honest, but is pretend-

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ing to believe things which he does not actually believe. This seems, however, to be a somewhat gratuitous suspicion. On the whole, there is nothing in the impression of Mandeville's character which his writings give to justify attributing to him a lack of intellectual straightforwardness; and no one with his peculiar record can plausibly be charged with a disposition to trim his words for the sake of escaping public censure. At any rate, there is an alternative explanation. Mandeville may be taken as a moral realist, who is not so much engaged in setting forth a theory of virtue as he is in exposing the pretensions to virtue in the human animal. It is possible, that is, to regard him—and in this way we are probably most likely to be doing justice to his merits—as animated in the first instance, not by a scientific interest, but by an antipathy to that compound of muddle-headedness and hypocrisy which sacrifices honest thinking and speaking to the sanctity of moralistic formulas, and thinks itself righteous when it is only self-righteous and conventional.

Thus the eulogists of morality had credited to it frugality and thrift as the foundation of a sound national life. Mandeville quite properly points out that people seldom put up with plain living apart from need or avarice, or from a natural deficiency of energy and ambition; and the sincerity of those who profess a noble scorn for luxury and display can be sufficiently tested by noticing how many of them persist in their frugal habits when they happen to have come into a fortune. So when we see a man preaching in the pulpit the vanity of all earthly enjoyments, and in practice plainly liking good food and drink, and eagerly accepting any invitation to dine at the tables of the wealthy, is it his acts or his professions that we should believe? Mandeville refuses to be impressed by the assumption that when a man uses a little common sense in appraising human claims to virtue, he is showing himself a cynic and an enemy to morality; and he is constantly engaged in pointing out the absurdity of these claims. The clergyman

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—Mandeville finds a rich source of material in the cloth—tries hard to get a better living, or adds to his present burdens by taking on several livings at once, merely that he may have a larger field for usefulness; the physician aims to increase an already extensive practice solely to relieve human suffering; the only reason why the politician wants high office is to save his country; and, presumably, the poor widow scrimps and saves to apprentice her son to a chimney sweep because she knows how, for want of clean chimneys, the broth has often been spoiled and the house set on fire, and therefore for the good of her generation she is ready to make sacrifices to assist in preventing the mischiefs due to soot. In the choice of the pope, the greatest dependence of the cardinals, and what they principally rely upon, is the influence of the Holy Ghost. And what a beautiful prospect of natural affection to our kind is presented by the shopkeeper, who provides employment for the deserving poor, entertains strangers with studied civility, and waits their leisure all day long in an open shop where he bears the summer's heat and the winter's cold with equal cheerfulness.

For interpreting Mandeville's excursions into ethical philosophy we may, then, with a great deal of plausibility, take as a point of departure the obvious irritation which he feels toward the common habit of giving eulogistic names and explanations to conduct that can evidently be accounted for very much more simply. Certainly, we shall be on the wrong track if we assume that he meant to pose as a systematic thinker; for abstract reasoning he has confessedly little taste, preferring to keep close to facts. But having this fondness for plain fact, and a flair for the absurd in human conduct, it was inevitable that he should find the current ethical theories fair game. Apart from Hobbes, they were all employed in crying up the nobilities of human nature. Whether with Cumberland we emphasize universal benevolence, or with Clarke the eternal relations in the universe, or with Shaftesbury the

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beauty of the moral order and the supremacy of good taste, it is invariably some form of reason that governs the conduct of all worthy and respectable citizens. Now to Mandeville, looking about with an unbiased eye upon his neighbors and the general drift of human affairs, the notion that man is an amiable being governed by reason, and inspired by an ardent affection for his fellow-man, seemed not unnaturally to have its humorous side. A philosopher may very well, however, be impressed by the undesirableness of a habit of attributing to benevolence or a sense of duty actions that plainly have no such origin, without going on to say that the standards of virtue possess no reality at all in so far as they stand opposed to common practice.

And Mandeville not only states plainly that he does not repudiate a higher standard, but, up to a point, such a criterion is implicated alike in his opinions and his method. For the most part, the instincts that underlie his own ethical judgments in particular are sound; it is worth noting in this connection that he is one of the very few ethicists who have ever manifested any interest in the rights and sufferings of the lower animals, for whose treatment at the hands of man he shows a clearly honest aversion. He seldom or never gives the impression, common with those who have really been concerned to establish ethics on a purely naturalistic basis, that he is congratulating himself on freeing mankind from moralistic scruples and superstitions. On the contrary, his satire is continually being trained against the "vices" to which he is sometimes supposed to have reduced all virtue; and it is difficult to see why he should continue to view these with a mixture of obvious amusement and contempt, if his real purpose was to justify them against current and mistaken notions of what virtue is. The example most frequently occurring in Mandeville's pages is that of honor, by which he means, of course, not genuine self-respect, but those artificial rules of good society which easily reveal themselves under scrutiny as

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the offspring of pride, and of a regard for the opinion of the world, and which may bring the man of honor at any moment into sharp conflict with the precepts of religion. And it hardly needs Mandeville's own assertion that his "defense" of dueling in this connection is satirically intended to make plain the conspicuous lack of admiration for such counterfeit or worldly honor which his whole treatment presupposes. What he is really interested in pointing out is, once again, not the illusoriness of true honor and religion, but the absurdity of supposing that a man can pursue one of two contradictory ideals without giving up the other—can combine Christian humility with the education of a gentleman.

Mandeville's "theory," then, can most easily be interpreted as a protest against the habit of transforming acts that in reality grow out of a natural desire to gratify a man's own passions, and that cost him nothing, into meritorious deeds of virtue. It is with this in view, primarily, that he delights in pointing out how motives of self-interest can be found everywhere mixed up with human conduct. And when he talks, accordingly, of the "felicity which the man who is conscious of having performed a noble action enjoys in self-love, whilst he is thinking on the applause he expects of others," such a statement may mean, and indeed appears to mean, not that the pleasure which attends it is the only possible motive of a virtuous deed, but that *in so far as* an act gives pleasure to the agent, it belongs to natural history rather than to morality, and we are not called upon to grow excited over its superlative merit. Mandeville's real opinion comes out with special clearness in connection with his attack upon one current theory in particular. This is the notion fathered by Shaftesbury, that virtue is an easy and natural product, to be attained by giving rein to our more kindly impulses. Against this Mandeville sets the counter-claim that virtue is not natural but acquired, the outcome of a struggle with imperious passions. Shaftesbury's view seems to him to be the fertile

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source of self-deception; its tendency is to lead a man to find specious reasons for following his own bent, just as Shaftesbury himself allowed his natural aversion to mixing in the world's business, and the value he set on tranquillity of mind, to persuade him that he was virtuous when he was only indolent and inoffensive. And if now this antipathy to Shaftesbury is honest—which it clearly is—it follows, also, that Mandeville must be sincere when he calls on us to admire a rational conquest of the passions as the true ideal of virtue.

But it is time to turn back again to Mandeville's original thesis, since this complicates to some extent what has just been said about his ethics. The economic claim that private vices are public benefits is, to be sure, not as paradoxical as it sounds. By vice, as he explains at length, he means to cover everything that men think of as an evil—not moral defects only, but such things as pestilences, the niggardliness of nature, and all the natural drawbacks that render people discontented with their lot and rouse them to exertion. In other words, a considerable part of Mandeville's doctrine comes to this, that it needs the threat of evil to overcome human inertia, and furnish motivation for those achievements that separate civilization from the state of nature. It is not the good and kindly qualities of man that make him beyond other animals a sociable creature, but the requirements of that self-interest which the moralists decry. Society depends on the multiplicity of desires, and on the difficulties of meeting them; and the social virtues, therefore, are not given at the start in the form of a natural love of the species, but are brought about gradually through experience and discipline.

A second qualification is equally harmless when it is put in terms that do not aim to startle the reader. One appreciable part of the claim that civilization rests on vices is at bottom no more than this, that human passions and desires are the stuff out of which conduct is made, so that if we regard the natural impulses as inherently vile, and disinterested rea-

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son as the only worthy trait of human nature—and this is what those whom Mandeville was criticizing were very apt to do—then we shall have to say that vice is the source of prosperity and progress. Such a statement would lose most of its terrors if it were supposed, instead, that the raw material of conduct is neither good nor bad, but neutral, and that it only lends itself to moralistic judgment in terms of its outcome. Thus the "virtues" of parental love or of compassion are really not virtuous as such, since at times they clash with the welfare of the larger whole; while, on the other hand, ambition or the love of gain, commonly frowned on by the moralists, may lead a man to do things by which everybody benefits. On this showing, the defense of vice would be a defense of the natural impulses, or springs of action, against the human self-esteem which endeavors to forget that man is also an animal, and that the loftiest feelings have their source in his physical constitution.

And both of these considerations, it will be noticed, go back in the end to the same philosophic root. On the side of historical genesis, in which he everywhere shows a lively interest, Mandeville is quite definitely an evolutionist, with a good grasp of the rough-and-ready methods of naturalistic development. His merits here will be apparent if we compare his treatment either with the idyllic conceptions of primitive man which the more orthodox thinkers held, or with the Hobbian doctrine of a hard-and-fast contrast between human passions as the source of evil, and reason as the sole cause of social good. Mandeville's speculations on the cultural history of society and man are, on the whole, much superior to anything current in his day in England, and indeed in some respects come as close to the probabilities as anyone is likely to get who has only a shrewd knowledge of human nature to go upon, without an actual acquaintance with the facts of primitive life.

In so far, the connection with a theory of ethics is not of

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necessity a very close one. A genetic account of manners and institutions does not have to commit itself at all to judgments about their value; while it furnishes material for these, it moves, as science, in a different field. But this separation of problems becomes a little difficult to keep up consistently when we turn to a further aspect of Mandeville's thesis, which is, on the whole, its most distinctive one. For among the points he relies upon to prove his case, and prominent among them, are also to be found qualities such as everyone would agree are really vices—just the traits, indeed, against which he himself is constantly employing the weapons of his satire. It is highly probable that his economic theory here is twisted, and that some of the evils to which he points are a natural by-product of civilized society rather than among its necessary sources. Certainly he goes to no trouble to inquire whether they might not conceivably be eliminated to a large extent without altering the social structure fundamentally; the judgment that the commercial prosperity of London is inseparable from its dirty streets is typical of his attitude everywhere. But it does not make much difference for the present purpose whether his economic doctrine is true, so long as he himself believes it; if he believes it to be true, the fact that the prosperity of society depends for him on the presence of such morally unpleasant qualities cannot but constitute a problem.

His own answer to the criticisms urged against him here is in a general way in line with what has previously been said. He does not, so he tells us, mean that vices are necessary to society. They are only necessary to the sort of society with which his readers are familiar, and which aims at wealth and power and expansion; and this implies no approval or justification of such aims. So that it might be just possible to hold that in his economic speculations, also, he is speaking simply as a satirist, concerned not to defend his paradox in earnest, but to ridicule, in the interest of a severer type of goodness, the logical and moral inconsistency of the man who

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tries to combine a pretense to such genuine virtue with the aims and customs that inevitably lead away from it, and who thinks he can be a true Christian without giving up the world.

But such an interpretation would be too forced to carry conviction. Without much doubt, Mandeville takes his economics seriously. Perhaps what he has to say about charity schools offers as good an illustration as any of his double interest. On the one hand, this entertaining and not uninstructive little essay is an excellent specimen of his satirical gifts, brought to bear on the psychology of popular charity. We are shown how the project gets its start with ambitious young tradesmen as a bid for greater social prominence; how they set out to found a society, and to cajole more influential persons into becoming its patrons; how the scheme is welcomed enthusiastically by those who have a gift for oratory or for meddling in their neighbors' business, by contractors with an axe to grind, and by such other members of the community as will not be expected to contribute; how it is financed by drives upon unwilling pocket-books; how its popularity is sustained by the political interest taken in the election of directors, by the welcome addition to the fund of gossip, by the naturally pleasing spectacle of regimented youth, and by the universal human fondness for having someone at hand over whom to domineer. "There is a pleasure," says Mandeville, "in ruling over anything, and it is this chiefly that supports human nature in the tedious slavery of schoolmasters; but if there be the least satisfaction in governing the children, it must be ravishing to govern the schoolmaster himself."

Nevertheless it is not here that the main interest lies which Mandeville has in writing; the primary ground for his dislike of "this enthusiastic passion for Charity Schools under which the nation has labored" is, again, the economic one. He does not believe in educating the poor, because it is simply giving them a smattering of knowledge which raises them above their proper station without really benefiting them,

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and at the expense of their superiors, or, as Mandeville would put it, of society. For, he argues, there is a large amount of disagreeable work having to be done which no one would do voluntarily; and therefore the existence of the poor, spurred to toil by their daily needs, and really better off for having no different standards with which to compare their lot, is a social necessity. To educate them, or indeed to ameliorate their condition in any way much above the standard of subsistence, is to make them poorer workers, and no better or happier men. There seems no occasion to suspect that Mandeville in this is not expressing a perfectly sincere opinion; one cannot read, for example, his account of the way in which servants have been spoiled in his own day, how they are demanding privileges and wages out of all reason, and have even had the insolence to form a union to enforce their interests against those of their employers, without the conviction that he is genuinely voicing the righteous indignation of the honest householder. And the consequence of all this is a certain apparent inconsistency in his attitude. At times we find him giving expression to a satirical dislike for the qualities most in evidence in the polite world, and for the social system that needs them for its basis. And then again he seems to take civilized society for granted, and man's deficiencies as excused, if not justified, by the part they play in making society possible.

No explanation of this inconsistency will get very far which does not recognize the genuine problem that underlies it. Exactly the same conflict confronts the present-day thinker. The essential modernity of Mandeville lies in the fact that he sets out to treat man in a naturalistic and genetic way; and for anyone who adopts this standpoint, it is inevitable that he should find himself justifying—in a historical sense—many things which the natural moral judgment does not look upon with favor. As he surveys the course of history, he everywhere is met by unlovely traits of human nature

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which yet seem to have played a necessary part in placing man where he stands today, and which even now continue—in business, for example, or in international relations—glossed over or defended on the plea of their necessity. And if Mandeville fails to hit upon an entirely satisfying reconciliation of the difficulty, the same thing is true of most other people also.

Now and then, to be sure, a scientist follows the lead of his logic, and really proposes to justify private vices; secure in the confidence that the business of science is merely to accept whatever it may find, he takes Nature's ways as sufficiently vindicated by the fact of their existence, and refuses to condemn where Nature seems to tolerate. But comparatively few thinkers have the strength of mind for such a stand; most of them, and Mandeville is of the number, reserve the right, where human living is concerned, to approve or disapprove of Nature's methods according to standards of their own. A more common attitude is one which seeks to outflank the problem by the use of pious but evasive formulas. It is of some interest to note the way in which this lessens the gap between Mandeville and his opponents. As a matter of fact, the thing for which Mandeville was execrated is much the same thing in essence that many of his critics had themselves more or less unctuously been preaching. When the philosopher and the theologian claim that everything is for the best in the best of possible worlds, and that apparent evils really are not evil, since in the end they work for good, they mean practically what they were blaming Mandeville for saying; the chief difference is that Mandeville calls a spade a spade, whereas the theologians cover up the implications of their doctrine by fixing attention solely on the justifying end, and utilize the language of religion to keep themselves respectable.

Meanwhile the great majority of people adopt neither of these courses, but are content to hold both opinions together,

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forgetting one conveniently when occupied with the other. As spectators they look with equanimity upon many things which they would not think of approving for themselves or of recommending to their neighbors. In dealing with the past, and especially with the remoter past, this seems a perfectly natural and easy thing to do; it is not quite so simple in the case of judgments on contemporary conduct. And therefore an ardent soul will occasionally be found trying to square social practice with moral insight by repudiating the standards of existing civilization, and setting up a new ideal of society in its place. But mostly we accept the world as we find it, and while regarding with a tepid approval visions of a better social order, we postpone their realization indefinitely to some period when possibly human nature shall have altered.

As a consequence, however, we are left with two standards which seldom harmonize completely; we approve, honestly enough, the rarer virtue of a kindly, unselfish, and self-respecting goodness, and use it as our ideal criterion of the good man, while at the same time in our practical judgments, on ourselves as well as on others, we are inclined to be more realistic, and not to ask too much of human nature. War, doubtless, is an evil; but so long as war is with us we hesitate to speak too harshly of the passion for military glory or the susceptibility to mob hysteria, however absurd and paltry they may seem to the eye of reason. Or we find excuses for the selfish greed and the capacity for driving a hard bargain which lead to success in competitive business, though we are perfectly aware that these qualities are in themselves neither attractive nor inspiring. To make entirely harmonious the two standpoints is, as has just been said, difficult if not impossible. But ordinarily we do not feel the discrepancy very acutely; there seems to us no special reason why we should not look with a tolerant eye on everyday conduct as about as good as we have any right to expect, while freely admitting that it is not the best.

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And Mandeville we may most plausibly suppose is only following here the usual path. He professes a personal liking for the virtues of a simple and uncomplicated existence. But he obviously never thinks of this as a real possibility; and there is no force of reforming zeal within his breast to lead him to fight for a lost cause. He admires the moral strength of the man who can give up wealth and ease voluntarily because he feels their inferiority to virtue. But he has no expectation of finding such characters abundant; and if pride and fear are able to bring about some of the consequences of virtue useful to society, he is prepared to accept them without a very violent protest. It will do us no harm, at least, if we recognize that true virtue consists in subduing the passions by reason rather than in following the path of least resistance, and if we hold this before us, not too vocally, as a standard. But there also is no point in refusing to recognize that at best human powers of resistance are weak, the progress we can hope reasonably to make in real virtue correspondingly small, and the task of breaking with the world and all one's pleasant habits too difficult for any but the most heroic natures, among whom Mandeville is free to confess that he does not himself belong.

But it is unfair to leave him here without returning once more to our starting-point. Mandeville cannot with the best of will be turned into a reformer; he is too easy going and too coolly disinterested to think seriously of trying to change the world, which is, after all, not a bad world for a gentleman of independent means, an active mind, and a gift for enjoying the foibles of his neighbors. But if he is not called upon to make the world better, at least he insists on not being fooled by sham virtues. He proposes to see things as they are, and to call them by their right names; however bad the human situation, there is no need to add the vice of hypocrisy and the folly of self-delusion. If he has any really ethical purpose in writing, it rather clearly lies here. "What hurt do I do a

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man," he asks, "if I make him more known to himself than he was before?" At least this will render him a little more tolerant in his judgments on his neighbors; and it is only when he realizes his weaknesses that he is likely to set about improvement.

Even this may, of course, be made a subject of debate. Mandeville's critics—and they have a wide following—blame him for taking a "low" view of human nature. It is much better, they hold, to idealize things a little, since otherwise you will discourage men's better impulses, and make them satisfied with an unworthy plane of conduct. We should, as Mandeville remarks, put the best construction on all that others do or say that things are capable of. If a man builds a fine house, though he has not one symptom of humility, furnishes it richly, and lays out a good estate in plate and pictures, we should not think that he does it out of vanity, but to encourage artists, employ hands, and set the poor to work for the good of his country; and if a man sleeps at church, so he does not snore, we should think he shuts his eyes to increase his attention. That there is a great deal to be said for Mandeville's own procedure is, however, rather obvious. It is an open question whether, even for philosophy, the too-exclusive preoccupation with ideals has not been one reason for the relative sterility of ethical speculation; and most certainly in practice it has encouraged men to take formulas for authoritative facts, and conventions for desirable ideals, in a way that has discouraged the self-knowledge that alone supplies a sound basis for conduct.

It perhaps will be useful to gather up the threads of this discussion. The difficulty of getting Mandeville's point is chiefly due to the fact that he has two relatively separate interests—the interest of moral satire and that of genetic explanation—which he insists on intertwining. Having committed himself in his original skit to a paradox which in its very statement had implied a moral valuation, he consistently

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refused to alter it. As a matter of fact, he had himself, as a social historian, no real objection to man as a natural being; and he might have carried through his genetic speculations, as indeed he does in places, strictly on their own merits. But here he found himself continually at odds with his contemporaries, whose philosophy did involve a condemnation of the natural, and, in consequence, a vicious idealization of man's whole moral life. And in his zeal to combat this, Mandeville was carried farther into the ethical problem than he had at first intended, and never quite succeeded in disentangling the genuine form of the problem from the complications he had let himself in for by his desire to shock the public. Very probably if he had avoided this confusion he would not have made the enormous hit he did; but he would have saved much trouble for his commentators.

NEW HAVEN

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EVILS AND EVIL

LOUIS ARNAUD REID

The first thing to do in discussing evil is to admit its existence. Whatever our conclusions there remains a fact, the fact that experience is clouded by evils of various sorts. It is a fact which no amount of cheerful optimism, backed by theory or otherwise, can abolish. There it is and there it remains, not in the sphere of human life only, but in "nature, red in tooth and claw."

The second thing to do in considering the problem is to ask whether the usual conclusion from the fact, i.e., that evils mean *evil,* that evil is an ultimate flaw in the face of things, is justified. Is this "best of all possible worlds" less good than it might have been had all evils never been? Has the finite creature, beset by evils, just cause for a grievance against a Maker who set out to fashion more than he could cope with, and who seems to sacrifice the individual in the course of his futile cosmic experimentations? If, for example, cosmic nature is, as Huxley said,[1] "no school of virtue, but the headquarters of the enemy of ethical nature," may it not be man's function to set himself against cosmic nature and to fight it? Or, on the other hand, is it possible to contend that the facts of suffering and evil do not in themselves give us any sufficient reason for believing there to be some irradicable mistake, or contradiction, or irrational incoherence in the plan of reality? Evils may be real; it may be impossible for us under any conditions of which we can conceive at present to rid ourselves of them in practice. Yet they may form no absolute bar to a harmonious account of existence. At least this is possible.

Before discussing the problems of evil and suffering in their broader aspects, it is worth considering for a moment or

[1] *Evolution and Ethics* (Macmillan, 1898), p. 75.

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two certain different assumptions as to what constitutes evil, or as to what is its source. The first point of view is that which identifies the problem of suffering with the problem of evil, and assumes that suffering is the evil par excellence which man has to combat. This is a view naturally adopted by those (e.g., doctors) whose daily life brings them into contact with suffering. Another point of view, represented perhaps best by those of theological or of social interests, is that which tends to identify evil with sin or vice. The third point of view, which might be described as that of the man of scientific tendency, is that in which it is held that the source of evil lies in ignorance. There is a fourth point of view, adopted sometimes by those of metaphysical interests, who, faced with the facts of suffering and evil in all their aspects, are completely baffled by the problem, and put evil down, on the one hand, to the presence of some positive malignant force combating good (the dualistic position), or assume it, on the other hand, to be due in some way to the incompetence or inability, or even the indifference or callousness, of God. I have called this attitude that of the metaphysician, because the metaphysician is puzzled by the problem in its most universal aspects. The metaphysician is hard put to it to account for the existence of evil in a harmonious world.

The foregoing classification is not exclusive or complete. It is only intended as a rough demarcation of the various attitudes which may be taken. The latter three of them will be dealt with by implication. Let us now turn to the first.

It is the assumption that the problem of evil is identical with the problem of pain or suffering.[2] This assumption is often unconscious rather than otherwise, and no doubt those who make it would quite willingly admit, if challenged, that there are other evils than pain. But as pain and suffering are most formidable objects in practical life, it is not unnatural that this somewhat unthinking assumption should be made.

[2] The terms, which may mean slightly different things, are here taken as having identical reference.

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In discussing the question of the relation of pain (or suffering) to evil, it is important to be clear on the question which has already been raised by implication, i.e., as to whether we mean by evil something which is evil or bad for human beings at certain stages of their existence, and which they have to face and overcome if possible, or an ultimate flaw in the structure of things. It is only if pain is regarded in the latter way that it forms the subject of a profound metaphysical problem. If we adopt the former usage, the problem of pain becomes a practical one, though of course it has metaphysical implications. (For if man, who is an important part of reality, is maimed or destroyed by evil, this might mean the existence of a flaw in the structure of reality. But the broad distinction is clear.) It is through the confusion of the practical with the metaphysical and theoretic issues, i.e., the supposition that because pain is bad for me, it is universally bad, that the mistake of the first attitude mentioned (i.e., the identification of pain with evil) arises. To identify pain with evil, and to speak of evil in this sense as a kind of insoluble problem of the universe, is to adopt a narrow view, and to suppose falsely that because man has practical difficulties which he cannot always overcome, these practical difficulties form real flaws on the face of existence. On the other hand, as we said, if and in so far as the fact of suffering should make it in any way truly impossible for man to realize his highest destiny, then the existence of pain would form a metaphysical puzzle which is unsolved, at least for us.

With one provision: that is, so far as this pain is caused by factors utterly and in every way beyond the control of man. For pain may be caused either (*a*) by the ignorance or the weakness or the immorality of human agents, or (*b*) by agencies over which human agents have no control whatsoever. Or at least so it seems. In the former case (*a*) we are faced with the metaphysical and theological, as well as the

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ethical, implications of the fact of human freedom. Pain, regarded as caused by human agency, is a peripheral problem leading to the central problem of good and bad, right and wrong. In the latter case (*b*) we are concerned with factors which it is not always easy to exemplify. It is hard to say, in many cases where suffering seems unavoidable, whether it is really so. Even being "carried away by a whirlwind"[8] *might* be avoidable with greater knowledge. Much of the suffering which comes in the ordinary course of "nature" is avoidable.

It is trite to remark that, generally speaking, this "natural" pain is, biologically, not evil, but good, in its effects. It warns the individual of greater dangers to come, and it rids the race of its less biologically worthy members. To know this is of course no great comfort to the human being who has to bear pain, but it at least indicates that there is no inherent contradiction in the existence of pain. If we keep the practical and theoretical aspects distinct, we realize that though in practice we do and must shrink from pain, and though pain is in this sense an evil, the existence of this type of pain as such constitutes no insuperable difficulty, either for science or for metaphysics.

If pain in itself were an ultimate moral evil inherent in reality, it would inevitably, where present, make morality itself impossible. But although in fact too great suffering and hardship does in certain cases deteriorate moral fiber, it does not do so necessarily and inevitably, and it is a familiar fact of history and biography that even out of pain and suffering men have laid the foundation of their souls. To say this does not mean that pain is in itself a good; but it may be a means to good. Pain is truly in its nature (although we shrink from it and therefore name it evil) non-moral; yet out of his experience of it man may fashion that character which, said Heracleitus, is his fate. As against those who believe that suffer-

[8] Aristotle *Nich. Ethics* iii. 1.

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ing is a wholly insuperable barrier to goodness, it is needful to get some such words as those of Maeterlinck:[4]

> Let us always remember that nothing befalls us that is not of the nature of ourselves. There comes no adventure but wears to our soul the shape of our every day thoughts. . . . . Real fatality exists only in certain external disasters—as disease, accident, the sudden death of those we love; but inner fatality there is none.

Yet there is a kind of suffering which throws on human life a darker shadow, perhaps, even than physical pain. It is the mental suffering and darkness which may come with age and disease. If there is inner fatality anywhere it is here. Disease and age may so affect mental and moral powers as apparently to undermine character and even lead to complete moral degeneration. To say that here responsibility ceases and the man becomes subhuman is scarcely quite satisfactory, though it may be true in some cases. Perhaps the saddest cases of all are those who suffer from the darkness and loneliness of age or sickness, and who yet have not the compensation of forgetfulness nor sufficient physical or mental energy to be courageous. It is in this sphere of suffering, if in any, that there seems to be an unaccountable residuum of evil. Yet even in these cases it is sometimes difficult to demonstrate that moral stamina is really defeated by the powers of darkness, or if it is so, whether the conditions which produce such sufferings are wholly unavoidable. We shall return to a discussion of the latter point below. Let us turn for the moment to a consideration of certain other aspects of the problem of evil. For there are difficulties other than that of the fact of pain produced by physical causes.

Two things among others the existence of evil is supposed to deny. One is the satisfaction of the reasonable desire for happiness in this life, both in itself and as the reward of virtue. The other is the satisfaction of the reasonable desire

[4] *Wisdom and Destiny* (Sutro's translation), pp. 37–38.

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to continue in a future life the work of discovery (with its accompanying happiness) which is only begun in this life.

Let us take the latter point first. It is sometimes argued that unless we believe in immortality we must think of one generation as a mere means to the next, of the individual as a mere means to racial purposes. But although it is true that the discovery and experience of a single life is always an unfinished one, and that future generations reap the benefit of what earlier generations have done, this does not imply that the life of one generation is simply a means. It may be means, but it is not merely so: it has instrumental value, but it also has intrinsic worth of its own. In regarding one generation as a mere means to the next we are ignoring the value and joy which is experienced in the life of discovery itself, the moral fiber which is created, the triumph of achievement which is worth while in itself, which would make life, so far, good, even if nothing else were to follow. That the value of life in its various activities may not be enjoyed forever does not detract from the enjoyment of value so far as it exists, except in so far as the idea that joy will have an end is allowed to affect present experience. In all vigorous-minded persons who have been infused with the joys of life it is true that the idea of its incompleteness must sometimes appear as a dark cloud upon the horizon of the mind. But though these thoughts will arise sometimes, they do not, except in the morbid and overspeculative, detract from the vigor and determination and grit with which the tasks of life are pursued.

To admit all this is not, of course, to touch upon the theoretic problem. It remains a fact that one of the strongest arguments that immortality should be (I do not say, necessarily, *is*) is that it appears a wastage that life should be cut off just at the time when a man is beginning to learn his lesson and reap the benefit of experience. That for too many men age means an undue crystallization, lack of progressiveness, and so deterioration of usefulness in a changing world, is no

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final argument that death should end all things for all men. The best men we know are those to whom life and living become sweeter and richer and mellower even as the years go by. The argument again would have no bearing on the mystery of those cut off in youth or in the prime of life. On the other hand, when all is said and done, we have no sufficient evidence for concluding with certainty that life does end with the grave.

As regards the other question, that of distribution of happiness in this life, and particularly the apparent independence of virtue and happiness, vice and misery, it would again seem as if there were no sufficient grounds for ultimate pessimism. In fact, the very way of stating the problem and speaking of the distribution of happiness as if it were a kind of thing apart from goodness is highly artificial. It is perfectly true that virtue, in this world, is not always followed by reward, that the just man is troubled, and so forth and so on. But speaking broadly, happiness is a sign of perfection of functioning, and unhappiness a sign of imperfection. Where there is pain or misery or unhappiness it is found, in cases where we have knowledge of the circumstances, that there is maladjustment of some sort. This maladjustment is not necessarily the fault of the individual who suffers, and if it be an ultimate evil or flaw in things (which is doubtful) that the innocent should suffer for the guilty, then evil exists. It is the business of mankind, community and individual, to adapt itself to natural and moral laws, and if one individual suffers misery on account of the maladaptation of his parents or of the wider society in which he lives, then it is his parents or society which is to blame, and not the designer of the universe. It is petulant and childish to blame the Deity for all the troubles that man is heir to on account of his own inability to adapt himself to his environment. (God in the end may be responsible for the measure of freedom in the creature, but that opens a wider question. It is undisputed that the creature can and does

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learn when it really wants to.) It is not as though life were something given ready-made to man by God, containing two values, virtue and happiness, both of which were necessary for full satisfaction, and that God in some cases, deliberately and out of his own free will, withheld happiness. This is an artificial, anthropomorphic, and pagan way of regarding the nature of the relation of virtue and happiness. The relation of successful functioning to happiness, in morals as in every other sphere, is organic, and it is mankind's task to discover, through hard experience, that if humanity fails to fit itself in with the purposes of God (whose purposes include the processes of nature), humanity, individual, and community, must suffer until it learns better. All this does not conflict with recognition that the suffering of the individual is a real suffering, and it is perhaps harder to understand in the case of the virtuous man than in the case of the vicious one. It seems just that the vicious man should experience sorrow and misery. As the world is, the reverse is often the case. The supreme Man of Christendom was the Man of Sorrows. On the other hand, as Jesus said, "I have meat to eat that ye know not of," and it is a mistaken view to regard the unhappiness of the virtuous man altogether in an external way. He himself may have rather a different story to tell. His conflict with the world brings pain, but he has an inner joy which it is impossible to describe, "a peace which passeth all understanding." The evil which exists alongside of it does not negate the existence of this value.

The general view on behalf of which I am arguing is that there is no evidence for assuming that evil (whatever form it is supposed to take) is an absolute principle of existence, as positive value is, or that God is the direct cause of finite evils, and wills them, although God may be said knowingly to have "taken his chances" that finite evils should exist, and in that sense to be ultimately responsible. In arguing this I am not putting forward a facile optimism. I am not ignoring the con-

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flict between the order of nature and the order of value, the existence not only of pain and deformity and disease of body, but of pain, deformity, disease, darkness, desolation of mind. All these are facts, as I began by urging, and at least half the business of life is to combat them. They are facts which humanity has to try to understand so as to gain mastery over them, and, when it cannot understand them, to suffer as best it may. But the existence of evils of these and the ten thousand other sorts which might be mentioned is no evidence that there is a principle of evil in the world; positive, like the principle of good. Evil appears to be, not a positive force, but something which arises in the conflict of finite beings with the world. Evil arises through the antithesis of matter and mind, of inertia and force, and out of the failure of life to adapt itself to environment. (Where there is simply difficulty, and not final defeat or failure, we should scarcely apply the term "evil." Thus in heaven or in a utopia it is conceivable that there might be real conflict without evil, though on the other hand it is hard to conceive of real conflict without the possibility of real defeat.) Finite evil arises, not out of any principle of its own, so to speak, but in the working out of the purpose of the world, which seems to be that creatures should perfect themselves through conflict, trial, and error. So far as we can judge it seems to be a good purpose. It is true that nature sometimes appears to be on the side against the realization of values—although at other times she seems on the side of value, e.g., the joy of young life in springtime. But nature is not the whole of reality; she is only one of the manifestations of it, and if nature seems sometimes to thwart human values just as they seem to be perfecting themselves, it does not follow that reality, with its wider purposes, has not in view a higher realization of value. On the contrary, it would seem that the purpose, as far as we can see it, which dominates universal life seems to be on the side of good. Taking it all in all, struggle does not eliminate the fit, but the unfit.

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Mistakes do not, on the whole, lead to worse mistakes, but to the correction of them. Failure ends usually, not in failure, but in new beginnings. The facts of pain or of natural disaster stir the human mind to fierce activity, which culminates in time in a mastery over natural events which is for the ultimate raising of the level of humanity and the fuller realization of the values which life has to offer. If in a sense God is the cause of all things, in that sense he is the cause of the evil, as well as the good, and it is his will that all creation should learn to perfect itself and to master its environment through action and knowledge by the way of battle and pain. But the will of God is not (at least the experience of people seems to show) finally for these things in themselves, but for the betterment of the quality, the character, the fiber, that is developed in the struggle and which it is inconceivable could be developed otherwise.

This latter point is frequently ignored; it is assumed that the world would have been better without evil, that the existence of evil is a sign of the inefficiency of God. But is it so? Can we conceive of the history of a world in which moral quality should have been developed, and which at the same time should contain nothing of what we call evil? Surely to try to conceive of a world in the development of which there should be no defeat, hardship, difficulty, pain, destruction, is to think one's self out of reality altogether, and in the process to find one's self dreaming a bad dream. A world which had always been perfect in every part would be, if it truly were conceivable at all, horrible to conceive; certainly far more horrible than the world as it is. In a word, it may be said to those who grumble that the Maker of things has failed in his handiwork: "Show us a better thing." As far as finite minds can judge, this world is certainly the best conceivable, in the plain sense that it is impossible for any finite mind to conceive a better, on the whole. Proposals of improvement on the

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scheme of things would certainly turn out to be immeasurably worse than the original.

The foregoing arguments do not, of course, imply that the world is not capable of improvement in detail. It is obvious that the world would be in actuality better if many of the particular evils we know were removed; that it is the task of mankind to remove them as far as possible.

The argument then is not that the world is wholly and absolutely perfect in every part; not that evil, as a feature of things, does not exist as an experienced fact; but that evil, though necessary in the process of world-making and development, is not the final purpose or end of things. The final purpose or end of things is good, or has positive value. Good or positive value is on the side of effort toward development. The contention is, not that evil is unreal, nor that all evils, coming together, cancel out in the Absolute. It is not that evil is in the end the good, but the very different one: that evil is necessary for good in the end. To put it theologically, the will of God may be held to be perfect, but it does not follow from this that every part of reality is perfect, even in the light of the whole, nor does it follow that if a perfect will wills something which is imperfect, i.e., that if a good God countenances evil, the perfect will is imperfect. To put the matter in a more orthodox form (for there are no original arguments on these matters), the limitation of God's will by the evil which is the corollary of finite development is his self-limitation, willed by a perfect will which sees that the best of all possible worlds is not a ready-made perfect world, but a perfecting world, where creatures with freedom pursue their chief end, which is the progressive glorification and enjoyment of God. That the God, whose will is still perfect, nevertheless shares the imperfection of his creatures, seems to me a matter for little doubt.

I cited four types of mind representative of four different ways of viewing the problem of evil: (1) The practical man inclines to regard evil as identical with pain or suffering; (2)

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the scientific man, with ignorance; (3) the theologian or the moralist, with sin or vice, while (4) some minds with metaphysical interests, accepting the fact of evil of various sorts, regard evil as a flaw or contradiction in the nature of ultimate reality. The general explanation of evil which has been adopted here, namely, that evil arises through maladaptation of the individual and the race to its environment, is sufficiently broad to include and account for all these views except the last, for which it is a substitute. (1) The evil of physical pain and of the mental pain resulting from physical causes is due to the maladaptation of the physical organism to physical conditions. In the animal world adaptation is learned by the elimination of the unfit and by the development of instinct and intelligence. At the human level the same factors play their part, only that intelligence is very highly developed and tends to supplement, and even to stand as substitute for, the other two, so much so that it may be said that human sufferings are more due to avoidable (2) ignorance than to any other cause. The scientist is right in his claim for knowledge. Science has sufficiently developed to indicate the enormous differences which knowledge may make in the solution of medical, surgical, social, and other problems. So rapid has been the progress recently that there is almost nothing of which it can be confidently said, "no amount of human knowledge could ever prevent this disaster to human life." This applies not only to physical and mental diseases, not only to accidents such as those at birth which may cause deformity or imbecility, but even to those great external disasters such as flood, earthquake, and fire, still referred to in insurance policies as being caused "by the act of God." Ignorance is maladaptation; knowledge is power over evil. So again (3) is sin and vice maladaptation, not merely to natural laws, but to the deeper demands and purposes of our nature called moral laws. Here again, if man sins he will suffer, and not he only, but his children and his children's children. In these ways, then—not

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exclusive, but supplementing one another—does man fail to adapt himself as a physical animal, as an intelligent being, and as knowing good and evil. These in themselves are sufficient to account for a very large part of the evils of life, without having any recourse to theories of dualism, of divine incompetence, and so on. The rest lie in spheres of which we have as yet no adequate knowledge. But ignorance is never ground for a positive thesis.

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CO-OPERATION AS AN EQUALITARIAN SANCTION

T. V. SMITH

In previous studies in this *Journal*[1] the validity of the American doctrine of equality has been resolved into the question as to the social desirability of giving men equality of treatment. What kind of world do we want, anyhow? The sincere democrat wants a world in which men can live together, in work and in play. The chief values that he may urge as justifying equality of treatment among men are fairly comprehended under the simple term "co-operation." It will hardly be thought to demand argument that men work together better when they regard themselves as substantially equal. Indeed, in so far as inequality is confessed and paraded, co-operative practice is certainly inhibited. Activity may go on; but neither true co-operation nor maximum efficiency nor real contentment prevails.[2] The advantages, therefore, of co-operation constitute, so far forth, justification for the philosophy which holds that men ought to be treated equally. Let us, then, evaluate co-operation in our quest for light upon equality.

I

To live and then to live well; first to guarantee life and then to promote the good life—these have ever been the tasks of man, and this their order. Neither task has been possible

[1] *International Journal of Ethics*, XXXV, 164–88; 377–403.

[2] Mr. Arthur Moore ("Bolshevism from an Eastern Angle," *Atlantic Monthly*, May, 1923, pp. 690 ff.), sets out this deep desire for social equality as being the very heart of the unrest in the East following the world-war. The source of the unhappiness of subject races everywhere is, he thinks, "the insults to human dignity that vain pride and social superiority inflict."

M. P. Follet, in her most recent book, drives home this point very effectively in her distinction between "power-with" and "power-over" (*Creative Experience*, esp. chap. x).

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of achievement apart from co-operation. The world was not made for man, but in it he happened and grew. Against this "reluctant cosmos" only man's united efforts have prevailed. "The progress of *man,*" as Bagehot so well puts the whole matter, "requires the co-operation of *men* for its development. . . . . The first principle . . . . is that man can only make progress in 'co-operative groups.'"[3] And even with the utmost of co-operation attained, in the sweat of his brow has man eaten his bread. Malthus thought that man, voyaging forever between the Scylla of a geometrically increasing population and the Charybdis of an arithmetically increasing food production, must forever be broken upon the shallows of misery. The fear of such an irremediable fate, with basis real enough perhaps in Malthus' day, has since his day been gradually lifting, but lifting because of a growing co-operation. For man's learning to apply to the problem of population an intelligent control born of scientific co-operation and to the problem of food supply an ever enlarging industrial co-operation has provided whatever brighter tints the picture has today. "Civilization," as Daniel Webster remarked, "begins and ends with the plow." The great urban centers of the world have only a few weeks' margin between them and starvation, and hardly more than two harvests shield the whole human race from extinction. The increasing production since the Industrial Revolution, thinks Woods,[4] has been more due to an enlarged human association than to the introduction and improvement of machinery. Man's greatest ally against nature has always been other men. But for the priceless boon of an associative heart, furnished in Plato's myth by the pitying gods, man could not now survive, could never have survived. Such a picture of nature as Bertrand Russell has drawn in his *The Free Man's Worship,* whether true or not, is of

[3] *Physics and Politics,* p. 213.

[4] *Studies in Philosophy and Psychology, by Former Students of Charles Edward Garman,* chap. iii.

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abiding influence, on the negative side, in keeping before modern men the oldest and the sternest sanction of a working equality; for, as Blackstone observed, "it is the sense of their weakness and imperfection that keeps mankind together."[5] This, then, constitutes the extrinsic value of co-operation, its efficiency as an instrument for sufficiently exploiting nature as to make human life possible at all.

But to this negative sanction, there is added, as inherent in the social derivation of the self,[6] a positive value, the one most dear to the solicitious gods. The brutes could live. It was reserved for man alone to find and enjoy the good life. But he must build upon the foundation provided: that co-operative spirit that enabled him to live at all would also, if sufficiently extended, beget the good life. Co-operation is intrinsically good. Where two or three are gathered together in harmony, a new value-presence arises: "all," as Emerson remarked, "become wiser than they were." It was the deep-lying recognition of this elemental truth by Whitman that has made him the poetic spokesman abroad for American democracy. With prophetic insight he entitled the poem in which this view becomes most clearly articulate, "The Base of All Metaphysics."

Born into a group, nurtured by it until there arises within him a microcosmic "socius," the express image of the enveloping social macrocosm, man is pre-committed to the co-operative life. To flee from it is not to escape: it is the wings wherewith he flies. Ineradicably social at his worst, man at his best finds in association with his fellows both meat and drink, stimulation to growth and opportunity for relaxation. George Eliot was plumbing this truth when she declared, "We can have the highest happiness—such as goes along with being a great man—only by having wise thoughts and much feeling

[5] *Commentaries*, Introduction, p. 32.

[6] For the bearing of this derivation upon equality, see a former article in *International Journal of Ethics*, XXXV, 377 ff.

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for the rest of the world." "Walk from the people," as the French proverb goes, "and you walk into night." To taste the water from this fountain of meaningful community is but to yearn to drink, and to drink is to find life more abundant.

The utter centrality of this oneness with his group is nowhere more eloquently proclaimed by the average man than in his longing backward glances to his early years. The reason for the constant inclining of the human heart back to childhood is not far to seek. The human individual, created initially by a group act, is dependent upon the group through an ever lengthening infancy for all that he has, is, or is to become. The harsher physical environment that would bring him death in a day is so mediated to him by social influences as to turn what otherwise were an inevitable doom into a heaven of love fairer than the most enchanted phantasy-land of poets. He awakes to consciousness, his human heritage,

> Fretted by sallies of his mother's kisses,
> With light upon him from his father's eyes.

And even the inhumanities that man shows man are themselves left also with the harsher sandals of physical facts at the threshold of the human nursery. As the infant sees no gruff lineament of Nature's face that can possibly be concealed from him, so also he discovers only the smiling, caressing moods of the Janus-faced human world. His food is warmed and sweetened if not predigested for him, his clothing is softened, and his random movements are constituted a repertoire on a royal stage where every gesture is enthusiastically encored. In his world, fire is hot but never burns; winter is cold but never freezes; want is pinching but seldom pinches. His facts are tamed down with fancy, and his beliefs are toned up to story form. In short, as organically related to the group he is bone of its bone and flesh of its flesh, so culturally related to it he is warp of its good fortune and woof of its success. Born thus into a mediating, comforting group and sustained by it through helpless years, man would

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not be the animal he is if, when later confronted by that sterner side of his human world and disillusioned by the gruff demands of his physical environment that his food be paid for with sweat and fatigue and his meager comforts be bought with troublesome foresight, he did not turn back in pained surprise upon his early fairy godmother for confirmation of his rosy expectations. The heaven that lies about us in our infancy is a very great influence throughout human life. Dimly remembered and utterly unrecognized images from this forgotten land we project to form our later social utopias. For its reinstatement we unknowingly strive in our quest for romantic love. And in our religious devotion we flee reality crudely to reconstruct in a timeless, painless, sexless, clime what we realized in all its mystic fulness ere shades of the prison house began to close upon us. For a reinstatement of this satisfying oneness of man with men humanity's seers and mystics have always yearned mightily.

But the Greek poets, Hebrew prophets, and modern dreamers have not been alone in highly evaluating man's life with man. Foreign dangers that kings once created in order to attain unity at home, modern democracies can almost find heart at times to welcome. So intrinsically good is group solidarity that it appears at times to compensate for any price. Dewey says:

> At times catastrophes that affect men in common are welcomed. For the moment they turn science away from its abstract technicalities into a servant of some human aspiration, the hard, chilly calculations of intellect are swept away by floods of sympathy and common loyalties.[7]

Through dominance to competition, through competition to enlarged co-operation, the spirit of man has gradually been pushing its way in all the three greatest human interests—religion, government, industry.[8] In industry the slowest prog-

[7] *Human Nature and Conduct*, p. 258.

[8] The story of this achievement in living is charmingly told in brief compass by James Hayden Tufts in his *Ethics of Co-operation*.

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ress has been made. And yet even there improved forms of association, supplemented by mechanical inventions, have during the last hundred years made possible for even the common laborer in most fields a margin of leisure that only feudal lords once enjoyed, a priceless boon that Aristotle supposed could never be available to more than a small minority and to them only through the serfdom of all the rest.[9] "The profound truth is that the prime source of modern industrial progress is in human association."[10] While much has been gained, more remains to be done. The unmeasured tracts of industry that still are unconquered for the principle of co-operation furnish perhaps the chief, though not the only, contemporary justification for any attempt to find a solid basis for human equality.

II

It seems fairly certain that co-operation has traditionally been more closely related to the claim of equality than we have recognized. In general, it is the conflict-situation out of which the notion of equality most certainly arises. War has proverbially stimulated group-solidarity—groups that did not so react carried with them into oblivion the tale of their disunion. While co-operation implies shared ideas, a common danger from which to flee is more compelling than a common good to be achieved. In the latter, co-operation becomes the price of a good life, in the former, of any life at all. Just as men avail themselves of the fiction of present equality for the sake of the co-operation thus insured, so historically they have claimed actual equality in order to account for co-operation already achieved. Co-operation was the direct answer to certain concrete situations, and was prior; the conception of equality was the explanation, and was subsequent.

[9] Edwin E. Slosson estimates that each of us has in terms of power equivalent "on the average twenty able-bodied slaves waiting on us, day and night" (*World's Work*, XLV [November, 1922], 41.)

[10] Woods, *Studies in Philosophy and Psychology, by Former Students of Charles Edward Garman*, p. 76.

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This correlation of the claim of equality with the benefits of co-operation gratefully remembered from the past, or existing in the present, or foreseen to be desirable, constitutes the real significance of Ritchie's declaration that equality is an "outgrowth of aristocratic and slave-holding communities."[11] Men born into a social order not of their own fixing have found themselves co-operating rather fully with some, fighting with others (which also involves a certain elemental form of co-operation, as is shown by the evolution of *rules* of war), and sometimes scorning others (being too proud to fight marks the climax of the anti-co-operative spirit). For the various degrees of co-operation, there have always tended to arise corresponding gradations in equalitarian claims. Even after all men are granted equal, some are only equal enough to fight together, others to work together in peace time, others to eat together, others to intermarry, and others—though this comes late in human evolution—get equal enough to join the same artistic or philosophic club. Every new claim of equality bespeaks some advance of the co-operative spirit.

Under the stress of a common danger, the Revolutionary fathers were fired to great enthusiasm by the assertion of equality in the Declaration of Independence. The precise meaning they attached to the assertion is relatively unimportant; it was the common tasks of a new world supplemented by a common menace from the old that made potent as dynamite a conception that had lain harmlessly dormant in the minds of Englishmen from the time of Locke. In similar manner, the common hardships and tasks and dangers of frontier life—ideas made common by unrelenting nature—have found expression in equalitarian terms in the successive democratic east-bound waves that have made the West a constantly perturbing factor in American life. It is certain that the belief in equality which, by common consent, has everywhere been strong among American pioneers did not spring

[11] Ritchie, *Natural Rights*, p. 248.

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out of the blue, but out of the innumerable voluntary associations that so impressed De Tocqueville. He was not quite certain that, as he phrased it, there is a "necessary connection between the principle of association and that of equality," but he was greatly impressed, not to say perturbed, by the surprising number of voluntary associations which he observed in the new world.

> Americans of all ages, all conditions, and all dispositions, constantly form associations. The Americans make associations to give entertainments, to found seminaries, to build inns, to construct churches, to diffuse books, to send missionaries to the Antipodes; they found in this manner hospitals, prisons, and schools. The Americans form associations for the smallest undertakings. They seem to regard it as the only means they have of acting.[12]

De Tocqueville's observation in the early nineteenth century is paralleled by Santayana's in the twentieth. He says:

> There is one gift or habit, native to England, that has not only been preserved in America unchanged, but has found there a more favorable atmosphere in which to manifest its true nature—I mean the spirit of free co-operation . . . . this slow co-operation of free men, this liberty in democracy—the only sort that America possesses or believes in. . . . . The omnipresence in America of this spirit of co-operation, responsibility, and growth is very remarkable.

And as Santayana goes on to observe,

> Where individuality is so free, co-operation, when it is justified, can be all the more quick and hearty. Everywhere co-operation is taken for granted, as something that no one would be so mean or short-sighted as to refuse. . . . . The general instinct is to run and help, to assume direction, to pull through somehow by mutual adaptation, and by seizing on the readiest practical measures and working compromises.[13]

The great avalanche of equalitarian sentiment that was thrust against slavery by the abolitionists followed upon such vivid pictures of racial co-operation in the humdrum of daily

[12] *Democracy in America*, II, 129–30. Cf. Turner, *The Frontier in American History*, p. 343.

[13] George Santayana, *Character and Opinion in the United States*, pp. 194 ff.

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duties and domestic life as are set out so ideally in *Uncle Tom's Cabin*. If men, women, and children could work together as in the pictures drawn by Harriet Beecher Stowe, then were they indeed equal in spite of color. Moreover, the moral resultant of this book, and similar propaganda, upon the reader was an irresistible sympathy, which, true to its derivation, is itself a form of co-operation. It is instructive to note that it has always been chiefly in the North that the belief in significant racial equality has flourished. The two races have not yet, as a matter of simple fact, learned in any complete measure how to co-operate. The actual observation of daily non-co-operative relations in everything from the tone of voice used in daily greeting on up to the law court itself makes it difficult for a Southerner to assert equality except in otherworldly terms, because constant contact with concrete inequalities continuously repeated has produced a kind of paralysis of the imagination. But those not instructed by constant clashes find it easier to assert thoroughgoing equality, because they find it easy to *imagine* actual co-operation. To say that the races ought to be equal, in whatsoever way, is but to assert that in that way co-operation is felt to be advantageous.

The history of organized labor in America is also instructive as showing assertions of equality to arise out of co-operative activity. Close association made imperative, willy-nilly, through the factory system, came as a result of the Industrial Revolution with its large-scale machine production. This involuntary association took the voluntary form of labor unions early in the nineteenth century, i.e., as soon as a common enemy emerged in the form of the capitalist or, sometimes more impersonally, "the system." These associations were motivated both by a common danger and a common good. The enforced co-operation of workers among themselves made them equal with each other, and made it easy for them to imagine an extension of the co-operation that would in-

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clude the employer along with them. The claim of equality among themselves has grown increasingly emphatic with increasing pressure; and with external danger sufficiently imminent and serious, equality has been applied to a degree that outsiders sometimes think malicious. The fact that the unions had in their inception to reckon as their enemies not only the employers, but the whole legal and judicial machinery, has helped long after the event to give their solidarity a martial flavor.[14] It is to be noted, however, that their claim of equality does not for the most part outrun their membership, that within the group it tends to rise and wane in keeping with the degree of external danger, and that discipline is very difficult to enforce in peaceful and prosperous times. Equality produced by any such conflict-situation clearly indicates its relation to the enforced co-operation; for as soon as the common danger relaxes, they both tend to pass together.

The most searching test, as Meredith suggests,[15] as to whether groups regard themselves significantly equal is intermarriage. If there is sufficient elemental dumb compatibility so that sex relations do not appear offensive, it indicates that concrete co-operation has progressed far enough to warrant an admission of equality. The further groups are from unrestricted intermarriage, the more likely it is that the assertion of equality, if made at all, functions really as an instrument of exploitation for the more astute, of compensation for the weaker. While this is the significance of marriage as regards co-operation between the groups concerned, it does not necessarily hold between the parties to the marriage. It is significant that equality has not traditionally been asserted as between husband and wife. While before the common law they were one, he was the one: a relation of dominance rather than of any fuller measure of co-operation. The hard and fast differentiation of function, the practically exclusive distribu-

[14] Groat, *Organized Labor in America*, pp. 38 ff.

[15] H. O. Meredith, *International Journal of Ethics*, XV, 33 ff.

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tion of labor, has tended strongly to make real co-operation between the sexes, even in marriage, impossible, because it has inhibited a sharing of ends. Only in regard to the sex life and parental relation did there grow up in the past sufficient co-operation through common purposes to justify the label of equality, and not always there. Of course, on the other hand, a frank male dominance has not been often avowed. The physical and economic inequality of woman took rather the compensatory form of attributing moral superiority to her, and of crowning her too often passive, or even unwilling, sexual acquiescence with the "glory of motherhood." It is only in very recent times, when opportunities have arisen for the sexes to get the *same* training and to do the *same* work, that concrete sharing of purposes, genuine forms of co-operation, have arisen. And, concomitantly, less is heard about either the legal superiority of the husband or the moral superiority of the wife. With the increase in co-operation, there is an increased tendency, as well there may be, to talk in terms of plain equality between them.

III

If, as we have argued, co-operative activity, when actual, has historically categorized itself under the concept equality; and if, as we have further argued, equality, when seen prospectively to be desirable, has justified and does justify itself by the extrinsic and intrinsic values of co-operation—then the validity and the limits of human co-operation mark the values and the boundaries of a philosophy of equality. Sooner or later, then, the democrat must raise the questions, How far is co-operation possible within the human species, and How far is it desirable? Only the dogmatic can answer the first question decisively. But the timid may gather hope from previous advances made by the co-operative impetus. Successive generations have overridden boundaries that preceding generations had deemed to be fixed in the very order

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of nature. Every form of human association has felt the transforming power of this advance—the family, the church, the state; art, science, sport, war. Property barriers, racial barriers, cultural barriers, religious barriers, sex barriers have all before this intrepid advancer here and there, now and then, made themselves thin air into which they vanished. The optimistic will almost certainly see nothing in the history of the race to justify the belief that the end of this process is yet in sight. Moreover, with the passing of notions of fixed selves and fixed species and a fixed order of nature, the belief grows that education has even more transforming power than the most enthusiastic claims of the past have made for it. Not enough of the biologically determined has yet been discovered and vouched for in human nature to daunt the growing faith that institutions may make of plastic organisms almost, if not quite, what they will. And since co-operation for man, the intelligent animal, is primarily a matter of sharing of ends, i.e., a mutual foresight and common acceptance of consequences, there is good scientific reason for believing that the limits of co-operation have not yet been glimpsed. This is a human faith that no disillusion seems able to dim. Schisms in spiritual bodies lead to two churches rather than to none. The road from the divorce court leads by the office where marriage licenses are issued. And out of the débris of a universal holocaust there rises as on the wings of magic morning the dream of a League of Nations that will spell the end of war, even as out of its dead ashes rose the Phoenix to a new life perennially renewed. Out of the defeat of this dream rise disarmament conferences and projected associations of nations which, though they too wither before the bud turns to fruit, are followed by other plans clothed out of the habiliments of human hopes, and they in turn by others—on to the end of the unending process. If man cannot live with other men, he certainly cannot live without them; and the extent

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to which this dilemma of man, the unsocial social animal, can be resolved is as yet not fully disclosed.

But the enormous possibilities of its progressive resolution gives point to our second question, How far is co-operation desirable? In the light of previous discussion, this question becomes, To what extent is it desirable to give men equal opportunities and equal portions of goods? Not even the democrat can answer this question dogmatically. Only the person who knows exactly what sort of society he would prefer and who is wise enough to know what ends will be produced by any given social means can speak with authority here. Wiseacres may rush in where wisdom fears to tread. But certainly most modern students of the social sciences know too much to claim to know that much. The solvent word, if ever to be spoken, must wait upon more knowledge both of desirable social ends and effective social means. And in proportion as we are reluctant or unwilling to resort to judicious social experimentation, to profit by the wisdom that observed trial and error can sometimes give, to that extent we postpone amelioration by perpetuating our ignorance. To refuse to avail one's self of the only means of enlightenment presented is to remain maliciously ignorant. And if a people not only refuse themselves to go into, but also hinder those who are going into, the crucible of social experimentation, then provincial blindness is willing to bring on a universal eclipse.

The first point, therefore, that trepidation may make with regard to the degree of equality that is desirable is that, since no one knows for certain what that degree is and since the only way we have of finding out is by experimentation, judicious experimentation both at home and abroad ought to be encouraged by democrats. Those who do not know, to take a current example, how far industrial equality can with profit be carried, and yet who wish to know, cannot possibly regard with other feeling than regret the unwillingness of at least

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democratic nations to facilitate the experiment that some, if not a majority, of the Russian people have chosen themselves to make. It is of course the same faith that men may find out by experimentation what is unavailable through any other means that has made Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes for a half-century the cynosure of democratic hopes and the judicial philosopher of a new order in America. It is against the traditional view that he has protested, a view well set out by Chief Justice Taft when in *Truax* vs. *Corrigan* the latter declared that "The Constitution was intended, its very purpose was, to prevent experimentation with the fundamental rights of the individual." Justice Holmes' protest has sometimes been pointed and polemic as when in a dissenting opinion on the case just cited, he puts his own faith over against that of his presiding colleague. "There is nothing that I deprecate more than the use of the 14th amendment beyond the absolute compulsion of its words to prevent the making of social experiments that an important part of the community desires." But at other times he clothes his dissent in the more general terms of the philosopher.[16]

But there are two more constructive suggestions that a democratic faith may make without feeling that it is too far outrunning our available knowledge of what is socially desirable and what are effective means to it. The first of these suggestions has to do with a psychological matter that may seem abstruse at first, but which will appear of the most fundamental importance when understood. It has to do with man's so-called conscious life, with the ends for which he works and fights. Without parading again the probable process by which man becomes possessed of a conscious self,[17] it is enough here to emphasize that much of human activity is teleological. Men work and fight and live *for* something. Now the irreducible minimum of equality that a philosophy can demand

[16] See, e.g., *Abrams* vs. *U.S.* 250, U.S. 616, 63 L Ed. 1173.

[17] *International Journal of Ethics*, XXXV, 389 ff.

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and still call itself democratic is the sharing by all men up to the level of their ability of the ends for which they must work and fight. Nor must this ability be considered to be justly represented by what it is at any given time, by the *status quo,* but rather by what it may become under favorable opportunities. That is, as a fundamental prerequisite of justice the chance at growth and development must be passed around. Fairness in passing it around will probably be best guaranteed by demanding that the chance be made the same for all, for the simple reason that any prejudgment that persons cannot profit from the same opportunity too easily becomes sheer prejudice. Nor is this insistence upon sharing ends an abstraction without practical bearing.

IV

A reorganization that might not stop short of the radical would attend the effort sincerely to apply this principle in industry. The ends of organized industry, to the furthering of which the majority of adults must in a capitalistic era devote most of their waking hours, are formed by a few captains of industry, appreciated by a few more people, understood by a few more, but are either unknown or are dimly enough known to be rebelled against by perhaps the majority of the world's workers. This means that the supreme misfortune that can come to a man in his work—the tragedy of being obliged to work at that which is not intrinsically interesting—comes to a majority of industrial workers today; for that cannot be permanently of intrinsic interest which is not seen in relation to the human ends it serves.[18] Many unskilled, and not a few

[18] The degradation involved in spending one's life in work that he does not like accounts for the added emphasis of the English labor movement on something more than wages and decent conditions under which to work. The Lounsbury-*Herald* program in England declares: "Not only must we assure to all workers an income on which a reasonable life can be led; we must also create conditions in which work ceases to be mere drudgery under a ruling class, whether of bureaucrats or of capitalists . . . . the demand of the British democracy is that the mass shall be partners instead of servants, even though as partners their material condition is not better than it would be as servants" (Angell, *The British Revolution,* pp. 128, 138).

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skilled, workers, are hardly more than flexible joints of the machines they tend—employed merely because they are a bit more flexible or less expensive than would be joints made of steel. Seeing not the large social ends that are served, the worker who as a human being is also teleologically minded substitutes for the social function the wage by-product. And then like the daughter of the horseleach that never cries enough, strikes for more and more and more. Employers are of course on the whole correct in their belief that if wages are raised, they must be raised again and again. But this is a judgment upon industry rather than an impeachment of the workers; for how much mere wage will a man take in exchange for his soul and be fully satisfied with the bargain? Men who are interested in the ends intrinsic to the industrial process and who, having competence guaranteed, would pay to work rather than remain idle, find it difficult to understand why many workers continually complain at both their work and their wage. But the complaint is not thereby made unintelligible. Not all work, to be sure, is equally interesting even when the ends and the means are brought together; but no work is wholly drudgery if seen in its social setting.[19] And there is perhaps no work that would not be drudgery if wholly divorced from the social ends it serves. Not even the fine arts could remain fine through such a test. And while the conditions in industry are not hopeless, yet what discerning student

[19] Speaking from practical experience with a modern industrial situation at its worst, in a state prison, Price P. Disque furnishes an illustration of what such equality as is here suggested involves by way of an initial attitude, a disposition to let workers have a share in the ends which they serve. "Men always perform better," says he, "when they understand what is to be done, and how, when, and why. They can act so much more intelligently, and since no manager can foresee all the details, it renders it so simple for the subordinates to use the human intelligence, which most of them possess, when anything slips a cog." Regarding his proposal to the convict-laborers for the installation of such a system as would recognize this simple principle, he continues: "It was an experience of a lifetime to watch the general and gradual change in expression—first confusion, then doubt, then hope, and finally contentment, as far as that expression can be registered upon the faces of convicts" (*Atlantic Monthly*, March, 1922, p. 330.)

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of the social unrest doubts that its source lies just here—work that can never be adequately compensated for by a wage is compensated for in no other way? The age-old tragic dilemma of finding an achieved goal transformed into a kind of doom has been re-enacted in modern industry for all too many human beings: the machinery that was to free man enslaved him. If it gave him leisure, it furnished him in the bargain—thanks to its unrelieved monotony—a machine-made personality that could use leisure only in further abuse of his once potential self. Nothing short of what may fairly be called citizenship in industry can meet the demand that equality mean at least a sharing of the ends of activity.

But the indictment rests not against industry alone. Dogmas in religion took the place of machines in industry; man achieved a certain growth only to find that while some growth was counted to him for righteousness, to outgrow that growth was mortal sin. In no department of human interest have men more consistently been denied a genuine part in the forming and transforming of the ideals by which and for which they live than in the field of religion. And here leaders and led alike have succumbed to the conceptual tyranny. Unlike industry, in which there have always been the few who knew what they wanted and then got it, in the field of religion nobody knowing clearly what was wanted, everybody took what tradition offered and learned how to want what they got rather than to get what was needed. Regarding as sacred what was changeless merely because it had not been changed, men have traditionally corrupted justice on earth because their forbears had enthroned injustice in the heavens. And whatever adaptations were made—and of course no ideals can remain actually unchanging in a world that does certainly change—were ineffectively made, because the most honest of men scrupulously guarded from the mind what the heart was doing. The maxim of equality that demands as a minimum a

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sharing of ends could never pass as a mere platitude in religion; for it demands, on the one side, that the values which men serve shall be the values of a living rather than of a dead generation and, on the other side, that, since these values must be constantly changing to fit them to a changing order, all men shall have a voice in their reconstruction. Vicarious experience should have passed with the passing of the doctrine of vicarious atonement.

Political life has found also its manacling counterparts: freedom of speech too easily becomes in perilous times the exclusive right to keep silent upon the matters thought most worth discussing, and freedom of contract, so toilsomely achieved, labor would oftentimes gladly surrender if it could. Secret diplomacy, made not notably less secret by the war, pre-pledges citizens to ends that they may be called upon to redeem at the cost of their lives, though they had no direct hand in shaping them and oftentimes would have disapproved of them by decisive majorities could they have been known in advance of the challenge to patriotism. To insist, then, that a philosophy of equality connote a share by all men in the ends that their activities serve is to demand more transformation of the several great human interests as they exist today than can be adequately described in advance of the process of seeing such a principle begin to be sincerely applied. It is significant, if for no other reason, because it demands an equalizing of education, a passing around of the opportunity to develop insight, and to attain such imagination as sees the ideal interrelations of our complex civilization.

V

But no honest democrat can be content to stop with the psychological connotation of a philosophy of equality, however far-reaching transformations it may seem to promise. The *sine qua non* of all educational and cultural advantages, such as those emphasized above, is a more equal distribution

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of the material conditions of life than prevails today in any civilized country. Property, and still more, income, is power to attain the decencies of life. These lacking, there is no other dependable guarantee of any of the great historic rights—life, liberty, or the pursuit of happiness. Moreover, the more specific one makes these rights, the more certain are they to be lacking in the absence of wealth or of an adequate income. At the present time the distribution of neither is such as to meet even the minimum demands of any respectable canon of justice.[20] The best available data indicate that in 1910 the richest 2 per cent of Americans owned some 60 per cent of the wealth while the poorest four-fifths owned scarcely 10 per cent,[21] and that the richest 2 per cent of our population received 20 per cent of the total money income, while the poorest 65 per cent received less than 40 per cent.[22] This means that where there was little or no property on which to fall back 39 per cent of American families had incomes as low as $700 per year.[23] For the year 1918, on somewhat fuller and more reliable data, the National Bureau of Economic Research was able to make the following estimates of the distribution of our national income.

The most prosperous one per cent of the income receivers had nearly 14 per cent of the total income, the most prosperous 3 per cent of the income receivers had nearly 26 per cent of the total, the most prosperous 10 per cent of the income receivers had nearly 35 per cent of the total, and the most prosperous 20 per cent of the income receivers had about 47 per cent of the total income.

It should be noted that when we start from the top of the income scale, we must go down to people receiving $8,000 per annum, in order to

[20] Professor Tufts puts it with no more confidence than the situation warrants in declaring that "Few would say, if the total wealth of the country were placed in their hands for distribution: 'We will give the bulk of the whole to a small fraction, we will divide a lesser portion among a great many, and will leave a minute fraction to be distributed among a quarter of the people.'" (*Philosophical Review*, XV, 368.)

[21] King, *Wealth and Income of the People of the United States*, pp. 80 ff.

[22] *Ibid.*, pp. 234 ff. [23] *Ibid.*, pp. 230 n.

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include one per cent of the income receivers. Similarly, to include 5 per cent of the income receivers, we have to descend to incomes of $3,200–$3,300. To include 10 per cent, we must take in part of the $2,400 class; and to include 20 per cent we must include part of the $1,700–$1,800 class.[24]

The poor may barely live, but it is certain that they cannot live the good life without the economic means whereby to live. That the difficulty, however, is not wholly a matter of distribution is indicated by the fact that the total yearly income, had it been distributed equally, would have yielded for the year 1910 only $332 per capita, and for the year 1918 only $372 (allowing for the rise of prices).[25] This means for a family of five an income hardly exceeding $1,500 a year as a maximum.[26] While there is a level at which the foregoing difference would have marked the line between decent living and mere subsistence, still equal distribution would have made no one far above the needs of life, even assuming that an equal distribution of income would not greatly decrease the total amount to be distributed. This indicates that a more fundamental problem than that of distribution is the dilemma either of increasing production or of decreasing population. That the former offers possibilities is indicated by the fact that recent estimates from conservative engineers have put the efficiency of our present productive system in certain basic industries as low as 50 per cent. But amelioration in this direction waits on engineering skill and social psychology, and must necessarily be gradual. That the latter is the easier and more rational would seem to be a truism to any unbiased student. Exclusion of immigration is dabbling at the problem that could be tackled manfully and set on the road to solution in a single generation, if a generation enlightened enough to give a compelling social sanction to voluntary limitation of

[24] *Income in the United States*, p. 147.

[25] *Income in the United States*, p. 144.

[26] King, *Wealth and Income of the People of the United States*, p. 248.

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families among the ignorant and poor could be magically raised up. No road is so short as this to amelioration, except for the fact that this road requires a certain freedom from superstition. Once this exception is stated, however, it is seen that even this road is long, especially in a country where half-living federal statutes still proscribe dissemination of knowledge regarding concrete means of birth control. While along one or both of these roads lies hope, this does not remove the injustice of the present distribution of income and wealth. Indeed, it is quite probable that the first prerequisite toward either greater production by the unskilled or smaller families among the poor is larger incomes on which to base a rising standard of living. It is certain that larger incomes stimulate intelligence by making available the sources of information and that either an increase in education or an improvement in standard of living makes for smaller families. While then it may well be true that increased production through greater efficiency and larger co-operation on the one hand and smaller families on the other are the main means to the end of social justice and happiness, yet these means themselves have as a common necessary prerequisite a more equal distribution of the wealth and income already available. If one is not moved toward this logical conclusion by a desire for a just and happy social order, then he might well be inclined to it by fear. "The road away from revolution," as a former President of the United States has recently phrased it, certainly does not lie along the path of a gradual concentration of the means whereby men live into the hands of the few.[27] The way of happiness to the many is the road to social stability; and the road to happiness does not lie in the direction of a too complete denial to the many of the economic basis of life.

But a philosophy of functional equality need not run it-

[27] Woodrow Wilson put his point affirmatively and religiously, but his suggestion aims at the same end as is here proposed (*Atlantic Monthly*, August, 1923, pp. 145–46).

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self into any strictly socialistic demand for the equal distribution of either wealth or income. It would merely demand such distribution as would contribute most toward the end of a happy and efficient society. This would probably gravitate toward equal shares in proportion as ignorance remained widespread and work continued therefore a drudgery. In proportion, however, as workers could be let in on the creative side of industry and could therefore become interested in their work for its own sake, there would probably be no demand for any near approach to quantitative equality, especially as regards wealth. This implies, however, that income would be so equitably distributed as practically to eliminate poverty. If a living wage could be guaranteed to all workers and work could itself be made increasingly interesting we might, even with gross inequality in distribution of wealth, approach among all classes the same degree of contentment as now prevails in the two great indigent professions of the modern world—preaching and teaching. Professor Tufts[28] has well pointed out that these professions, having relatively very little property and also a comparatively low income, are stabilizing influences in our society, because they find their satisfaction in what Veblen would call the instinct of workmanship: they make not only things, but construct and reconstruct ideals. Participation in the ends for which they work redeems their work from drudgery.

VI

We have for the moment turned aside from our theoretical discussion of the concept of equality to suggest what are its practical bearings. And even in this more concrete attempt we have not been able to dot our *i*'s and cross our *t*'s; for though from the beginning we have asserted equality as one of our national ideals, we are in America little closer to knowing what it may be safely made to mean than when we began

[28] *Philosophical Review*, XV, 376.

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our experiment in democracy. It would not be, therefore, without practical avail if we could call emphatic attention to the method whereby we may find out what equality may safely be made to mean in action. That, then, has been our first proposal. We have attempted, however, to go somewhat beyond a mere suggestion of methodology. On the positive side, we have emphasized that equality must mean as a minimum that in actual practice all men shall understand and even have a hand in the formation of the ends intrinsic to their work, a procedure which alone can give genuine significance to human activity. Chiefly as a means to this, we have insisted that equality must mean a more nearly equal sharing in income, if not in wealth, than is now possible. These, then, are the more specific contents of what we have called in the large co-operation and by the necessity and desirability of which we have sought functionally to justify equality as an ethical principle. These considerations guaranteed, the further details connected with the problem of distribution—which usually monopolize attention—may well be left to future stages of the social process for settlement upon the broad principle of what from time to time is utility. For, if our previous account[29] of the genesis and nature of human individuality be correct, of this one thing we may be assured: man will not rest, indeed he cannot rest, except in an ever enlarging community of sharable goods, in an ever growing co-operation.

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[29] *International Journal of Ethics*, XXXV, 389 ff.

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ECONOMICS AS A SOCIAL PHILOSOPHY

EVERETT W. GOODHUE

Present-day economics is not altogether content to remain a science of "what is." The current emphasis is less didactic, and more social in character. The tendency now is in the direction of re-establishing a philosophy of economics. And by this, I mean a search for the ultimates of human life in so far as these can be discovered within the limits of the economic processes. Many of us are not satisfied with the investigation of our economic order; we desire to go farther and inquire into the effects of economic fact and economic law upon human welfare.

In this paper I wish to attempt an answer to certain questions. (1) What has been the fundamental drive of the various historical schools of economic thought? (2) What may be said in regard to the controversy over economic value? (3) What are the essential economic motives? (4) Is economics anything other than applied ethics?

I. WHAT HAS BEEN THE TREND IN ECONOMIC THINKING?

Thinking about economic topics is, I presume, as old as human history. To go no farther back than the Greek philosophers, we find in them frequent reference to the problem of getting a living. Plato and Aristotle looked upon wealth as a necessary background for philosophic thinking. One must be freed from the cares and worries of how to get enough to keep body and soul together before there could be leisure for contemplation. A sufficiency of material things was necessary, a sort of *sine qua non,* to continuous and efficient mental effort. The approach here was largely ethical in nature. Division of labor, specialization, production of wealth paved the way for the well-being of man. This well-being, the *summum bonum*

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of life, was the power and the leisure to think in terms of ultimates. The greatest good was attained through a philosophy of life, and the philosopher was the most useful citizen. Economics, therefore, was purely incidental, a by-product of the prevailing philosophy.

We may pass over the long period of the Dark Ages without comment. Such statements of economics as we find are considerably mixed up with the prevailing theological doctrine. Luxury and certain kinds of money lending were frowned upon. The problem of wages was largely one of the fairness or justice of wage payments. In fact everything was interpreted in the light of the particular church dogma which chanced to exist.

Meantime the term "economics" was replaced by that of "political economy." As early as 1615, Montchrétien first used the term in his book, *Traicté de l'Economie Politique*. In the main, during the whole of the seventeenth and a considerable part of the eighteenth centuries, economics was closely identified with the state. It was at first little more than a study of public finance; a consideration of government revenues and expenditures. Under the two renowned cardinals, Richelieu and Mazarin, and that great finance minister of Louis XIV, Colbert, attention was given to the successful prosecution of certain foreign and domestic policies which involved the raising of revenue. The important system of Mercantilism, as developed in France and England, and the system of minute regulation of industry and trade known as the National System were a natural product of this period.

From the time of the Greek philosophers to the middle of the eighteenth century economics was an adjunct of ethics or political science. In 1758, Quesnay, physician of the French king, Louis XV, published *Le Tableau Economique*. As a result of this publication a school of economic thinkers was originated which took the name of Physiocrats. Two ideas were developed: (1) a belief in a natural and essential order

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of human societies, (2) the superiority of agriculture over commerce and manufacturing. To this school artificial restraints were anathema. There should be a return to the state of nature. Laissez faire was their outstanding doctrine. Agriculture was truly productive, and alone gave a *produit net*. For upward of a century we see a complete reversal of policy in regard to the control of industry and commerce. Governmental restrictions and regulations were largely eliminated. Students of the problem did not appreciate the fact that often economic restraints are more intolerable than legal restraints, and lead to greater abuses. Thus England had to go through that black period of child and woman slavery in the mills and mines and sweated industries.

In 1776 came the monumental work of Adam Smith, *An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations*. This was a first attempt to formulate in a coherent way a definite doctrine of economics. It is on the whole a remarkable book, and is a fairly accurate and truthful picture of the economic conditions and forces of the period in which it is written. The classical school of political economy, or as it preferred to call itself the liberal school, now comes into being. Smith, Ricardo, Jean Baptiste Say, and John Stuart Mill are its recognized leaders. Under their leadership, economics became a systematic, co-ordinated social science. They accepted very largely verbatim the hedonistic psychology and the utilitarian philosophy of Jeremy Bentham. A very naked individualism and the doctrine of a modified laissez faire were cardinal principles of their economics. Free competition, which most economists tacitly accept today, was the keystone of their arch; a sort of major premise. The method employed was one quite commonly used in all science; they observed facts, imagined an explanation, and then tried to verify the hypothesis. Their mistake, says Gide, "was in too frequently taking the abstraction and the hypothesis for the reality." The end which the

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liberal school had in view was, like that of the Greek philosophers and the Physiocrats, very frankly, social welfare.

Now comes a change. There is a reshaping of emphasis in economics. The drift is away from social philosophy and toward a positive, scientific statement of economic doctrine. Things are astir in the scientific field. Darwin and Huxley in biology; Newton, Tyndall, and Lord Kelvin in physics; Harvey in physiology; and John Couch Adams in astronomy set the scientific pace. Economics, like the proverbial fish, takes on the mottle of the ground on which it lies, and feels its way to a more exact exposition of economic hypothesis and law. There is a persistent hunt for uniformities and bases for quantitative measurement. Precise definition, classified facts, derivation of generalizations become the vogue. A study of value is made the heart or core of economics, and the subject is divided into the conventional divisions of consumption, production, exchange, and distribution. The searchlight of logical method is turned on "what is," while "what ought to be" is apparently relegated to the limbo from whence no visitor returns. Thus is the goal of economics narrowed. The drive appears to be that of presenting a clear analysis of economic organization, and of stating the laws or tendencies which exist. There was danger that the subject would become stiff, stereotyped, and an end in itself.

During the past half-century there has been a deal of theorizing with respect to value. And this despite the fact that John Stuart Mill in 1848, with glorious dogmatism and a superb sense of finality, remarked that there was nothing further to be said on the subject of value. The labor theory expounded by Smith, Ricardo, and Mill was followed by the theory of marginal utility. The eminent Cambridge economist, Marshall, brought these two theories together and wove them into a single, consistent doctrine. Exchange value then became the resultant of the two forces, cost of production and marginal utility, operating together. This was an extraordi-

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nary effort to pour oil on the troubled waters of economic controversy.

Not only was the exposition of value causing heart burnings, but there was also a revolt over the whole question of method. The early writers clung tenaciously to the abstract method of deduction. They started with certain premises like perfect competition, perfect economic man, a perfect market, and then derived therefrom specific generalizations. It is quite possible that some of their so-called hypotheses were not hypotheses at all, but rather what Vaihinger in his *Philosophy of As If* would call fictions. By this he means that they are not subject to verification, and men merely act "as if" they were true; such, indeed, may be that amazing assumption, "the economic man." The German historical school used the reverse method, induction. Starting with facts which could be either statistical or historical, they worked back to generalizations. Without doubt both methods are strictly speaking scientific, and both can be legitimately used. The controversy is, however, conceived in a narrow spirit and is not seriously important. Either group might well be straining at a gnat and swallowing a camel. Another modification of method appeared with Sismondi in Italy, Sidney Webb in England, Sombart in Germany, and Veblen in the United States. This is commonly called the institutional method. In large part, these men believed that any fruitful study of economics must proceed from an investigation of human institutions. These would include not merely markets, organized production, transportation systems; but more importantly customs, traditions, taboos, and what in general Professor Sumner has called the "folkways" and Walter Lippman, "stereotypes."

Most of the current textbooks follow the conventional, orthodox divisions of the subject: consumption, production, exchange, and distribution. The study is of value, price, mechanism of exchange, wages, interest, rent, profits, and an application of principles to certain current problems as the rail-

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roads, trusts, labor, and the like. These divisions may coincide with facts and be the best we can devise, but there is certainly on the way a readjustment of emphasis. In a recently published book, *The Trend of Economics,* which represents the thinking of a group of younger economists in the United States, considerable importance is attached to the statistical method. One of the contributors, Mills, claims:

> We cannot discriminate or handle scientifically the multitude of unique objects and events which make up the universe of facts in any given field. We must deal with phenomena in the aggregate, sacrificing detailed knowledge of individual things and events for the wider, more useful, though less precise knowledge of averages.

And in the same book one is a bit startled to discover the importance attached to modern psychology. If, as the book seems to say, economics is a study of one aspect of human behavior, then familiarity with psychology is essential in tracing the causes of value and in understanding the motives to economic activity. Mitchell puts it very nicely when he says:

> We do not get very far with academic disquisitions upon instincts, or with general discussions of balked dispositions. They are at least a starting point for more serious work. And the economist has constructive work to do upon his aspect of behavior which the psychologist can but help him to set about in an intelligent way.

Moreover, the whole field of production of wealth is being reconsidered. It is possible the theory of value and distribution will recede from the central place which it has so long held, and that production and consumption will be the dominant fields of investigation in the future. It is clearly seen that larger incomes, and hence larger opportunities for human happiness, may not be possible without larger production. Production for profit, to use Tawney's phrase, may be replaced by production for service. The modern business man may look upon his business not simply as a means of making profit, but as a great avenue for creating well-being. Mill or factory or transportation system or store will offer a peerless

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situation in which to forge, mold and fashion human lives. What an ideal and what a prospect! It may be discovered that many of the things we now produce which cater to low appetites and make, as Veblen asserts, for "conspicuous consumption" and "invidious emulation" are nothing but horrible waste. Capital, land, and labor are extravagantly used, and diverted to satisfying unnecessary wants. A deal of consumption, according to Hobson, is in the nature of disutility, and leaves individual and country but worse off. Is the tide setting strongly toward welfare? If so, there must be a heart-stirring investigation of the old hypotheses and the old theories. No longer will the economist be satisfied with "what is," but he will push out eagerly into that *terra incognita* of human welfare.

II. THE THEORY OF VALUE

The classical economists explained value in terms of labor. It seemed a logical, simple, obvious explanation. Certainly too obvious. The utility of a good taken for granted, its importance to an individual was determined by the amount of labor necessary to produce it. If it took twice as much time, or perhaps energy, to capture a deer as a beaver, then deer and beaver would naturally exchange in the ratio of two to one. If one yard of cloth exchanged in the market for one pair of shoes, it was quite evident that the amount of necessary labor expended upon the cloth was the same as that expended upon the shoes. The labor talked about is, however, not everywhere so clear. Is it labor time, or labor pain, or labor value, or maximum labor, or average labor? This explanation is at best one-sided, and only a partial truth. Socialists seized with eagerness such a reason for value, and much to the confusion of the disciples of Smith, used it to defend the just claims of socialism. If labor, reasons Karl Marx in 1848, is the cause of value, then labor alone is productive; rent, interest, and profits are a surplus value which unfairly has been wrested away from the true producers. And so the labor theory of

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value, arduously built up by the simon pure economists, became a mighty boomerang in the hands of the socialists.

For the better part of a century the labor theory of value remained substantially unchallenged. Economists and business men alike tacitly accepted the doctrine. In connection with the population thesis of Malthus, it gave color to the "subsistence theory of wages" and the "iron law of wages." It formed a basis for governmental policy. About 1871 both in Austria and England an assault was made on this explanation of value. Jevons, Gossen, Menger, Wieser, and Böhm-Bawerk led the attack. Not labor, they said, but utility is the real reason for value. These good men and true quite confounded the classicists with a barrage of psychological inference. Marginal utility was the standard under which they valiantly marched to the attack. Scarcity was only a conditioning factor. Its effect, if any, was purely quantitative. The real chain of causation ran from wants to diminishing utility, to marginal utility, to value.

The ideas of these Austrians were based fundamentally upon the naïve psychology of Bentham. Bentham was an outspoken champion of utilitarianism. He took the hedonistic standard of pleasure and pain as a measure of utility. Happiness was found in a surplus of pleasure over pain. The driving motive of every individual was to obtain as large a differential of pleasure as possible. Bentham, I believe, would not be considered today much of a psychologist; nevertheless his ideas had a profound effect on economic thought. His influence was so significant that McDougall says classical political economy was a tissue of false conclusions drawn from false psychological assumptions. The cardinal errors were enlightened self-interest and the tendency to identify "the good" with pleasure. Economists seemed to ignore the fact that "mankind is only a little bit reasonable and to a great extent very unintelligently moved in quite unreasonable ways."

Captious critics soon found logical fallacies in Bentham's

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hedonistic hypothesis and in Jevons' assumptions concerning utility. These criticisms involved the searching of motives. Sidgwick tritely remarked that he ate because he was hungry, not because he anticipated pleasure. Frequently enough we play golf or tennis because we think we ought to get some exercise. People trade at one store rather than another for perhaps no accountable reason other than habit. The unskilled laborer goes to the day's work from sheer necessity. Some, possibly many, go to church, to the opera, or take a trip abroad not by reason of any pleasure derived, but solely because it is the thing to do. In the light of such springs to action what becomes of this much vaunted pleasure-and-pain theory? Quite evidently it has surprising limitations. Surely economics cannot be reduced to such simple terms. We inevitably face the fact that human beings are remarkably complex. Too much simplification is likely to lead, in the range of human relations, to egregious errors. And at this point the psychological school found a peck of troubles. It was a veritable Pandora's box. Some writers ignored the hedonist complex altogether though still clinging to the orthodox analysis. Others, like Davenport and Fisher, tried to reject psychology entirely, and make economics purely a question of price. Still others, like Fetter, worked along the line of volitional psychology and set up "choice" or "preference" as the primary basis for economic thinking.

Apparently the modern trend is to consider economics as one aspect of behavior. A warp of psychological inference is found in the weft of economic fact. Economics takes as causes what the psychologist treats as effects. Responses and wants are evidently synonymous terms. Human wants give the motivation to economic activity, but to the psychologist these are but effects which have prior causes. Carleton Parker, taking a leaf from the book of McDougall, made a sort of first attempt to analyze the instincts of the worker. Whiting Williams in *What Is on the Worker's Mind* shows the causal relation be-

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tween thinking and acting. We may not agree with all the conclusions of Mr. Parker or Mr. Williams; we may feel that their psychological analysis is inadequate, that they over-simplify "what is on the worker's mind," but we must confess that their approach to the worker's problems is more sane and reliable than that of the older economists.

Many of the younger economists are making grateful use of the researches of psychologists. We, as a group, are discovering that some part of the older economic analysis must be refashioned. In the study of prices, of interest, of wages, and of profits new elements appear. A person buys at a given store not because the price is right, but because the owner of the store is a good Methodist; is a member of the right political party; is a graduate of Yale, Chicago, Dartmouth, or some other cherished alma mater; belongs to Masons, Elks, or Kiwanis; from custom, or inertia. Men save to protect their families, to gain social prestige, or because there is nothing else to do. Men work because they like to, or from fear of social disapproval. And so the matter runs. Everywhere in the domain of economics psychological factors obtrude themselves. And precisely because it is a study of one branch of human behavior.

In the light of the above what should be the attitude of the economist to psychology? Should economics be merely a sub-species of psychology, or should the economist, which, in the main, he is not, become a student of psychology? Surely the psychologist has many problems of his own and is not anxious to invite trouble by taking over those of economics. Economics is a highly specialized field, and for this very reason, if for no other, the economist is better fitted to grapple with the peculiar tasks set by this subject. The best results, I think, will be achieved by keeping the two subjects distinct. The economist should, as it were, sit at the feet of our psychological Gamaliels. Reading liberally in the books of modern psychology and with the knowledge of human nature thus

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gained, he will be able the better to sift and weigh the conflicting evidence presented by economic data. And who knows but that these contributions of psychology will be "as the shadow of a great rock in a weary land."

III. ECONOMIC MOTIVES

The orthodox economists perhaps inherited their economic man from the then current psychology. The springs of economic activity, they asserted, were in self-interest, or least cost. Men primarily strive to get the most with as little expenditure as possible. Inasmuch as money has come to be the one thing in which all economic values are expressed, and as this can be used to purchase all other goods and services, the fundamental drive of human beings is that of money-getting. However, it is an error to assume that the instinct of self-interest and the instinct of acquisition are identical. It is not to be denied that Mill and the neo-Classicists saw other motives, but these were everywhere overshadowed by the profit-making motive. Keynes sums up the case for the defendant as follows:

> The abstraction by which men are supposed to act solely with a view to their own material advantage and the advantage of those immediately dependent upon them has, nevertheless, its place in political economy. For while it is true that our economic activities are subject to the influence of a variety of motives, which sometimes strengthen and sometimes counteract one another, it is also true that in economic affairs the desire for wealth exerts a more uniform and an indefinitely stronger influence amongst men taken in the mass than any other single motive.

This doctrine makes the price paid, money wages received, interest obtained, profits realized, the great quest of man so far as his economic life is concerned. Under the spur of self-interest man's inclination is to buy where he can obtain goods the cheapest; to invest his savings where interest rates are highest, assuming, of course, equality of risk; to render his service where he can obtain the largest fees or the greatest wage; and to sell goods in the dearest market. The farmer

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plants wheat rather than oats or potatoes or peas because wheat pays better. If profits chance to be greater in the manufacture of steel than in drilling for oil, labor and capital will tend to flow to Pittsburgh, Gary, or Buffalo. If the market rate of discount is higher in New York than in London, Paris, or Berlin, international bankers will transfer funds to the New York market. If Australian wool can be sold in the United States cheaper than domestic wool, woolen manufacturers will stock up with Australian wool. If the unit cost of producing cotton textiles is lower in North Carolina than in Massachusetts, spinning and weaving machinery will be moved out of New England. The one sublime test is, does it pay? As thus stated it all seems absurdly simple. The simplicity, however, is only on the surface. Digging a bit deeper, we find that in some cases this easy formula does not work at all, and in other cases it does not work by any means completely. Even a casual observation will show that woolen manufacturers do not always buy in the cheapest market; that some farmers will continue to plant peas rather than wheat, though the latter pays better; and that capital persists in staying, in some cases, where profits are low or nonexistent. Business men will do the most unexpected things, as for example, the head of a great city department store who would not allow his representatives to travel or do business on Sunday. In another case, one of the great manufacturers of this country launched a rabid, anti-Semitic campaign with a proper disregard of the effects on his sales. Men turn over their business to their employees, Filene instals a thoroughgoing, democratic system of store control in which the management has no voice; the Florence Manufacturing Company develops a unique scheme of welfare work; advertising agencies appeal to a wide variety of motives in conducting their campaigns; trade unions are more interested in "recognition of the union," implying perhaps social prestige, than in wages, hours or conditions of employment; and able lawyers have

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been known to give up large retaining fees of corrupt corporations rather than compromise themselves.

It is quite safe to assert that economic activity is not conditioned solely or, in numerous cases, mainly by prices and profits. Money gain is only one among a long list of motives. The sense of power, desire for prestige, love of a fight, enjoyment of work for work's sake, creative instinct, patriotism and loyalty, regard for the other fellow, fears of one sort or another, and the simple lure of the game are all factors which must be considered in any explanation of economic activity.

Many people have held, and still continue to hold, the idea that large prizes are necessary to call requisite talent into existence. This theory received a rude shock during the period of the world-war, and, I fear, it is not altogether hole-proof in normal peace times. Jeritza might very well trill quite as merrily for fifty dollars a night as for one thousand. The eminent New York specialist in obstetrics has been known to render his expert service for small fees or no fees at all as well as for large ones. The man who has supreme talent for business organization may exercise that talent without much regard to the monetary reward. The able scientist and the skilled inventor has always been peculiarly unconcerned about the question of whether his invention will net large profits, and, indeed, many of these people have died in abject poverty. Faraday and Darwin, Pasteur and Metchnikoff, Agassiz and Pupin, Ford and Edison, Hill and Rosenwald, and scores of others who might be mentioned have rendered their distinguished service to humanity with little thought of pecuniary gain. The argument so often set forth of the necessity for big monetary prizes is decidedly inconclusive. Large prizes are offered not because they are necessary to draw out the talent, but simply because there are moneyed people who can afford to pay the price. Much of the reasoning on this question is purely circular. Big fees are paid because there are people who are willing to pay the fees. Scores of individuals go as

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missionaries, go into college teaching, become preachers, establish themselves as physicians in small towns, and link themselves to other professional or business pursuits where the monetary rewards are meager. As Douglas says,

> The evidence seems irrefutable that alongside the economic motive, which is undoubtedly real and powerful, there are in most of us, these non-commercial incentives as well, which are, at present, utilized to a small fraction of their capacity. The false conception of the exclusively economic man has blinded us to these other characteristics of mankind and has helped to make our age one where the emphasis is laid on acquisition.

IV. ECONOMICS AND ETHICS

The attempt to hold economics within the limits of a positive science has not been altogether successful. In nearly all the books on economics a careful reader will find touches of optimism and idealism. Even as confirmed a price economist as Professor Davenport, in the last chapter of his book, *The Economics of Enterprise,* speaks of religious faith in this wise:

> It is given to none of us to thwart the will of the Creator of all of us. Whatever we do, we must perforce be working out the great program, treading the wine from His presses, milling out the foreordained grist. It cannot be but that we are playing the part for which we have been assigned to the ends of the eternal process. . . . . It forthwith becomes incredible that the best interests of any of us can antagonize the interests of the others, if only it be possible to the individual to appreciate things in their ultimate meanings and their long effects.

The economist does not set up the economic man with his acquisitive instinct through sheer bravado, but that we may not be deluded into seeing things other than they are and may have a sound basis for working out social salvation. Economics is not an intellectual strait-jacket into which man must be thrust. It is a study of man himself, and the end and aim and purpose of it all is to glorify man's estate. Assuredly the goal is human welfare, and this goal economics holds in common with the other social sciences. Economics presents only one aspect, gives only one angle of approach to the great, universal human problem. Many economists are moralists of a sort.

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The very hypotheses of economics are being subjected to heart-searching analysis. William Smart, toward the end of his life, writes:

> And in revising my best book and forcing myself to sum up a great stream or tendency which I noticed in our economic life, I had these questions forced upon me: Where is this economic life leading us? Are we content that our successors should pursue the same direction as we and our immediate ancestors have followed? However vaguely any goal to "economic progress" is conceived, is it a goal big enough for a society becoming conscious of itself and its meaning? And, in its last issue, is it a goal which every man may, consciously and with all his heart, adopt as worthy of his life?

Again John Stuart Mill in a very notable chapter wrote:

> I confess I am not charmed with the ideal of life held out by those who think that the normal state of human beings is that of struggling to get on; that the trampling, crushing, elbowing, and treading on each other's heels, which form the existing type of social life, are the most desirable lot of human kind, or anything but the disagreeable symptoms of one of the phases of industrial progress.

Considerations such as these are bothering the economists. The very logic of events compels recognition of welfare. The tide is apparently setting strongly in the direction of seeing economics as a means to a great end, the realization of human happiness.

And now a problem necessarily arises. If economics is a study of human behavior, in what respect does it differ from ethics. Is economics anything other than a branch or segment of ethics? Mackenzie, in his *Manual of Ethics,* says that "Ethics is the science of conduct. It considers the actions of human beings with reference to their rightness or wrongness, their tendency to good or evil." Or to put it a little more concretely with the use of an illustration, Dewey and Tufts say: "To study a corporation may be economics, or sociology or law; to study its activities as resulting from the purposes of persons or as effecting the welfare of persons, and to judge its acts as good or bad from such a point of view, is ethics." Now, no good economist will deny that there are many ethical ques-

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tions which arise in the study of this subject. Wealth is always a possible condition of human welfare, though it should not be identified with it. A given amount of wealth is a conditioning factor of human happiness, but happiness in the last analysis is a state of mind or of being. In identifying what is wealth and what is not wealth the economist claims advisedly that if people want a certain thing and are willing to pay the price for it, by that very fact it becomes wealth. By this test quack cures, burglar's jimmies, roulette wheels, bootleg whiskey, opium dens, and an ill-assorted array of other socially undesirable things become wealth. The trouble is not with the economic facts, but with the unfortunate tastes and desires of mankind. It is surpassingly foolish to stick our heads in the sand like the proverbial ostrich and solemnly deny that these things are not wealth, and that the person who makes possible such unfortunate commodities is not a producer. The economist must take things as they are, and not as he might like them to be. There is a deal of regeneration to be done on the wants and tastes of mankind. It will take time, and the combined effort of economist, sociologist, and ethicist to educate people to the fact that whiskey and opium, and roulette wheels, are distinctly undesirable. A simple way to be assured that capital and labor will be used in the production of those things which make for the larger life is to get people not to want them. Undoubtedly we should come to Ruskin's concept of wealth that "the true veins of wealth are not in rock, but in flesh. The final outcome and consummation of all wealth is in producing as many as possible full-breathed, bright-eyed, and happy-hearted human creatures."

Nor are all the ethical concepts subsumed under what is wealth and what is not wealth. Is the system of competition in itself desirable? How shall we regard private property? Does the present system of wealth distribution operate in the direction of social progress? Are the large private fortunes of the present time in the United States the result of economic restrictions and of practices which cannot be defended on

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moral grounds? Is the process of production one calculated to benefit the worker? Is cost of production to be reckoned in terms of toil, and blood, and deprivation to human life? Have we realized least cost when we have reduced the unit cost of production to the lowest point in terms of money outlay, if this has been accomplished by depriving the worker of a fair chance to make the most of himself? Is the natural price of an article the dollars and cents for which it exchanges in the market, or is it as Thoreau suggests "What a thing costs in terms of human life"?

Although there are many ethical implications in economics, it should not be assumed that economics is merely applied ethics. There are features of economics which are purely physical, such as the law of diminishing returns. There are other features which are largely mathematical in character, as the quantity theory of money. Not all problems of this subject are ethical. Economics is not the "all" of human conduct; it is but a specialized department of it. Ethics covers necessarily a wider field; it is a general study of conduct. The expectation is that ethics will show the serviceableness of means to ends, and will formulate rules for a more complete life. Both ethics and economics can profitably study the rightness and wrongness, according to some fairly elastic standard, of the way in which the present economic machine runs. Each will contribute its quota toward a more complete understanding of the unparalleled human issues at stake. The two subjects are not mutually exclusive, and it is not desirable that they should be. They are rather complementary studies. Human relations are altogether too complex and many-sided to be neatly set off into water-tight compartments. In sum, economics, ethics, sociology, psychology, and other subjects are working on the human data with the hope and belief that the way may eventually be found leading to the top of our mountain, which may be called "substantial happiness for the greatest number."

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MYSTICISM AND THE PHILOSOPHY OF WILLIAM JAMES

JULIUS SEELYE BIXLER

To link the word mysticism with the name of William James may be to suggest at once the less fortunate connotations of the word, and the least attractive among the many interests of the philosopher. For "mysticism," from its unhappy association with the magical and occult, has very nearly become a term of reproach, and the religious element in James's philosophy is by many readers connected only with dissociated personalities, subliminal consciousnesses, and the psychical underworld in general.

The interest of the present paper, however, is in mysticism as a way of thinking and acting which has tested high ethically and achieved recognition philosophically. And the view taken of James is that his great contribution to the philosophy of religion lies in his insistence that truth is too rich and complete a thing to be reached by any method which fails to take all departments of human activity into account, the aspirational as well as the logical. Not in his interest in the abnormal, but in his delight in the healthy and robust, and in his own craving for the most abundant life do we find James's key to religious values. As religion begins to have less to do with a consciousness of sin and puts more emphasis on a sense of achievement it can hardly be doubted that its debt to his healthy humanism will be increasingly realized.

A few suggestions as to some of the contacts made by James's thought with the philosophy of mysticism may therefore not be out of place. Not that a contribution to the philosophy of religion must be of a mystical turn, but rather that the incidence of an intensely religious way of thinking, like the mystical, upon an intensely humanistic philosophy like

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that of James should have suggestive consequences. In his published *Letters,* especially those written in 1904, when the comments on his *The Varieties of Religious Experience* were beginning to come in, James frequently admits the presence in himself of what he calls a "mystical germ"[1] which inclines him to look for truth in the records of religious experience. And the affinities of his point of view with that of the mystics were many. It is the interest of this paper to show that in three points especially the philosophy of mysticism offers a natural and legitimate supplement to James's thought: first, it contains a solution of the conflict in James's religious philosophy; second, it supplements the phenomenalism of pragmatism; third, it relieves the individualism of James's ethical theory.

To say that mysticism provides a solution for the conflict in James's religious philosophy may be to raise a question as to the nature of this conflict. While it is true that it has not received attention from writers on James, the evidence for such a conflict is clear in James's works. Throughout his writings James gives the impression of being confronted by two opposing views of life to both of which he was strongly attracted, and between which he never finally decided. James felt, on the one hand, the press of the active impulses, their challenge to man's environment and eager desire to remake it—the aggressive assertiveness of the will to survive, to believe, and to achieve. But, on the other hand, he was not insensitive to the more passive need for assurance, stability, and comfort. In the one mood James seems ready to scale the highest heaven in his quest for value, or to penetrate the deepest abyss in his insistence on the triumphantly conquering and creative quality of the human spirit. In the other his whole being longs for peace, whether of ecstasy or rationality.

James himself puts the antithesis clearly in his introduction to the posthumous publication of some of his father's

[1] Cf. *The Letters of William James,* II, 210 ff.

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writings. Here he says that "pluralism is a view to which we all practically incline when in the full and successful exercise of our moral energy. The life we then feel tingling through us vouches sufficiently for itself, and nothing tempts us to refer it to a higher source." Yet, as he then goes on to explain, there are times when this active combative attitude is far from satisfying. "To suggest personal will and effort to one 'all sicklied o'er' with the sense of weakness, of helpless failure, of fear, is to suggest the most horrible of things to him. What he craves is to be consoled in his very impotence, to feel that the powers of the universe recognize and secure him, all passive and failing as he is. Well, we are all *potentially* such sick men. The sanest and best of us are of one clay with lunatics and prison inmates."[2]

But James not only sets the antithesis before us; he gives us positive evidence that he was himself a victim of the alternation of these two moods. One has only to compare the letter written to Thomas W. Ward[3] and the account of a morbid experience attributed in the *Varieties* (p. 160) to a French correspondent, but acknowledged in the *Letters*[4] as his own, with the eager self-confidence of his letter to his wife[5] to see the extremes to which his moods could carry him. As to the reflections of this conflict in his philosophy, we may notice first of all the alternation in his conception of the Deity. In "The Will to Believe" and the other essays published with it God is treated as that conception which stimulates man to the highest, most energetic moral endeavor. But in *The Varieties of Religious Experience* the interest shifts and the emphasis is put on man's need for aid and on God as the author of saving experiences. A partial synthesis of the two views is reached in *A Pluralistic Universe,* where God is described both as that spiritual agency which will evoke in men the highest, most co-

[3] *The Literary Remains of Henry James,* pp. 115 ff.

[4] *The Letters of William James,* I, 130 ff.

[2] *Ibid.,* I, 145. [5] *Ibid.,* I, 199.

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operative response, and also as the source of those saving experiences which are unpredictable by any rational process but are empirically certain. And not only in its main outlines, but in the details of his argument as well, does evidence of the conflict appear. Take the contrasting chapters in the *Varieties* on "Healthy-Mindedness" and "The Sick Soul." Which is, after all, the deeper mood, the active or the contemplative? Is it better to put on the whole armor of God or to rest on the everlasting arms? It is difficult to find in James an unequivocal answer. If we turn from the *Varieties* to *The Will to Believe* the same situation confronts us. In this volume the emphasis is placed on the importance of the active life, yet the need for an assurance which transcends anything that earthly achievement can give is suggested in such a sentence as this: "A nameless *unheimlichkeit* comes over us at the thought of there being nothing eternal in our final purposes" (p. 83), and in the assertion that the need for unity is one of the two fundamental aesthetic needs of our nature, so that "some men will always keep insisting on the reason, the atonement that lies in the heart of things" (p. 90).

Finally, we may observe in passing that those parts of James's thought where his interest is other than religious still show the pervasive character of this conflict. On the one hand we have the well-known insistence on courage and the need for a conquering faith. "All James's cherished theories," says Professor Dickinson S. Miller, "free will, will to believe, pluralism, pragmatism, radical empiricism, meant for him what the church calls 'newness of life.' . . . . They meant the possession of 'genuine novelty' in our experience, the blowing of a fresh wind, the breathing of an indescribably new atmosphere" (*Harvard Graduates' Magazine,* March, 1921). But the other influence is also here, especially in the recognition which James often shows of the religious value of the Absolute. In the *Principles of Psychology* (I, 316) he mentions the legitimacy of the yearning for a "Great Com-

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panion," the "Absolute Mind." In *A Pluralistic Universe* he brings forward a conception of confluent consciousness which, as he says, differs from an absolute chiefly in being "thicker and more concrete," and in his Ingersoll lecture on immortality he takes a position which, the second edition of the book is careful to explain, *need* not be construed in an absolutistic manner, though it is open to such an interpretation. Also, he reminds us that there is "one permanent inferiority of pluralism from the pragmatic point of view. It has no saving message for incurably sick souls. Absolutism, among its other messages, has that message, and is the only scheme that has it necessarily. That constitutes its chief superiority, and is a source of its religious power."[6] Absolutism brings a greater religious intimacy than the "older theism," an intimacy which all right-minded men will demand.[7] There are times when we all need absolutism's message of comfort.[8]

Here, then, is the conflict, especially apparent in James's religious philosophy, but making its influence felt throughout his thought. Which is better, deeper, and truer, an attitude which finds the last word in creative human achievement, or one which sees that "healthy-mindedness is not the whole of life," and reaches out for something which human effort cannot bring? James seems to have solved the difficulty, in a manner only partially satisfactory even to himself, by the paradoxical idea of a pluralistic universe. Since the world is a universe it is able to respond to our need for stability, but since it is pluralistic it affords scope for our creative activity as well. God is the author of saving experiences, and to that extent is dependable, yet he is limited, and needs man's aid in carrying his purposes to fruition. Clearly, a reconciliation of the two demands is difficult. If the universe is to be safe it cannot at the same time be risky. There cannot be a real pos-

[6] *The Meaning of Truth*, p. 228.

[7] *A Pluralistic Universe*, pp. 27 ff.

[8] *Pragmatism*, pp. 292–93.

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sibility of loss and at the same time an assurance of final salvation.

We do seem, in other words, to reach a dilemma when we try to formulate a theory which will do justice to both the demands which James makes. But the mystic attacks this same problem from the practical side. The great mystics have been able to reconcile the experienced need for human effort with the also experienced dependence on a source higher than the human by recognizing the supplementary parts played by the active and the contemplative moods. The mystic has always insisted on a strenuously moral preparation for the ecstatic experience. Thus an experience which itself is passive is preceded by vigorous, active effort, and leads again to energetic effort in the "mystic life" of active well-doing which follows. Each taken by itself is insufficient, but when the two supplement each other the mystic finds that the goal of life has been achieved. No writer on mysticism has brought this out more suggestively than Professor W. E. Hocking, in his book on *The Meaning of God in Human Experience*. The principle of alternation, this author indicates, is normal not merely for the mystic, but for everyone. "Alternation lies deep in the nature of things" (p. 396). The will to work and the will to worship reinforce each other. Attention must be directed at times to the source of all experience and at other times to the particular items of experience themselves. As Havelock Ellis expresses it, rhythm marks all the physical and spiritual manifestations of life.[9] The *Legend Beautiful* symbolizes this truth with consummate skill in its story of the monk who left a vision of the Master at the call of the bell to distribute alms, and who, returning disconsolate to what he supposed was his deserted room, was greeted to his immeasurable surprise and joy by his Master with the words: "Hadst thou stayed, I must have fled."

It is interesting to find that James himself discovered in

[9] *The Dance of Life*, p. 37.

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the mystical experience a hint as to the need for satisfying both the active and the passive moods. In the chapter on "Mysticism" in the *Varieties* he stresses passivity as a characteristic of the mystical state (p. 381), emphasizes its monistic background (p. 419), and brings out its message of comfort and assurance (p. 428). But in his article on Benjamin Paul Blood, now reprinted in *Memories and Studies,* he calls that writer a pluralistic mystic, stressing the independence which the mystical experience brings. And in his unsigned review of Blood's "The Anaesthetic Revelation and the Gist of Philosophy," printed in the *Atlantic Monthly* (XXXIV, 628), he emphasizes the part that volition must play in any religious experience worthy of the name. He here says:

> Interpretation of the phenomenon which Mr. Blood describes, is as yet deficient. But we may be sure of one thing now: that even on the hypothesis of its containing all the "revelation" he asserts, laughing-gas intoxication would not be a final way of getting at that revelation. What blunts the mind and weakens the will is no full channel for truth, even if it assist us to a view of a certain aspect of it, and mysticism versus mysticism, the faith that comes of willing, and in terms of moral volition, has a million times better credentials.

Mysticism, then, even on James's own statement, offers a fruitful suggestion toward a solution of the conflict by which he was troubled. The second connection which it makes with his religious philosophy is its suggestion as to a release from the phenomenalism of his religious pragmatism. Pragmatism, as James describes it, is avowedly positivistic. Truth is a matter of definitely experienceable workings, it is determined by its empirical consequences—at times James even says it is the consequences themselves. Men live by postulates rather than by certainties. Even when they have hold of a certainty, they do not know it to be such. The case against pragmatism in this regard has been put by Professor James B. Pratt, in his book *What Is Pragmatism?,* when he argues that the "logical outcome of pragmatism when applied to re-

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ligion is not salvation from philosophic doubt, but a necessary and ineradicable skepticism" (p. 205). For, "since the truth of an idea means merely the fact that the idea works, that fact is all you mean when you say the idea is true. Nothing more, nothing 'transcendent' nor 'cosmic' must be sought for it" (p. 206). And " 'tis idle for us creatures of a day, who cannot even *mean* anything beyond our own experience, to spend time on questions necessarily so remote and inaccessible as are those which religious people *think* they are discussing and about which they *think* they care" (p. 208).

With all the truth which this statement of the limitations of pragmatism as a philosophy of religion contains, it seems also to be true that mysticism, as James treats it, affords a way out of pragmatic phenomenalism, and a way which is justified by pragmatism itself. As any reader of James will remember, pragmatism relies for the completion of its process of verification on a perceptual experience, an experience of immediacy, a face-to-face presentation. (Cf. especially the first two essays in *The Meaning of Truth.*)

Now, this immediate, perceptual experience may be a sense-experience, but it need not be. It seems entirely fair to James's thought to claim that it may be a mystical experience. The mystical is a perceptual experience. It is true that it has nothing to do with sense-perception, for sense stimuli are absent. But its form is perceptual, just as any mental state is perceptual in its immediacy before the concepts have had time to get in their work. As James describes it in "A Suggestion about Mysticism," now reprinted in *Collected Essays and Reviews,* it is a moment of perception of a great mass of memories, concepts, feelings, relations, all at once. It brings an extension of the ordinary field of consciousness by which the horizons are widened, and material usually transmarginal comes into view. It is a moment of experience in the widest sense of the word, coming with an indescribable sense of fulness and richness and power. As soon as an object

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is singled out and classified, the experience becomes conceptual, but in its "much-at-once character," as immediately apprehended, it presents an undiscriminated perceptual field.[10]

We may notice in passing that mysticism so described fits naturally into an empirical philosophy. As James observes: "Reason, operating on our other experiences . . . . would never have inferred these specifically religious experiences in advance of their actual coming." But now that they have come, empirically, "they suggest that our natural experience . . . . may be only a fragment of real human experience."[11] And we may also notice that mysticism makes its contribution to a philosophy of *radical* empiricism. For radical empiricism is a demand that the relations between terms, as truly as the terms themselves, shall be matters of direct experience. And mysticism is just the process of finding that the larger relations of life, one term of which is the individual self, are directly experienceable.

But while mysticism is empirical, even radically empirical, is it justifiably associated with James's pragmatism? It is indeed perceptual. That James so regarded it, and that he considered it as legitimate a perceptual experience for the individual as a sense experience, is clear from the chapter on "Mysticism" in the *Varieties*. And his way of treating the whole subject of perception is at times strikingly similar to the treatment of the mystical experience by the mystics themselves. Like a religious man speaking of the Deity, James says of perceptual objects of acquaintance: "At most I can say to my friends, 'Go to certain places and act in certain ways, and these objects will probably come.'"[12] And again he talks as though in a mystical strain when he says: "The maximal conceivable truth in an idea would seem to be that it should lead

[10] Cf. *Collected Essays and Reviews*, p. 502.

[11] *A Pluralistic Universe*, p. 306.

[12] *Principles of Psychology*, I, 221.

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to an actual merging of ourselves with the objects, to an utter mutual confluence and identification."[13]

Yet, when all is said, a feeling of inner lack of harmony persists between the perceptions of the mystic and the kind of perceptual verification for which pragmatism is looking. And a chief reason for this seems to be the contrast between pragmatism's social point of view and mysticism's individualism. Mysticism does indeed reach out beyond the phenomenal world, but the mystic himself is the only one who feels the direct touch with the noumenal Object. Ethically, pragmatism is a philosophy of social amelioration; epistemologically, it requires social verification. But the mystic's truth exists for him alone. "No authority emanates from them [mystical states] which should make it a duty for those who stand outside of them to accept their revelations uncritically."[14] The mystic is indeed invulnerable, but he is lonely as well.

This brings us face to face with one of the central questions of James's theory of knowledge. On the one hand we have the will to believe, with its hypotheses about life and destiny, making postulates which are tentative, offering something to live by, but adopting an agnostic attitude toward ultimate reality. Allied to this is the pragmatic tendency to think of truth as known and even conditioned by its value, dependent for whatever being it may have on the "working" of particular experiences. On the other hand we have James's description of the thoroughgoing, though lonely, certainty of the mystic, and his obvious sympathy with the whole mystical-perceptual procedure. And in *A Pluralistic Universe* we seem to have an alignment with Bergson and the acceptance of Bergson's notion of a perceptual intuition by which reality, even ultimate cosmic reality, is grasped by a stroke of intuitive sympathy.

Is it possible to bridge this chasm, and to have certainty

[13] *The Meaning of Truth*, p. 156. [14] *Varieties*, p. 422.

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which is yet socially available? It seems to be possible, even on James's own statement of the case. One of his earlier works, the essay on "The Sentiment of Rationality," contains this passage:

> . . . . however vaguely a philosopher may define the universal datum, he cannot be said to leave it unknown to us so long as he in the slightest degree pretends that our emotional or active attitude toward it should be of one sort rather than another. He who says "life is real, life is earnest," however much he may speak of the fundamental mysteriousness of things, gives a distinct definition to that mysteriousness by ascribing to it the right to claim from us the particular mood called seriousness—which means the willingness to live with energy, though energy bring pain. The same is true of him who says that all is vanity. For indefinable as the predicate "vanity" may be *in se*, it is clearly something that permits anaesthesia, mere escape from suffering, to be our rule of life. There can be no greater incongruity than for a disciple of Spencer to proclaim with one breath that the substance of things is unknowable, and with the next that the thought of it should inspire us with awe, reverence, and a willingness to add our co-operative push in the direction toward which its manifestations seem to be drifting. The unknowable may be unfathomed, but if it make such distinct demands upon our activity we surely are not ignorant of its essential quality.[15]

When it is a question of the universal datum, then, a definition is possible. A reaction which calls for a certain emotional or active attitude toward life is itself a definition, and communicable. But the mystic reaches just such a universal datum, on James's own showing in another part of the same essay.[16] And the history of mysticism bears out the fact that the mystic does not rest content with his intuition, but spends his life trying to translate it into an "emotional or active attitude." He defines the object of his vision by the attitude toward life which he takes. And by so doing he communicates and socializes his experience.

As a matter of common observation, the truly religious man is always translating his vision into action, just as the true mystic has always transmitted to others the content of his ex-

[15] *The Will to Believe and Other Essays*, p. 86. [16] *Ibid.*, p. 74.

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perience in terms of conduct. Indeed it was James himself who argued that most men get their religious experience at second hand, and that the deities whom they worship "are known to them only in idea"; that many men are Christians, though "it has been vouchsafed . . . . to very few Christian believers to have had a sensible vision of their Savior."[17] The experience of mankind bears out the notion of the socially verifying quality of religion and supports the claim of mysticism to furnish a legitimate means of escape from the positivistic side of pragmatism.

The final contribution offered by mysticism is to James's ethical theory. In the essay on "The Moral Philosopher and the Moral Life" James makes the point that words like "obligation," "good," and "ill" have no meaning in a world devoid of sentient beings. But when even one such being comes into existence a distinction between good and evil comes into existence also. That is good which furthers the interests of this being. Any conflict is simply a conflict of his own demands. Of the various aims with which he is confronted, some "will no doubt be more pungent and appealing than the rest . . . . they will return to haunt him with more obstinate regrets if violated. So the thinker will have to order his life with them as its chief determinants, or else remain inwardly discordant and unhappy."[18]

This inward lack of concord is all that immorality means so far, but the situation is greatly complicated if another person or a number of persons be introduced. Then there are as many worlds as persons, each with its demands gradually becoming internally unified, and developing subjective ideas of truth and value but with as yet no objective criteria. As is the case in so much of his work, James is eager here to discount the worth of a transcendental realm in which a pattern of human virtue is kept, and by which human activity is determined. The true and the good are not established beforehand. They

[17] *Varieties*, p. 54. [18] *The Will to Believe and Other Essays*, p. 191.

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are brought into being in and through human effort. Just as in another context he argues that truth grows up inside finite experiences, so we find here the similar claim that goodness and value have meaning only in reference to human desires. Nothing is good except as some consciousness feels it to be good, and there is no obligation except as some personality makes a claim.

But to say that obligation must be understood in terms of desire is not to make a great advance toward setting up a stable system of ethics. Whose desires are to carry the most weight, and, in case of a conflict, where is the basis for a decision? When the conflict is in the mind of the individual, he may indeed settle it in favor of that desire which is most "pungent" or most likely to "return to haunt him." But who shall decide where two individuals are concerned?

James wrestles with the problem for several pages, in the course of which he sets up the definition that "the essence of good is simply to satisfy demand" (p. 201), and then observes that, "since all demands conjointly cannot be satisfied in this poor world," our aim must "be simply to satisfy at all times as many demands as we can" (p. 205). And we can best accomplish this by taking experience as it comes instead of relying on a priori rules. In his enthusiasm for the empirical attitude in ethics, James here offers one of the strongest defenses of the radical ever penned. He argues:

> In point of fact, there are no absolute evils, and there are no non-moral goods; and the *highest* ethical life—however few may be called to bear its burdens—consists at all times in the breaking of rules which have grown too narrow for the actual case. There is but one unconditional commandment, which is that we should seek incessantly, with fear and trembling, so to vote and to act as to bring about the very largest total universe of good which we can see. Abstract rules indeed can help; but they help the less in proportion as our intuitions are more piercing, and our vocation is the stronger for the moral life. For every real dilemma is in literal strictness a unique situation, and the exact combination of ideals realized and ideals disappointed which each decision creates

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is always a universe without a precedent, and for which no adequate previous rule exists" (p. 209).

But how and when are we to know whether our piercing intuitions really pierce? Do they carry with them anything by which we may know their authority? Here once more the mystic brings his offering. Just as James's empirical philosophy attains greater sureness by following its empiricism through, and finding a noumenal realm which is at the same time an object of direct experience, so the cure for an individualistic and pluralistic ethics seems to be more pluralism of a religious sort. For pluralistic mysticism, in its own paradoxical way, gives the individual an independence which brings its own authority. This seems to be the idea that James gleaned from that arresting writer, B. P. Blood, mentioned above.

And even though he reject the title "pluralistic," the mystic is still of service here. For the mystic has his own intimate touch with reality, bringing, as he believes, a higher than human authority. He has his own "piercing intuitions" which he has always trusted as against the authority of tradition. He is a "radical who confronts the existing order not with the intent of pure destruction, but with a new standard of what human nature really needs."[19] The mystic can break with custom because he is a man who knows what he is about. His is "a deliberate undertaking to recover the principle of value self-consciously."[20] As Jesus observed in the uncanonical story of the conversation with the man working on the Sabbath: "If thou knowest what thou art doing, thou art blessed; but if thou dost not know, thou art under the curse, and art a mere law-breaker." This is just the issue which the mystic feels equipped to meet. He does know what he is doing, and he knows that his authority is greater than that of any external law. The mystic, in a word, transcends the average. Out of

[19] C. A. Bennett, *A Philosophical Study of Mysticism*, p. 174.

[20] *Ibid.*, p. 40.

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the riches of his abundant life he creates new truth and new value. His prophetic insight is greater in degree, but similar in kind, to that of James's empirical, creative individual who is able to envisage the highest values in any given human situation. And the activity to which he is led by his confidence in his own inner authority has ever served to demonstrate to his fellows the practicability of the new truth he has discovered. His basis for judgment between conflicting desires has proved acceptable. He has known whereof he spoke.

In these three ways, then, do we find mysticism making a connection with James's thought. The connection is illuminating in both directions. Mysticism, it would seem, cannot be merely a philosophy of the abnormal, if its relation is so close to the thought of a healthy humanist like James. And correspondingly, the religious element in James's thought must be fundamental if the points of contact are so many. Yet is this not what one would expect, if religion be a natural human attitude and activity?

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ON NATURAL RIGHTS

RALPH MASON BLAKE

At various times in the history of moral and political philosophy the concept of natural rights has played an important and prominent rôle in the thoughts of men. It has frequently, indeed, been the central and dominating idea of a whole system. At other periods, however—and it is through one of these that we seem at present to be passing—it has fallen out of favor. In many quarters it seems just now to be regarded as an outworn and exploded superstition of the past, and any appeal to the idea is looked upon as evidence of an antiquated and unenlightened approach to the problems of the day. We may well ask ourselves, however, whether an idea of such vitality, appealed to at times, indeed, by the most diverse schools of thought as giving warrant to their views, and constantly reappearing in men's minds just when it seemed once more finally to have been got rid of, does not really embody some important notion which it would be useful to preserve and dangerous to lose sight of. It is this question which I propose here to examine.

It would be admitted, I suppose, that, speaking generally, "rights" are correlative with "duties" and are defined by laws. Thus, if we start with the positive law, whether constitutional or statutory, we find that there are many positive laws which define "rights" vested in certain individuals or groups of individuals (one of which groups may be society as a whole), and impose duties correlative with these rights upon other individuals or groups of individuals (or again upon society as a whole). The rights so defined seem usually to be of the nature of *claims* which their possessors may legitimately (i.e., in accordance with the law) make upon others, claims, therefore, which always imply some correlative duty

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on the part of these others. Thus if in accordance with the law a laborer, upon the performance of labor, has a right to the wages for which he contracted, this means that he may legitimately *claim* the sum agreed upon, and that it is the legal *duty* of the employer to satisfy this claim by paying the wage. Or again, if a man has a legal right to the exclusive enjoyment of a certain piece of property, this means that he may lawfully claim immunity from any interference on the part of others with such exclusive enjoyment, and that it is the legal duty of these others to refrain from such interference. It thus appears that positive laws may, on occasion, give rise to positive legal rights and duties; and such rights as thus arise seem to be of the nature of certain liberties or freedoms which their possessors may legitimately exercise.

The traditional conception of "natural" rights, whatever its other content, seems at least always to be that of a system of "rights" having a deeper and more fundamental character than any merely legal rights, of a system of rights possessing an ultimate and objective validity not derived from their relation to any system of positive law. Natural rights, as their name indicates, are supposed to be based instead upon a law of nature itself, independent of any positive enactments of men, and of a higher validity. It is therefore considered possible to contrast merely legal rights with natural rights, and in case of conflict to assert the superior claims of the latter. Just as positive rights are derived from positive laws and correlated with legal duties, so natural rights are conceived to be based upon the "natural law," prescribed by the very nature of things, and to be correlated with certain natural duties. And, like legal rights, natural rights appear usually in the form of *claims,* often to some freedom, immunity, or privilege, made legitimate by this "law of nature."

But now this conception of a "law of nature" is certainly not entirely clear. It merits further examination. Among what are commonly known as laws of nature are certain gen-

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eralizations of physical, chemical, or biological phenomena. These in fact are what we nowadays have chiefly in mind when we speak of natural law, or of the laws of nature. But these laws, it is fairly clear, are precisely not what are in question when it is a matter of determining rights. Laws of nature, in this sense of the term, do not tell us in the least what is right or what ought to be; they merely describe for us, without reference to matters of value, how natural phenomena as a matter of fact actually do occur. They thus explicitly abstract from the whole question as to whether the natural occurrences which they describe embody any sort of right or justice.

The natural laws from which natural rights could be supposed to arise must therefore be of quite another sort. They must *not* abstract from matters of value, but must instead deal primarily therewith. They must be statements of what claims various individuals or groups of individuals *ought* to be privileged to make. Not, then, from natural physical laws, but only from natural *moral* laws can natural rights be conceived to arise—from the principles of *natural morality,* if one may be permitted to employ so unfashionable a term.

And now it is necessary to point out a very significant difference between the conception of a "law" in the sense of a fundamental principle of natural morality, and a law in the sense of a positive law or legal precept. The latter is in essence a *command* or imperative issued by some competent authority and backed by the force of some sanction, some penalty or reward to accrue from the authority in question, whether this authority be state, church, public opinion, or the customs of society. Natural moral laws, on the other hand, are not necessarily to be thought of as commands or precepts issued by any authority whatever. If they chance to be backed by some authority, that is conceived to be a wholly accidental circumstance. Nor are they necessarily enforced by any sanctions whatever. A positive law issued by no authority is a contradiction in terms. Laws of nature, on the other hand, are con-

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ceived to be independent of any authority. They remain what they are and retain their entire validity whether any authority commands them and enforces them with penalties or not. A law of nature *may* be enacted into a positive law—indeed many have held that in default of enactment by any human authority they must be conceived to form part of the positive law of God, and to be enforced by supernatural sanctions. But the very conception of a law of nature is that it does not derive its being or its validity from any enactment or positive command whatever, but would remain valid even if every positive law were to contravene it. It is not only independent of positive laws, it is also deeper and more fundamental than they, and possessed of a higher validity.

The conception of a "natural law" from which natural rights and natural duties are derived is, then, the conception of a principle stating that the claim to such and such liberties, freedoms, or privileges ought to be vested in such and such individuals or groups of individuals, a principle which is to remain true and valid no matter what the positive law of any authority may decree, and by which any positive law which contravenes it may be condemned as contrary to natural right and justice—as constituting a violation of natural rights. And by calling these principles "laws of nature" it is implied that they are prescribed and determined by the very nature of things and are therefore independent of any choice or arbitrary decree, human or divine.

Not only, however, are such natural laws conceived as prescribed by nature herself, and as therefore superior to any arbitrary decree or enforcing sanction; they are also thought of as constituting eternal and immutable principles, as possessed of no merely temporary validity, but as remaining permanently valid—so long at least as the present order of nature shall continue in its general features to remain substantially what it now is. It might perhaps be admitted that other principles may be "laws of nature" for beings other than

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human, placed in a different general scheme of things; but such laws of nature as affect us human beings are conceived to be permanently valid truths for this our world, lasting unchanged so long as it shall last. Moreover, such laws of nature are conceived as being not only permanent in time, but as being also universally applicable in place. Inasmuch as they are determined by the general nature of things, it is held that they must be valid for all men everywhere, whether as a matter of fact all men have always recognized or acted upon their validity or not. And finally these natural laws are held to be *rational* laws, that is to say, principles which right reason, reflecting upon the order of nature, must necessarily discover to be generally valid.

And now, if it be admitted that these are the features which form the core of the ideas of natural laws, and of natural rights and duties based upon such laws, as these ideas have commonly been conceived, we may well ask ourselves whether there actually is or even conceivably can be any such thing as a "law of nature" in this sense of the term. In what sense, namely, can "nature" or "the nature of things" determine laws as to what claims ought to be vested in certain individuals or groups of individuals, and as to what duties ought in turn to be imposed upon others? And at first sight we may well doubt whether anything of the sort is at all possible, for when we turn to history we find the most diverse and incompatible opinions, not only as to what these "natural rights" and these "laws of nature" as a matter of fact *are*, but also as to the very way in which "nature" is supposed to supply these principles or standards. The conception of "living according to nature," according to natural right and justice, as opposed to and deeper than merely legal, customary, or conventional standards, has played a central part in many different philosophies; but the difficulty is that it has supplied so many and such diverse standards—many of them mutually incompatible. Thus Aristotle found the "natural" in the rational stand-

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ard of the mean, and in all that distinguishes man as a rational animal from the brutes; the Epicureans, on the other hand, found the "natural" precisely in that which men share with the brutes—the tendency to seek pleasurable and to avoid painful experiences. Thus Hobbes found the natural man to be actuated only by the egoistic will to power, whilst to Rousseau he appeared as a model of innocent peaceableness and sympathetic affection. It seems impossible to bring any real order out of such a chaos, and the attempt to find any standard of "what ought to be" from a contemplation of "nature" may thus well appear to be wholly futile.

And in fact, as this attempt has usually been conceived, it really is futile. I do not believe it to be possible to derive any principles with regard to what ought to be, any principles of "natural morality" or "laws of nature," from a contemplation, no matter how earnest, disinterested and thoroughgoing, of the facts of nature, as these are reported to us by the ordinary descriptive sciences of nature. There is no road to the derivation of such principles from the consideration, taken merely in themselves, of the truths of physics or astronomy, or even of those of biology, psychology, or history. The reason for this impossibility seems to be that from "nature" as it is studied in any of these sciences all matters of *value* have from the beginning been carefully excluded. The physicist, the astronomer, the biologist and the psychologist simply abstract from the value aspects of the phenomena which they study. They do not even ask the question—and *a fortiori* do not succeed in answering it—whether this or that phenomenon with which they are dealing is good or bad, right or wrong, just or unjust—all such matters are left entirely to one side. And since a consideration of values is no part of the task of these sciences, no principles concerning values can possibly be derived from or determined by their results. The "nature" which they study is the natural order deliberately considered apart from any of the values which it may embody, and nature

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in this abstract sense can determine no standards. When we consider nature apart from value we have already deprived ourselves of any basis for rationally preferring one part of nature or one tendency manifested in nature to any other. We cannot deduce, solely from the fact that physical or psychological laws are what they are, any principles as to what ought to be.

But let us now note that if values are left out of the "nature" studied by these sciences, it by no means follows that values are not also themselves a part of the natural order, if that order be only considered in a less partial and abstract fashion, nor that this value aspect of the natural order may not itself legitimately be made the object of a rational consideration. Reflexion upon human experience in the world discerns certain phases of it as "good" and certain others as "bad." We find thus as a matter of fact that the world of "nature" contains distinctions of value as an actual part of itself; and from an impartial consideration of these value aspects of the natural order it is not so entirely chimerical to hope or to expect that some principles or standards may be derived.

If we ask what are the primary or fundamental "values" of human experience, as discerned by such a consideration, I think that we can give a reply which will represent a very considerable measure of agreement on the part of contemporary students of the subject. It seems, namely, to be very widely held nowadays that intrinsic positive value attaches only to those conscious experiences which can be described as experiences of "happiness" or of "satisfaction," and that negative value, on the other hand, attaches only to conscious experiences of "unhappiness," "misery," or "dissatisfaction." The exact determination of the meaning of these phrases is of course still to a considerable extent a matter of dispute. There are, on the whole, two main schools of interpretation.

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According to the one, happiness and unhappiness consist respectively in the psychological states of feeling called pleasure and displeasure, whereas, according to the other they consist rather in what is called "fulfilment of interest or desire"—a matter which often goes under the name (implying also certain modifications of the view) of "self-realization." But in spite of the theoretical difference here indicated there appears to be such a very close connection in practical human experience between experiences of pleasure and experiences of fulfilment of interest, that the two theories seem bound in the end to come out practically at very much the same point.

In any case, if we admit that this widely accepted view, for instance, in one or the other of its divergent interpretations is correct, we are supplied at once with principles of value. And such principles, if they or anything like them be true, are not merely "ethical standards" imposed on the natural order from without. In fact they are genuinely *natural* standards. It seems to me, for example, that the proposition "misery is in itself an evil," or the proposition "happiness is in itself a good," is as much a truth about the natural order of things as is the proposition "fire burns," or "grass is green." Now from such principles of value we can derive principles of conduct. We can say, for instance, that what any person or group of persons "ought" to do is simply whatever will produce a greater balance of happiness over misery than any other alternative that is before him, and conversely, that what he "ought not" to do, or what it would be "wrong" for him to do, is just whatever would produce a lesser balance of positive over negative values—having in view, of course, the effects of his actions upon the experience of all conscious beings whatsoever. Doubtless all these conceptions lead to great difficulties when we try to apply them to the details of practical conduct; but I believe that we can and do guide our-

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selves more or less effectively by reference to such principles, and at any rate the principles themselves seem clear enough.

Now supposing principles of conduct to be determined in this way, it seems to me that they would rightly be called "natural principles," for they would be determined by "natural" standards—by standards, that is, which have a validity of their own, independent of the arbitrary command or prohibition of any authority whatever. They would be "natural laws" or the laws of "natural morality," and "natural rights" would be simply those "rights," those freedoms or privileges, which any individual "ought," in the sense defined, to be allowed to claim, i.e., in the sense that to allow these claims is a condition of the realization of the natural standard of, say, the increase of happiness and the decrease of misery or unhappiness. They would be claims which would be valid because they would rest upon the validity of a "natural law," because they would be prescribed by the very "nature of things."

In accordance with our previous discussion of the meaning of "natural rights" we must add, however, that "natural laws," so far as they are to define natural rights, must be principles of permanent, and not of merely transitory, validity, and furthermore that they must be such as are valid for all men everywhere. In other words, the truly natural rights must be those claims, liberties, and privileges the possession of which by the person or persons in question will continue, so long at least as human nature and the laws of the physical universe remain substantially what they now are, to constitute permanent and general conditions of human happiness.

But now, finally, *are* there any such natural rights, and, if so, what in particular are they? I believe that it is reasonable to hold that there are in this sense natural rights. We can scarcely doubt that there are certain general features of the physical order, of the psychological nature of man, and of the association of men in social and political aggregations,

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which have been, and will so far as we can see for a long time continue to be, permanent forces to be reckoned with in the human pursuit of happiness. And it seems reasonable to hold, these factors being what they are, and the values of human experience being also what they are, that so long as all these factors of the situation remain the same there will be certain permanent and general conditions for the attainment of values, and that some of these conditions will take the form of the allotment to certain individuals or groups of individuals of certain claims, privileges, and freedoms which all others shall be bound to respect. I shall not, however, attempt to say what in particular any such natural rights may be. In fact, I regard the determination of natural rights rather as a problem awaiting solution than as anything as yet at all fully or satisfactorily determined. But I do at least regard it as a legitimate problem, and as one which there is some fair hope of solving. Indeed, I suppose that sociologists and political scientists, however unwilling they may be to state the problem in the terms which we have here employed, are already, at least in some measure, approximating to its solution.

What has brought the notion of natural rights into general, and as it seems to me undeserved, contempt has, I think, been the almost universal assumption on the part of those who have believed in them that the "natural rights of man" and the "laws of nature" on which they are based are readily discoverable either by a simple consideration of traditional commands and prohibitions, or by some short and easy method of insight or immediate intuition. Rather, their determination must be the result of long and careful investigation and experiment. And the defenders of natural rights have also made other serious errors. They have usually conceived of natural rights too abstractly, as if each stood quite on its own basis, independent of and indifferent to every other. On the contrary, natural rights must form a *system* of carefully inter-

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related and mutually adjusted rights and duties. And finally, natural rights have too often been thought of as vested in certain individuals apart from all reference to society and the interests of society. The very definition of a "right" should be sufficient to dispose of such a notion. A right is a claim which ought to be allowed to an individual in view of the general welfare. Allowed by whom? We can only answer, "By society." A claim upon what? Upon the forbearance and support of others. Society is implied at every turn.

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BOOK REVIEWS

LAW AND MORALS. By Roscoe Pound. Chapel Hill, North Carolina: The University of North Carolina Press, 1924. Pp. 156.

One opens a book by Dean Pound with the expectation of finding wide learning applied with great common sense to matters of serious practical interest, and the present little volume displays all these qualities. His subject is certainly of profound interest at the present time, even though apparently not quite of the kind prescribed by the founder of the lectureship for which the work was originally prepared, for it is a little hard to see just how his legal arguments "show the mutual bearings of science and theology upon each other," or prove "the existence or attributes of God from nature." But that both lawyer and layman are in sore need of some illumination on this subject of the relation of law and morals, recent criticism and defense of court action leave little doubt.

Of the balanced good sense of the treatment it would be idle to speak. An even, dispassionate justice characterizes the attitude toward every phase of jural opinion. But one cannot help commenting on the breadth of careful scholarship exhibited in these popular lectures. There is not a paragraph without its abundant documentation, while at the end is a critically annotated bibliography of nearly two hundred titles that forms an invaluable guide through the literature of the subject.

The book consists of three lectures giving the views on the relation of law and morals held by the historical, the analytical, and the philosophical schools of jurisprudence, together with the interpretations and comments of the author thereon. At the outset we are given a very condensed but interesting sketch of the development of law from its beginnings as a form of social control not yet differentiated from religion and morals, through the stage of strict law to the period when again morals begin to modify it in the name of natural law, and it tends to become once more what it was to the mind of Plato, the expression of the essential reason of man. This process of infusion again gives way to a more static period in which the results of the creative process are assimilated and systematized, and law comes to be regarded as having its being, not in moral reason, but in the will of the sovereign state.

This variation in the content of law is reflected in the schools of jurisprudence. Of these the earliest in the field, representing the tradi-

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tional classic point of view, was the philosophical. Under the ethico-theological concept of natural law as the standard and pattern of human law, the jurists of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries were able to embody the common conscience of Christendom in their systems of jurisprudence. For them law and morals were identical.

For a variety of reasons, this rationalistic school gave way to the historical. Instead of an eternal moral order realizing itself through the creative activity of individuals, we are given the idea of custom gradually differentiating itself into human institutional life through the unconscious forces of history. Law still retains for a time its relation to morals, though now the latter is no longer the ideal code of the philosophers but only the actual customs of the historian and anthropologist.

One further step in this demoralization of law was taken by the analytical jurists in their contention that there is no need to look for any justification of law beyond itself. Its essence consists in its being the expression of the sovereign political power, and although the legislator may rightly regard morals in his activity, the judge has no need to go back of the strict law in his decisions.

In the present century jurists have begun to recover somewhat from the acquiescent attitude of the historical and analytic schools, and have taken a more critical and creative attitude toward the law. A new philosophical jurisprudence is coming into existence, only this time its standards are not those of a supposedly absolute conscience, as were those of the older law of nature school, but instead the more empirical and less arbitrary ideals implied in the social experience of a given age.

Thus we may at least have a natural law with a growing content—an idealized ethical custom and an ideal picture of the end of law, painted, it may be, with reference to the institutions and ethical custom of the time and place, which may serve as an instrument of shaping and developing legal materials and of drawing in and fashioning materials from outside the law.

In spite of the author's well-known sympathy with this newer sociologically minded philosophical group, he ends upon a somewhat pessimistically critical note. The result of twenty four hundred years of discussion has been to leave us where the Greeks began.

If we said that to the analytical jurist law was law by enactment, that to the historical jurist it was law by convention, and that to the philosophical jurist it was law by nature, we should do the cardinal juristic doctrines of the last century no injustice and should be putting them in terms that would be entirely intelligible to a Greek philosopher.

And the conclusion drawn from this discouraging history is the impossibility of understanding law in terms of a single relation such as that to

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morals, the point being enforced by an enumeration of the heterogeneous sources of our Anglo-American law. Jurisprudence, therefore, cannot bear an exclusive relation to ethics, but must be taken in its relations with the social sciences as a whole.

The book is so small and the treatment so necessarily limited that criticism of it seems hardly called for. Yet one might suggest that if Dean Pound would take more thought for the structural form of his writings it would be a great boon to his willing readers. Each sentence is clear and each paragraph is usually a unit, but single chapters and the book as a whole present confusing repetitions and shiftings of the point of view such as to make the following of the argument needlessly difficult.

And perhaps one point in regard to the author's conclusions might also be mentioned. He does not confine himself to the history of juristic opinion in the last century, but offers us criticism and a suggestion of his own conception of the relation of law and morals. Yet his own position is left so incompletely stated as to be tantalizingly indefinite. One might even question whether he has not settled the problem of the earlier schools, not by solving, but by evading, it. He will not admit that law can be identified either with moral principles or historic custom as such, or that legal rules can stand simply on the basis of authority. Law "must include all the immediate materials of judicial decision." But do these materials in themselves constitute law? If they do, we seem left to the arbitrariness of individual interpretation, with social, instead of rationalistic, philosophers as our highest authorities. If they do not, what is it that finally stamps them with the authority of law? The author is so idealistic that he is unwilling to identify the law with the arbitrary will of the state, and he is so realistic that he will not accept the philosophers as its spokesmen. The law is the expression of social purpose. But the historic question recurs, whose purpose? Can we in any way make practical use of an ideal save through the medium of an arbitrary decision?

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ROBERT OWEN. By G. D. H. Cole. London: Ernest Benn, Ltd., 1925. Pp. 267. Price, 15s. net.

The industrial age, which brought new faces into English life, generated not only great entrepreneurs but great idealists and agitators—the disease side by side with its remedy. In the series of biographical essays entitled "Curiosities of Politics," this short, well-balanced study by Mr.

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Cole, though it adds little that is new to our sum of knowledge of Owen, is valuable from his special knowledge of the intricate history of the early years of the labour movement in England, and is thus more illuminating than the life of Podmore.

Robert Owen, the greatest figure in the early development of Socialism, was long-lived: he reached manhood at a time when the tide of the Industrial Revolution was at the height of its first swift advance; he lived through the long struggles with Jacobinism and with Napoleon, the sharp crises after the peace of 1815, the working class movements that followed the Reform Bill.

In 1817, for reasons which remain obscure, he openly, at a meeting, denounced all religions by which, as he maintained, man "has been made a weak, imbecile animal, a furious bigot and fanatic, or a miserable hypocrite." "I am not," he added, "of your religion, nor of any religion yet taught in the world." Such an utterance cost him a good deal of support, it made it much more difficult for him to work with the leaders of the labour movement. The "benevolent Mr. Owen," who had set out patriarchally to found ideal communities, founded instead the modern trades-union movement and made straight the way for co-operation. But in the setback in 1834, Owen's trades union was shattered; trades unionism, lifting its head a few years later in the Amalgamated Societies, knew Owen no more. From that time onward, he ceased to be an industrial leader and became a religious teacher, making his social doctrines the basis of a rational religion of humanity. The old prophet continued to foretell the advent of the new moral world, but his teaching became lost in apocalyptic mysticism. He died at eighty-seven in a world deaf to him and his message. Owen was, strictly, a "curiosity of politics," a humanitarian who had lost his humanity, and chilled it with universal benevolence. It is the coldness of this good man which makes him a less likeable subject for Mr. Cole than is Cobbett. It was Owen's weakness that he was a self-taught and a self-centered man, obstinate and self-confident. "No man," as his biographer well says, "is strong enough to live so utterly by his own illumination." He was "very positive," even fanatical in his beliefs; he never argued, he only reiterated his prophesies. So Sir Leslie Stephen, in his biography of Owen in the *Dictionary of National Biography,* terms him one of those "bores who are the salt of the earth."

Yet the truths that Owen had to speak were vital. At a time when capitalists and manufacturers were ready to defend the Industrial Revolution and laissez faire, Owen stood for the efficiency of good factory management and humane treatment of his operatives. At a time when

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it had become customary to employ children in the mills at six years of age and even earlier, Owen would have no children in his factory under ten years of age; indeed, he was in favor of raising this age limit. In 1816, in the infant school that he founded, the children were not to be annoyed with books, but were to be taught the uses and nature or qualities of the common things round them by familiar conversation, when the children's curiosity was excited so as to induce them to ask questions respecting them. His success in organizing the New Lanark Mills is surprising when his odd blindness to realities is considered. He pursued the millenium, which remained ahead of him, in spite of a C. M. (signifying the commencement of the millenium) written upon the door of one of the communities founded in his name.

M. J.

PERSON UND SACHE. Von William Stern. Vol. I. *Ableitung und Grundlehre des kritischen Personalismus* (1st ed., 1906; 3d ed., 1922), pp. 434. (Price, M. 13.) Vol. II. *Die menschliche Personalichkeit* (1st ed., 1917; 3d ed., 1922), pp. 272. (Price, M. 8.) Vol. III. *Wert-Philosophie* (1924). Leipzig: J. A. Barth. Pp. 474. (Price, M. 15.)

This large work is a statement of a system of philosophy aiming at the establishment of a point of view which accepts "human" or "value" elements in experience as central. The first part discourses the old contrast between teleology and mechanism. The basis of the author's thought is obviously Kantian, quite apart from his use of the word "critical"; but he seeks to establish a unification of experience—dissolving the contrast between person and thing, soul and body—by reference to monism in personality. The result is a good criticism of "impersonal" categories of science and a long discussion of psychological evidence, leading up to the establishment of a basis for ethics. We have no right to assume that there is an irreconcilable contradiction between mechanism and teleology, between law and freedom; still less have we any right to assume that no such contradiction is fundamental. The second volume is entirely devoted to an analysis of personality: we are given a theory of spontaneity and the unconscious.

The third volume deals with the relation of "facts" and "values"; and the discussion of social and historical issues passes into a statement of the inner acceptance of "values" in the experience of the self. The last section of the work treats of a "personal Ethic." The whole, therefore, is interesting to students of moral philosophy; and though the manufacture of systems is not smiled upon today as it was in the early nineteenth century, it is perhaps useful to be reminded that any ethical

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theory implies some metaphysic. Criticism of the system here propounded is hardly possible in a short review; and, further, the consideration of such a system needs to be somewhat more prolonged before any criticism can be valuable. It may be sufficient therefore for the present to draw attention to the completion of a work which deserves the attention of scholars.

C. D. BURNS

CODES OF ETHICS: A HANDBOOK. By Edgar L. Heermance. Burlington, Vt.: Free Press Printing Co., 1924. Pp. viii+525. Price, $4.00.

The title of this book should be "Codes of Business and Professional Ethics." It is an amplification of the codes in the Appendix to the issue of the *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science* for May, 1922. Since that issue of the *Annals* was planned there has been a rapid development of business codes. Accordingly the bulk of Heermance's book is filled with the codes of the different trade associations. He prints codes, usually completely, for approximately two-hundred associations. The older professional codes are reprinted also. The author explains the purpose of the book as follows:

> In publishing this collection of ethical codes, I have had a threefold purpose. First, to facilitate the work of association officers in drafting or revising standards. Second, to bring before leaders of public opinion the concrete evidences of a remarkable ethical movement. Third, to assemble case material for teachers of Ethics who wish to make use of the laboratory method.

It may be added that investigators of ethics will find excellent material for study apart from immediate classroom purposes.

The enterprising teacher of ethics will find this book a necessary addition to his reserve shelf in the library. If most of his students are going into the older professions, the issue of the *Annals*, mentioned above, will be sufficient for them. But for students going into any business, Heermance's book is indispensable.

For ethical investigation, by teachers and advanced students, the book offers a wealth of material for comparison and contrast, analysis and criticism. It could be made more useful by the inclusion of such material as is given in Costigan's *Legal Ethics*.

Readers of the French school of sociological ethics will find in this book abundant correlations with the doctrines of Durkheim, Lévy-Bruhl, and Bayet. But those who do not accept the doctrines of those men will find that Heermance has collected abundant and valuable material for the inductive approach to ethics or for the illustrative application of ethical theories. Philosophers who take ethics seriously could do

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no more useful task than to understand and criticize these codes. Students of ethics have much to learn from the codes, but the writers of the codes have still more to learn from the philosophical principles applicable to their problems. I give as an example one topic that arrested my attention. There are throughout this book most extraordinary and questionable doctrines concerning competition by employers for the services of employes; for examples, see pages 6, 87, 178, 446, 466. If students and teachers of ethics cannot supply suggestions and criticisms about such debatable problems, what is the function of ethics?

The codes of ethics are arranged in alphabetical order. It might be better to print them chronologically, or at least to add a chronological table of all the codes. It is obvious that many codes have been copied from earlier codes. At present it is difficult to trace the origins and influences for each code on account of the alphabetical order. Moreover, many codes differ in no essential matter from other codes. For example, the ethical code for gas products does not seem to be substantially different from the code for peanut butter, pages 198–204 and 410–416. Much of this duplication might well be omitted. Someone should give us a small and cheap book containing all the important professional codes and about six important and typical business codes. Such a book could be purchased by students and used in class. But I do not mean to disparage Heermance's book by these suggestions. It is an interesting and useful book which every teacher of ethics should incorporate in his work.

A. P. Brogan.

University of Texas

The Self-Directed School. By Harry Lloyd Miller and Richard T. Hargreaves. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons. Price, $1.80.

In this book the authors propose a "New School" which is to have as its aim the "development of the self-purposing individual." In its pages one finds challenge after challenge to the accepted theories and practices of education. The question of fundamental concern to the authors is, "How may we produce the self-active, responsible, socially-minded individual who can be trusted with power"? Asserting that "free intelligence" is the only safe and ultimate guide in the choices of life, they set about devising a technique of instruction that will insure this. This brings forth a discussion that in the course of the book leads to interesting and suggestive material for students of philosophy and those interested in producing a higher standard of ethical activity.

The book sets forth no new philosophy of life. The aim of the au-

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thors is to get a philosophy actually to function in living. The reader interested in ethics, and in the teaching of ethics, will find the book vital and stimulating. The organization of the book represents an effort to put into school practice the principles of living held within the pragmatic philosophy. The goal is to teach the individual to think to the maximum of his capacity. His thinking is to enable him to satisfactorily adjust himself to his world, a constantly changing world. In the school he is to be given all sorts of jobs, and in working out these jobs he achieves a mind, intellectual stability, and a system of morality. The child must be prepared to meet the unexpected. Instead of giving the individual rules and facts he is to be trained in method, given a technique, of attack upon new situations. Man's place in the world is not fixed or static but one of indefinitely changing relation. It is one of endless adaptability and endless reconstruction of intelligence at the point of crisis. The child in his development is merely the "terminal bud of human evolution" and is capable of immeasurable development along many lines. All that lies before him in the building of a set of moral principles, as in the building of any other life principles, is endless experimentation. No hard and fast rules can be given; only a compass at best can be provided. No chart can be expected; that will continue to be made by each traveler on the highway of life. No two charts will be identical. That which gives distinction to one's individual chart will be the quality most prized in the round-table discussion of life's values (p. 362 f.).

The chief business of life, according to the authors, is the creation of a self. The self is "a socially induced nature built up gradually through experience which includes such technics of civilization as language, customs, machinery, occupation, government, politics, religion, as well as nutrition, clothing, home life, conversation, daily contacts."

One is impressed with the discriminating judgment, the reasonableness, the effort to be fair, on the part of the authors. There is no pleading for a particular "brand" of philosophy, nor for a specific method of teaching. They plead, instead, for an attitude of mind that will tend to build in youth that "creative intelligence" necessary to function satisfactorily in a constantly changing world. Accepting the idealism of youth and its will to self-creation, they seek to build a new society by concrete application of ethical principles to the situations in school life.

Every teacher, whether in the college, the university, or the public school, will find this book inspiring, helpful, suggestive in his work. It deals with a problem that is the burden of every teacher—how to get his instruction to take root in the lives of students. The authors advocate a "Self-Directed School"; every teacher of philosophy wishes to secure a

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"self-directed" ethics and philosophy of life. There is much here to aid in that direction. The authors advocate a Copernican revolution in the field of education. They are writing primarily for the teacher in the high school but between the lines there is the thought that moral theory and instruction must no longer be so completely confined to the college or university classroom. It must become a part of the activity of the public school. Ethical principles must become guiding attitudes in the mind of our youth.

ORVIL F. MYERS

EASTERN ILLINOIS STATE TEACHERS COLLEGE

SHORTER NOTICES

POLITICAL PRINCIPLES AND MOTIVES. A treatise for legislators and electors. By D. W. Caddick. London: Methuen & Co., 1925. Pp. 97.

This book has nothing to do with principles or motives, except in reference to its confused assumptions; and neither legislators nor electors would find anything in it that they could not find in their daily paper. The whole book is a collection of short articles from conservative and reactionary periodicals; and it would be hardly worth notice but for the fact that its magniloquent title may mislead scholars into making useless efforts to refer to it.

C. D. B.

PRIMITIVE LABOUR. By L. H. Dudley Buxton, lecturer in anthropology in the University of Oxford. London: Methuen & Co., 1924. Pp. 272. Price, 7*s*. 6*d*. net.

The author had a Kahn Fellowship which permitted him to travel round the world; and some of the material he has used in this book is drawn from his experiences on that journey. But the greater part of the book consists of those generalizations with which we are familiar in anthropology and for which the evidence might be a problem in logic. The life of primitive hunters and agriculturists is described, with the usual references to the Australian and other savage tribes. The second part of the book deals with the influence of climate and locality, and this is followed by excellent descriptions of actual races and tribes in Asia and America. The latter is taken as the place for the study of desert and plain peoples, the Hopi and the Navajo in Arizona. Indeed the latter part of the book is a valuable summary of the existing knowledge of certain peoples in districts not affected by European culture. We have here, therefore, something more than an introduction to the subject; for the analysis and restatement of present knowledge provides a new outlook in regard to the place of labour in human development.

C. D. B.

INDUSTRIAL PSYCHOLOGY AND THE PRODUCTION OF WEALTH. By H. D. Harrison. London: Methuen & Co., 1925. Pp. 184. Price, 5*s*. net.

This is a general introduction to the study of psychology as applied to industrial problems. It deals with vocational selection, fatigue, motion study, incentives. The author follows the guidance of Dr. C. S. Myers, and his admirable institute in London has provided much of the material used as evidence. The book, although short, is full of exact detail and the conclusions are

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well stated. The restriction of output by employers is given its proper place; and the influence of unconscious tendencies in the work of production is very clearly explained. The author has succeeded in writing a book which is both learned and interesting; for it shows the vastness of the field already covered by investigation, and it is vividly and pointedly written.

C. D. B.

THE HEART OF ARYAVARTA: A Study of the Psychology of Indian Unrest. By the Earl of Ronaldshay. London: Constable & Co., 1925. Pp. xviii+262. Price, 14s. net.

The meaning of the word nationality has been defined by an Indian writer as "the individuality of a people"; peoples are differentiated by peculiarities—physical, social, and mental—due to certain prehistoric conditions in the race structure. The most potent of race peculiarities are to be found in the thought structure, and the social structure of the different peoples; and it is the "structural formation of the thought-life" of a people leading them "to view themselves, view the world, and approach the eternal world-problems from different standpoints" that is the essential and significant element of different race consciousness and constitutes the original elements of difference in types of civilization. Lord Ronaldshay in this third volume of his Indian trilogy discusses the peculiar problem of India, in which the culture of the intelligentsia has been overlaid and overshadowed by that of Europe.

In the earlier chapters we have a picture of the anglicanisation of Indian education which was accompanied by a neglect, sometimes a positive dislike of the Indian heritage of custom, philosophy, and tradition. The use of the English language as the medium of instruction teaches the scholars to attach importance to words rather than to thoughts, to forms rather than substances, and in the acquisition of a foreign language, the "knocking at the gate and turning of the key take away the best part of life." In addition, the instruction itself is almost wholly unrelated to the real thoughts and aspirations of the Indian student. For a time the cultural traditions of the East were forgotten in the shadow that the West had for a long time cast upon national life. The nationalist reaction was inevitable; an Indian writer returning to his country in 1921 after an absence of eleven years writes that the people are becoming more and more dissatisfied "with being turned into mock Englishmen." From an apologia for the culture of India, the Nationalists passed to an attack upon Western culture which has on occasions assumed a revolutionary form, especially under the guidance of Mr. Gandhi. As to the future, Lord Ronaldshay, himself an able Indian administrator, hopes for a synthesis between East and West, a middle way. But he is aware that no changes in the machinery of government are a solution of the essential problem presented by the rivalry of two religions.

C. D. B.

THE TRAVEL DIARY OF A PHILOSOPHER. By Count Hermann Keyserling. Translated by J. Holroyd Reece. New York: Harcourt Brace & Co., 1925. I, 6+338; II, 6+400. Price, two volumes, $10.00.

Here is a book that will touch the ethical consciousness in many countries. Written informally as a diary, Count Keyserling manages to bring most of his philosophical insight to bear upon various problems presented by a trip around the world. Feeling the ethical conflict between his empirical self and the real self that he felt to lie deeper, and fearing that his real self was being incarcerated by a prematurely narrowing personality, he set out on what was hardly less than a pilgrimage in order to discover and to free his deeper nature. The

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sharpest problem that comes to consciousness from his travels is the conflict between the philosophy of the East (the Yoga philosophy in particular) and the efficiency attitude of the West. The good life is the life that somehow strikes the golden mean between action and contemplation. His sympathetic attitude toward the Orient leads one to feel that his informal, out-loud thinking upon the ethical problems presented by Buddhism, Mohammedanism, and Christianity is singularly fresh and suggestive. His contrast of sexual ethics of the East and the West is also easily worth perusal by one who wishes to face this problem frankly.

T. V. S.

STUDIES IN THE HISTORY OF POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY BEFORE AND AFTER ROUSSEAU. By C. E. Vaughan (late professor of English literature in the University of Leeds) edited by A. G. Little. Manchester: University Press, 1925. I, 364; II, 339. Price, 42*s.* net.

An introductory memoir of Professor Vaughan, who died in 1922, explains that these studies are the result of a life-work aiming at a philosophical discussion of political theory. At the beginning of the second volume there is a list of all Professor Vaughan's published work. In the first volume, the authorities dealt with are Hobbes, Spinoza, Locke, Vico, Montesquieu and Hume: the discussion centers in the theory of contract. In the second volume the subjects are Burke, Kant, Fichte, Hegel, Comte, and Mazzini. The chief merit of the whole work is the truly philosophical way in which the problems of politics are stated and considered; for in recent English and American political theorizing psychological observation has somewhat displaced metaphysical principles. Thus it is good to find Professor Vaughan's appreciation of Hume as a thinker upon realities such as "cause." Of course Burke, Comte, and Mazzini are hardly philosophers in the strict sense of the term; but even in dealing with them, Professor Vaughan has emphasized the philosophical assumptions on which their argument rested. He has read and absorbed his authorities so well that the restatement, for example, of Mazzini's doctrine is a really new contribution to political thought. The contrast between Hegel and Mazzini at the end of the second volume is most illuminating; and altogether the book is one which will make all scholars regret that the death of Professor Vaughan has deprived us of the larger work which he had planned. The history of political thought as rendered by him is not a mere succession of different doctrines. He does not merely summarize the work of great thinkers. The whole movement of political thought is lived through again, and the theories of the past are viewed always with reference to the practical experience of today.

C. D. B.

MAN AND HIS SUPERSTITIONS. By Carveth Read. Cambridge: The University Press, 1925. Pp. xvi+278. Price, 12*s.* 6*d.* net.

Man and his Superstitions is an expanded and corrected impression of the last seven chapters of Professor Carveth Read's *The Origin of Man and his Superstitions*. In the earlier chapters (now issued separately) the interesting theory is maintained that primitive man owes his development from the apes to the fact that he adopted the habit of hunting in herds like the wolf. Men were sociable because they lived by hunting as a pack, and as a pack they were led by leaders, who were personally superior. When, however, the time came that hunting was no longer the chief means of livelihood, and when owing to effective weapons the pack was no longer essential to successful hunt-

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ing, a group of men and women was kept together (when it *was* kept together) by belief in the magical powers of some of their elders. What we know of the most backward surviving peoples makes it highly probable that magic was the sanction of their government, supplemented by animism or belief in the influence of spirits; and these two "imagination beliefs" (as Professor Read terms them) became the seed of government. The closely reasoned analysis of these beliefs which is the subject of the book, is certainly "not without edification."

A peculiarly interesting chapter traces the development of the scientific attitude at the expense of the superstitions and there is some valuable criticism (chapter vii) of Frazer's conceptional hypothesis as to the origin of totemism. From man's having depended upon the organization of the pack, results, according to Professor Read, the low average development of mankind in both intellect and character. A pack or tribe needed enough variability to produce able leaders, "shepherds of the people," and enough average ability to follow and support them in a crowd. Natural selection, therefore, has operated first in producing variability, but the average intelligence or ability of the herd is much less important. The result is that industry, science, art, and invention be provided by the few; and thus the leading nations have of late years made wonderful progress in science and mechanical invention; but as Professor Read adds "there is no reason to suppose that anything has been done towards raising the average intelligence and character, and in default of that in my judgment nothing has been done to advance civilization."

C. D. B.

THE NEW HISTORY AND THE SOCIAL STUDIES. By Harry Elmer Barnes. New York: The Century Company, 1925. Pp. xvii+605. Price, $4.00.

If the author has not taken all learning for his province, he has at least attempted a somewhat ambitious program in the field of the social sciences. For the volume is not merely a discussion of the new history and of the relation of the social sciences thereto. It offers rather a considerably extended account of psychology, sociology, economics, political science, and ethics, with shorter discussions of geography, anthropology, and the history of science. Nor is his account of these various social studies merely a report. The author does not hesitate to set right the workers in these various fields, where they have gone wrong. The chapter on ethics gives a brief résumé of modern genetic views of ethical conceptions. Professor Barnes has a low opinion of the present status of ethics: "Supernaturalism reigns supreme, and whatever supplementary utilization may be made of logic and rhetoric is merely for the purpose of dignifying and rationalizing primitive illusions and spontaneously accepted dictates of the herd." The modern exaggeration of sex is, according to the present fashion, charged to puritanism in which "sex bigotry and the impurity-complex were seized upon as a compensation for economic chicanery." Kant's ethics was a rationalization of this in order "to justify his own physical frailty and extremely limited life experiences." Various historic ideals and the leading types of ethical theory are then reviewed and evaluated. Photographs of eminent scholars in other fields are given, but no writer on ethics has this honor. There are very copious references to modern literature in various sections of the book, and the reader will find much information as to the discussions now going on in the social sciences. But, if one may judge from the chapter on ethics, he will need to be cautious in assuming that he is getting an objective picture of existing conditions.

J. H. T.

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THE NEGRO YEAR BOOK. By Monroe N. Work. Negro Year Book Publishing Company, 1925. Pp. viii+544. Price, paper, $1.00, boards, $1.50.

This seventh edition of the *Negro Year Book* contains much historical material as to the past history of the negro and contains much new material. Among other topics is the question what term should be used for the people of African descent. "We hate the term 'Nigger,' we dislike Negro; but would our lot in reality be bettered by attempting to change to another no more satisfactory. . . . . Perhaps this matter of a race term will never be absolutely settled, and perhaps it is just as well that it should not be. . . . . However, the word 'Negro' bids fair to become the most universally accepted of race name terms. It has that tendency now." The *Negro Year Book* has information as to educational institutions, newspapers, mortality, crime, population, and bibliography.

J. H. T.

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NOTES

LOSSES TO ENGLISH PHILOSOPHY

During the autumn of 1924 and the spring of 1925, English philosophy has suffered many heavy losses, the roll of names including Bradley, McTaggart, and lastly James Ward.

In F. H. Bradley, who died at the age of seventy-eight in September, 1924, a leading, indeed a unique, figure has been removed. His *Ethical Studies* (1876) are marked by distinct originality, and it is significant that in the years between the appearance of his *Logic* and his epoch-making *Appearance and Reality* (1893) he was largely occupied with the study of psychology. Interesting estimates of Bradley as a man and the "kindest and most unwearied of friends," and of certain aspects of his teaching (his treatment of Nature and his doctrine of experience) appeared in the January (1923) number of *Mind*. Professor G. Dawes Hickes, while subjecting one aspect of Bradley's work to close and critical analyses, concludes with the expression of his conviction that Bradley's work, both constructive and critical, "will survive as a great effort of human speculation."

Professor James Ward, who died in March, 1925, and Bradley were held by common consent to be the two most eminent of contemporary English philosophers. Ward was within a few years of Bradley's age; his earliest interest, his chief subject for many years, was psychology, and his influence upon the Cambridge school of moral science was potent. It is characteristic of Ward's outlook that he threw himself into the modern scientific movement, and made a close study of biology at Leipzig and Cambridge, under Michael Foster, who termed him, in later days, a "physiologist spoilt." In 1897 he became professor of mental philosophy and logic at Cambridge, and two years later his important (Gifford) lectures on *Naturalism and Agnosticism* were published, containing very keen criticism of the preconceptions underlying naturalistic and agnostic theories of the universe. In later years his famous articles on psychology (in the *Encyclopaedia Britannica*) were revised and augmented into an independent treatise, which appeared as *Psychological Principles* (1918); and after that date his psychological and philosophical work was continued almost up to his death.

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The death of J. M. Ellis McTaggart (who published important studies of the Hegelian system) at the age of fifty-eight in January, 1925, was also a heavy loss, the first volume only of the *Nature of Existence* (1921) having been issued before his death. In the appended list will be found references to the articles contributed by Ward, Bradley, and McTaggart to the *International Journal of Ethics*, together with contributions by Bernard Bosanquet, James Seth, and Hastings Rashdall.

Bosanquet, B.: Articles: "The Principles and Chief Dangers of the Administration of Charity," *Journal of Ethics*, III, 323; "The Reality of the General Will," *ibid.*, IV, 308; "The Evolution of Religion," *ibid.*, V, 432; "A Moral From Athenian History," *ibid.*, IX, 13; "Ladies and Gentlemen," *ibid.*, p. 317; "The Dark Ages and the Renaissance," *ibid.*, XII, 195; "Charity Organization and the Majority Report," *ibid.*, XX, 395; "The Prediction of Human Conduct," *ibid.*, XXI, 1; "The Place of Leisure in Life," *ibid.*, p. 153. Discussions: "The Moral Aspects of Socialism," *ibid.*, VI, 503; "Aspects of the Social Problem," *ibid.*, VII, 226.

Bradley, F. H.: Articles: "Some Remarks on Punishment," *Journal of Ethics*, IV, 269; "The Limits of Individual and National Self-Sacrifice," *ibid.*, V, 17. Discussions: "A Personal Explanation," *ibid.*, IV, 384; "Rational Hedonism," *ibid.*, V, 383.

McTaggart, J. M. E.: Articles: "The Necessity of Dogma," *Journal of Ethics*, V, 147; "Hegel's Theory of Punishment," *ibid.*, VI, 479; "The Conception of Society as an Organism," *ibid.*, VII, 414; "Some Considerations Relating to Human Immorality," *ibid.*, XIII, 152; "Human Preexistence," *ibid.*, XV, 83; "The Individualism of Value," *ibid.*, XVIII, 433.

Rashdall, H.: Articles: "The Theory of Punishment," *Journal of Ethics*, II, 20; "The Limits of Casuistry," *ibid.*, IV, 459; "The Ethics of Forgiveness," *ibid.*, IX, 193. Discussion: "Mr. Bradley on Punishment," *ibid.*, V, 241.

Seth, James: Article: "The Problem of Destitution," *Journal of Ethics*, XXII, 39. Discussion: "Theory of Punishment," *ibid.*, II, 232.

Ward, James: Article: "G. S. Mill's Ethology," *Journal of Ethics*, I, 446.

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EXPERIENCE AND NATURE, by John Dewey, *Columbia University.* **Price $3.00**

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Biographical sketch and bibliography by Prof. R. C. Archibald, Brown University. Reminiscences by President Emeritus C. W. Eliot, President A. L. Lowell, Professor Emeritus W. E. Byerly, Chancellor Arnold B. Chace.

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THE DEVELOPMENT OF ETHICAL PROBLEMS IN GERMAN THOUGHT SINCE THE WAR

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With the loss and the ruinous aftermath of the war, there fell upon German intellectual activity sore distress, which because of the collapse of the currency increased beyond endurance. The homes of science could not be amplified, in fact in many cases they had to be abandoned; institutes of research were paralysed by financial pressure; libraries, once our pride, could no longer serve the exchange of ideas; valuable works of scholars lay stored away in drawers. . . . . In the tragedy of an afflicted people whose culture was of the highest standing those who were responsible for the intellectual enterprise are the chief mourners. . . . . But despite all this the suffering group of intellectual leaders has made the least outcry on the streets, in the press, and in parliaments.

I

In these few sentences a man familiar with German intellectual endeavor and German economic affairs, Dr. Otto Everling, chairman of the "Protective Association for the Suffering Intellectuals of Germany," has given expression, equally simple and true, to the distress of German intellectual life in general and German science in particular. Indeed, the simple fact that there is a "Protective Association for the Suffering Intellectuals of Germany," likewise a "Brotherhood of German Scientists in Need," attests this distress more plainly than any words could do, so plainly that even the embarrassment of poverty could not quite hide our poverty from the world.

[1] Translated from the German by Edwin A. Burtt, University of Chicago.

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To the effects of the losing of the war, of the forced settlement of Versailles, of the revolution, must also doubtless be ascribed the restriction of scientific production for the general public. To make this clear I need only point to the single fact that for years German universities had to give up the printing of theses. Only this year the first dissertations are again becoming accessible to the public in printed form. Nevertheless, the inner vitality, the intensity of scientific effort, had not relaxed. Perhaps the war itself with its unhappy outcome has increased reflection on problems, and of course not merely (as might be supposed) problems of economic life, but also those of the intellectual life. One might perhaps maintain that this very reflection in the form of thoughtful and well-balanced "discretion"—the Greek σωφροσύνη—has been of profit in large measure to ethics itself by returning thus as a genuine ethical concept. For when we speak of reflection on the problems, not merely of economic life, but also of intellectual life, the union of both types of problem in their widest extent seems quite characteristic of ethical thinking in the Germany of our time. We strive for exactly the right balance in the problem of social justice—not solely to reveal the difference, but also the mutual relations and implications of both spheres in the whole of social life. Yet that is simply one part within the whole of our ethical task, not the whole itself. And if in the course of the following essay we have to come back to just this part, still we must not place it at the peak of the enquiry. For at the peak of interest in our ethical work stand those fundamental questions out of which the problem of that union of economic and intellectual life derives its meaning.

Moreover, ethics shares its interest in that problem with another discipline which especially since the war has been cultivated in Germany, namely sociology. Hence it has become for us of particular scientific interest to distinguish ethics and sociology clearly and precisely from each other. We try to conceive ethics as a strictly philosophical science of first prin-

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ciples, which investigates the values and tasks out of which alone human life as expressed in will and deed derives its meaning. By contrast, sociology always starts with historical events, in which not only economics and morality, but also law, religion, art, science, appear together, in the real world. And it is simply this factual union as revealed in social processes, institutions, and relations that sociology tries to understand and to investigate in terms of its causes, laws, patterns, impulses, means, and ends. But sociology is not in the strict sense a philosophical science of first principles.

II

So far as regards the fundamental problems in the ethical field with which we have been especially busied since the war, it is unmistakable that all work, at least to the degree in which it can lay claim to philosophical and scientific value, shows continuity with the great traditions of German idealism. Even in the last year of the war a new philosophical journal was born, which under the name *Beiträge zur Philosophie des deutschen Idealismus,* took as its special task the cultivation of this tradition, but which has had such a struggle for existence against economic difficulties that it is questionable whether it will be able to continue. But however obvious the continuity with the great conceptions of German idealism, in the ethical field as elsewhere, it is just as obvious, and especially in the same field, that such continuity does not merely take the form of dogmatic acceptance of those conceptions. We are trying rather to develop them from their originally more formal side toward the material side, and to expand ethics into an ethic of values with special reference to its content. Hence appears anew an effort to come to terms with Kant's fundamental ethical ideas.

How powerful an influence Kant's thought is exerting in this most recent ethical development is shown in very interesting fashion on the side of a definite ethical movement, namely

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Catholic ethics. In Germany, Catholic ethics has perennially stood in the sharpest opposition to philosophical ethics, especially to the Kantian. This opposition of Catholic to philosophical ethics is now represented with unusual vigor by Scheler. Now it is very interesting to observe on this point that—as W. Koppelmann has shown with much pertinence and penetration—this Catholic opposition cannot do Kant justice at all, it must needs always reinterpret or misinterpret him in order to combat him, and that it has to take a position in "obvious contradiction" to Kant's own "clear utterances" in order to carry on its attacks. We might add to this that the Kantian formalism, as M. Wittmann has correctly shown, is attacked with a certain justice. But what this opposition offers on its own account cannot satisfy. Already the "formalism" is misunderstood and misinterpreted, and the assertions brought forward on the "a priori structure" of the ethical "kingdom of values" could be presented better and more clearly in terms of the main and central ideas of Kant himself, in such wise that a sheer formalism would be avoided. However, the most interesting aspect of the new opposition of Catholic to philosophical ethics, particularly the Kantian, lies in the fact that it too stresses an "a priori structure" of the ethical "realm of values" and acknowledges that for itself it is unable to determine that structure sharply and precisely, but in the end holds fast to a merely formal statement. This almost suggests the suspicion that it has itself been more deeply influenced by Kant than it suspects. The peculiar feature of this situation is that the Catholic ethics, while seeking of course to transcend sheer formalism, falls into vagueness and obscurity in the very attempt, while from the fundamental ideas of Kant, without stopping at formalism, we are able to discover with real clarity and distinctness the content of the "a priori structure" of the ethical "realm of values." Of course, it is characteristic of the so-called formalism of Kant that one cannot actually remain in it. But neither does one

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need to remain in it, even if in other respects he recognizes and acknowledges in the ideas of Kant a framework of enduring worth for the foundation of ethics. Under these general points of view my own investigations in the ethical field coincide with those of H. Barth and A. Görland, the harmony here being consistent with not unessential differences from other viewpoints.

I myself have distinguished two forms of the principle of law in ethics. These have equal objective validity, but a different relation to the willing and acting subject. Both equally would require acknowledgment, but would require a different form of realization. The one would be able to address itself to the will of every rational being, the other would depend on conditions necessary for its being realized. The principle of ethical autonomy as a universal basal law of ethics would represent the first form. Its discovery will always remain the merit of Kant. Kant's fault, on the other hand, lies in not having given sufficient attention to the second form of ethical law. While he brings the principle of autonomy to a clear expression in the "categorical imperative," he touches upon the second form only in the "hypothetical imperatives," but with respect to it remains without a sure and clear decision. Now this is a problem which ethics at the present time must attack with unusual energy. I have established, with sufficient precision in detail, that autonomy is indeed the basis of ethics, but that it does not comprise on that account the whole system of ethical law. In distinguishing ethics and morals from each other, and in relating them, I was able to show that autonomy as such could include the realm of moral values, but not the entire realm of ethical values. On this principle of autonomy every deed must of course be based if it is to be called ethically good. But it does not need to be based solely on that principle to claim ethical value. The totality of ethical values is then more inclusive than the principle of autonomy. To such a totality belongs, besides autonomy, that second

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form of ethical law which, to distinguish it from the "categorical imperative," I have designated not merely as did Kant the "hypothetical imperative," but the "cultural imperative" (*Kulturimperative*). Since between autonomy and cultural imperatives there exists an inseparable connection, an indissoluble interrelation, there will also obtain between morality and culture an inner mutual dependence. And only in that relationship can the entire realm of ethical values be revealed. Hence we may admit a legitimacy in the Kantian demand to "act from duty," likewise in the Fichtean demand to "act from consciousness of duty." But beyond this general and still formal demand we can then speak, still in the ethical field, and with concrete reference to their content, not merely of moral duties, but also of religious duties, of legal duties, of political duties, of logical duties, of duties of the scholar, the artist—briefly, too, of the duties of one's calling, etc.

III

In this way alone, even in philosophical ethics, can those central problems be treated fruitfully and hopefully, which in the period since the war have acquired large significance in the public life of Germany and especially in social movements. I mean the problems of personality and community. It is indeed no accident that on these problems in recent years philosophy and life have met in exceedingly close contact. The distress of the time and the state of social relations have placed these problems directly in the foreground of interest in the general consciousness of our public. And although it is the philosophy of Germany which has from time immemorial in its ethics devoted especial attention to these problems, yet in the period since the war this has been done in continually increasing measure. In the vital interrelation of philosophy and life philosophers in the field of ethics have applied themselves to these problems in the most varied manner. I might name especially in this connection Brunstäd, Eucken, Spranger, M. Wundt, Litt, and also myself.

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It is only from this entire realm of ethical values that the meaning of the concept of personality becomes clear. And to the ethics of personality Spranger has devoted unusually fine studies. The law of ethical values demands, in order to be represented in actual life, a will that can relate itself to values. "To relate itself to values"—I have expressed the state of affairs thus—"is something which is only possible for a will that is conscious of itself and of the values, that is able to distinguish itself from them so as to relate itself again to them, thus a self-conscious and a value-conscious will, or in short, a rationally willing self-consciousness." Self-conscious, because conscious of law and value and uniting itself to them—only through such a being, as possessing will, can the law gain expression. But a self-consciousness which can consciously attach itself to the law as a value, which can voluntarily represent it, is what we mean by a moral personality. Its specifically moral meaning lies in the fact that, conscious of the law and of itself, and thus self-conscious, it is able to relate itself to the law and give the latter representation through the process of willing. It is irrelevant whether it does actually thus relate itself and actually give the law representation. If it does this through a deed, then just on that account the deed is moral. But in itself it is always a condition of the possibility of moral conduct. And just in this lies its properly moral character. It has, as on an earlier occasion I formulated the matter, ethical potentiality. This ethical-personal potentiality is the presupposition of all ethical reality. Hence it is also necessary not to confuse ethical personality with the real individual. The latter as such—the individual merely as individual—is no more moral than the real in general, which as such is always individual. For the individual himself personality remains a task. The individual is a moral personality only potentially, as personality represents the law only potentially. But because the law does not require the individual, but does require the personality, it is not the individual but the personality that has

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this ethical potentiality. As the moral law remains a task for it, so it remains itself a task for the individual in the ladder of teleological dependence, which corresponds to the movement toward entelechy in Aristotle. Although in the real world personality always presents itself only as individual, nevertheless the individual (for everything real is individual) does not present itself as personality (for not everything real is a personality). Even if it were possible to attribute to the individual potential personality, yet it is only personality which as such possesses ethical potentiality. For it is precisely personality, not barely or merely individuality, that is required to bring the law to expression. (Cf. my "Ethics" in the *Kultur der Gegenwart,* Vol. entitled *Systematische Philosophie,* pp. 252 ff.) Although then the validity of the values in the ethical system subsists independent of all subjectivity, it can find its expression in reality only through a subject which can relate itself to it—that is, however, a personality. The latter is "the subject in which the moral law becomes actual."

As such a subject, new value comes to it by transfer from the ethical value-system. This leads at once from the problem of personality to the problem of the community, purely on the basis of its ethical potentiality, that is, solely on this account, that personality is the subject of the possibility of ethical conduct, while simply as personality it is also the object of moral treatment. However we may describe its objective character as the object of moral treatment, whether we call personality "object of reverence," whether we give it the more religious name, conceived in its deepest meaning by Christianity, of "object of love," yet this, its specifically ethical character as object, is always based on its specifically ethical character as subject, as personality. Both stand in inseparable interrelation. And this interrelation is what we call community. This makes it necessary to conceive of personality and community as themselves correlative concepts. Personalism and socialism in the ethical sense do not exclude each other, they require

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each other reciprocally and include each the other. No ethical community is possible which is not a community between ethical personalities. Likewise no ethical personality is possible which is not the member of an ethical community because it is just in such a community that the possibility of ethical conduct and of ethical relations with others imply each other. But because personality gains ethical potentiality solely from the realm of ethical values by transfer, the ethical community always appears both as a community between ethical personalities and also as a community of ethical values. It is always, at one and the same time, a community of personality and a community of value, and its character as personal is just as inseparable from it as its character as value.

This likewise distinguishes the ethical community from real society. The same relation as obtains between individual and personality holds between society and community. As personality to the individual is something to be achieved, community likewise remains for society as something to be achieved. Again, society is ethical community only potentially, just as the individual is a moral personality only potentially; and just as personality is a condition of the possible realization of ethical values, so is likewise the community. Hence it is community and not society which possesses ethical potentiality, because it is community of personality and not merely of individuality. As in the real world personality reveals itself only as individuality while individuality does not necessarily reveal itself as personality (because of course everything real is also individual, but is not necessarily personal) so likewise community naturally reveals itself in the real world only as society, while society does not thus reveal itself as community. On this account we can, for example, speak of societies even among the animals—it is enough to mention wasps and bees for illustration—but we speak of community only in reference to men. Solely in human community is found a community between personalities and one that has ethical value.

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While earlier in German philosophy the contrast between individualism and socialism in the ethical field was much discussed, now we are beginning to perceive that this alternative was set up in a form that was really false. The relation between personality and community as treated in German ethics during recent years has at least carried us far beyond the old opposition between individualism and socialism in ethics. Today, so far as ethics is concerned, we would properly speak rather of personalism and socialism, but we should have to add at once that these do not stand in opposition to each other but have found a synthesis. For they are alike factors in a higher relationship. Hence the ethical relativism which was frequently championed in Germany at an earlier time and which is still occasionally supported, has been approaching extinction more and more. Just in the all-embracing correlation of personalism and socialism, of personality and community, in the community as community between personalities and as community of values, the relation between these factors gains a meaning that reaches beyond all relativism, a meaning which even makes possible the attribution to personalities of a superpersonal worth. And if one were to attempt to work out a theory of relativity in the ethical field, as Herbertz is doing, it would be only in a sense analogous to the physical theory of relativity at one point, namely, in so far as the latter, rightly understood, would be able to transcend all physical relativity in the highest and most general relations. Solely from the insight that in the most personal relationship there is something of personality achieved reaching beyond the bare moment, yes beyond all time, in and for the community of good will, can the discussions about socialism and Christianity, as Rudolf Stammler says at the end of his fine and profound volume on *Socialism and Christianity,* "find a solution and a liberating outcome."

IV

We have said that in the interest in problems of personality and community, philosophy and life in general among us

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in Germany have come together in a special way during recent years, and the contact has been close. Our last paragraph brings us to the field of life in which this meeting and contact is especially noteworthy. For when Stammler writes on *Socialism and Christianity,* or Eucken on *Idealism and Socialism,* or Fr. Brunstäd on *Germany and Socialism,* these thinkers mean unanimously political socialism. So it is actually and primarily political life which has set new problems for the most recent development of ethics in Germany. The general public consciousness in Germany has been forced to observe in the concrete facts of politics too sharp a contrast between politics and ethics to be passed by carelessly and easily. The political treatment which Germany experienced through the forced settlement at Versailles, the lie involved in loading upon her the entire and sole guilt for the war, and many other things besides, stand in such sharp contradiction to the demands and commands of ethics, that this very contradiction necessarily stimulated our minds to make of the relation between politics and ethics a problem. The challenge is generally felt to view politics and ethics no longer merely as contrasts, but to win a positive relation between them, to ethicize politics, place it on an ethical foundation. Whoever has read German newspapers attentively during recent years must have noticed in them that an infinite amount of writing has been done not only against the Versailles Treaty and the lie about the guilt of the war, but also on the peace and reconciliation of peoples. Of course for the most part the purpose in such efforts was very much better than the result. Frequently, also, these writers have not been quite clear as to the difficulty of the problems attacked. Without having thought through deeply the fundamental ethical questions themselves, one cannot get at the bottom of such problems. Hence necessarily the task of collaborating upon such problems fell upon philosophical ethics. This has likewise been done in many different ways, whether in general terms as by Eucken in his *Ethics as the Foundation of Political Life,* whether by sketching in broad

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outline with Max Wundt a new *Philosophy of the State* or still more generally the *Spirit of Our Time,* whether finally by discussing specific problems as I have done in *The Dialectic of War and Peace in the Philosophy of Kant,* or *Fichte and the German Idea of the State,* or *The Concept of Nationality,* etc. It can be appreciated that we in Germany have likewise taken under ethical-political points of view a position on such questions as those of the pros and cons of pacifism, of the ethical meaning of a political constitution, whether republic, democracy, monarchy, aristocracy, etc. It will be as easily intelligible that opinions on these matters in detail are very diverse. But in this connection we cannot enter upon such details. Only so much will I observe, that measured by philosophical points of view in social ethics the parliamentary principle cannot win particularly high valuation, and that we today, following Kant, are not at all inclined to identify genuine republicanism merely with democracy, as of course they have not been identified in America, whose war once for independence and freedom found nowhere in Europe so great sympathy as with Germany's greatest philosopher, Immanuel Kant.

What Kant viewed as the proper end of the state, in which point his great successors such as Fichte and Hegel were in essential harmony with him, has again become the vital crux of ethical discussion on the problem of the state in our time, and thus reveals once more the continuity of present work in ethics with the tradition of German idealism. However impossible it is, as noted, to enter upon details here because of the limited scope of this essay, yet at least the principal thought must be clearly emphasized, viz., that from the ethical point of view it is the meaning and goal of the state to develop and cultivate its members within the community for freedom and for an intelligent vocation in the service of the community, so that everyone will be able to work out within the political unit to which he belongs a meaning and value for his life in its individuality and in its contribution to the community. Since it is

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the duty of every member of the political community as a personality to work out for himself meaning and value in life, every personality within the community has a right to the opportunity of fulfilling this duty, and to a guaranty of freedom in the state for such fulfilment of duty through governmental control of the community life.

With this arise a whole series of further problems for ethics such as the problem of law, of freedom, of work, of industry, of culture and education, all of which are co-implicated in their ethical bearing, and have assumed, especially in the ethical work of recent years, an unusual significance.

V

It is a natural corollary of the ethical meaning of the problem of personality and community, and of the endeavor to advance from the merely formal aspect to the material content of the entire realm of ethical values, that in the most recent development of ethics this meaning should be related systematically to those sciences which stand in a close connection with it as regards this problem. Cohen had already related ethics closely to jurisprudence; Albert Görland had followed him in this in his *New Basis of Ethics*. But Görland goes far beyond Cohen in not limiting this relation merely to jurisprudence. Görland extends it to what he calls the sciences of community life (*Gemeinschaftswissenschaften*). As such besides jurisprudence and political science he treats economics and education. In the attempt at such an extension lies doubtless a valuable contribution of Görland, even though we may perhaps not be able to find in his idea of the sciences of community life the entire content of the field of ethical values. I have been seeking to bring out this content especially in the direction of those sciences which we in Germany since the basic contributions of Rickert describe as the field of the "cultural sciences," so that I bring ethics into very close relation to philosophy of history. Its connection on the side of philosophy of

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law finds expression also in such essays in that field as have recently been written by jurists. The paper of Radbruch on "Elements of the Philosophy of Law" was an earlier example of what I mean. In a yet higher degree this is now illustrated by the great *Philosophy of Law* by Julius Binder, a work of truly monumental significance which is of the greatest importance not only for the philosophy of law but also for ethics.

Ethically the idea of law is based precisely on this, that everyone has the duty of working out for his life within the community a meaning and value, and that just for the reason that he has this duty he has also the right to the conditions of its fulfilment. In its deepest basis, then, from the ethical point of view, what the caprice of the individual might claim as right is not necessarily right, but only that is true right in its ethical significance which Radbruck has expressed in his formula, "the right to the fulfilment of duty." All true right gains its proper justification always and solely from duty. Such a conception also reflects in every respect the consciousness of daily life, which says, "Where there is no duty there is likewise no right," or, "Without duties there can be no rights."

It is the deepest meaning of law that the fulfilment of duty shall be made possible for a personality within a community, that his freedom for the fulfilment of duty shall be guaranteed. In the ethical sense, as has again been expressed in agreement with Kant, but with still sharper emphasis than in his case, law covers precisely the totality of conditions under which the freedom of each can subsist in the same community with the freedom of all others. In this way we are trying to gain for the problem of freedom a new and deeper meaning. The battle between determinism and indeterminism is, to be sure, not yet entirely ended in peace. Indeterminism has found support again, occasionally, in this period, as with Messer; even natural scientists of Planck's rank have sought to give it support. But it is also frequently rejected by determinist opponents as a mere "illusion." However, the alternative

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—determinism or indeterminism—has not stood in the most recent movements in the field of ethics any longer in the foreground of philosophical interest. We could rather assert that the deeper endeavors in the most recent development are characterized just by the attempt to transcend this alternative; indeed we might perhaps maintain that our attempt is to prove that it is a false way of putting the question. Determinism or indeterminism—thus it might be maintained against them and has been maintained against them—neither of them signifies genuine freedom. And not everything that people call freedom is the freedom with which ethics is concerned. Not only is freedom no mere absence of constraint and independence of law. Freedom is also not always superior to obligation, but freedom in its highest and deepest ethical sense is simply obligation, not of course the obligation submitted to by the slavish soul but self-devotion to the law of duty and value. In this connection, in our time, a profound phrase in the poetry of Goethe has found philosophical justification, the phrase namely that "law alone can give us freedom." It is evident likewise from this that freedom in the ethical sense is to be sharply distinguished from every form of mere caprice. Caprice simply means freedom from compulsion. It is therefore merely negative freedom. It does not understand that compulsion itself can be only a means in the service of positive freedom, by which we mean freedom to realize values through personality in the totality of community life.

Now for the ethical meaning of the problem of law and the state this is of the very greatest importance, and on it I have ventured extensively in several of my writings. Here I can only mention the following point very briefly: since, as I have already said, law appears ethically as the sum of conditions under which the freedom of each can consist with the freedom of all others in the community, a corollary is obvious which Stammler has called its significance as the expression of community control. On this rests also the unique character of law

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as compulsion, which distinguishes law from properly ethical obligation even as it indicates the relation between them. Ethical conduct is never compulsory. Forced ethical conduct is a contradiction in terms. But of course legal conduct is always compulsory. The character of compulsion, of law as enforcement, is precisely what may appear as its most obvious nature, as much to the unsophisticated mind as to the philosopher or jurist. Although now the layman may recognize the relation of law to duty, although he may easily discern the enforcement bound up in the nature of law, he will still find a certain difficulty in the thought that the compulsoriness of law serves its function only as guaranteeing freedom for the fulfilment of duty.

VI

This difficulty is avoided precisely by our distinction, that freedom is not absence of compulsion, but is freedom for law and purpose, for duty and value. Freedom and compulsion are therefore not simply contradictories. Hence compulsion can itself be a servant to freedom, a means to the end of freedom. For it does not need to be directed against freedom but just against everything that disturbs and hinders true freedom as self-determination in the fulfilment of duty for the sake of purpose and value. In this is revealed again the relation between law and duty. As compulsory, of course, law is distinguished from properly ethical obligation. But as a compulsion which is directed against those things that disturb and hinder ethical freedom, it stands in the closest relation with ethical obligation itself. Compulsion does not destroy ethical freedom. Of course it limits subjective caprice just because the latter hinders ethical freedom. While, then, compulsion hinders caprice, precisely by that very fact it serves freedom. Law, with its compulsory obligation, is therefore no compulsion against freedom but against subjective caprice, which it limits directly in the service of freedom. Hence it is by law

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alone that the life of the community can be ruled in the interest of ethical values.

For the ethical meaning of political life this is of far-reaching significance. Just on this problem, too, much emphasis is placed in the ethical work of our time. If right as regards its deepest ethical basis is "right to the fulfilment of duty" for a personality in a community, and if it is a condition of the regulation of community life, then it also requires (for it lies in its very nature to restrain caprice and thereby serve freedom) force to express right and make it effective. All rightful government of community life is thus only expressed and realized through the state in so far as it possesses the force necessary to control social life in accordance with right and hence justly. Force is therefore inseparable from the ethical meaning of the state. But however important force is for the state, nevertheless it is never its final and highest end. It can only be a means to the end of the social regulation of the state. It must derive its justification solely from the idea of right, as the latter must derive its justification from the idea of duty. As right can exist solely on the ground of duty if it is to be a just and justified right (*ius iustum*), so force derives its right solely from the idea of right itself—it is the force requisite to make right actual. The assertion "force takes precedence of right" is therefore ethically entirely false. At most it could have a merely temporal meaning in the sense that force appears earlier than right. But that would concern merely the natural side of the relation. Yet the mere state of nature is in general of course no state in which right exists, as Fritz Münch has especially emphasized in his endeavor to establish the proper meaning of right as a cultural concept. For every true state of right is always also a state of culture, with ethical value. Hence, even if force appears before right in the course of nature, since right always lifts us into the sphere of culture, force remains in its ethical meaning and value always subordinate to right. Should it wish to make itself superior to right it

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would become itself decidedly in the wrong. So far as the ethical meaning is concerned, it can be only a means to the end of right. And because right in turn is a means to the end of duty we could say: Force is the means of a means to the properly ethical end of duty, hence as means it has in general only a secondary ethical significance, however necessary it may be as a servant of the just regulation of the community life.

VII

With the ethical problem of the state stands in very close connection the problem of the ethical meaning of nationality and humanity. It is no accident, but follows in close actual and necessary connection with the political events of the last decade, that ethics in Germany has applied itself with especial energy to these problems too. In fact it was not possible to leave them in the hands of political thinkers alone. Ethics too must give them her interest, for it is above all in this field, of course, that the realm of ethical values gains its concrete form. However necessary the state is for the regulation of community life, there is always something formal about it. The content, however, which under the form of the state gives the significance of spiritual life to the life of the community, can only take shape in the development of the nationality of peoples. The nation is the most concrete form which community life gains historically. In it alone does the individual citizen discover concrete tasks, purposes, and duties for which he has to work in order to fulfil his end in the community and in order that the community as a whole shall itself realize its end.

The right to the fulfilment of duty thus becomes at the same time the duty and the right to work. But with work the right to compensation stands in necessary interrelation. The problems of work and wage thus appear in their ethical significance. Man has the duty to work in order to give his life a meaning in the community of the nation and the state. Hence he has also a right to work, but he must be able through his

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work to assure for himself a wage, in order to live and to be able to fill his life with meaning and to express by his life his duties to the community and to himself.

In this way we reach also as an ethical problem the relation between intellectual life and economic life. For Germany this relation has, of course, gained a quite unusual importance. I do not need to say much about it in general. I might only indicate briefly along two lines the way in which we in ethics view the problem. One point concerns the relative rank of intellectual life and economic life in their relation to each other, the other concerns the organic connection between intellectual endeavor and economic endeavor. It was just the dominance of economic interests over intellectual interests in all countries of the earth and particularly in the field of politics, which led to the catastrophe that has certainly fallen upon Germany most heavily, but which—to make this clear we need only think of materialistic Marxism and Bolshevism with their dangers for the whole world—can lead to the darkest and most woeful doom for all lands and nations if politicians do not before it is too late gain an ethical point of view, such as would yield to intellectual interests, in truth and in deed, not alone with fine phrases, pre-eminence over economic interests. Life itself has taught us this in Germany with peculiar emphasis. And we have tried to give this lesson a consistent basis in the ethics of our time. I think that I have shown in my writings with especial clearness that however great importance economic considerations have for the life of nations they can never furnish its final and highest end, but must always take the place of mere means in the service of intellectual activity, from which alone they receive their meaning. Similar ideas have been expressed also by Heinrich Rickert. This is all that I am able to indicate briefly on the relative rank of these interests. The connection between intellectual and economic endeavor, with reference precisely to its illustration in Germany, Otto Everling has described in the following manner.

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Without the significant contributions of German intellectual effort German industry would never have had its successes. Without it our people in their limited territory could never have reached such a standard of living before the war; without it it will be quite impossible to preserve unimpaired living conditions for the German people on the still more limited soil of Germany. The entire economic structure of Germany, her industry not least, has a living interest in maintaining science along with economic effort, in keeping the brain-worker active beside the hand-worker, with all the tools that the new day has made possible. But on the other hand these intellectual workers in Germany who are an indispensable means for the preservation and development of our best national powers can only continue to exist if they are supported by a vigorous, healthy, German industry.

Then Everling points to the fact that the intellectual contributions of German culture have not only been of great value to German industry, its leaders and workers, "but also have benefited the peoples of all the earth."

Here we have touched also the ethical problem of humanity, which has likewise won a peculiar significance in the ethical work of our time.

VIII

Of course when we say that this problem has won a peculiar significance in our time, that does not mean that ethics in Germany has just now begun reflection on it. We should not be maintaining too much if we opined that in the philosophy of no land has this problem been so busily attacked as in Germany herself from Leibniz, through the whole of the so-called "Philosophy of the Enlightenment" to Kant, Fichte, Schiller, W. Von Humbodt, and their successors. The idea of "humanity" stirred men's minds so vigorously that often the idea of nationality was forgotten. Thinkers fell into an entirely too nebulous and abstract ethical cosmopolitanism. This was shown with peculiar clearness in the so-called "Philosophy of the Enlightenment." In our day, especially in the period since the war, the problem while thus not being newly discovered has yet been faced anew. And the earlier tenden-

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cies continue to influence our present ethical attack on it. In the socialistic *Internationale* the old abstract cosmopolitanism has been preserved unchanged. But on the basis of its materialistic position it has given a merely economic stamp to these endeavors. Another position on the problem is being taken by the ethical enquiries, which are characterized at the same time by a keener historical consciousness and a deeper philosophical appreciation. Although it is impossible now, in the limited scope of this article to develop all the various opinions expressed in present attacks on this problem, yet at least a few striking points must be noted. It is necessary to observe at once that community as such is more, and greater, than any national community by itself. A personality has duties not merely to the members of his nation but to the community as the sum-total of personalities. This indeed is its character just as personality, in which as the subject of moral conduct and as the object of ethical treatment the relation of community subsists. Thus ethical values have validity not merely for this or that nation, but because they are valid in and for themselves, they are valid for all nations. As the totality of all tasks which grow out of these objective ethical values which give meaning and content to human life, humanity itself looms up as the international goal for all peoples and nations that find themselves called and equipped to work together in the intellectual and spiritual life. But in the next place we must observe that humanity can only win a concrete historical life through the original, independent spiritual and intellectual toil of nations. Without the concrete historical form of nationality humanity would be and remain an empty name, a mere abstraction. It is in the relation of people to people that it has a vital, historical life. But there is no relation of people to people without a vigorous nationality, without nations themselves —no *inter nationes* without *nationes ipsae*. Thus, however supernational ethical values are, their concrete realization and representation is always and only possible in history, and in

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the history of the culture of intellectually independent and original peoples. Between such cultures, certainly, relations can be established, because the ethical values, on which they are grounded, are valid in and for themselves independently of nations. But because nations can share in these ethical values, they can likewise in those relations, both as regards their own intellectual life as nations and as regards their union with the intellectual life of other nations, bring into actuality the idea of humanity itself. In the third place, finally, it must be remarked in this connection that to have ethical value those relations of nations to each other must not be sought mainly where still today the mass of men and a fairly large number of politicians as well are seeking them, namely in economic matters alone. They must rather above all be found in intellectual and spiritual endeavor. It is indeed obvious that in the field of intellectual activity, more especially of scientific activity, lies a quite unusual ethical task of working for such a goal.

In conclusion, the fact may be emphasized that even the theory of education in Germany conceives the idea of "humanity" in this sense, and that particularly in recent times it has been trying to attain very close relations to the philosophy of values, especially to ethics as the science of ethical values. To make this clear by illustrations I should like to mention before all others the names Hönigswald, Johannsen, Litt, and Spranger. However independent of each other these authors may be in other respects, the realization is equally strong in all of them that all education, as regards its meaning and essence, is education for values, and that values therefore stand both at the beginning and at the end of all theory of education. Hence ethics must have an especial significance for such a theory.

In the preceding pages I have attempted to draw at least a general picture of the work with which in the field of ethics in recent years we have been unusually busied and are yet occupied. The modest compass of the essay did not of course permit me to take up individual variations in this ethical

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work. I had to limit myself to the endeavor, first of all to make clear the fundamental problems which compose the content of our work in the field of ethics, and then to point out the general direction and manner in which we seek the solution of these problems. I hope I have succeeded in this, and that I have at least given my American readers a general picture of the state of our ethical activity. If I shall have accomplished this, some contribution will have been made to the attainment of the end of humanity as I just described it, the end, namely, that in the interest of humanity nations should learn to know each other, particularly in the field of intellectual endeavor, and should understand each other's intellectual labors —that indeed to this end scientific work has a very special contribution to make.

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UNIVERSITY OF JENA

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MAKING THE INTERNATIONAL MIND

C. DELISLE BURNS

One of the chief obstacles to peace, and therefore to the improvement of civilized life, is the continued hostility between the peoples and races of the world. Hostility is due in part to impulses which are primitive and perhaps ineradicable —such as the impulse to dominate over others; but in part the hostility of nations is due to ignorance of the true character of our own nation and of the elements which constitute the civilization we share. This more superficial source of hostility can certainly be dealt with by conscious policy; and when we have overcome ignorance we shall probably find that we have turned the primitive impulses into channels less destructive than those at present followed. The policy, therefore, which is summarized in what follows here is educational. Its purpose is the transformation of the outlook of the next generation.

But in order to define clearly the methods by which such a transformation may be brought about, a distinction must be made between the subject-matter of education and the educational system. An improvement in education involves partly a change in the subjects or methods of study and partly reorganization of "the machine," that is to say, the schools and universities and the relation between them. Therefore the policy suggested in what follows here would have to be worked out partly by scholars and teachers and partly by administrators.

I. SUBJECT-MATTER OF EDUCATION

History is the crucial subject. As the physical sciences transformed the material circumstances of mankind during the last century, so history can transform the spiritual outlook of mankind in this century. History should be taught with an emphasis upon the *contributions* which all nations, including

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our own, have made to a *common store* of knowledge and ability which we call civilization. Obviously (*a*) the history of the child's own country must be the basis of all history taught, and patriotism must be the ethical outlook implied in the teaching. But patriotism must be based upon the knowledge of the good one's own country has done to other countries. That is to say, history based on local facts must from the beginning interpret those facts internationally. Even the consolidation of one's own country must be regarded not simply as a benefit to its inhabitants, but as an opportunity for the country or its inhabitants to assist the rest of the world. In the same way the growth of the children of a family is not simply an advantage to themselves and their relatives, but an opportunity for their service in the world.

It is essential that no opposition should be felt to exist between the love of one's own country, or patriotism, and the international outlook. The earlier forms of internationalism were either negligent of patriotism or opposed to it; but this is quite unnecessary. A child or an adult can love or be proud of his own country for two very different reasons, just as he may be proud of himself for two very different reasons. He may value wealth and power, and love of his country may involve getting for it as much territory or power over others, or financial opportunities, as possible. This, if it is patriotism at all, is an objectionable form of patriotism; for it is primitive and barbaric. On the other hand, a man may be proud of his country because of what it has done for the rest of the world, either by the scientific discoveries of his compatriots or by the skill of his compatriots as administrators and artists. Similarly, a man may be justly proud of the services he has rendered to his fellow-men. This sort of pride is not vicious, nor primitive, nor barbaric. So the true patriotism implies a love for one's country as an instrument of service. It is the patriotism of giving, in contrast with the patriotism of getting. It is a patriotism which brings nations together, not the barbaric localism which separates them.

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If a list were drawn up of the men and women of any nation whom other nations regarded as their benefactors, any nation would have ground for pride. Of course, the kind of services performed cannot always be understood by children or unintellectual adults. It is difficult, for example, to explain to some people why Beethoven and Shakespeare are regarded as benefactors by others than Germans or Englishmen. It is more difficult to explain the benefactions we have received from mathematicians or experimentalists whose names are not generally familiar. But the point is that there have been in all nations some men and women, not generals or admirals or politicians, who were "great" because of what they did for other nations as well as their own. These provide, so to speak, the credentials for our patriotism.

The relations of nations, therefore, can be shown to be essentially useful to each; but the other side of the facts must not be omitted entirely. There should be a record of battles, although it must be quite subordinate in interest to the other instances of contact with foreign peoples. The battles must be treated as the unfortunate effects of obstacles in the way of the progress of civilization. Secondly, the record of the battles must not end with the words "defeat" or "victory," but with a specific account of the number killed and of the results in disease, impoverishment, and insecurity on both sides. It is easy to suggest the doubt whether, even when war has been beneficial in expelling foreign tyranny, another method would not have been better. The main point is that the patriotic emotion can be transformed into an impulse toward peace. The "devil" must not be allowed to have "all the good times."

b) The elements in human life which should stand out in the teaching of history are not political nor economic, but "cultural," religious, and intellectual. That is to say, even young children must be told first, not about the forms of government nor about trade, but about how common folk lived, what they knew, and what they believed, what music and poetry and other art they had. In every period treated the com-

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parison should be made between our own countrymen and the inhabitants of other lands. If clothing and customs are referred to, the emphasis must not be upon economic cost or economic production, but upon taste and beauty and general happiness. Cultural history is not yet fully known, nor are there yet adequate books for use in schools. This is dealt with below (p. 142). History in fact is still very crude. It is generally as childish as medieval science was. We have, of course, given up the old record of dates and names of kings; but we are still obsessed with machinery and external circumstances. Social history is still very seldom concerned with music or painting or poetry. We are still too "political" in the outlook of our history textbooks. The history of any nation may be understood better from its artistic and religious movements than by reference to its government; and, obviously, "illustrations" of such history are much more easily understood. But as soon as we emphasize that history, the interdependence of nations becomes obvious.

c) Foreign countries should be referred to both as indebted to our own country and as sources for some of what we enjoy in the arts and sciences. In the schools for children, of course, the child's own country must remain the center to which all the history taught is related; for otherwise it will become too abstract. But to any such center has been brought at different dates the music, the poetry, the religious enthusiasm, and also the trade of other countries. In the universities the point of view should be higher. It should be possible there to show that civilization has no one center, but that the interchange occurs everywhere.

This does not involve rejection of existing histories; but it does involve supplementing them. The facts which show contact with other nations are numerous and quite familiar; but they are generally not noticed in the teaching of history. For example, wall paper and cotton prints are in origin Chinese

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and Indian. Trousers were a discovery of the "barbarians" outside the Roman Empire. Different medicines are due to different races. Such facts can be collected and the record can be made quite amusing. There is a large field for research here, in which even children can practice real historical investigation. This will have the additional advantage of teaching not only historical information, but historical method. In schools today history is often treated as a mere set of facts to be remembered, as arithmetic once was. We now know that method is what we must teach. We must teach students, not to "know history," but to be historians. That is more valuable educationally than memorizing.

d) This historical treatment should apply not only to the teaching of what is called history, but to the teaching of all the subjects, grammar, arithmetic, etc. There should be no subject in the curriculum which is not taught historically. The inevitable result will be that our debt to foreign nations will appear. A new outlook will be produced, not only in those interested in history or literature, but also in those who are good at mathematics or physical science. The history of the discovery and improvement of signs, such as the alphabet and the arabic numerals, would show our debt to dead races. In grammar every great language is of course saturated with good ideas from foreign parts; and it might be useful to show that each language has "exported" some words in exchange for others. It could be shown that the growth of language was dependent partly upon the increase of invention and discovery. The history of arithmetic, algebra, and geometry is quite international, and these subjects should not be taught as ready-made rules, but by reference to the gradual discovery of which they are the outcome. It will not be necessary to urge that such teaching will promote peace and concord. It will be in every way better teaching. Of course the logical correctness of mathematics or science is more important than where this or that bit of knowledge came from; but truth is better under-

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stood and more highly valued if it is shown to be the result of efforts made by many men in many lands.

II. EDUCATIONAL SYSTEMS

In dealing with the system of education, there are two chief sections, one with regard to books and educational apparatus, the other with regard to travel and interchange of students and teachers. This part of the plan must be carried out by administrators who must, of course, be fully in touch with educational methods, but need not be themselves teachers. The scholar and professor is often a very bad administrator, and on the other hand the administrator is often a bad judge of the value of this or that method of teaching.

a) Books present an obvious problem. The books which are needed for transforming society through the schools do not yet exist. The first necessity, therefore, is to produce, on a large scale and in the very best form, a new type of history and other textbooks for each country. These new books must drive out the old because they are (1) cheaper, (2) more beautiful, and (3) contain more and better knowledge. They must not be labeled with any "uplift." For some years they may have to be sold at a loss. In very poor countries or poor schools it may be best to give them gratuitously through the school authorities. We are not thinking here of history books only. Textbooks of arithmetic or grammar should be provided as well, each with some historical reference to the nations which have given us the numerals or the alphabet, and all with illustrations. In every country the co-operation of a small group of scholars and writers must be secured. The production of the new books will take some years; but the scheme is no more difficult than the production has been of the large volumes of the Carnegie Institute's social and economic history of the war. In some cases material already exists.

Similarly, other apparatus—pictures, copies of works of art, models of ancient or modern machinery—all can be shown

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to be due wholly or in part to this or that nation. With regard to such apparatus, the efforts of foreign nations can be shown by pictures and models; but here again some international organization is needed. The Committee of Intellectual Co-operation of the League of Nations may be used. Already it has discussed the use of films produced in France for other countries, but all appearance of "propaganda" for any one nation must be removed.

b) The other element in the policy suggested refers to travel. The travel of students and teachers has already increased immensely since the war, and in many countries, as for example in England, there is already an organization of exchange visits with other countries. But this could be much extended. The most important new element should be the intimacy of the contact between the scholars and teachers of different nations, such as occurred in some medieval universities. The extension of the travel of students, etc., is a problem partly of finance, but mainly of information. No great amount of money is needed for providing funds, but arrangements of a quasi-financial kind must be made with shipping and railway companies. Secondly, many students and teachers would willingly visit foreign lands if they had information about travel facilities. The practical plan, therefore, would be to create in each country a small office, or to use the office of some organization, for (1) making arrangements with transport and hotel companies and (2) sending out information to all schools. The students should be brought into contact with foreign students, and use made of the Comité International des Étudiants (C.I.E.) and of the National Union of Students, the Student Christian Movement, etc. There need be no duplication of the work, but co-ordination of the existing bodies might be improved.

c) Interchange of teachers and lecturers is another possible improvement of the existing system. Something of the kind already exists in a few countries; but one important point

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has not yet been sufficiently understood. What is needed is not that the foreign teacher or lecturer should address audiences, but that he should meet small groups of persons with interests similar to his own. Thus the lecturer on any section of history should meet in a foreign land teachers who deal with the same period or aspect. This is carrying out in practice the idea implied in the teaching of history suggested above (Section *b*), namely, that civilization progresses through intellectual intercourse of men of different nations. Perhaps the best method for promoting this would be the appointment of an unofficial ambassador in each country to arrange that his countrymen may be introduced into the right circles. The guiding idea is derived from the history of the French *salons* and academies of the eighteenth century. Science was spread by the meetings of ten or twenty persons in private houses. This is a good method even today, when the vast numbers of the populations, the general gatherings and large audiences, tend to obstruct personal intercourse. We must return to the small personal meetings of a few capable persons, if possible in private houses. The increase in the number of travelers to foreign lands may be beneficial; but it is outside our purview here. What we suggest is close intellectual contact which is possible only for a very few in every section, partly because of language difficulties. The purpose should not seem to be primarily to increase friendship between nations, but to develop the particular science or art at which the traveler is working in his own land. The great friendship between nations would follow.

III. CONCLUSION

The whole purpose of the foregoing plan is to develop the international mind; and by that is meant no vague, general good will, but a definite and practical outlook upon life and the world. The time has come for a change as radical as that which followed the discoveries of the Renaissance. Just as the discovery of America, the new knowledge of astronomy, and the device of printing destroyed the medieval outlook, so the

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facts of contemporary life will make it impossible to maintain the traditional nationalism, village politics, and village gossip. The "national" mind in any people is the ability to see and to feel their common interests in addition to, but not to the exclusion of, the local or sectional interests of groups among them. So the international mind is the ability to see and to feel common interests among all people, without in the least denying or underrating the differences between peoples.

Now nearly all wars and threats of war arise either from ignorance of what is occurring outside one's own frontier or from inability to solve problems of conflicting interest. This ignorance and this inability are facts of the utmost importance in practical politics, and it is the business of the statesman to make the best of the actual situation. But it is the task of education to correct ignorance and improve ability for dealing with new situations, and thus make the work of the statesman more progressive. The changes brought about by education are comparatively slow, but they are more permanent than others. For example, the Romans conquered the Western World very quickly, but their empire fell: Christianity, on the other hand, which was largely an educational movement, took some four hundred years to affect Europe, but it has produced a changed outlook on the world and life which still survives. Medieval Europe was indeed full of local jealousies and wars, but the situation would have been much worse if it had not been for the medieval church and schools.

In our time the material circumstances of life have greatly changed. All human history from the earliest times until about 1850 depended upon the road, the horse, the hand-driven machines, and small local supply for local markets. Within the past century the whole situation has changed. We now have the railroad, the steamship, the airplane, steam or electrical machinery, world-supply of foodstuffs, and clothing material for world-markets. But the mind of man has not yet risen to the occasion. It is not a problem of increasing men's virtue or good will toward others; it is a problem of making men realize

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that in an adult world a child's politics and economics and knowledge and feeling are helpless. Men remain children without the gracefulness or the inquisitiveness of childhood. Our policy is to make them "grow up."

At present most nations are dominated by desires which are quite irreconcilable—they desire peace, security, and wealth, and at the same time they desire to dominate over other nations. Now it is quite impossible to have both peace and domination over others. It is, however, implied in the above policy that the change will not come about by the direct preaching of new ideals or the inculcation of any code of conduct. The new ideals and the better standards of conduct must underlie the actual method of education. They must, as Plato would have said, be in the atmosphere of the school; but they are not subjects for lessons. These new ideals will become operative in the course of the change brought about by the new knowledge which it is the purpose of the policy here suggested to promote.

It is implied that the new knowledge of other men and of our own lives as part of a great history is not a mere matter of book-learning or of memory of facts for use in examinations; but the policy suggested, it is believed, would produce a finer quality of mind. We are still very imperfectly civilized. To secure peace for the world in modern circumstances it is necessary that a definite, if limited, educational policy should be adopted. As soon as the first steps are made, new openings for progress will appear, and therefore our policy is not conceived as a complete program, but only as an indication of the line of action to be followed. It is based, as far as possible, upon tendencies which are already in operation; but it implies a much more concentrated use of such tendencies than is common at present in any country. It is a policy which may have practical importance for those in all nations who are determined to make their own countries free and to bring the whole world to peace.

LONDON, ENGLAND

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THE SOURCES OF NATURAL LAW

WILLIAM ORTON

Until comparatively recent times the problem of sovereignty has been conceived mainly as a problem of authority. Even by those who inclined to a pragmatic view of the question the nature of the state as an instrument of power, rather than its function as an instrument of purpose, has occupied the forefront of discussion; and its ends have been stated in transcendental and general terms whose ethical connotation begs the question of authority at the very outset. The result is that our legacy of political theory has proved inadequate to the needs of a rapidly changing social order; and now the actual progress of events has swung us round full circle, so that we find ourselves back in our speculation at a position corresponding almost exactly to that of Heraclitus. That is to say, we stand once more on the threshold of a "classical" era, to be marked in its social thinking by a second attempt to derive the principles of social relations, without adventitious aids, from the world as given and objectively apprehended; and (perhaps we may add) with our psychology in much the same relative condition as Heraclitean physics. Of this circle of political theorizing we may imagine Cicero as marking the first quarter, with Seneca close after in the dawn of Christendom; the great sixteenth-century Jesuits at the farthest swing; Hobbes and Locke in the late afternoon of the Christian ethos;[1] and Bentham, toiling away—though with different tools from ours—to re-establish a *naturalis ratio* of human affairs, somewhere near ourselves; while from time to time, contrary to all rules of the game, men like Carneades, Marsiglio, Cusanus, Spinoza, Machiavelli, cut chords inside the circumference, and are usually penalized in consequence.

[1] Hobbes' view of nature is accurately Aristotelian; cf. Preface to the *Rudiments* and *Nic. Eth.*, I, 13.

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The most useful clue to this long process is, paradoxically enough, the idea of natural law—paradoxically since, as the unlearned might innocently remark, if law is natural, why all this fuss about enforcement? The answer to this foolish question indicts nature rather than human wits; reveals her complexity, rather than their *naïveté*, as the cause of that unhappy, and at last conflicting, dichotomy of natural and supernatural categories of being, in the second of which the idea of law raised the problem of authority in such peculiarly insidious form. Not by any means that we envisage nature as all of a piece and rational, as we conceive rational; but that we have lost the taste for categorical imperatives based on entities of which we have no certain knowledge. It may, in fact, be of use to our subsequent discussion to posit here two propositions of a general order: First, that no rational statement can ever be made concerning a thing in itself; or, in other words, that a category can be made the subject of a real proposition only to the extent to which the proponent has experience of categories other than the one in question.[2] Second, that while the categories of being to which life has access may be considered not finite, it is the custom of those in which it has not attained, or maintained, the level of reflective co-ordination, to appear irrational, in so far as they appear at all.

I

The oldest and the most fundamental of all problems is that of the one and the many. Unity and diversity—order and chaos—direction and spontaneity—coexisting in the same time and space in the cosmos as a whole, in inanimate nature (if such there be), or in the community of mankind: that is the problem with which, in some phase or other, thought is perennially confronted. In its larger aspects the problem is probably insoluble; but in its successive restatements there is

[2] For a classical statement of this position see the views attributed to Gorgias: Gomperz, *Greek Thinkers*, I, Book III, chap. vii, and Robertson, *A Short History of Morals*, p. 110.

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progress, and such progress constitutes new knowledge for each succeeding situation.[3]

Before attempting to analyze the phase of it with which political theory has been most concerned, it is desirable to distinguish briefly three senses in which the term "law" has been, and sometimes still is, employed. The first connotation is that for which Karl Pearson has suggested the term "formula":[4] a summary statement in "mental shorthand" of the observed recurrences in the relations between perceived facts or classes of facts. The second is that indicated by the Roman *jus*, for which perhaps our word "right" (as in "natural rights") may be deemed a rough equivalent: that which is supposed to be defended or secured by justice. Implicit in this, and supplementing the notion of order or uniformity, is an ethical value-judgment arising from the disposition of the mind itself. In virtue of this value-judgment *jus* becomes background or foundation for the third connotation, namely, that of law (*lex*) in the Austinian sense, that of an explicit rule girt with authority and sanction. This distinction—historic, of course, rather than analytic—is as near general applicability as is worth striving after in this connection; but it is to be noted that even historically the scheme is liable to confusion owing to the constant tendency of medieval writers in particular to use *lex* in the first sense of formula, adding to its connotation a value-judgment based on neo-Platonic metaphysics, and thus the criterion of *lex* (*νόμος*) in the familiar legal usage of that making it the logical precedent of *jus*, which in turn becomes much too-adaptable term.

Now what the Romans took over from Greek philosophy was substantially a mode of transition from the first to the second connotations above cited: from formula to principle. This tradition in Greek thought starts with the attempt of the sixth-century philosophers to understand the external world

[3] Cf. Pearson, *Grammar of Science*, Preface to 1911 ed.

[4] Pearson, *op. cit.*, chaps. i and iii.

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—that is, to perceive system or order in it—in contrast to the mythical or semimythical cosmogonies of their predecessors. Heraclitus and Anaximander are objective in their attitudes, to the extent, at least, of not shirking the dilemma with which their senses present them. The dicta of Heraclitus concerning universal substance, polarity, and flow belong to the realm of fact and hypothesis—formula—rather than law or principle. But as his thought develops we trace the imputation of the value-judgment by which the transition from formula to principle is made. The idea of measure, for example, clearly foreshadows the conception of political justice in Plato.[5] The notion of an "invisible harmony" in which all coexistent discords are resolved marks a further advance; and the idea of universal law existing from all time becomes clearly philosophical when we find the epithet "divine" imputed to it.[6] The transition from formula to principle by means of the value-judgment is complete in such dicta as: "Wisdom is one thing. It is to know the thought by which all things are steered through all things."[7]

Here we have the first suggestion of that identification of reason in the mind with system in the cosmos which was later to attain such importance. In passing we may notice that in Empedocles and Anaxagoras we have the transition made in the opposite sense—the facts or formulae of mental life carried over into the cosmos at large. Relevant to this early phase of natural law doctrine there is an extremely significant remark of Karl Pearson: "To speak of the universal validity of a law of nature has only meaning in so far as we refer to a certain type of perceptive faculty, namely, that of a normal human being."[8] While it would be too sweeping to claim that the Greeks had no inkling of this fact, such traces of it as are to be

[5] *Republic* iv. 427–34.

[6] Gomperz, *op. cit.*, Vol. I, Introduction.

[7] Burnett, *Early Greek Philosophers*, chap. iii.

[8] *Op. cit.*, chap. iii.

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found, for example, in Plato[9] did not save them from that objectification of the nature of mind which constitutes the essential weakness of their tradition. Even in the illustrations from Heraclitus just cited there is a clear correspondence between wisdom in the mind and divinity in the cosmos. A necessity of thought is, as it were, projected into the phenomenal world, and because of its supreme interest to the thinker made the basis of a superlative and objective value-judgment. Thus early does the homocentric orientation govern the concept of nature—a fact of cardinal importance to all subsequent theorizing.

II

At this stage the tradition is reinforced from another and an independent source in which the value-judgment is primary instead of secondary. The idea of eternal law in the ethical sense is perhaps traceable to the old concept of Moira, fate, which constrained both gods and men.[10] Its importance in both Greek and Roman thought arises from its subjective and emotional basis; as illustrated, for instance, in Antigone's famous appeal to the "unwritten and unfailing statutes of the gods,"[11] and in the choric hymn in *Oedipus Tyrannos*:[12] "May I never break the sanctity of the unwritten laws. Heavenborn, they live and move on high and are not made by man, nor shall they ever sleep or be forgotten. In them is a divine power which grows not old."

Examples of this attitude from both ancient and modern speech could be almost indefinitely multiplied. It is the religious attitude, of course, in one of its many manifestations. Without attempting here to define that attitude, it will probably be acceptable to remark that on the subjective side at least it springs from the conflict of impulses, and constitutes,

[9] *Laws*, iv. 714. See also iii. 700; vii. 800.

[10] Gomperz, *loc. cit.*

[11] Soph. *Anti.*, 454 (Jebb).

[12] *Oed. Tyr.*, 853 ff. (Campbell).

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in its intention toward peace, blessedness, the sense of sanctification, etc., a recognized and well-established means of reunifying or reintegrating the personality. Just as the concept of nature previously referred to reflects the human effort to resolve the conflict of impressions and ideas, so the ethical concept in this second case reflects the effort to resolve the conflict of desires and emotions: the effort being in both cases projected on the cosmos or "natural" world and there objectified. It may be added that just as in the first case the effort usually takes a form that is conceptually serviceable to others, so in the second case the form is apt to prove ethically serviceable. The result is thus in both cases normally and pragmatically social; there being, however, no guaranty or inherent necessity that it should so prove, other than the natural selection and survival of those instances relevant to the larger areas of like-mindedness.

A third and most important constituent of natural-law doctrine has its first explicit formulation in Socrates:[13]

> But now, are you aware, Hippias, of certain unwritten laws?
>
> Yes [he answered] those held in every part of the world, and in the same sense.
>
> Can you then assert [asked Socrates] of these unwritten laws that men made them?
>
> Nay, how [he answered] should that be, for how could they have all come together from the ends of the earth? And even if they had so done, men are not all of one speech.
>
> Whom then do you believe to have been the makers of these laws?
>
> For my part I think that the gods must have made these laws for men.

It is to be noted that this position, though well defined as far as it goes, is philosophically incomplete, inasmuch as it indicates no firm reason, other than a simple *ipse dixit*, for imputing supreme ethical value to the universal. It is, in fact, logically open to precisely the development for which Ulpian was so severely castigated by medieval jurists[14]—the extension of

[13] Xen. *Mem.* iv. 4 (Dakyns).

[14] See e.g., Erdmann, *Hist. Phil.*, Vol. I, par. 252.

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the *jus naturale* to cover such universal practices as procreation, in which even the animals partake.

For a more reasoned statement of the argument from universality, which avoids the possibility of such an indiscretion as Ulpian's, we naturally turn to Aristotle. We find, in the first place, a direct synthesis of the religious element of natural law (the second above noted) with the appeal to universality, attained by setting back the universality argument from the plane of overt act to that of the moral sense itself. After quoting Empedocles' reference to "a universal law stretching without break through the wide domain of the sky and through the vast earth too," the Stagirite adds: "For there is a certain natural and universal right and wrong, which all men divine, even if they have no intercourse or covenant with each other."[15] This is a distinct step forward. Philosophers, it is true, have never succeeded in giving much specific content to the natural law thus appealed to: Socrates as well as Hobbes had some little difficulty in the matter,[16] and the solution of the jurisconsults was mainly empirical. But though modern comparative sociology may rejoin that the moral sense is specifically no more uniform than moral practice, Aristotle's logic had brought him at least to a dialectically safer position.

This position, we may note in the second place, harks back to the datum of conflict or dualism (of rational and irrational), both in the mind and in the cosmos,[17] and to the need of integration as the supreme interest, and therefore good, of man, both individually and socially.[18] The trouble with vice is that it clouds the clear discrimination of the ends of action which it is the virtue of temperance to preserve; practical wisdom being "a true rational state of mind which is active in the

[15] *Rhet.* i. 13 (Jebb).

[16] Cf. Xenophon *Mem.* iv. 4, and *Leviathan*, chaps. xiv and xv.

[17] *Nic. Eth.* i. 13.

[18] *Ibid.* ii. 6; cf. *Pol.* i. 1, 2.

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field of human goods."[19] When, further, Aristotle proceeds to explain "right," in the phrase "right reason," as meaning that which is accordant with practical wisdom,[20] he is enunciating a definitely social philosophy in as secure terms as the state of knowledge could have permitted. He is thus, of course, restating, more analytically and empirically, substantially the same philosophy that Plato had arrived at from the cosmological standpoint. In the Platonic cosmogony the god or demiurge or prime mover is not the creator, but the arranger, the imposer of order upon a chaos which he cannot wholly subdue. He works by the light of the ideas fixed in the eternal reason; and by this same reason man himself is guided toward the attainment of order, both in his individual and his communal life. Thus in the *Republic*[21] we have the idea of justice as consisting in adherence to true nature or function *because* thereby social harmony ensues; and in a noteworthy passage of the *Laws* the whole position is summed up:

> How can there be the least shadow of wisdom where there is no harmony? There is none; but the noblest and greatest of harmonies may be truly said to be the greatest wisdom; and of this he is a partaker who lives according to reason; whereas he who is devoid of reason is the destroyer of his house and the very opposite of a savior of the state: he is utterly ignorant of political wisdom.[22]

III

It is worth while pausing at this point to review the elements of the progress just outlined. The proposition that the real is the rational, implicit in Heraclitus, explicit in Plato, is in fact a piece of anthropomorphism not yet recognized as such, prompted by the human need to resolve the conflicts of sensory and reflective experience. From this proposition follows a second basic element which we may roughly indicate by the phrase, "the right is the real": that is, right conduct is conduct according with the true (rational) nature of man and

[19] *Nic. Eth.* vi. 5.
[20] *Ibid.*, vi. 13.
[21] *Rep.* iv. 427–34.
[22] *Laws* iii. 689 (Jowett).

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the universe.[28] This position, explicit in both Plato and Aristotle, is also anthropomorphic in origin, springing from a similar need to find for the conflicts of impulse and desire a solution not merely dialectical, but backed by intrinsic authority and absolute sanction. The anthropomorphism of these positions is not, of course, peculiar to the Greeks: it pervades most human logic and ethics and does no particular harm *except when it is made the basis of an authoritarian system.* It may well be that reality supports the particular construction thus put upon it, as one among many possible constructions. The logical importance of the anthropomorphic or homocentric element is determined simply by the distribution of emphasis in the developed systems, as between subjective and objective, humanistic or authoritarian sanctions.

A third element of the Greek tradition, which we may schematically indicate by the phrase, "the real is the universal," constitutes the basic ingredient of later juristic natural law. In this case we find in both Plato and Aristotle attempts at historical or empirical verification, which could not, however, contribute very much to substantiate or test the position; and we are left confronting what is really an act of faith in the solubility of social conflicts through law based on a supposed "natural" solidarity of mankind.

There are thus latent in the Greek heritage not one, but two, distinct possibilities: the first, a development of the original humanistic tradition, seeking, with a minimum of appeal to transcendental absolutes, a clue to the solution of individual or social conflicts in the Platonic ideal of harmony; the second, a development of the projective tradition, placing the emphasis upon the objectified divine element, or *causa causans,* and building thereon a deistic authoritarian system. The first possibility was realized to no small extent by the Epi-

[28] Cf. *Laws* iv. 714: "We must hearken, both in private and public life, and regulate our cities and houses, according to law, meaning by that very term 'law,' the distribution of mind" (Jowett).

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cureans, and to a lesser extent, particularly in respect of the dogma of "spontaneous sociability," by the Stoics;[24] the second, by Seneca and the church.

But the dominant choice was not, of course, determined on logical grounds—else the Epicureans would not have had to wait until the twentieth century for their succession; it was determined, as such choices always are, by the cultural needs of the particular situation. We may regret that the authoritarian interpretation of nature, with its inherent anthropomorphic basis, precluded for centuries the idea of relativity in juridical philosophy and militated against a scientific application of what might have been a very useful method. On the other hand we must recognize that it furnished a basis of authority when other authority was insecurely founded, and thus played its part in the integration of human association.

It is interesting to observe the eclecticism with which the early church selected, from the miscellany of ideas transmitted by Cicero and Seneca, just those elements upon which the theocratic system could most easily be founded. Cicero's affirmation of natural law as the manifestation of an active and divine administrator in the universe; his insistence on this principle as a sufficient prescriptive rule for mankind, even in the absence of positive law; his attribution of the authority of *jus* to its divine source, and to that alone; his inclusion of the idea of sovereignty in the natural order—all these are, as it were, ready-made materials for a system which involved a progressive abandonment of the attempt at a scientific ethos,[25] and culminated in a dogmatic identification of natural law with the gospel, pentateuch, and decalogue—that *"epitome legis naturae."*[26]

But while we can easily understand the rejection by official christendom of the sceptical empiricism of Carneades and the

[24] Barnes, "The Natural State of Man," in *Monist*, January, 1923.

[25] Cf. Carlyle, *Med. Pol. Th.*, Vol. I, chap. i.

[26] Nicolaus Hemming, quoting Erdmann, *loc. cit.*

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Epicureans—which even to Cicero, as a "well-mannered and honorable-minded philosophic amateur," seemed anarchistic and subversive—it is not so easy to explain the fate which doomed the really constructive elements in Cicero to relative sterility for eighteen centuries. For those elements represented the maturity of the less anthropomorphic side of the Greek heritage, and have been received by modern thought as a far safer basis for political thinking than the deistic and revelatory thesis.

Chief among them is the Stoic idea of human solidarity as a basis of prescriptive law.[27] This is forecast in the description of right reason as that which cements society or maintains human association, and the consequent censure of the man who violates this human fraternity.[28] It is still plainer in the postulation of common human interests which the laws are established to subserve and from which the rules of right conduct can be derived.[29] In point of fact it matters little whether human solidarity be explained as due to divine reason in the universe or a so-called "gregarious instinct" among men, so long as it is accepted as a primary datum for the principles of social procedure. Cicero frequently so accepts it in theory as the jurisconsults did in practice; and seeing how much of durability it contributed to the law, we are justified in asking why it received so little emphasis, as compared with other elements of the Greek legacy, in political theory.

The answer raises certain considerations which apply not less to modern than to classical theory. In the first place, it was a comparatively late and a priori idea of the philosophers, and as such could not compete in dynamic import with the

[27] *De Off.* iii. 5, 6. [28] *De Leg.* i. 15.

[29] *De Off.* iii. 6: Atque etiam, si hoc natura praescribit, ut homo homini, quicumque sit, ob eam ipsam causam, quod is homo sit, consultum velit, necesse est secumdum eandem naturam omnium utilitatem esse communem. Quod si ita est, una continemur omnes et eadem lege naturae, idque ipsum si ita est, certe violare alterum naturae lege prohibemur. Verum autem primum; verum igitur extremum.

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older deistic, or quasi-deistic notions: the reason lying less in its content than in its motivation, though to some extent in both. The history of the period, as of all subsequent periods, shows conclusively that to attain dynamic importance in society an idea must spring from, and answer to, psychological requirements other than the purely intellectual. The notions of divine reason and divine justice—but especially the latter—fulfilled this condition much more completely than that of spontaneous sociability. Originating in a fairly common individual experience of intellectual or emotional conflict, the former were well calculated to arouse, especially in their popular personified form, that affective reaction without which even the best-authenticated notions are doomed to social sterility. The idea of general or natural solidarity did not lend itself, as a theoretic datum, to personification or (except perhaps to some extent, and indirectly, under the pax Romana) to widespread affective reaction.

There was, indeed, and is still in it a certain projective or anthropomorphic element (if the word may pass in this connection) somewhat similar to that which we noted in the deistic concepts: but it was a projectivism or anthropomorphism of the philosophers only. The philosophic mind, consciously relishing the good of peace and community in a limited circle of direct experience, is perennially tempted to objectify this good upon the background of humanity in general, making of it a "natural" element like the divine reason, and imputing the existence of it to that wider sphere of relations in which direct experience does not extend. It is a divine error—but an error none the less. Just as "gregariousness" breaks up empirically into membership of specific communities, so this general or "natural" solidarity breaks up into local or functional or kindred-interest groups. And just as "consciousness of kind" implies in actuality consciousness of difference, so this "spontaneous sociability" involves, in its pluralistic and heterogeneous reality, feelings of group rivalry and antagonism.

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Any attempt at verification of the postulate, even in classical times, would have met with grave difficulties; the philosophers themselves made no consistent effort to apply it. The admission as an ideal of the defended city-state, with its permanent warrior-caste, relegates it to a rather abstract plane; and when we come to specific cases—the practice of infanticide, the relation of social classes or of subject and conquering nations—what we actually get is something suspiciously like a rationalization of the status quo. Thus Aristotle, upon slavery, Cicero, upon imperialism, fall back upon the alleged inequalities of individuals or groups;[80] while in Cicero is traceable the germ of the doctrine stated by Seneca and developed by the church—that of the justification of social, including coercive, institutions by a "fall" of humanity from the pristine state of nature in which equality and spontaneous sociability had originally obtained. Quite logically this leads, in seventeenth-century theology, to a *jus naturale prius* (ideal) animated by innate reason, and a *jus naturale posterius* animated by *prudentia*.[81]

Thus the principle of universal solidarity proved inadequate in just the way such highly generalized notions still do —that of "society" or "community" in modern thought is perhaps a case in point. On the subjective side it did not come sufficiently close to the conflict of interests arising in individual experience to mobilize behind it the psychological drive which is a necessary constituent of any dynamic theory; while on the objective side it had no sufficiently concrete solution to offer to the concrete problems to which the conflict-of-interest groups gave rise. The common interests to which, as in Cicero, it sometimes professed to appeal were in fact logical, not psychological, realities; and the task of interpreting them in terms which shall "mean something" to the average man, es-

[80] Carlyle, *loc. cit.* Cf. Robertson, *Short Hist. of Morals*, pp. 138–39.

[81] Erdmann, *loc. cit.*

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pecially to the non-rational elements of his makeup, remains largely unaccomplished.

On the other hand, it is perhaps consoling to observe that the authoritarian position is open, in the final analysis, to much the same criticism. If the deistic synthesis triumphed for so long, it was because subjectively its terms answered the psychological needs of the time more completely, while objectively it provided a more serviceable basis for a functioning social structure. But the cessation of these conditions leaves it with no other sanction to fall back on.

> On any view, there is plainly no content, logical, ethical, or philosophical, in the formula that the ideal of virtue is God, when the idea of God admittedly varies with every believer, being, in fact, the mere apotheosis of the believer's notion of power and goodness. . . . . No God-idea whatever can *add* anything to our resources in grappling with the problem of evil. At the best it is made by the ethic which professes to found on it. The God-idea being necessarily a human construction, "the Brocken-Phantom of self projected on the mists of the Non-Ego," it matters not for the purposes of ethics (save in respect of the moral conceptions embodied in the practical doctrine) how the given deity is supposed to relate to human conduct, or how his existence or character is supposed to be made out. No ethic whatever can be justified to the intelligence merely by saying that the theorist infers the agreement of Deity with his views of right and wrong.[82]

The criterion of both the subjective and the social validity of any doctrine is after all the individual experience; and when we find authoritarian deism failing simultaneously as a principle of personal integration and as a sanction for social institutions, the cue is clear for a different approach to both phases of the problem.

In fine, we must fall back upon scientific empiricism. On the subjective side we must invoke the aid of analytical psychology for the problem of personal integration, including in its purview, so far as knowledge allows, those situations which often appear objectively as interest-claims. And we must be

[82] Robertson, *op. cit.*, pp. 87–90.

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prepared to face the possibility that the solution of this phase of the question may be somewhat less identifiable with positive social theories and institutions than tradition has hitherto suggested; that it may call not so much for more or different social institutions as for fewer and less rigid ones. Meanwhile, on the objective side, we must concentrate our attention upon interests that are psychologically as well as logically real; abandoning the attempt to find, in any generalized logical ideal—even that of peace—a sufficient and self-authenticating principle of social relations. This would suggest, as the task of social engineering, a broadening and interrelating of the areas of actual community and like-mindedness: to the end that human solidarity may become not merely an idea of the philosophers, but an experience of the average man. If from the solidarity of our material culture we cannot extract that basis of a golden rule, let us acknowledge our essential inferiority to the genius of the third century.

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ECONOMICS AS A PHILOSOPHICAL SCIENCE

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The science of economics enjoys today so vast a prestige, especially as compared with the philosophical sciences, that an attempt to treat economics philosophically might seem almost an insult. But the writer of this paper intends no such disrespect to existing economics as would be implied in a philosophical treatment of the empirical laws which economists reach by induction from the study of facts. What is intended is rather to throw light on some of the fundamental conceptions which economists do not so much derive inductively from facts as presuppose in their attitude toward the facts. These fundamental conceptions, such as value, wealth, and the like, are used by all economists, but seldom, if ever, satisfactorily defined. Yet in spite of this, people seem to know what they mean by them, much as people seem to know what they mean by space or time or identity or causation, though to define these is notoriously difficult.

These fundamental or presupposed conceptions of economic science are the subject of this paper. The thesis here advanced is that these conceptions are various aspects of, or various attempts to describe, a certain form of action which, for the sake of a provisional name, we shall call economic action. The conceptions of value, wealth, and so forth are not ultimate inexplicables; they can be understood, but only by resolving them into the conception of economic action. This resolution is a task for philosophy. Philosophical thought is that which conceives its object as activity; empirical thought is that which conceives its object as substance or thing. Economics, then, is an empirical science if it is conceived as the study of a thing called wealth; philosophical, if it is conceived as the study of economic action. But it is not enough, to make

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a science philosophical, that it should *call* its object action; it must really *think* of it as action. If a certain type of thought calls its object activity but nevertheless deals with it as if it were a substance or thing, it is an example of empirical, and not of philosophical, thought, and this is what happens in the case of psychology. Empirical economics, as belonging to the empirical study of human conduct, may be regarded as a branch of psychology: and just as there is a philosophical science of knowledge, distinct from the psychological science of knowledge, so there is a philosophical science of conduct (ethics) distinct from the psychological science of conduct. It has been recognized by philosophers in all ages[1] that the special type of action which economists study empirically is a type whose individuality is, from the philosophical point of view, both genuine and important; and therefore no apology is needed for raising once more the problem of a philosophical interpretation of economic concepts.

The thesis here to be advanced, then, is that there is a special type of action, which we ordinarily distinguish by such epithets as expedient, useful, profitable, and the like; that this utilitarian or economic type of action is the fundamental fact with which all economic science is concerned; that a pure or philosophical economics would consist of the analysis of this

[1] To quote a few outstanding examples: Plato, followed by Aristotle, distinguishes between moral and economic action, and attaches great importance to the distinction; the state, for both these philosophers, is a moral activity which has its roots in, or grows out of, economic activities, and the essence of moral action is that it should at once control and safeguard economic action. Machiavelli and Hobbes did their best work in the analysis of economic activity and the insistence upon its reality and necessity. Kant sketches a philosophy of economic action when he lays down the doctrine of a hypothetical imperative, distinct from the categorical imperative of morality; Hegel works this hint out, with help from Plato and Aristotle, into a complete theory of economic society as a distinguishable "moment" within political society. And Croce, while sweeping away most of the Hegelian distinctions as "merely empirical," insists upon the philosophical validity of the concept of "economicity," and regards the useful as a fundamental philosophical notion on a level with the beautiful, the true, and the good. It may perhaps be added that modern economics is, historically speaking, an offshoot of ethics, and was first taught from academic chairs of moral philosophy; hence the economist need not hesitate to obey the oracle *antiquam exquisite matrem.*

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special type of action and its implications; and finally, that the ultimate or fundamental problems of economics are soluble only by abandoning any attempt to solve them empirically or inductively, and dealing with them according to their true nature, as philosophical problems to be approached by philosophical methods.

Economic action is distinguished on the one hand from moral action, on the other from certain types of action whose characteristic quality is their immediacy. As opposed to moral action, economic action is not affected by the idea of duty or moral obligation. That there are actions into which this idea does not enter is generally admitted. To invest money in a stock chosen for its promise of good dividends, or to obey a law or other command for fear of punishment may be right or wrong when judged by moral standards; but such actions can be done, and frequently are done, without the agent's raising any moral issue whatever. It may be argued by a rigid moralist that no one ought to invest money in a concern without asking whether he ought to do so; which would involve inquiring into its aims and methods of doing business, and satisfying himself that they are morally praiseworthy; but no one will suggest that this inquiry is one which investors always, or as such, undertake. Not only, however, are some acts done without the agent's asking himself whether they are morally right, but a non-moral element is distinguishable within actions where this question has been raised. Thus, a man may invest money under a sense of obligation to provide for his children, and in such a case the act of investment is a moral act; and he may also feel obliged to choose an investment in which his money is used to finance an undertaking of which he can approve; but nevertheless the act of investment as such is the non-moral and purely utilitarian act of lending money with the expectation of a good return, and to lend money otherwise than this is not properly investment at all. Similarly, a man may feel morally obliged to bring a criminal to justice; but

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though in that case his act has a moral aspect, it has also a non-moral aspect in so far as the steps he takes in the matter are steps designed simply to bring about a given result irrespective of that result's moral qualities.

All moral action thus has within it a subordinate element of economic action; and there are cases in which this economic element is supreme, to the exclusion of all explicitly moral motives. Implicitly, perhaps, moral motives are never wholly absent. It may be argued, and perhaps rightly, that all actions which on the face of them are purely economic have an implicit moral motive: that, for instance, when I drive a bargain and appear to be thinking only of getting the best bargain, I am in fact restrained, by the force of moral tradition, from adopting underhand methods of dealing which would actually give me a better bargain; or again, I may appear to obey a law solely through fear of punishment, when a careful analysis of my motives would show that I believe it to be right that law in general, or this law, should be obeyed.

On the other hand, just as there are some economic actions in which the moral motive is either absent or at most implicit, so there are actions in which the economic motive is absent or implicit. When a child runs shouting round the garden, it does not aim at any profit or advantage. It feels a desire to act in a certain way, and acts in that way without more ado. The action is, or at least may be, advantageous to its physical or mental development; but it does not think of that. Or it may, by so acting, please or displease someone whose pleasure or displeasure may affect its happiness; but that again does not enter into its calculations. It has no calculations. And just as a person may perhaps be condemned as immoral who acts on economic motives without raising the question whether he is justified in so doing, so a person may be condemned as imprudent who obeys his impulses without reflecting on the economic aspect of such action. Indeed, the reason why one thinks it important to reflect before indulging one's appetites

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is not merely that such indulgence may lead to immoralities, but also that it may lead to imprudences.

It is thus possible to distinguish three types or forms of action. First, the doing something because it is what we want to do; secondly, the doing it because it is expedient; thirdly, the doing it because it is right. The first is the sphere of impulsive action; the second, of economic; the third, of moral. These three are not mutually exclusive species of a genus. There is no action in which impulse or desire does not play a part, and there is, therefore, a sense in which all action is impulsive. So far, the hedonist, who argues that everybody does precisely what he wants to do, is in the right. But though impulse is, as it were, the foundation of all action, the hedonist is wrong in arguing—as in effect he must argue—that economic and moral acts differ in nothing essential from acts of pure impulse. The mere fact that he has to twist these types of action into conformity with his standard shows that hedonism is a dialectical *tour de force* rather than an unbiased statement of the facts. We applaud his ingenuity in showing that the sweated laborer and the religious martyr are simply enjoying themselves, but even he is not really convinced by it. In economic action impulse is, though present, subordinated to utility, much as in moral action utility is subordinated to duty. Hence the hedonist's effort to drag economic action into line with impulsive action is parallel to, and cannot succeed better than, the utilitarian's effort to drag moral action into line with economic.

The distinction between these three forms of action is not an accidental or arbitrary distinction. It is a philosophical distinction; one which is made not because we choose to make it, but because we cannot think about the subject at all without making it. For the present our concern is with economic action only, and therefore we need not raise the question whether the three forms of action above distinguished are the only forms whose conceptions are in this way philosophically

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necessary, or whether a closer examination would reveal others. Our present task is to make clear to ourselves the concept of economic action, and we must leave to empirical economics the question of what particular actions are economic or expedient in particular circumstances, and the attempt to classify, in a manner none the less useful for being arbitrary, these particular economic actions.

In attempting to define the concept of economic action we shall derive help from reflecting on such epithets as useful, expedient, profitable, prudent; such distinctions as those between means and end, profit and loss, debit and credit, receipt and expenditure; such concepts of action as purchase, exchange, and valuation. All these terms have one feature in common: they all assert a relation of a peculiar kind between two things. That is useful which enables someone to enjoy something else which he wishes to enjoy. A prudent act is one in which the agent looks beyond what he is doing and by its means secures something which is other than itself. Purchase is giving one thing in order to receive another, and so forth. This duality is the characteristic feature of economic action. Two elements are present in it; first, the immediate act, and secondly, the mediate act. The immediate act is the means, the expenditure, the price; it is this act which is described as prudent or useful or the like. The mediate act is the end, the receipt, the thing purchased; it possesses not utility, but (if one may use the word) desiredness. An economic act is an act which differentiates itself into two parts, one of which is done for the sake of the other. The act is not complete till both these parts are present.

This duality is peculiar to economic action. It is not present in impulsive action, for here the distinction between means and end is simply non-existent. If we take the case of the shouting child, or of an angry man kicking a chair, and try within this act to distinguish means and end, we find no room for such a distinction. It is a misrepresentation of the facts to

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say that the man kicks the chair as means to work off his anger; if that were a true account of the case, it would not be an impulsive act. A man might perhaps say to himself: "I feel angry; how can I work off this passion? perhaps kicking a chair would do it; let us try"; but if he did, it would be a case not of impulsive, but of economic, action. In moral action, on the other hand, the distinction is present, but it is merged in a fresh unity; thus it is actually a definition of moral action to say that a moral act is an end in itself, that the good will is the will which wills itself, and the like. The end which the moral man sets before himself is to be good; and the only means to being good is—being good. Yet the distinction between means and end is here a real distinction, though a distinction without a difference.

The distinction between impulsive and economic action may be stated by saying that in impulsive action we do what we want, whereas in economic action we do what we do not want in order that we may do what we want. That which is immediately desired is the end; the means is only mediately desired, as the necessary presupposition of the end. That which is immediately done is the means; the end is only mediately done, as consequential upon the means. Hence what we immediately do is, in economic action, never what we immediately want to do. This fact is rich in consequences. In the first place, economic action on its immediate side appears as the antithesis to impulsive action. It is doing what one does not want to do, as opposed to doing what one does want to do. It is therefore not pleasant, but painful; it is labor, as opposed to enjoyment. It is not getting what one wants, but sacrificing what one wants; it is thus in its immediate aspect not receipt, but expenditure. And in the second place, the same action on its mediate side appears as a gain or enjoyment, but one which arises only indirectly from our own activity; therefore it appears as something coming to us from outside ourselves, something which we obtain from an external world, something

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which we earn and do not create. Both these aspects of economic action are illusory, for both disappear when the two sides of the action are taken together. In the light of the end, the means cease to be merely laborious or painful; they become an integral part of that which, taken as a whole, we desire. In the light of the means, the end ceases to be something outside ourselves which is given to us as a result of our labors; it becomes our own activity regarded as achievement. Thus, a man sweeps a path to earn a loaf; but what he gives is not mere labor, but the labor necessary to earn his loaf, and what he gets is not the loaf, but the act of eating it, or the act of giving it to his children. In so far as he is conscious that the sweeping is the necessary means to the eating, the sweeping itself becomes an object of desire; but it is, even so, only mediately desired, that is, only desired because of the end to which it is the means; and there is always and necessarily a conflict between its mediate desiredness and its immediate distastefulness.

This distinction between the mediate and the immediate sides of an economic act is mythologically represented by the distinction between two persons called the purchaser and vendor, producer and consumer, or the like. "The purchaser" and "the vendor" are obviously abstractions, for no one can be a purchaser without being at the same time a vendor, and vice versa: every sale is an exchange, and each party sells what he gives and buys what he takes. But they are more than abstractions; they are mythological figments; for there is no such thing as an exchange between persons. What one person gives, the other does not take. I may give a piece of bread for a cup of milk; but what I give is not the bread, but my eating of the bread, and this is not what the other party gets; he gets *his* eating of the bread, which is an utterly different thing. The real exchange is my giving up the eating of bread and getting the drinking of milk; and there is another exchange, that of his drinking against his eating, on the part of the per-

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son with whom I am said to exchange commodities. All exchange, in the only sense in which there can be a real exchange, is an exchange between one person and himself; and since exchange, understood as the relation between means and end, is the essence of economic action, all the essentials of economic theory can be worked out with reference to a single person. Indeed, it is only so that they can be intelligibly worked out; for the appeal to a number of persons implies the fallacious doctrine that something exists, called wealth, which can be transferred from one person to another. The reality concealed behind the mythological idea of wealth is the enjoyment of a desired activity; and this cannot be transferred from person to person. The truth behind the idea of transferring wealth is that where a number of persons stand in determinate relations to one another the activity of one is so bound up with the activity of the rest that cases constantly arise in which one person can do what he wants only if someone else does not do what *he* wants.[2] But if I forego something that I want in order that another may have what he wants, I do not, except in a metaphorical sense, give him the thing I want. What I do is to make it possible for him to have something else. And he may induce me to do this by making it possible for me to do something I want to do. In this case each party is using the other as means to his own ends by permitting the other to use him in the same way.

This reciprocal relation of means to other people's ends is the root of all economic organizations, and the basis of all their peculiarities. For instance, there is always a conflict of interest between the parties to a purchase, each trying to buy cheap and (what is the same thing) sell dear. So long as this

[2] These remarks about wealth must be taken as applying to all the various ideas which revolve round that of wealth; for instance, the idea of production. Productive labor is not labor that produces a thing called wealth; it is a synonym for economic action, which in its immediacy is labor, and as achieving an end is productive. The epithet "productive" is therefore otiose; a given action is felt as labor only because it is not an end in itself, but is undertaken for what it produces.

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is presented as a merely empirical fact, it is unintelligible from a scientific point of view and disconcerting from a moral. One is tempted to ask, in the first place, why should this be so? and in the second place, need it be so? Would not our economic life be sounder, more truly productive of real wealth, if it were not so? These questions can only be answered by presenting the conflict of interests as a corollary of the concept of economic action.

Cases certainly occur of purchases which offend our moral consciousness. In these cases the vendor accepts a price which we think he ought not to accept; and we may think it morally desirable that he should obtain a higher price than the minimum for which he will consent to sell. But it is exceedingly important to realize that when this happens we are protesting in the name of morality, not against the size of the price, but against the fact that, *in this case*, a price has been given at all. In other words, we are asserting that *this* case morally demands not an act of exchange, but an act of gift. When someone gives me goods or services, and thereby opens to me certain opportunities for actions which I desire to do, my accepting of these goods or services is an exchange or economic act so far as I induce him to give them to me by giving him other goods or services my own desired use of which I forego. Now it is for me to determine which of two incompatible alternatives I prefer. If I may either eat my bread or exchange it for milk, I have before me two incompatible alternatives: eating this particular piece of bread and foregoing the milk, or drinking this particular milk and foregoing the bread. I may choose, in such a case, either on economic grounds or on moral. I may simply ask myself which I prefer; or I may ask myself which action I ought to do. In the latter case, I may decide to drink the milk although I do not want it and do want the bread, because—for instance—the other party to the transaction needs the bread, in my opinion, more than I do, and cannot offer me an attractive price for it. But if so, the act is not

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an exchange, but a gift. My taking something in return does not prevent its being a gift; for the thing which I receive is not what induces me to act.[8] Hence, in this case there is no purchase; nothing is bought, nothing is sold, and nothing that can be called a price changes hands. But in the other case, where my choice is made on economic motives, there is only one reason that can induce me to exchange, namely, that I prefer drinking this milk (not milk in general, nor even a specified quantity of milk, but *this* milk; and not even this milk in any circumstances, but here and now, with this particular thirst upon me) to eating this bread. If, when I am so disposed, I meet another person who prefers the opposite, and if it is in my power to enable him to eat the bread, and in his power to enable me to drink the milk, then we can do what is called effecting an exchange, which means entering into the condition of reciprocity described above; collaborating with each other in economic actions each of which is essentially an exchange between the agent and himself.

Now because, in an economic act, I am answerable to myself only for driving with myself a bargain which shall satisfy myself, it follows that there is no appeal from this act; there is no way of fixing the right price of anything except by finding out the price which, at the moment of purchase, the purchaser is willing to pay. If I can get a certain end by undergoing certain expense or labor, and if I do not sufficiently want the end to undergo this expense or labor, then, so far as economic motives are concerned, I go without. If the price is a higher price than I am disposed to pay, I do not pay it. No doubt I may change my mind and pay it tomorrow; I may pay it five seconds hence; but that will be because circumstances have altered, and when that has happened the act is a different act.

This principle is ordinarily expressed in the theorem that

[8] There are cases, such as the exchange of presents at Christmas, in which we give expecting to receive; but this expectation does not convert the exchange of presents into a purchase, or exchange, in the economic sense of the word.

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the price of a commodity varies directly as demand and inversely as supply; these two factors being really identical, since the demand for a given commodity is nothing but the supply of other commodities which are to be exchanged for it, and vice versa. Demand, in the economic sense of the word, is not at all synonymous with desire or want; there is no "demand" for a thing till something is offered in exchange for it, that is, till someone proposes to buy it. The ordinary theorem, therefore, means that prices are fixed by proposals to buy. But this truth is obscured in empirical economics by the idea of quantitative prices, which are supposed to vary as the intensity of demand varies. This idea involves the fallacious assumption that what I pay for is (for instance) bread, whereas what I really pay for is my eating of this piece of bread; and the price of this cannot vary, because it is a thing that only happens once. In strictness, every economic act is unique, and consists of undertaking unique means to a unique end; but empirical economics classifies these acts in arbitrary ways, according to their more-or-less accidental similarities, and within the classes so formed it tries to distinguish by a quantitative scale individual cases whose real differences are qualitative.

Prices are thus fixed afresh by every single act of exchange that takes place. Every such act is a determination of value; and value in the economic sense of the word cannot be determined in any other way. When a man who owns certain goods puts a price on them he is simply forecasting what, in the given circumstances, someone will think it worth his while to pay; and when the circumstances change, he must price his wares afresh. Hence all prices are always ultimately fixed by the "higgling of the market"; but this is, in practice, concealed by the way in which a skilful vendor will anticipate such higgling and put upon his goods a price which, understanding the mind and circumstances of his public, he knows they will pay. And if people will not pay the price which he has fixed, this

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shows, not that the public is too stupid or too stingy to pay a reasonable price, but that his calculation of what he could get was at fault. The price which he ought to have asked is the highest price that the public will pay.

Thus, when the fallacious suggestions due to its quantitative language have been guarded against, the formula "buy in the cheapest market and sell in the dearest" is the definition of buying and selling, that is, of economic action. Because the economic act falls into two parts, the means and the end, the end being immediately desired and the means immediately distasteful or laborious, there is a necessary conflict, within the act itself, between the means and the end. We want the end, but we do not want the means except so far as we are convinced that we cannot get the end without them; and therefore every economic act involves an attempt to evade or minimize the means, that is, to substitute for this act another and less distasteful act which shall procure the same end, or an end the same for practical purposes. This is the conflict of interests which is recognized as subsisting between the parties to any exchange. It is not a conflict between person and person; it is a conflict between the mediate and the immediate sides of economic action as such, and it is quite as prominent in the economic life of a Robinson Crusoe as in that of a retail fishmonger. In this conflict of interests the economic life consists; for the economic life is exchange, and exchange consists in balancing means against end in such a way as to get the best available return for your expenditure.

It is, therefore, impossible for prices to be fixed by any reference to the idea of justice or any other moral conception. A just price, a just wage, a just rate of interest, is a contradiction in terms. The question what a person *ought* to get in return for his goods and labor is a question absolutely devoid of meaning. The only valid questions are what he *can* get in return for his goods or labor, and whether he ought to sell them at all.

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As soon as any moral motive is imported into an economic question the question ceases to be an economic one, and the price, or wage, or interest becomes a gift. But the demand for a just price or a just wage is not a mere confusion of thought. It has two motives, one sound and the other unsound. The right price of anything is what it will fetch at a given moment on a given market; but it does not follow that everything ought always to be on sale in every market. By threatening a man's life or reputation I may induce him to give me money; this money is the price of my forbearance, and the fact that I can get it shows that it is a perfectly fair price. If a blackmailer puts his figure too high, he will be told to publish and be damned. But because in certain circumstances a man will give a thousand pounds for some old letters it does not follow that the circumstances ought to arise. The blackmailer creates a demand for certain commodities, just as the advertiser does, in order to enhance their price; and, from an economic point of view, there is nothing to be said against his doing so. But the particular means which he adopts in order to create a demand are contrary to law, and he is therefore a criminal; or, if you like, contrary to our moral ideals, and therefore we call him a bad man. Now it is always possible, and often desirable, to raise the question whether the circumstances which induce a given person to pay a given price for a given commodity ought to exist. The wages of sweated labor are economically irreproachable, because the laborer is willing to work for them, though (like everyone else) he would get more if he could; but the reason why he is willing to work for them is that he is so poor; and it is very desirable to ask whether, that being so, he ought not to receive gifts instead of wages. It may be held that the bargain which he makes is a bargain which nobody ought to be allowed to make. The notion that there are certain kinds of bargains which must not be made is familiar enough;[4] and it is an equally familiar principle that certain

[4] A great deal of confusion on this point is visible in current discussions concerning such things as gambling. There cannot conceivably be any economic argu-

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circumstances ought to debar persons from making certain bargains; for instance, tender years or infirm understanding. And it is arguable that excessive poverty should, while entitling a person to receive some kind of maintenance, debar him from offering his labor or possessions in the open market. The demand for a just wage, a wage fixed by legal or moral, rather than by economic, standards, is a rational demand and deserving of respectful attention if it is based on the belief that special circumstances, which ought not to exist, induce certain wage-earners to accept a lower wage than that which they would accept if these circumstances were removed. If such circumstances exist, they ought to be removed, for instance by legislation; and since this legislation would raise some people's wages, the wages as so raised might be loosely described as wages fixed by law. But they would really be fixed not by law but by supply and demand in a market where law insured fair bargaining. In a word, the demand is reasonable so far as it is a demand, not for legislation directly controlling wages—that is an impossibility, since a wage fixed by any but economic considerations ceases to be a wage—but for legislation amending the condition of society.

On the other hand, the demand for a just wage is wholly irrational if it is a demand for the control of wages by any standard other than the act of exchange itself. Such standards have often been advocated; it has been argued that the wage-earner has a right to a living wage, to the whole produce of his labor, and so forth. Such proposals as these are always in practice "rationalizations" of a dissatisfaction with existing wages. They do not seriously propound a standard; they only cover a vague demand for more. But the demand for more is

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ment against gambling; if I choose to pay a certain sum of money in return for a certain profit contingent on my luck or skill, I am paying market price for a commodity which I desire, and there is an end of it. But it is arguable that here, as in the case of prostitution, exchanges are made which ought not to be made; and if that is so, the further question arises of whether they can and ought to be prevented by law.

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an inevitable feature of all economic action; it is impossible that such demands should not be made, and made constantly. Because every exchange consists of buying cheap and selling dear, every exchange is accompanied by a more-or-less explicit wish that one had bought cheaper and sold dearer. Everyone is in some degree dissatisfied with every bargain he makes, and wishes he could have made a more advantageous bargain. This dissatisfaction would be replaced by resignation if he could be quite sure that the price he paid for his end was an absolutely necessary price. But within the economic sphere no one can ever be quite sure of that. If the means and the end were envisaged in such an indissoluble unity the dualism, which is the differentia of economic action, would vanish. Hence to be dissatisfied with one's own bargain is inseparable from the economic life; it is only when we cease to bargain that we cease to be dissatisfied with our bargains.

This truth is intuitively recognized by that common sense which derides as a mere utopian dream the longing for a just wage, a non-competitive economic system, a society in which mutual suspicion shall be replaced by mutual respect, and bargaining by generosity. Conflict of interest, competition, the will to drive a hard bargain, is the essence of economic action, and a society in which economic action has no place is certainly a utopia. It is mere sophistry to argue that, because co-operation is necessary to any economic system, competition is wasteful or economically undesirable; for the presence of these two opposites together is essential to an economic system. The parties to an economic action co-operate in competing, like two chess players.

Yet these utopian dreams, these rebellions against the sordid aims of the economic life, against the worship of gain and the acquiescence in a competitive system, are not wholly to be condemned. They are both foolish and vicious if they proceed from a desire to enjoy wealth without winning it in the open market. If people who cannot get as high a price as they want

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for their goods or labor complain that only a ruthless competitive system prevents them from getting more, they are merely throwing a cloak of hypocritical moralizing over their own disappointed greed. The competitive system of which they complain is just the fact that they, and people like them, want all they can get. But the economic life is not everything; and it is right to protest against the assumption that buying cheap and selling dear make up the whole duty of man. Indeed, a renunciation of purely economic aims is the essence, negatively defined, of the moral life.

Exchange, in the sense of exchange with one's self, the balancing of means against ends, is the fundamental conception of economics. The task of economics as a philosophical science is confined to stating this conception and working out its necessary implications; the task of economics as an empirical science consists in showing how this activity of exchange reappears from point to point in a constantly changing historical process; how the social structure of a certain time and place—especially of our own time and place—reveals the features which, according to philosophical or pure economics, all economic activity must present. Whether a conception like that of wages, or capital, or money belongs to empirical or pure economics is a question of the utmost importance for pure economics, but one which empirical economics can afford to ignore; for an empirical science reduces every concept to the level of an empirical generalization.

Of the three concepts just enumerated perhaps the only one that belongs to philosophical economics is that of money. Wages are only a special case of prices, and are peculiar only in being the price paid for a peculiar kind of commodity. Capital is a concept which stands or falls with that of wealth, and we have seen that philosophical economics must resolve the idea of wealth into the idea of economic action.[5] But the no-

[5] Capital is wealth used in the production of other wealth, but not thereby either consumed or parted with. Hence it differs from labor, because labor is consumed,

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tion of money introduces a real differentiation into the notion of exchange, and we may therefore conclude with a few remarks on this subject. Money is the means of exchange; that is, something taken in exchange only to be given in exchange again. The simple act of exchange, which we have seen to be distinguishable into two correlative acts called the means and the end, is by the introduction of money made into a compound act, distinguishable into two pairs of correlatives in which the money, like the middle term in a syllogism, appears twice over: first we exchange one thing for money, and then we exchange the money for something else. Thus money is an interpolated term between the means and the end, and an economic act into which money enters is a twofold act, which is complete only when the money has been both accepted and spent by the agent in question.

Into the practical value of money as facilitating exchange and thus affecting the organization of society we need not here inquire; that belongs to the task of empirical economics. But money in its essence, so far from being a social expedient, plays its part within the economic life of the individual. When anyone looks forward to an end and adopts means in order to attain it, the relation between means and end is never immediate. If the means led instantly to the end, there would be no appreciable distinction between the two, and the economic character of the action would disappear. There is always, in an economic act, a certain mediation, passage, or transition leading from the means to the end. This passage can be distinguished into phases, each dependent on the preceding phase, and therefore it is not a single indivisible act, but a chain of acts connected by their leading up to the end. The making of a journey in order to reach a certain place, the daily practicing

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and from a price, because a price is parted with. But *something* is parted with, namely, the using of one's capital for another purpose; and the using of capital is really a mere case of exchanging one action for another, possession of the capital being equivalent to being in a position to choose between these actions.

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of a difficult piece of music, the development of the tactical plan of a battle, are examples. Now these intermediate stages which connect the means with the end have certain characteristics of their own. They are not mere means; relatively to the starting-point, they seem almost like ends. It is a positive satisfaction to see them emerging; even when they actually include the most difficult and painful part of the process, there is in them a definite sense of achievement. On the other hand, relatively to the end, they seem like mere means, for their only value is that they lead to the end. They have this double character: that they are aimed at with the deliberate purpose of passing beyond them. But this is the pure definition of money; and the empirical fact which we call money is only a special case of such intermediate stages between means and end, just as the empirical fact which we call purchase is only a special case of exchange, or the adaptation of means to ends.

In the empirical fact which we call money a number of mixed motives are at work, which it is not the concern of philosophical economics to analyze. But so far as what we call money really is money, so far as it fulfils the function of a means of exchange and no other function, its entire character is deducible from the definition given above. It is an end which is also means, neither mere means nor a mere end. If food is an example of an end and labor an example of means, the money with which the laborer is paid and which he gives away for food is neither a kind of food nor a kind of labor; but it has something in common with both. Labor is created by the laborer and is spent by him for the sake of getting something else; food is earned and consumed by the laborer. Money, like labor, is spent, but it is not created; it is earned, like food, but it is not consumed. Money has the peculiarity of being earned to be spent; or rather, whatever is earned to be spent is money. If an article of food, such as salt, is accepted in an act of exchange with the purpose of eating it, it is a commodity; if with the purpose of exchanging it again, it is

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money. If a bank note is accepted with the purpose of lighting one's pipe with it, it is a commodity; if with the purpose of spending it, it is money. It is always possible for the possessor of money to divert it into use as a commodity at any moment; and where salt, or cows, or cartridges, or lumps of gold are used as money, this is because people want their money to possess an emergency value as a commodity. This may or may not be an advantage to society. If commerce is at a very low level of development, if the possibilities of exchange are restricted and precarious, it is useful to have a currency which can be treated as a commodity in emergencies. Where commerce flourishes, emergencies of this kind are unlikely to arise, and the inconvenience of using cartridges (say) as a currency outweighs the advantage of being able to fire off your money when you run out of ammunition. Hence an advanced, as opposed to a primitive, economic organization is recognizable by its adoption of a currency chosen for its efficiency as money, and not for its emergency value as a commodity. For the same article cannot be at the same time and in the same respect both money and a commodity, and therefore whatever is well adapted to fulfil one of these functions is to just that extent ill adapted to fulfil the other. If you select a certain thing for use as money because of its value as a commodity, you are tempting people to use it not as money but as a commodity. Thus, if children used chocolate money, they would eat it; and if you make a sovereign out of a sovereign's worth of gold, anyone who has a use for gold will melt down his sovereigns instead of spending them, unless you make it illegal for him to do so. And the law which forbids the melting down of coin is an empirical recognition of the truth that money is only money so long as its users pay no attention to its possible value as a commodity.

The same truth is curiously illustrated by Gresham's Law. Why should bad money drive out good? Such a survival of the unfittest seems, on the face of it, paradoxical. It is absurd that

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if two currencies are in existence, one economically good and the other economically bad, anyone should ever accept the latter instead of insisting on receiving the former; and equally absurd that anybody possessing both should use the bad money rather than the good, if by good is meant good *qua* money, or capable of being exchanged for good value. Since to be money is to be exchanged, the fact that good money is hoarded instead of being exchanged proves that it is not money, but a commodity. The true interpretation of Gresham's Law is that it refers to a state of things in which a commodity, such as cartridges, salt, or gold, passes as currency among people who, in using it, are conscious of its commodity value, and by "good" money it means money whose face value is equal to its value as a commodity. If now a second currency comes into use, having a commodity value less than its face value, the so-called "good" currency will cease to be money and will become a commodity. But this proves that to lock up commodity value in currency is wasteful and economically unsound, and that in fair economic competition a currency which is not thus loaded with commodity value will always defeat one which is. The "best" money, in the sense in which Gresham's Law uses terms, is the worst.

This is directly deducible from the definition of money. Since money, as such, is earned to be spent, not to be consumed, any capacity for being consumed is irrelevant to the efficiency of money as such, and to accept it because it possesses this capacity is to accept it as something other than money. It might be inferred that a perfect currency would consist of perfectly unconsumable objects: gold which could not be made into jewelry, pennies which could not be made into paperweights, and notes which could not be used for lighting a pipe. This is clearly impossible, nor is it necessary. What is necessary is only that people should not, when they accept money, be influenced by the thought that it possesses a commodity value—should not, for example, prefer to accept

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a kind of bank note that was good for lighting a pipe; and the obvious method of securing this end is—if we may here trench for a moment on empirical economics—to make the commodity value of one's money so small in proportion to its face value that no case is likely to arise in which anyone in using it thinks of its commodity value at all.

The absence of recognized commodity value, however, is only the negative qualification of a perfect currency. The positive side is constancy of exchange value. This again follows from the definition of money. As the middle term of a syllogism must not be ambiguous, that is to say, must not be subject to a change of meaning between the major premise and the minor premise, so, and for exactly the same reason, the mediating link in an exchange must not be subject to an alteration of value between the time when a given person accepts it and the time when he spends it. For he only accepts a given sum of money on the understanding that it will procure him a known quantity of goods; the real exchange is goods for goods, and it is the current price of the goods which he wants that determines the price he will take for the goods he is selling. If he does not know what money will buy, he has no means of deciding how much money to take for the things he is selling; and if he is misinformed as to what money will buy, he is under a delusion in agreeing to accept a certain sum of money. Hence, if people do not believe that the money they accept will remain approximately stable in value till they have spent it, they will not accept it, and it ceases to be money.

These are the only two qualifications of a sound currency. How they are to be realized, or approximately realized, in practice is a question for empirical economics. Whether we want to realize them, or prefer to realize some other aim incompatible with them is a question of politics. For our present purpose it is enough to point out that they cannot be realized except by what is called a "manipulated" currency. Constancy of value cannot be attained either by using as money

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a substance whose commodity value is for some reason not subject to fluctuation, or by using a substance whose total quantity is limited by some accident of nature. The values of all commodities are subject to fluctuation, for the value of anything is only the value that a given person in a given situation sets upon it, every act of exchange being a fresh act of valuation; and limiting the total quantity of money in existence does not insure the constancy of its value unless the total quantity of goods available for exchange is also constant. Because in any given purchase the value of the money and the value of the goods for which it is exchanged must be "equal,"[6] it follows that in the sum total of all purchases the same equality must obtain. Hence the only sound currency is one which is "manipulated" so as to maintain a constant ratio with the amount of goods on the market. This is well known as an empirical fact; everybody knows that if a state floods the market with paper currency, prices rise all round proportionately to the increase in the amount of money in circulation. The same thing would happen if, owing to large new discoveries of gold, a similar increase in gold currency took place. The only serious argument for a gold currency is that the latter event is unlikely, and cannot be arbitrarily brought about, as the increase

[6] It may be worth while to explain what is meant by equality of value. There is, of course, no such thing as "value," a measurable substance of which equal quantities may somehow exist in a penknife and a two-shilling piece. And if, *per impossibile*, this did happen, no one could have any reason for choosing to have the one rather than the other; for, their values being equal, neither would have any preferability. In point of fact, to the vendor of the penknife, the two-shilling piece is worth more than the knife—he would, of the two, rather have the coin; whereas to the purchaser, the knife is worth more than the two-shilling piece. The value of two things is said to be equal (the knife, e.g., is priced at, or said to be worth, two shillings) when the holder of *each* thinks an exchange advantageous to himself, i.e., prefers what the other holds to what he himself holds. This explains the conception of profit, which remains perplexing as long as we allow ourselves to take the phrase "equality of value" literally. If the values of the goods exchanged are equal, then no one can make a profit except by fraud. But profit simply consists in getting what you want in exchange for what, relatively speaking, you do not want; and hence every true exchange is profitable to both parties.

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of paper currency so easily can, by the unscrupulous action of a bankrupt government.

But this argument is based on the fallacious assumption that governments can be kept out of mischief by denying them certain powers, as one denies firearms to a child. In the case of the child the case is simple. But in the case of the government, *quis custodiet?* The people? If so, the people can destroy the government that they distrust and substitute one that they trust. If they cannot make up their minds to trust any, they will be governed by one they do not trust, which is unlikely to respect their economic opinions. A sound currency, by creating wealth, would certainly create opportunities for the misuse of wealth. But anyone who advocated an unsound currency on the plea that a sound currency would be a dangerous weapon in the hands of governments might be asked what he thought of allowing governments to handle other dangerous weapons, such as legislative power or the control of armies. A kind of moral cowardice has prompted some people to imagine that in creating machines—and money is a machine—man may become the slave of his machines, may be led, by the mere fact that they exist, into using them disastrously or immorally. Such a fancy is a mere mental vertigo or loss of nerve; it is not amenable to argument; and anyone who is driven by it to this or that form of self-mutilation is, perhaps, better mutilated. That is not our present question. We are asking, not whether we shall establish a sound currency, but what we mean by a sound currency; not whether we are likely to shoulder successfully the responsibilities of wealth, but what wealth is.

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THE APPROACH TO THE PROBLEM OF MORAL MOTIVE

FRED R. MORROW

There is a certain way of thinking about mind and action which must characterize any modern attempt to deal with the conduct-situation. This is a logical necessity growing out of the new realization of the momentous place occupied in ordinary conduct by non-rational factors like instinct, emotion, and habit. The reaction from a former over-intellectualistic psychology has resulted in various conclusions. The scope of our conception of motive being enlarged, reason, purposiveness, control, and deliberation seem to suffer a reduction in their dignity, if not in their necessity. The place of reason and deliberation may be wholly transferred, and represented as lagging so far behind action in point of time as to serve merely as a justifier or apologist for it.

One finds this sort of conclusion admirably suited to the emotional preconceptions of "anti-repressionists." The sort of thinking common in the contemporary "free-expression" group likes to emphasize the claims of nature as embodied in impulse and instinct. The deliberation and foresight that have become synonymous with control and repression are conceived as of illusory value. As a matter of fact, of course, the philosophy and psychology behind this great movement are not simple; but the appeal to natural impulse is a great factor.

Many persons are convinced that the reinterpretation of nature and reason in relation to conduct has implications which are not at all disparaging toward rationality, or even toward a certain measure of repression. In examining this conviction, such a question as this might be asked: What sort of morality is possible and desirable in view of the new-found facts of human nature? And what motives shall be considered the proper and acceptable ones in this sort of morality? The

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conditions in our national life are such as to make the answer to these questions a matter of practical and immediate importance.

It is the present purpose to consider briefly two or three leading contemporary conceptions of the approach to moral problems, with a view to finding what method and conclusions strike most nearly to the heart of this problem. There are the present conditions in popular morality, whose motives follow lines of least resistance, and hence tend to the careless and degenerate. Then there is the "free-everything" propaganda which rationalizes and justifies the least-resistance standards.

Another sort of preconception will also be considered, namely, that which causes men to come at moral problems by way of social study and control. A third theory comes from those ethical teachers who look to intelligence for the solution of our moral problems. Of this type Professor Dewey is an outstanding representative. Lastly, returning once more to an individualism at present too widely neglected, we shall call attention to a viewpoint typified by Mr. Marshall Dawson. This striking recall of men to a belief in degeneration and in the need for "backbone" in the moral life will perhaps furnish a needed complement to the background of our modern thinking about human nature and conduct.

I

The present tendency to stress freedom and individual expression as the means to what may be called "salvation" is not by any means an isolated phenomenon. Broadly speaking, there is a periodic swing between nature, in its narrower connotation, and man. Professor George Herbert Palmer, in his eminently satisfactory *Nature of Goodness,* devotes the concluding chapter to a critical review of this pendulum movement in history. "Under our analysis," he says, "two antithetic worlds emerge, a world of nature and of spirit, the former guided by blind forces, the latter self-managed."[1] This is the

[1] *The Nature of Goodness* (New York, 1903), chap. vii, p. 193.

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essentially Christian conception, and the one which underlies the thinking of early Christian philosophers.

"Yet," continues Professor Palmer, "it must be owned that during the last few centuries doubts have risen about the justice of this Christian ideal. The simple conception of a world of spirit and a world of nature arrayed against each other, the one of them exactly what the other is not, the world of spirit the superior, the world of nature to be frowned upon, used possibly, but always in subordination to a spiritual purpose—this view has been falling into disrepute."[2]

Traced in the fine arts—poetry, painting, and music—this reaction away from a view of nature and spirit as antithetical has moved to certain extremes. In our own time, natural science is the leading field of knowledge. Great non-human forces are so commonly investigated and harnessed, and their use is so universal, that one sometimes wonders whether perhaps they have not harnessed, and are using, us.[3] Eighteenth-century naturalism was saved from anarchism by an intellectualistic psychology and a proximity to settled standards of belief. It is reflected in the exaltation of the primitive. "Back to nature" was the watchword of Rousseau and the deists alike, and both education and religion came in for their share of influence from this source. But the eighteenth-century attempt to return to nature was not made on the very crest of a wave of scientific knowledge which includes in its scope the nature of man as animal. The psychology of this age placed a new value on nature, but of man the intellect still remained the crowning glory. Religion was not condemned because it was found incipient in savagery; but savagery was extolled because it was thought that its simplicity and *naïveté* were more genuinely religious.

The change which nineteenth-century advance brought out gave an entirely new tack to the glorification of nature.

[2] *Op. cit.*, pp. 195–96.

[3] See Butler's *Erewhon;* also David Grayson, "The Man in the Glass Cage," *American Magazine,* January, 1925.

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The older conception of man had left him intact; if fear, pride, and selfishness were the ruling motives of life, as according to Hobbes, Bentham, Mill, at least life remained a unity. Man still maintained a co-ordinated selfhood of intellect, will, and emotion; the animal was no kin of his. But the idea of evolution has brought in a new conception, which not only acknowledges a kinship with the brutes, but analyzes man's nature in such a way that the only vital and dynamic elements of his life belong to the lower realm. Obviously there is no inherent evil in such a theory or such a fact. Every fair-minded observer desires and welcomes new and helpful analyses in every realm of knowledge. But the change which has come over the idea of man demands that it should be re-examined from the standpoint of values. What occasions the fears of spiritually minded persons at present is that the reinterpretation of nature is being attempted without a sufficient background of spiritual, or value, perception. It is the content, and not the form, of an attempted return to nature which one is forced to look upon as unfortunate in the case of the free-expression school.

It is the present contention, therefore, that in so far as the expressionistic ideal is an incarnation of a historic and valuable outlook upon nature, it is not inherently a false ideal. So long, furthermore, as it insists upon stressing personal values as a part of human nature it is on the right track. But when personal values become identified with the free play of instincts, emotions, and ambitions, then this historic form is given a content which assumes negative value for morality and religion.

The answer to our essential question is, then, for this type of ethics something like this: The new idea of human nature resulting from modern psychological analysis shows us that the only conceivable morality is that which works toward the fullest development of each individual nature. Give free scope to each impulse and each power. Repress nothing, lest

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some spark of genius be crushed out. The highest aim of every soul is to free the body and enjoy it.

The danger of such a philosophy lies in the convenience with which it can be appropriated to the desires of a weak, bestial, selfish, or unprincipled individualism.

II

As one school of ethics offers an answer to the moral question in terms of the individual nature, another type of morals begins in opposite fashion with society. The English writer who has been the champion of anti-intellectualism in the analysis of individuals has also been the chief proponent in England and America of the view that the elements of individual action and character are essentially social. Hence we have a "social psychology." But for Professor McDougall the genetic process goes from the individual to society. Social institutions and customs have their origin and their reason in the makeup of the individual constituents of society; an argument is often found, indeed, for social fixedness in the supposed immutability of instinct. Professor McDougall recognizes, however, that the individual cannot be explained apart from his social environment.

> It was, I think, mainly because the older moralists neglected to take sufficiently into account the moral tradition and the way in which it becomes impressed upon us, and because they treated the individual in artificial abstraction from the social relations through which his moral sentiments are formed, that they were led to maintain the hypothesis of some special faculty, the conscience, or the moral sense or instinct, or the moral consciousness, in seeking to account for moral conduct.[4]

We may believe that the attempt to do away with a distinctive moral consciousness by explaining it in terms of sentiments, or instinct combinations, plus social origins, is also a failure; but in this statement of Professor McDougall we see the recognition of a new and potent reality in individual conduct, over and above that which is recognized by the out and

[4] *Introduction to Social Psychology* (Boston, 1910), p. 228.

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out individualists. Society is viewed as exerting a decisive influence upon the formation of sentiment and character.

But the great modern philosophy of society comes from France, where the successors of Comte, Durkheim, Levy-Bruhl, *et al.* are laboring to convert ethics into a science, and are succeeding in filling the categories of social morality with vital new content. It is not possible here to go deeply into this movement. It may be characterized broadly as positivistic in method and social in emphasis. It goes to the opposite extreme from that occupied by individual "expressionism." Where the latter looks upon social molding forces as impediments to true genius, social positivism places upon them the weight of sole validity and value. The social factors in conduct are the prime objects of research and analysis. The "nature" studied by this social ethics is "social nature." According to M. Levy-Bruhl:

> Man can no more easily dispose of social nature than he can dispose of physical nature, and the only means of conquering the one as the other is first to discover its laws. . . . . The reformer will subordinate himself to the sociologist.[5]
>
> The facts of social relationship are inevitable and all-influential, hence "ethics needs no more 'founding'" (i.e., in a priori principles) "than nature in the physical sense of the word."[6]

The two great difficulties which attach to this social positivism are these: (*a*) From the standpoint of the individual it leaves no place for initiative and change. The democratic theory of genius is advocated so strongly that personality, both in thought and action, is unduly subordinated. To quote M. Levy-Bruhl once more:

> A social reality which existed before him, and will survive him, is imposed on any normal individual being in any society, ours, for instance. He knows neither its origin nor its structure; he must conform to all its prescriptions, obligations, interdictions, morals, laws, manners, and conventions under penalty of various punishments, some external, some

[5] *Ethics and Moral Science* (London, 1905), p. 86.

[6] *Ibid.*, p. 154.

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within himself, more or less scattered, but which make themselves felt in the most incontestable fashion by the effects they produce, by the intimidation they exercise.[7]

(*b*) In the second place, a strictly scientific social ethics, such as that represented typically by Levy-Bruhl, shares the lack which characterizes all scientific approach, namely, it can view standards and values *existentially* only; it can make social and moral values the objects of a purely phenomenal investigation, but it cannot, by the very nature of the approach, make any evaluation. Now the weakness of traditional ethics has undoubtedly been its disregard of social facts and its undue emphasis on certain abstract aspects of individual moral experience, such as conscience, duty, deliberation, goodness, happiness. But the characteristic of which these familiar concepts are symbols is that which many believe to be the very differentia of evaluation. Value does not enter at all into a truly scientific investigation; primitive taboo and Christian love stand on a par as objects of scientific study. Social positivism, therefore, with its emphasis on non-evaluative study, offers no solution whatever to the question of comparative moral values. It can discover, examine, analyze, and trace to an origin any number of moral ideals and motives; but it cannot make such ideals and motives live for any individual, nor can it consistently offer changes or improvements in existing social systems.

This second great tendency in moral study is then subject to the criticism that it is incapable of offering a content for the form which it offers in analysis. Moral conduct is native to all normal persons living in social relationships; morality is not only real, but inevitable. Social nature is as valid as physical nature, and its demands upon the individual just as insistent. But there is no provision in this philosophy for the truth which is characteristic of individualism at the opposite pole. Immediate experience, with its conviction of values, its inventive-

[7] *Op. cit.*, p. 154.

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ness and originality, its creativeness, and its privacy is too lightly considered. Present, already existent systems of conduct may be analyzed, but no attempt is made to determine what motives are good and what bad, whether this restriction is right or wrong, or that social habit desirable or undesirable.

III

A school of ethics which is extremely popular at the present time is that which makes intelligence the *summum bonum* of conduct. The social psychology of Professor Dewey posits impulse as the fundamental force behind all behavior. Organized and co-ordinated within individual experience by habit, this primal force is capable either of rational direction on the one hand, or of irrational inflexibility or capriciousness on the other. Habit gives meaning to conduct. Intelligence delivers habit from fixity by furnishing the capacity for adaptation to changed conditions. Thus, while primitive impulse, under the command of a slightly less primitive system of habits, permeates and energizes all of life, the meaning of the whole comes from the continual presence of foresight and deliberation.

Mr. Dewey has avoided both the extreme anti-intellectualism of the "back to nature" advocates and the over-intellectualism and lack of solid emotional content found in French positivism. He views as a caricature of moral valuation the school which "abrogates objective intelligence in behalf of sentiment, and withdraws into little coteries of emancipated souls."[8] There is nothing attractive, from this point of view, in the idea that unrestraint in the satisfaction of appetites is identical with free realization of individuality. On the other hand, by allying intellect with the warmest and most intimate elements of individual experience—emotion, impulse, feeling —and so arranging his analysis that rationality is seen ideally to permeate all sorts and degrees of action, Mr. Dewey avoids

[8] *Human Nature and Conduct* (New York, 1922), p. 7.

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the necessity of having to apologize to the ordinary man for the existence of theoretical morals.

This conception of reason, or intelligence, as a constituent of all conduct is one element in the modern unification of life. Traditional ethics circumscribed morality too closely in defining ethical conduct variously in terms of duty, perfection, obedience to the divine commands, or the pursuit of personal happiness. As a result personal morality has often suffered a complete amputation from the overlofty ideals set up in theory. The ends of action in every department of life are capable of moral interpretation, and hence have moral significance. It is necessary to recognize both the importance of irrational factors in action—impulse, habit, emotion, feeling, sentiment—and the essential character of intelligence as the value-giving and value-conserving constituent. One finds this conviction strongly expressed throughout Professor Dewey's philosophy. Life is, or at least should be, a moral unity throughout, by virtue of the existence in the entire process of deliberation and control; irrational factors which form the body of the system are organized into a happy unity by intelligence. He says:

> Rationality . . . . is the attainment of a working harmony among diverse desires. "Reason," as a noun, signifies the happy co-operation of a multitude of dispositions, such as sympathy, curiosity, exploration, experimentation, frankness, pursuit—to follow things through—circumspection, to look around at the content, etc. . . . . Reason . . . . is a laborious achievement of habit, needing continually to be worked over. A balanced arrangement of propulsive activities manifested in deliberation —namely reason—depends upon a sensitive and proportionate emotional sensitiveness.[9]

Thought and energy working together in a harmonious relation of superordination and subordination respectively—this is the essence of the truly moral in conduct.

It is here that America's most versatile and least impractical college professor places the emphasis in moral action. Morality is social, active, all-inclusive, but above all, intelligent. Mr. Dewey's ethical philosophy is strong where, again,

[9] *Op. cit.*, pp. 196, 198.

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traditional practice is indisputably weak. Morality is too generally nothing but blind, slavish conformity to what is customary in certain realms of life, while in other less fixed but increasingly important regions selfish impulse is allowed to set the standard. In other cases the lack of intelligent control results in casuistic cavil. Destructive negativism takes the place of positive virtue.

We may well ask whether Professor Dewey, in offering intelligence as the solution to our complex problems of conduct, has been willing to go quite far enough in recognizing those distinctly spiritual ideals to which he is temperamentally disinclined. If rationality "is not a force to evoke against impulse and habit," but consists rather in the fortunate co-operation of various dispositions, what is the force which whips recalcitrant impulses into line and, by pushing certain dispositions aside, allows others, conceived as more desirable, to occupy the place of action? So far as I have been able to find from Mr. Dewey's theory of ethics, merely intelligent action allows for deliberation, foresight, spontaneity, flexibility; but the propulsive force behind intelligent action, as behind any action whatsoever, is still the power of impulse shaped by habit. The problem is to discover how an admittedly "laborious achievement" like intelligence can get along without what the ordinary man thinks of as "repression." The liberation of impulse, so that balked habits may be recognized smoothly, and the fixation of habit, so that desirable dispositions may be cultivated and conserved—this is the work of intellect. The expenditure of energy in the process requires effort; the more intelligent the action, the greater the effort and the larger the number of tendencies that must be suppressed. It is to this extremely important implication of intelligent action that Mr. Dewey notoriously finds himself objecting. Temperamentally, Mr. Dewey is thoroughly positive, expressionistic. Practically, he is forced to recognize the vital necessity for effort, the source of which he does not want to recognize as distinctively moral. The differentia of morality is therefore thrown back on

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intelligence, which, according to ordinary observation, either may or may not be of positive moral value.

Broadly speaking, Mr. Dewey not only fails in furnishing us with standards which are uniquely moral, but he also insists that there are none, outside of intelligent action itself. Reasonable conduct is morally valuable; the ends sought in such conduct are variable, and to fix them is to kill them. Ends do not worry Mr. Dewey, since it is not in them that value resides in the last analysis. The moral motive is not that which tends to an end result having moral value, but is a constituent of any action that is intelligent. Thus, this form of social psychology extends the significance of morality into all the aspects of life and action. But in placing a premium on mechanics and attention to the purely logical results of action, it threatens to overwhelm the major, moral meanings and aims of life under a flood of calculations which themselves ultimately lose their significance by breaking contact with those major realities.

IV

"It is a mistake," according to Mr. Marshall Dawson, "to assume that people have self-acting moral power, when in fact they are not self-active morally, but slip along in grooves of inertia or custom." This statement is one which is typical of a book recently published by Mr. Dawson, called *Nineteenth-Century Evolution and After*. Here we come across a new kind of pessimism, and another sort of dissatisfaction with the present state of affairs. In modern ethical theory we have had almost every element of the moral situation at one time or another set forward as central, with the exception of this one—moral effort. The desire on the part of theorists to get rid of this factor in moral life has resulted in its being left out in practical conduct as well, and it is these practical fruits that we are gathering on our news-stands and in our police courts. Mr. Dawson champions the cause of a return to the centrality of moral effort—the re-recognition of the necessity for "backbone" in conduct.

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Backbone never develops in individuals who either believe that it is not necessary to develop it, or think that it is useless to resist the forces which press upon them from without, or who cling to the idea that they can have morally successful lives without specifically developing moral backbone, or who remain unconvinced of the general desirability of possessing "vertebrate" characters. Now the philosophy and the psychology of our day have not done a great deal toward allaying such beliefs and toward supplying such lacking convictions. Of the general tendencies just reviewed, each represents some way, or combination of ways, of escape from this effort. The "expressionist," for example, sees no need for selecting the more difficult of two courses of action when his impulse directs him unmistakably to the easier, and when even the motive for unifying and correlating impulses is that of more effective impulsiveness. The positivist, on the other hand, begins with the presupposition of social determinism, and ends with urging, not individual effort, but social control. Moral problems gain largely from these points of view, as well as from all the approaches which moralists have made to the problem. But it is necessary to stress also the crying need for a new return to the individual will. Mr. Dawson offers such a return.

We have reacted too far from puritanism. For while the Puritan fortified conviction with a dogmatic assurance, and identified the will of God with the most austere morality, he did at least hold convictions. He had not progressed far enough in speculative ethics to have lost his belief in the primacy of practical results over theoretical conclusions. Jonathan Edwards had no compunctions in arguing from doctrinal infidelity to political unrighteousness. That good conduct issues from good doctrine is a perfectly good argument for the former, and the motives furnished by a theology, if they result in moral conduct, are thereby seen to furnish justification for that theology. In a sermon preached in 1794 before the Governor and general assembly of Connecticut, he said:

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> Now to restrain from vices of this description [injustice, fraud, robbery], from all vices practiced in private, and from vice in general, nothing is so useful as a belief in a final judgment, and of a subsequent state of rewards and punishments, in which all sins not renounced by sincere repentance shall be punished, and every man shall receive according to that which he does in the body, whether it be good or evil. The best, and perhaps the only, remedy for . . . . [various civil vices] . . . . is a full belief of the Divine universal providence, of the accountableness of all men to God for all their conduct, and of a future equal retribution.[10]

There can be no doubt that this sort of argument was very effective. A Senator Fall or a General Forbes could not have left that presence without at least a severe dent in his self-esteem. But our present tendency is to separate so distinctly the theoretical problems of individual and social conduct from the actual practical results which flow from them that theory becomes remote from life, and life becomes, as it were, disethicised. The abstraction of intellectual activity about morals from intelligent and sincere moral activity itself may lead to an Abe Reuff[11] or a Leopold and Loeb, but it will not produce another Jonathan Edwards.

The great contribution of twentieth-century ethics to the problem of moral living is not so much the one that has stood out so prominently—scientific and comparative study of moralities—as the conviction that has arisen out of this study to the effect that natural forces cannot account for moral advance. The problem of progress receives no help from any of the "ologies," except the contribution be negative. This statement is a direct contradiction to some, and a decided addition to other, of the points of view we have been examining. Two headings might be made to cover the most striking novelties in this modern ethical study. Both have already been indicated.

In the first place, there is the rediscovery of the unified man, so strikingly illustrated by Professor Dewey. But we have also contended that the unification extends still farther, so that not only "heart" and "mind," but also "backbone,"

[10] *Works*, Vol. II (Boston, 1854), pp. 186–87.

[11] Cf. Dawson, *op. cit.*, p. 52.

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must be included in the wholeness which constitutes a man. Abstraction from actual moral strife has caused some ethical thinkers to deprecate conviction, moral steadfastness, integrity, and moral austerity of any kind, in the interests of a free moral inquiry. This is nothing more nor less than the carrying over of scientific agnosticism into conduct, a procedure which is destructive to conduct because it denatures it. Action proceeds on pragmatic or practical premises, not on hypotheses and probabilities. Even a truly scientific agnosticism proceeds to act upon the hypothesis which is most in accord with the evidence. But the philosophy classroom has often perverted this policy of no-dogma into a doctrine of no-conviction, under which it is difficult, if not impossible, to justify ways either of good or of evil.

"In the controversy between Adam (human nature) and evolution, Adam will have the last word," says Mr. Dawson.[13] Adam represents the nature of humanity—a compendium of evolution—the result of ages of struggle and failure, of climbing, slipping, and going on again. Adam has survived as a unity of head, heart, and spine; by attempting to neglect the latter element, a certain type of evolutionary theory, with its philosophical children, has threatened to do away with one of the chief differentiae of moral conduct.

Secondly, there is the renewed realization that science does not, after all, furnish a propaganda against moral effort, struggle, ethical earnestness, and upward striving. The evolution of Herbert Spencer was optimistic. "Progress is not an accident, nor a thing within human control, but a beneficent necessity." It proceeds mechanically, according to laws, regardless of human interference or co-operation. The present results of this sort of theory are not confined to the few who still find enjoyment in the sweeping grandeur of Spencer's cosmic scheme; they are seen in our life in politics, industry, religion, and the family. To seek the good, or to do one's duty, or to follow one's conscience at any cost is not necessary in a

[13] *Ibid.*, p. 57.

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world which will progress regardless of individual moral decisions or actions.

Twentieth-century science has returned inevitably to degeneration as a factor in the cosmic drama. The survival of the fittest has included as a corollary the principle of the destruction of the unfit. This is where we have often left the matter and, with a gesture of dismissal, have returned to the study of those who did survive. When applied to social nature the tendency has been to forget that human progress, like that in every lower realm of reality, involves degeneration in the absence of certain qualities. Progress, whether subhuman or human, individual or social, requires the presence of a certain nexus which connects each stage with that just higher. Failure to attain to the peculiar quality of the higher stage has meant non-survival; attainment, which involves the ability to see and to fight toward the higher point, has been the mark of those who survive.

Applied to the moral life, this doctrine means that mere individuality, mere intelligence, or mere sociality, all of which are the high peaks of relatively lower stages, and belong without effort to the total nature of man in society, are surpassed as moral ends, and that a strictly moral reality, carrying with it a set of effective moral motives, must be sought outside of and above, yet fully inclusive of, these ends. It is this truth that I believe has a peculiar applicability to our present situation. We have allowed certain lazy implications of an incomplete biological doctrine to lull us into false security, forgetting that the picture of the centuries exhibits a double aspect:

> Shape by shape, with brow uplifted,
> One by one, where night is rifted,
> Pass the victors, many-gifted,
> Where the heaven opens wide;
> *While below them, fallen or seated,*
> *Mummy-like or shadow-sheeted,*
> *Stretch the lines of the defeated,*
> *Scattered on the mountain-side.*
>
> —MADISON CAWEIN, "Attainment"

BERKELEY, CALIFORNIA

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BOOK REVIEWS

EXPERIENCE AND NATURE. Lectures upon the Paul Carus Foundation, First Series. By John Dewey. Chicago: The Open Court Publishing Co., 1925. Pp. xi+443. Price, $3.00.

One looked forward to a book by Dr. Dewey upon *Experience and Nature* with the hope and expectation that here at last would be declared the metaphysical implications of "pragmatism" and "instrumentalism." Hitherto in his writings Mr. Dewey has, in the main, concerned himself with an inquiry into the adequacy of accepted and traditional ideas and methods with respect to the definition and the control of the goods and values of experience. His explicit treatment of metaphysical doctrines has been critical. That he rejected all of the current types of "idealism" and "realism" we knew. We wanted to know whether he had a metaphysics, and if so what in detail it was. We wanted to know what Mr. Dewey believed our experience to disclose concerning the nature of things. We hoped that the experience which men have and have had would be surveyed, analyzed, and interpreted so as to throw some light upon—not the experiences which are "had"—but upon the nature of that world or worlds which comprise the environment of human life and experience. We hoped that the emphasis would now fall not so much upon experience as upon nature and the nature of things. This desire and this interest seemed inevitable, significant, and innocent. It had always seemed to have been the impelling energy of both science and philosophy. It was experience that we *had*, and it was the nature of things that we didn't have, but which we wanted to get at and to know or, at least, reasonably to surmise. The only clues in our possession, of course, fall within our experience. How could we use them, with critical intelligence and controlled imagination, to divine something of the true outlying nature of things? It was an answer to just this question which a philosophical discussion of *Experience and Nature* seemed to promise.

Now the present reviewer is in some doubt as to whether the book really does this or not. He is uncertain whether the discussion undertakes to scrutinize experience in order to ascertain what the environment of experience really is, or whether a certain type of answer to just this question is assumed to be altogether obvious, inevitably dictated by the present state of our sciences, the discussion then proceeding to certain questions and conclusions whose significance and validity hinge upon these

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prior assumptions. Experience does indeed, it is urged, disclose the kind of thing that nature is. There are two traits of existence upon which repeated emphasis is laid. Existence is a blend of the precarious and the stable, the one as real as the other, and neither of them capable of being exorcized to an inferior grade of being by philosophical theory. Existence again is a history, and not a structure. Or rather, existences are events which transpire, whose histories overlap and are interwoven. There is not a single "thing" of which philosophers have ever spoken—life, mind, selves, meanings, essences—which are not themselves events and the outcomes of the interactions of historic expisodes. Nature is the collection of such events, interactions, and histories. A valid theory of anything which we find in our experience, for instance, thought, "is actually a theory about nature." Now this "theory about nature," suggested by a scrutiny of experience, is the kind of thing we want. We *have* experience and we want to *know* what nature is.

But it is overwhelmingly disconcerting also to be told certain other things which make it appear that this whole way of formulating the interest of philosophy and science proceeds upon false premises. We have assumed that experience is something had, and that we were to use it to penetrate to the nature of things which weren't "had." But this implies some sort of boundary separating experience and nature, or reality, into two regions. And this is just what we must avoid doing. Experience is not at all any "distinctive subject-matter." It is a *method*. And just "this fact convicts upon sight every philosophy that professes to be empirical and yet assures us that some especial subject-matter is experience and some other not" (p. 10). To ask, therefore, what experience which we have teaches us about the nature which we haven't got but want to know is ruled out as meaningless. Shall we then say that nature *is* had in experience, and that experience is the method of disentangling nature and knowing it? But it is just as vicious to suppose nature to be a substantive part of experience as it is to suppose experience to be a substantive portion of nature. Experience is not at all substantive, but is method. Yet objects are said to appear "in experience." And immediately after it is said that "the visible is set in the invisible; and in the end what is unseen decides what happens in the seen; the tangible rests precariously upon the untouched and ungrasped" (p. 43). Does this contrast occur *within* experience, or is it a contrast between what is within experience and something outlying? If the former, are we to be said to see the invisible, to touch the intangible, and to grasp the ungrasped? If the latter, does not experience become a substantive region set over against an environing world of the nature of things?

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Still more disconcerting to us who wanted to know what experience might teach us about the real is the declaration that science yields no knowledge of things at all, in any meaning of the term "knowledge," according to which knowledge is "insight into, or grasp of, real being as such" (p. 135). This is precisely what we must not suppose knowledge or science to be. "The objects of science, like the direct objects of the arts, are an order of relations which serve as tools to effect immediate havings and beings" (p. 136). Yet later on H_2O is said to embody in its essence "instrumental efficiency in respect to things *independent of human affairs*" (p. 193; italics mine). To have discovered *any* feature or structure of things "independent of human affairs" would seem to be an instance of a kind of insight into the real texture of things, an instance of knowledge of the sort which has been repudiated, but which in all our theoretical science and philosophy we most deeply want. And, possessing at least so much knowledge about instrumental efficiencies "independent of human affairs" (which must mean "independent of human experience," if it means anything at all) we would like to go on and ask whether any further knowledge about the nature of things (not knowledge of how to enhance the goods and meanings in human experience) is available, and if so, of what sort and of what degree of validity. But this is precisely one of those questions which is necessary and unanswerable only on the premise that scientific or philosophical theory yields knowledge—grasp and envisagement—of real being. It is a question which arises out of "the separations which trouble present thinking: division of everything into nature *and* experience" (p. 358). The only significant question is said to be that which concerns the distinction "between those modes of practice that are not intelligent, not inherently and immediately enjoyable, and those which are full of enjoyed meanings" (p. 358). This is a distinction which occurs *within* experience, and we have gone astray just because we have taken experience to be a specific province and have wanted to know what lies across its boundaries. There simply are no such boundaries. Various sorts of consummations, ends, goods, and meanings are *had* (not known) within experience. Our sole concern is with the liberation, enhancement, and fortification of such meanings and goods as prove to be instrumental and fruitful for further meanings and goods, significant in proportion as they are enduring and sharable. All knowledge is a method and an art for the achievement of this end. There is no knowledge worth the name which is other than this. The nature of things as a realm stretching out beyond experience which we, in our *naïveté* and innocence wanted to "know," simply vanishes away. We are left with just the

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things "had" within experience, precariously had until we learn how to insure for them a greater measure of stability and fruitfulness.

It is this clear and dominant interest in the definition, the liberation, and the enhancement of human goods and meanings that lends to Mr. Dewey's philosophy its verve and appeal. It is the most liberal, the most intellectual, the farthest removed from sentimentality of the *humanisms* which spring up from the background and upon the premises of naturalism. And the naturalism which does supply the premises for this humanism has a character of flexibility; it is suffused with imagination and with feeling which mark it off from every type of materialism and most historic types of naturalism. But even so, a metaphysical thesis *is* assumed as an initial premise, *on the basis of which* most, if not all, of the persistent problems of philosophy are either shown to be meaningless or to be, in principle, already answered.

Experience and Nature thus seems to the present reviewer to be not an inquiry into the most valid metaphysical hypotheses about the nature of things which the scrutiny of experience and the present state of our knowledge best warrant. It is, rather, an inquiry into the nature of human goods and meanings and the possibility of their intelligent liberation and control, an inquiry and interpretation which proceeds throughout upon the assumptions of a type of metaphysical naturalism. There is no need of saying how penetrating and stimulating this delineation of human goods and meanings is, and it is futile to attempt here a summary of the rich store of insight and wisdom which the book offers. The large question remains as to the influence upon Mr. Dewey's ethical analysis, upon his survey of human "goods and meanings," of just that type of metaphysical naturalism which is, if I am right, rather a presupposition than a reasoned conclusion. The perplexing paradox of the situation is that neither the things "had" in experience nor any outlying environing world may be said to be known. Since the former "are *had*, there is no need to *know* them" (p. 264), and knowing never discloses, reveals, or grasps "real being." Just as the latter statement makes it necessary to dismiss every metaphysical problem as otiose and meaningless, so the former statement rules out, it would appear, any knowledge and interpretation of values had in experience, i.e., any ethics. Yet an ethics and a metaphysics are perforce here, a humanistic ethics and a naturalistic metaphysics, both of them envisaged in a new and fresh light, suffused with imagination and a wide perspective. They are here, it would almost seem, in spite of the impedimenta which Mr. Dewey's explicit statements would impose upon any theoretical and constructive interpretation, for the sake of sheer "old-fashioned" knowing, both of the goods and meanings of ex-

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perience and also of the stage upon which experience itself appears, the reality which envelopes it. No one in our time has done more than Mr. Dewey to insist upon the prime necessity of bending every effort to the intelligent liberation and control of the latent and stupidly hemmed-in energies and values of human experience. It may be, however, that this eminently practical and pragmatic task cannot be intelligently and fully entered upon until we seek not simply for a method of enhancing the values of experience, but also for some insight into the kind of world which must be supposed to be real if our human impulse to the liberation and the expansion of our deepest interests is really the thing that it is.

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ETHICS: ORIGIN AND DEVELOPMENT. By Prince Kropotkin. Authorized translation from the Russian by Louis S. Friedland and Joseph R. Piroshnikoff. New York: Lincoln MacVeagh, The Dial Press, 1924. Pp. xvi+349.

According to the Introduction by the Russian editor, Prince Kropotkin planned a work on ethics which should form the final summary of his scientific, philosophical, and sociological conclusions. This work was to be divided into two volumes, the first dealing with the origin and development of ethical theories and ideas, the second with the "bases of realistic ethics," or the systematic formulation of a moral ideal in the light of the most complete scientific and philosophical knowledge. Kropotkin died, however, before this design was completed. The greater part of the volume here published belongs to the historical part of the work planned, though even this part was not finished. The later chapters, in particular, have clearly not received a final revision; two of them at least are broken off before the end is reached; and the editor tells us that a chapter on Nietzsche, Tolstoi, and other contemporary moralists remained unwritten. Of the second volume nothing was written beyond a few essays which were published as periodical articles. In form, therefore, the present volume is a history of ethics prefaced by three introductory chapters giving a general statement of Kropotkin's ethical point of view.

It appears also from the Introduction that even the parts which were completed were written under very unfavorable circumstances. The author was living in a small Russian village, he had almost no books, and he was already in failing health. The composition of a historical work covering the whole literature of ethics was really impossible, even if Kropotkin's main interest had been the writing of history, which was certain-

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ly not the case. It is true that he had a wide range of reading at the back of his mind, but nevertheless much of his exposition is frankly second-hand, being based for the most part on Jodl's *Geschichte der Ethik*. The book can scarcely claim importance as a historical work.

Its interest consists, in fact, in the glimpses it gives into the thought of Kropotkin himself. It takes us back, indeed, to the ethical evolutionism of the 1890's—to the days of Huxley's *Evolution and Ethics* and Spencer's *Justice*—and serves at once to remind us how much the issues have changed, and also how few of the problems started have really been solved. The frankly stated disappointment of Spencer (in the Preface to the last part of *The Principles of Ethics*) has been amply justified. Kropotkin's optimistic faith in science, now that the supernatural, the theological, and the metaphysical have been safely put out of the way, makes the present-day reader feel strangely old and disillusioned. The new system of ethics, derived with scientific certainty from biology, psychology, and sociology, a moral ideal not only explained but justified by science, seems farther away than it did forty years ago.

More specifically it is the scientific theory of evolution upon which Kropotkin relies for the basis of the new ethics, and here he achieves a theory which is at all events more consistent than Spencer's. In this respect his ethics is a development of the biological theory which he ably defended in his *Mutual Aid* (1891–94). The superficial interpretation of natural selection as a *bellum omnium contra omnes*, which obliged Huxley to place the ethical and cosmic processes in bald opposition, is abandoned for the view that mutual aid, at least within the limits of a single species, has as a rule higher survival value than mere strength, or cunning, or individual prowess. It follows that the psychological apparatus for mutual aid, which Kropotkin calls vaguely the social instinct, is deeply ingrained in most species, and perhaps most deeply of all in man. It is at least as normal as the so-called instinct of self-preservation, which egoism was wont to take as self-explanatory. Kropotkin's contribution to ethical theory might therefore be summed up somewhat as follows: On biological grounds mutual aid, sociality, altruism are as easily to be understood as self-assertion. And indeed no one would now dream of denying either the truth or the importance of this general conclusion. On the other hand, it is clear that the "social instinct" is as fictitious as the instinct of self-preservation.

Beyond this point the ethics of Kropotkin, though professedly derived from science, really passed over into the region of ideology, in this case the ideology of the social revolutionist. From mutual aid and the social instinct he derives the ethical principle of equity or justice, the recog-

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nition that all men's rights are to be regarded equally, and that as a result all class distinctions must in the end disappear. This is based upon the alleged law of evolution that individuality and sociality develop side by side, and is said to be supported by tendencies discoverable in human history. As in most such cases, the evidence for this tendency depends largely on the degree of resolution with which we close our eyes to all other tendencies. Finally, from justice the author derives morality itself, which he identifies with altruism or self-sacrifice. Following Guyau, he regards these qualities as a sort of overflow of energy which takes place after the needs of individual life have been satisfied. The three principles, mutual aid, justice, and self-sacrifice, form the foundation of what Kropotkin considers to be a scientific system of ethics.

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A COMPARATIVE STUDY OF LIFE IDEALS, THE WAY OF DECREASE AND INCREASE, WITH INTERPRETATIONS AND ILLUSTRATIONS FROM THE PHILOSOPHIES OF THE EAST AND THE WEST. By Yu-Lan Fung. Shanghai, China: The Commercial Press Limited, 1924. Pp. vi+264.

What Dr. Yu-Lan Fung has attempted in this study is an integration of oriental and Western thought. As far as is possible in a book of this size he has done this very successfully. According to the *Vita* (p. 263–64), he is mainly interested in western light on the contemporary problems which face Young China. While his undertaking is hardly as ambitious as the main title suggests, the subtitle indicates the scope of the work fairly accurately, and it does bring together the Chinese and European traditions in an interesting and suggestive manner.

Two ways suggest themselves of studying ideals. One would be to observe and describe men's works and deeds, and from what they were able to do, infer what they tried to do and, hence, what in practice their ideals were. The other way is to take their philosophies and interpret what they say about the ideal life. The latter is what Yu-Lan Fung has done. Taking a fundamental basis he is able to make a classification which cuts across regional and chronological classifications and lines up such far-sundered thinkers as Chuang-tse, Plato, and Schopenhauer, or Aristotle, Confucius, and Hegel. The basis of his classification is suggested by the saying of Lao-tse: "He who devotes himself to knowledge seeks from day to day to increase. He who devotes himself to Tao seeks from day to day to diminish" (p. 10). Devotion to knowledge amounts to idealization of art, and devotion to Tao is idealization of nature.

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Dr. Fung's study is based on the character of the ideals themselves. He has shown three stages in the idealization of nature, depending on the degree of the process of diminishing—the romanticism of Chuang-tse, the idealism of Plato, and the nihilism of Schopenhauer. Similarly he shows three stages of the way of increase—the hedonism of Yang Chu and the Cyrenaics, the utilitarianism of Mo-tse and Bentham, and the progressivism of Descartes, Bacon, and Fichte. Also he gives us four attempts which have been made to find in the continuity of nature and art the ideal of man—the philosophy of Confucius, that of Aristotle, Neo-Confucianism, and the philosophy of Hegel. Activity is itself both nature and art, and so these systems all emphasize the good of activity.

Without entering into a detailed criticism of this artistic little book we may express our most important objection. As a comparative treatment it is hardly objective and impartial. The classification itself, in the terms "decrease," "increase," and "reconciliation," carries the implication of inferior, superior, and best. The fondness for trilogies does not allay our suspicion that the treatment is artistic rather than scientific. We feel that his "illustrations from the philosophies of the East and the West" are highly selected. If we were to make a somewhat more complete list of the great philosophies of life we would find that they would not fit very snugly into this threefold division. We would find, for example, that the idealization of nature is not always the way of decrease, since it lies at the basis of Roman law, rights of man, and will to power. We would find also that idealization of art is not always the way of increase, since art, in the narrow sense at least, often means retirement from the world of brute facts, anti-intellectualism, asceticism, and mysticism.

E. T. MITCHELL

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INDUSTRY AND CIVILIZATION. By C. Delisle Burns. London: G. Allen & Unwin, Ltd., 1925. Pp. 278. Price, 10*s*. 6*d*. net.

The subject-matter of Mr. Delisle Burns's fresh and stimulating book is the area of economic life and its psychological and ethical problems; economic life being defined as "all those activities of men which are directly concerned with the interchange of services and commodities." This subject-matter (economic life), seen from the angle of moral philosophy, is therefore paralleled by the study of the canonists of the Middle Ages, who discussed the theory of the *justum pretium* and of usury, for economics had its origin as a department of ethics. "But when the canon

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law was dominant in Europe the analysis of economic matters and fact were still undeveloped, and when the development occurred, the canon law had ceased to dominate." The civil law at present is the inheritor of the moral standards expressed in the medieval ecclesiastical courts, hence the laws of contract, wage-payment, adulteration, and company organization are our modern canon law. But although moral standards actually effect economic life more than heretofore, less attention, as Mr. Burns points out, is paid to the statement and to the criticism of these standards.

The vagueness of Marx and his followers who hypostasized a proletarian mind is neatly exposed. For there is no such psychological outlook, "and what is called the proletarian outlook is a political and economic doctrine, not a psychological tendency." In examining the closely integrated groups of workers in industry a certain psychological "set" can be distinguished, and it is significant that the industrial worker has never been an individualist, "never felt himself an atomic individual." Secondly, it is characteristic of the workers to take short views, a feature which can be directly traced to the wage system.

There is an able analysis of the psychology of trade-unions, hitherto (in spite of the great recent development of social psychology) insufficiently illuminated. The trade-unionist's mind is affected by the group mind of his union, and that again is affected by the past history of trade-unions. For over a century (as Mr. Burns explains) the outer world opposed and obstructed—by combination acts, by judicial decisions, by police measures—the efforts of wage-earners to organize their mind-group; therefore that mind-group came into existence in a fighting mood. The memories of subject peoples can be long, and this century of opposition left an ineffaceable mark. The past survives in the mind-group of the trade-union, and the tendency to opposition is a mental characteristic of the groups whose early and intense experience has been that of a minority. This does not imply that the tendency to opposition will always be a characteristic of trade-unionism, since the acrid past must recede from memory and the immediate successes of the group dominate the group mind.

While the worker in a group has been shown to be no individualist, the consumer also is not atomic: "We are all members one of another." A section of the book is occupied with the consumer in economic life. Stress is laid upon the co-operative nature of consumption, even when it is not consciously organized; the social group in which a man lives defines, by continuous pressure, the kinds of goods and services which that group considers desirable. Taste, for the vast majority, appears to be vicarious, and fashions are "catching." A defect of the consumer or

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group of consumers appears to be that they have no grasp of their moral functions, or of their responsibility for the conditions endured by their "servants"; also that, in this industrial age, demand is unenlightened and consumption often obstructive to life. "Clearly, demand or consumption is the expression of psychic energy, and the moral life consists in refining the quality and extending the range of this expression of energy." The consumer is therefore essentially an artist and stimulator, a source of new energies. But with regard to a certain class of goods, houses, clothes, and household gear, there is today a formless productivity, when compared with the products of the pre-industrial era, and ease of production has cumbered taste or choice until there is little taste or choice to express. As Lowes Dickenson puts it (in the *Letters of John Chinaman*): "Machinery of every kind you can make and use to perfection, but you cannot build a house, or write a poem. Still less can you worship or aspire." This lack of skill and blindness in consumption is patent in the contrast between the medieval festival, or the existing festivals in non-industrial countries, and the "bank holiday," in which the industrial crowd finds nothing worth doing, and which exposes the degradation of its civilization.

A suggestion rather than a final statement, Mr. Burns's criticism of economic life is an excellent tonic for the general reader, who is often deterred from the consideration of such realities by the vagueness of controversy upon our economic system. It is throughout in touch with the world of realities.

M. J.

KANT ON THE MORAL LIFE. By J. W. Scott. London: A. & C. Black, New York: The Macmillan Co., 1924. Pp. viii+182.

Strange things may be read on the wrappers of books these days, often representing as they do the commercial sense of the sales manager rather than any professional appraisal. The statement on the wrapper of Professor Scott's new book, telling what it is about and nothing more, is of an almost obsolete type. "An exposition," it reads, "of Kant's *Metaphysics of Ethics* with running commentary; preceded by an outline of *The Critique of Pure Reason*, and followed by a critical review of Kant's general position. The book is intended as an elementary introduction to Kant, and to the study of philosophy." Extraordinary restraint and simplicity when compared with the megaphonic deliverances from the business office which are becoming too common.

There are three words in this simple statement which nevertheless

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aroused some doubt in my mind, "With running commentary," I said to myself; "one can guess exactly what that means. Why will these professors insist on keeping the reader from the writer himself?" That was before I had opened the book. Once introduced into Professor Scott's method my objection vanished. His book is intended as a companion volume to Kant's *Fundamental Principles of the Metaphysic of Morals*. "The student is expected to keep the two volumes open before him at the same place and to read them together." The purpose is to go through Kant's work systematically, taking successive sections of convenient size, expanding or condensing the argument, supplying illustrations, adding biographical and historical items—in a word, to use all available material to bring out what Kant thought about the moral life. While, therefore, Kant's position is presented in successive paragraphs, these are not mere paraphrases. They are summaries aiming at substance of doctrine. Any student who takes the subject at all seriously, who compares the corresponding section in Kant with Professor Scott's argument and the commentary which follows, will without question be greatly assisted in grasping what Kant meant. As a book to be used in the classroom under the guidance of a teacher, or for private study without a teacher, I know of nothing comparable to it on the subject to which it is devoted. This holds true of the brief analysis of the *Critique of Pure Reason*, which constitutes the introductory chapter of the book, supplied as a prerequisite for understanding the ethical theory which follows.

To analytical keenness the author adds a simple, lucid, urbane style. It is a style not so rare among British or Continental philosophers as among us over here, but one that is not common anywhere. One can imagine college youths reading the book because they want to, not because they must. Whether Kant still deserves to be exhaustively studied by these college students is a question which need not be considered here. Granting this, it is something to be able to make the study interesting—free from the pedantry, the jargon, and the obscurity characteristic of well-known "elucidations." To some persons this will at once suggest superficiality, for in their minds the test of profundity is obscurity. But Professor Scott is profounder than the obscurantists; he has the ability and the daring to make his meaning clear.

Following the Introduction the author devotes four chapters, developed after the manner indicated, to the Preface and the three sections of Kant's *Grundlegung*. In a concluding chapter, entitled "Review of Kant's Position," he turns to constructive criticism. It transpires that Kant was *essentially* right; right in his conclusion that "he finds reality in that free activity which is our being as minds; and which comes out in goodness

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and in the synthesizing act in knowledge." But he went wrong when he refused to accept at its full value this theoretical-practical activity he had found. He thus played fast and loose with the question whether in the free act, which alone makes morality possible, we actually touch metaphysical bottom. And because he wavered at this point, his position remains theoretically ambiguous, and on the practical side leaves us without a guide of conduct.

The chief weakness of Kant is discovered to be the imperfection of his hold upon the concept of activity. To make good this defect Professor Scott believes "we must take the whole burden of the view that it is literally the *real behind outer phenomena* that is being sketched here at the center of ourselves." We should naturally do this with a sense of proportion. "The fact that the authentic character of reality is indicated and crops out in this activity, which is we, must not be taken to mean that you or I are entitled to stand up and say that what wells up in our proper selves is all the reality that is appearing in the infinite phenomenal panorama which spreads out before our eyes." Our self-activity is necessarily but the faintest focal point of a reality reaching from the depths of utmost time to beyond the dog star. And if we do not make the subjectivist's mistake, we shall not readily make the further mistake of thinking that the infinitesimal focus of reality which our own activity is can complete itself through what is nearest.

> Substantially and concretely interpreted, Kant's challenge to the moral man to be independent of the given must be taken as a challenge to recognize a far wider given—a given which morality can no more do without than knowledge—and the test of an ethical theory which has once glimpsed this fact, as Kant's has done—despite all his formalism—again and again and again, is to see to it that this wider given is wide enough; wide enough for morality to live; wide enough to permit of the moral individual's feeling, when he devotes himself to it, that he is really and genuinely making himself over; that he is giving himself away to another.

For this part of the book my indorsement, I confess, is less enthusiastic than for the expository chapters. The reason for this would open up a large subject, but the substance of it is that Professor Scott, following Kant, moves away from the issues in and through which, as it seems to me, the moral impulse should aim to realize itself. Unfortunately he felt it desirable or necessary to salvage Kant's theory for present use. So devotion to the "wider given," through which the moral man must find fulfilment, is defined as a "giving himself away to another." And this, in spite of possible protests to the contrary, means the perpetuation of Kant's transcendental drift, together with the problem incident thereto.

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It would, in my opinion, have been more significant had the author made the "wider given" refer to the conditions under which conduct must take place, and the human interests and powers upon which this conduct must draw for actualizing force. This I take to be the direction of hope. And unless philosophy is willing and able in these times to serve mankind by helping to clarify human impulses as they actually exist, and in this way perhaps making a worthy form of life more general and more secure, one can hardly justify the wish that philosophers were more influential.

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Studies in the History of Ideas. Vol. II. New York: Columbia University Press, 1925. Pp. 377. Price $3.00.

The first volume of brief studies in the history of ideas by those connected, then or once, with work in philosophy at Columbia University appeared in 1918. This second volume continues the interest and the endeavor thus initiated. The twelve contributors and contributions are: John Dewey, "The 'Socratic Dialogues' of Plato"; Matthew Thompson McClure, "The Theme of Plato's *Republic*"; Irwin Edman, "The Logic of Mysticism in Plotinus"; Albert G. A. Balz, "Dualism in Cartesian Psychology and Epistemology"; William Forbes Cooley, "The Lure of Metaphysical Simplicity"; John Herman Randall, Jr., "Religio Mathematici: The Geometrical World of Malebranche"; Sterling P. Lamprecht, "Empiricism and Epistemology in David Hume"; Horace L. Friess, "A Note on the Interpretation of German Idealism"; William Pepperel Montague, "The Missing Link in the Case for Utilitarianism"; Herbert W. Schneider, "The Significance of Benjamin Franklin's Moral Philosophy"; Wendell T. Bush, "William James and Pansychism"; Helen Huss Parkhurst, "Unwritten Philosophies." In a supplement is presented in English John Dewey's essay on "The Development of American Pragmatism," originally published in the *Révue de Métaphysique et de Morale.*

Though all the essays are brief, they are meant for students and will reward careful study. The volume as a whole represents an unusually well sustained and successful attempt to recover the contemporary scene of every author treated. The introductory essay by Professor Dewey sounds this keynote by suggesting such an interpretation of the so-called Socratic dialogues as would make them Plato's reply to rival schools, a reply at once the more effective and jovial because judgment is passed upon the Socratic schools by Socrates himself. But for the purpose of

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this review I must take as representative of the volume the three essays that bear most directly upon ethics, leaving the evaluation of the other chapters to technicians in the several fields discussed.

Professor McClure undertakes to show, in the second chapter, that Plato's major preoccupation in the *Republic* is the compatibility of virtue and happiness. It is difficult to avoid the feeling at times that the obvious is being proved in a very scholarly manner. For that Plato in this dialogue seriously sets himself to a defense of the intrinsic validity of the virtuous life hardly needs proof; and yet perhaps even more proof than is here marshaled would be required to show that Plato is content to make happiness the final seal of grace upon virtue. Already, in the *Gorgias*, Plato's intuition catches gleams from beyond happiness and unhappiness. Professor McClure does not seem to see the importance of Plato's return to this theme in the *Republic* (444B ff.); but surely Plato's expressed indifference to the happiness of the highest class in his state (an indifference observed but not emphasized by our author) entitles one to the suspicion that happiness is the counterpart of virtue only for inferior classes, out of deference to the limitations of their clay. But in the guardian class —where alone Plato's value-theory would be put to the test—virtue becomes not so much incompatible as incommensurate with the affective level connoted by happiness and, rising into pure rationality, flowers as health of the soul. Happy or not, those who have health are whole; and only the well-born virtuous have it. Such a view has at least the realistic virtue of insinuating into the very heart of Plato's ethics the obvious virus of his class prejudices.

Professor Montague undertakes a defense of utilitarianism in a brief but packed chapter. Getting a running start by replying (1) to "the egoist's objection to the altruistic logic of utilitarianism" and (2) to "the behaviorist's objection to the hedonistic psychology of Utilitarianism," he comes quickly and with full steam to his real objective, "the intuitionist's objection to the ethics of Utilitarianism." The "missing link" is precisely Utilitarianism's failure to prove, not that all moral evaluation must have a connection with happiness (this he feels that Mill has shown in his analysis of justice), but that this connection constitutes the whole of value. The massive discrepancy between superior and inferior happiness, between quantity and quality, must be resolved for the intuitionist without superseding happiness by some non-eudaemonistic principle. Clearly this *is* the problem—quite a problem, one need not add. Not to play upon Montague's remedial categories of *potentiality* (the intuitionist's "virtue" being but the permanent potentiality of the utilitarian's happiness)

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and *dimensionality* (the spiritual nature representing merely a different dimension from the sensuous), the gist of his defense can be put more clearly, if not indeed more forcibly, by simply saying that the very incommensurability of Socratic happiness and pig happiness leaves room for an infinite augmentation (or diminution) of quantity, and thus makes unnecessary a qualitative distinction. Quality's necessity is, so to say, quantity's opportunity; and the very rock of offense becomes the head of the corner. If the rose actually smells as sweet under another name, then let each man smell first and name afterward. The significance of this essay lies, one may think, not so much in the author's thrilling dexterity at juggling novel categories as in his genuine feeling for the validity of both sides to this historic controversy, and in his consequent desire to save both virtue and happiness for human enrichment.

Professor Schneider writes very interestingly on the moral philosophy of early America's foremost scientific mind—Benjamin Franklin. We have here, he thinks, a frankly secular and instrumental ethics. Franklin's virtues are but formulations of what American pioneers had to practice if they were not to attain through starvation premature saint-hood. His acumen consisted in the fact that he did not waste time over metaphysics when the natural ends of health, wealth, and wisdom were both inevitable and free; that he emphasized as morally pregnant what was causally efficacious; and that he recognized his virtues as effective means to life rather than as sops to avaricious gods or curtsies to pathological consciences. The very fact that he took his morals straight in an age that habitually sweetened them with theology and metaphysics betokens not ignorance but wise preoccupation with the major business in hand. This frank secularization of the morals of Puritanism saved for pioneers an effective social way of dealing with their environment long after Calvinism was losing its compelling supernatural sanctions. Indeed, Franklin's popularity as a moralist reveals the power of Puritanism to have been not in its spiritual embroidery but in its economic potency. Cognizance is taken of the fact that morality cannot live upon means alone; but since ends are more plural and personal than means, and means are more universal and scientific than ends, Professor Schneider thinks that there is not a little to be said morally for generalizing Franklin's preferential treatment of means. Franklin stands out under Professor Schneider's genial and yet skilful analysis as having not his least influence in the field of moral philosophy.

A closing word of appreciation must be registered for the concluding essay in this stimulating volume. It is a genuine delight to find an Ameri-

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can philosophic mind that can write with such imaginative freedom and such refreshing whimsicality as does Professor Helen Huss Parkhurst on the "Unwritten Philosophies" of mankind.

T. V. SMITH

UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO

SHORTER NOTICES

PLURALIST PHILOSOPHIES OF ENGLAND AND AMERICA. By Jean Wahl. Authorized translation from the French by Fred Rothwell. London: The Open Court Company, 1925. Pp. xvi+324.

We have here passed in hasty review almost all the philosophers of England and America who have lived during the last century. Pluralism is the constant *fundamentum divisionis* of the entire discussion. The rise of idealism in both England and America is emphasized as having helped to motivate pluralism as a reaction. The term "pluralism" is, indeed, loosely used to cover all non-Hegelian philosophies. Bradley, Bosanquet, and Royce are scrutinized, moreover, for any pluralistic leanings. Almost no attention is paid to the political counterpart of philosophical pluralism—the one movement, it would appear to some, whose importance could justify so highly specialized a vivisection of recent schools.

The style as well as the content is pluralistic. The paragraphs are short; and yet many a philosopher is worth no more than a single one, if perchance he neglected to make the problem of the one and the many his major preoccupation. Insight into pluralistic symptoms does not alway reach below the verbal skin: James is given almost a hundred pages; Dewey barely more than one page. Three philosophers are honored with photographs: James, Russell, and Dewey. The pictures of the former two serve apparently to adorn their doctrines; but Dewey's picture is for the most part made to substitute for his philosophy.

T. V. S.

A HISTORY OF GREEK RELIGION. By Martin P. Nilsson, professor of classical archaeology in the University of Lund. Translated from the Swedish by F. J. Fielden, with a Preface by Sir James G. Frazer, Oxford: The Clarendon Press, 1925. Pp. 310. Price, 12*s.* 6*d.* net.

In this work Professor Nilsson, the well-known Swedish scholar and archaeologist, has given a compact but masterly outline of Greek religion from its cradle to its grave, if "grave" may be freely understood to mean not total extinction but the escape of some "ghost" to influence an alien faith and ritual. As was evident by his studies on primitive religion, Professor Nilsson is a master of the methods and principles of comparative religion in its application to the first stirrings of man's religious consciousness, and he had previously made a special study of certain points in Greek religious antiquities. The book (published in Swedish in 1921 and revised for the present translation) has all the advantage of the latest research. The author indicates how the familiar cycle of Greek legend hangs round the great centers of Minoan and Mycenaean culture in Crete and on the mainland, and is therefore presumably in debt to these sources. As Greek mythic and legendary lore is due to the contact between two races, and a graft upon an alien stock, we are forced to surmise in

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the Greek race itself some fusion from some non-Aryan stock. "The extent of the debt it is no longer possible to measure, but if we recognize the existence of the debt, it appears to follow that for the pure, the unmixed offspring of the Aryan intellect, we must look elsewhere than to Greece—perhaps to the less varied, the less artistic, the less beautiful literature of ancient India and the Scandinavian North." While the author makes a sober use of the weapons of the comparative method in religion and recognizes the great part played in Greek ritual by magic, his head is not lost in the clouds, and he never pushes his comparisons to extremes to discover (in Sir James Frazer's words) "a totem under every bush and a ghost under every god."

M. J.

BENEDICT SPINOZA. By J. Alexander Gunn. Melbourne: Macmillan & Co. Ltd., 1925. Pp. xiii+167.

At a time when scholars are turning in greater numbers to the study of Spinoza it is fortunate to have the philosopher made available to those who are not scholars. This admirable little volume means to cover all aspects of Spinoza's life and work in a simple, intelligible fashion. The special student will find footnotes and a bibliography of works by, and on, Spinoza in all languages, including also the works of the Societas Spinozana. Other students will find the biography of the philosopher well interthreaded with the problems that his writing sought to clarify. A question arises from the reading of the book as to whether its tone is not too apologetic. But deep sympathy, even bias, may become a virtue when one tries to make intelligible to laymen the work of a technician.

T. V. S.

THE ETHICS OF BIRTH CONTROL. London: Macmillan & Co., 1925. Pp. xv+179. Price, 2*s.* 6*d.* net.

This little book forms the report of a special committee of the National Council of Public Morals. Its chairman was the Bishop of Winchester, and it consisted of seventeen members, nine of whom were representative of religious communities (including the Jewish, but not the Roman Catholic). Of the remainder, seven were doctors and surgeons, including Dr. Sullivan, the well-known opponent of birth-control, but not a single well-known gynecologist. Sir William Beveridge's short paper on "The Fall of Fertility among European Races and Some of Its Social Reactions" is by far the most informative and objective part of the transactions, which form not so much an impartial inquiry into the facts, or a discussion of pure ethics, as a statement of religious teaching.

Now it is true that the Committee makes a general recommendation on improving economic conditions, including housing. But until the time comes when every family can have sufficient accommodation to house the four or five children which, as the Committee thinks, form a reasonable progeny for persons of "moderate means," it is not much comfort or help to a workingwoman to tell her that if she is Christian, "her life is lived with a background of eternity," and "spiritual reinforcements are available"; that "self-gratification is not the true purpose of life," and that "playmates in the nursery are more important than parents' ease."

It was likely that the report would be guarded in its conclusions, which come to this: the practice of conception control calls for further investigation; it is symptomatic of our artificial state of civilization; in numerous cases it is medically necessary and economically advisable, but the ideal method of birth

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control is self-control; no general approval can be given to the use of contraceptives, the real remedy lying in a return to a more simple life and a drastic reform of social and economic conditions; in married life intercourse fulfils other functions besides procreation, but the deliberate disconnection by mechanical means of sexual satisfaction and its natural result opens the door to grave social perils and throws great responsibility on those who adopt the practice; a campaign of redistribution and empire settlement is necessary to meet the dangers of overpopulation; the ultimate remedy for unfavorable economic circumstances, such as low wages and bad housing, lies in improving those circumstances and not in the adoption of birth control; young people should be trained in self-control. There are some unimportant reservations.

It is not possible, within the scope of a review, to attempt to estimate further the value of each of these conclusions. But the importance of the whole subject, rather than of this particular contribution to its study, perhaps warrants comment on one special point. The Committee has ignored almost entirely the importance of birth control as a factor in the elimination of international war. Mr. Russell has stated elsewhere that, while birth control is practiced in the most intelligent sections of the most civilized nations, its dissemination among the masses is opposed by many governments where there is no religious motive, in order to maintain the human material necessary for war. Only a year ago Paris received a pastoral message from its Archbishop urging the procreation of large families for purposes of national defense. Perhaps Mr. Russell endows governments with too diabolical an ingenuity. But the elementary fact remains, known to every student of international affairs, that of the potential causes of war one of the most serious is the pressure of population on certain national boundaries. Austria is a political storm-center in Europe because it has become doubtful whether the population can subsist upon the available resources. Again, the emigration from Italy to France alone amounts annually to about 140,000 persons, and it cannot continue at this rate without political complications. America is closing her doors, and the Italian pressure is being diverted to Asia Minor, where the political dangers are no less. The overpopulation of China and Japan is a menace in the Far East, as every Australian knows, and one which cannot be met by schemes of "Empire settlement." Setting aside, therefore, the perplexing consideration of the "purpose in nature" of Providence, does not the simple question arise whether we can *afford* to neglect and even reject a new discovery which brings under partial control a force of nature which is no less powerful for good or evil than electricity or steam? The church preaches self-control. But if self-control is inadequate, as it has been in the past and appears to be in the present, the only known alternative to birth control is war-creating famine. This method, as Mr. Russell has pointed out, has been extensively tried since 1914, and it is obviously wasteful.

E. F.

IMMANUEL KANT. Addresses by G. H. Palmer, M. W. Calkins, E. C. Milne, W. E. Hocking, H. Shapley, Kuno Francke, Roscoe Pound, and G. von Schultze Gaevernitz. Yale University Press, 1925. Pp. 88. Price 9*s*.

This small book is a collection of addresses commemorative of the birth of Kant in 1724. They are apparently directed to the very cursory attention of a "general" audience, and there seems to be no "sufficient reason" for publishing them.

C. D. B.

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IMMANUEL KANT: 1724–1924. Lectures by Edward L. Schaub, G. T. W. Patrick, Martin Schütze, Joseph A. Leighton, Edward Scribner Ames, S. G. Martin, J. H. Farley, E. L. Hinman, J. F. Crawford, E. F. Carritt, Frank Thilly. Chicago: The Open Court Publishing Co., 1925. Pp. 211. Price, $1.00.

These lectures were delivered at the bicentenary commemoration of Kant held at Northwestern University. They are popular in nature, and before being published in the present book form, were used to make up the April, 1925, number of the *Monist*. They are presented here with an introductory note by Professor Edward L. Schaub, with a number of illustrations, and in a very attractive binding.

T. V. S.

THE ECONOMICS OF SOCIAL PROBLEMS: AN INTRODUCTION TO SOCIAL ECONOMICS. By H. A. Silverman, lecturer in economics in the University of Birmingham. London: University Tutorial Press Ltd., 1925. Pp. 426; index. Price, 5*s*. 6*d*.

This is an admirable textbook for students of social life, especially for those who are aiming at some activity connected with social reform. It assumes a knowledge of the first principles of economics and treats fully such questions as the supply of labor, wages, trade-unions, co-operative societies, unemployment, and poor-law relief—but all from the English point of view, and with direct reference to English law and administration. The result of recent investigations are given and the problems are very well stated without any bias. The writer, however, evidently is in close contact with actual men and women of the working class, and does not suffer from book knowledge, as so many of our economists do. The different sections of the book are clearly divided, and yet the book is interesting to read. Altogether it seems a model of what a modern textbook should be. The author is to be congratulated. The book will certainly be valuable to English students, and for those outside England it provides a good summary of English social problems and their treatment up to the year 1924.

C. D. B.

HEALTH MAINTENANCE IN INDUSTRY. By J. D. Hackett. New York: A. W. Shaw Company, 1925. Pp. xx+488.

Assuming upon evidence that less than 1 per cent of industrial plants in America maintain adequate medical service for employees, the author sets out to indicate in detail how and why such service should be provided. His object is "to show those who manage plants . . . . how the worker's health may be maintained and improved as a means of increasing production. The subject is treated simply, and its medical and surgical aspects are dealt with only in so far as may be necessary to their understanding from the plant manager's point of view." This maintenance of health in industry, it is argued, "is not alone useful because it is a real aid to production; it is also a symbol of good will, and tends to smooth out one of the underlying causes of friction. Medical attention helps the worker by relieving pain and suffering; it lessens the economic burden of medical costs when no wages are coming in, and, whether the workers admit it or not, a good medical service stands as a bulwark against the fear of sickness which is always present among those workers who have saved little or who have earned too little to save." The book, while written for industrial managers, would interest medical men who look before and after their art. It shares their fear of medical service dispensed by the state, and uses this fear

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to exalt the alternative that medical men in America fear only slightly less than state socialization of medicine, namely, industrial socialization. The student of ethics whose mind runs to practice would find, by reading this book, that virtue conceived as health is capable of paying its own way in the work-a-day world of the business man.

T. V. S.

LA FILOSOFIA DI BENEDETTO CROCE (3rd ed. By Emilio Chiocchetti. Milan: "Vita e Pensiero," 1925. Pp. 334; no index. Price, 15 lire.

This book was first published two years ago. That it should now be in its third edition is a proof of the interest in Italy for the new idealism of Croce and of Gentile, on whose philosophy Signor Chiocchetti has written another book. The present book gives a very good summary of Croce's main thesis and explains the concept of "spirit" in its new forms. The author does not seem to have contrasted Croce's revival of Hegelianism with the newer forms of philosophy existing outside Italy; but he quotes Caird with some respect. It may be an advantage for students to have in this one small volume a vivid and comprehensive account of the best that is in Croce's philosophy.

C. D. B.

EMPLOYEES' REPRESENTATION IN COAL MINES. By Ben M. Selekman and Mary Van Kleeck. New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 1924. Pp. xxxv +454. Price, $2.00.

EMPLOYEES' REPRESENTATION IN STEEL WORKS. By Ben M. Selekman. New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 1924. Pp. 293. Price, $1.50.

SHARING MANAGEMENT WITH THE WORKERS. By Ben M. Selekman. New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 1924. Pp. xix+124. Price, $1.50.

Being desirous to contribute as effectively as possible "toward the improvement of human relations in industry," the Russell Sage Foundation decided, in 1919, after extensive conferences with social and economic and political leaders, to gather and record and evaluate "the experience of those industries in which definite effort had been made to give wage-earners a voice in matters affecting their employment." We have here the first three volumes of this study. The first concerns specifically the Industrial Representation Plan of the Colorado Fuel and Iron Company in its coal mines; the second, the same company in its steel works; and the third, the Partnership Plan of the Dutchess Bleachery, Inc., of Wappingers Falls, New York.

Without further condensing the already greatly condensed material of these investigations, it may be said that hardly less important than the extent to which these studies indicate workers' participation in management in basic industries to have gone is the concern of a great Foundation like the Russell Sage to facilitate further progress in this humane direction by becoming an unbiased organ through which public opinion may grow and function. The studies represent the best technique as yet available for dealing with complex and highly disputable social data. They have evidently been prosecuted with the most considerate attitude toward all interests involved, and yet with the scientific determination to get at the facts colored as little as possible by prejudice. They represent in fine form the foundation of the monument that all ethical minds hope to see reason build in what is almost as yet the no man's land of conflicting industrial interests.

T. V. S.

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FOUNDATION OF CHRISTIANITY: A STUDY IN CHRISTIAN ORIGINS. By Karl KAUTSKY. Authorized trans. from the 13th German ed. London: Allen & Unwin, 1925. Pp. 480; index. Price, 16s. net.

This book was first published in German in 1908, and in the Preface Kautsky tells us that he treats the subject from the Marxian point of view. We are therefore prepared for "economic determinism" and the class struggle of a proletariat.

Kautsky has no claims to special acquaintance with the evidence for the early history of Christianity; but he had a long political experience among the working classes of Germany, and he therefore brought to the study of early Christianity some new sources of interpretation. There is some truth in the idea of social unrest and the hopes of a subject class as an explanation of early Christian history; but it is so obviously not the chief explanation that it seems regrettable to omit reference to other issues.

Some of Kautsky's explanations are guesses, and not very good guesses. The summary descriptions of Roman life are somewhat misleading, and it seems fantastic to use the concept of the proletariat for the very mixed subject-classes of that period. However, students of religion may be interested in the interpretation of Christianity given in this book. One may perhaps learn more from it about the attitude of German social democracy than about Christianity.

C. D. B.

AN OUTLINE OF CHINESE CIVIL LAW. By Robert T. Bryan, Jr. Shanghai: The Commercial Press, Ltd., 1925. Pp. vi+92.

The author, himself a practitioner of law in China, gives here in very brief compass indications of the nature of Chinese civil law. Expression of personal opinion is avoided, where any other superior authority can be cited. The subject-matter is grouped around four heads: "Sources of Chinese Law," "Family Law," "Chinese Civil and Commercial Law," and "An Outline of China's Constitutions."

T. V. S.

WHAT I BELIEVE. By Bertrand Russell. New York: E. P. Dutton & Co., 1925. Pp. vii+87. Price, $1.00.

This is one of the popular "Today and Tommorrow Series." In the second volume of the series, *Icarus*, Russell expressed his fears for the human race. In this volume he parades his hopes. Under the captions of "Nature and Man," "The Good Life," "Moral Rules," "Salvation: Individual and Social," and "Science and Happiness" he sets out in very clear and challenging form the philosophy of life already available in his more weighty books, technical and otherwise. He boils his ethical philosophy down to the belief that "the good life is one inspired by love and guided by knowledge."

T. V. S.

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NOTES

FOURTH INTERNATIONAL MORAL EDUCATION CONGRESS ROME (FRIDAY, 16 APRIL, TO TUESDAY, 20 APRIL, 1926)

The Fourth International Moral Education Congress is now being planned for Rome, April 16–20, 1926.

The themes will be two: (1) the possibility of a universal moral code as a basis for education; and (2) personality, the means for its developments in the family, schools, and the world; two principal papers being devoted to each. The writers of the four principal papers and the writers of concise commentaries on the four principal documents are selected by the Italian Committee; and all these contributions will be printed and distributed by April 16. The Congress will dispense with the reading of these papers in order that the sessions may be utilized for free discussion. The languages in which the proceedings will be conducted will be Italian, French, Spanish, German, and English.

The President of the Italian Executive Committee is Professor Francesco Orestano, who took an active part in the three previous Congresses and is well known in philosophical and educational circles.

Membership of the Congress is open to all persons who accept the object and basis, and who pay not less than the equivalent of fifty Italian lire. This sum entitles the subscriber to receive whatever printed documents the Fourth Congress may issue. Applications for membership should be sent to the Presidenza IV Congresso Internazionale d'Educazione Morale, Roma (34), via Brenta, 2.

FREDERICK J. GOULD,
Hon. Sec. International Executive Council

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PLATONIC HAPPINESS AS AN ETHICAL IDEAL

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That all men naturally and inevitably desire happiness, and that the term "happiness" is somehow final as a formulation of the object of desire, has only to be mentioned in the Platonic Dialogues to secure immediate acquiescence. But as to what constitutes this happiness which all desire, opinions differ. All believe that happiness comes from the acquisition or possession of good things, but as to what things are good, and how far, and why, there is little agreement. Many seek happiness by the road which acquires such "goods" as real estate, fine houses and furnishings, fine clothes and foreign travel, with all the luxuries and friendships which money can purchase.[1] Others seek their happiness by a more explicitly psychological or physiological road, eating, drinking, and love-making in such a way as to make of their lives one sensuous gratification after another, using their bodily organisms as sieves or channels for the passage of a maximal number of such gratified stimulations.[2] Others, again, seek happiness by way of power and leadership in the community, with the idea that members of the inner ring which controls policies are able to do what they wish without restraint from others, and that happiness somehow comes to those who are free to do whatever they desire. To those who follow this pathway, some

[1] *Rep.* 419*e*, f., etc.

[2] *Gorg.* 493, f; *Rep.* 586.

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quasi-Napoleonic figure, such as Archelaos or the Great King of Persia, represents the type of happiness.

The Platonist, however, regards all such roads, as commonly understood, as failing to lead one, with any sureness, to anything worthy the name of happiness. It is perfectly possible for a man to acquire a fine house and all that goes with it, and still to miss happiness. On the other hand, it is equally possible for a man to have no private possessions, but to live "as men do in a camp," and, in spite of the absence of such possessions, to attain to the highest human happiness. So too it is possible to pass one's life in the Sicilian style, reveling and banqueting and titillating every sense one has, and yet never to attain to anything truly worth while. On the other hand, it is equally possible never to drink large quantities of wine, or to taste Attic confectionery, or to visit the damsels of Corinth, and yet to live the happiest of human lives. So again, in the third place, it is not only possible to live a quasi-Napoleonic life without being really happy, but Plato attempts to demonstrate that, in proportion as he succeeds in grasping the reins of power, the irresponsible dictator becomes progressively less happy until he reaches the acme of human misery. On the other hand, it is perfectly possible for a man never to commit a single act of arbitrary power, and still be a pattern of human happiness. The suggested methods of attaining happiness have, therefore, omitted something from their calculations, and that something is the matter of character. To the man who is himself "good," such things as food and drink, possessions, and leadership may be true goods, that is, may be taken up into his life and constitute organic portions of the ideal life, whereas to the man who is not himself "good," such things may turn out to be evils, and may bring misfortune and ruin upon their possessor.[3]

Let us consider more closely what is meant by calling a man "good." In the first place, he must be temperate or self-

[3] *Euthyd.* 280*b*, *e*, f., etc.

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controlled. The temperate life runs less to excess, whether in pleasure or in pain, than the intemperate life, and on the whole has a favorable balance of pleasure. It is also superior in rectitude or excellence, and in reputation. The Dialogues consistently maintain that this victory over the passions is essential to happiness, and that, the more self-controlled a man is, the more happy he will be.[4] The temperance in question may be the social virtue which comes from habit and attention, independently of philosophical reflection. This helps to perfect our innate love of the good, and makes for social friendliness and harmony, and easily expands into justice and religion.[5] This temperance, however, which is based merely upon habit, unless expanded so as to include wisdom also, is not perfectly satisfactory. It may invite aggression from rough neighbors, or may at all events lead to a kind of smugness which abstains from certain forms of pleasure mainly in order to obtain a greater amount of other pleasures, and thus hardly rises above the level of hedonistic psychology to the ethical level.[6] For its full development, then, as an element in the ideally good character, temperance needs the enlightened guidance of wisdom or philosophical insight.

In the second place, courage is a necessary element in character. This is based upon the psychophysical disposition toward pugnacity, and is developed by habit and training into the Spartan type of morale, which faces death on the battlefield in defense of the community and its ideals. To the Greek mind, this is the typical expression of courage, but in the Platonic Dialogues it is always pointed out that battlefields represent only one out of the many occasions when courage may and should be exercised. In perils by water, in sickness, and a thousand such occasions, in pleasures no less than in pains, even in such activities as judging a public dramatic contest,

[4] *Charm.* 176*a*; *Phaedo* 81*a–b*; *Rep.* 579*c*, f., 606*d*; *Laws* 733*d*, f.

[5] *Phaedo* 82*a–b*; *Sympos.* 188*d*, f.; *Rep.* 580*c*.

[6] *Phaedo* 69*a*; *Politicus* 307*e*, f.

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there is need of manly resolution and strength of character.[7] For the finest development of this virtue something more than habitual discipline is needed, viz., wisdom or philosophical insight into values. For the highest kind of courage is the strength of character which supports "the good" in its undying conflict with the forces of evil, including among these forces certain secret places in one's own character no less than the assaults of openly declared enemies.[8]

How is this connected with happiness? The character which is devoid of resolution is unable to make headway against temptation, whether from without or from within, and falls an easy prey to every suggestion of pleasure-pain, and his life is a succession of battles in which he always loses, a succession of moral failures. Here a pleasure is enjoyed, there a pain is avoided, but always his personality is infirm of purpose and suffers degradation. Part of Plato's picture of the misery which attends irresponsible power applies here, although in the whole picture other vices, as well as cowardice, are present. On the other hand, strength of character used in the service of the higher values makes life consistent and purposeful, superior to momentary temptations no less than to fears, and by its aid our life acquires unity, rectitude, and genuine significance in the scheme of things. But these are obviously organic elements of the happy life.[9]

In the third place, justice is an essential element in the character of the good man. Man is a social animal and finds satisfaction in community living, as such. He ceases to live as a mere individual and learns to live as a member of the group, bound to his fellow-members by all the ties, whether of pleasure or of duty undertaken and shared in common, which community living involves. Social pressure urges each citizen to undertake some definite function in the community life, whether as producer or distributor or as official, and to devote

[7] *Lach.* 191*d*, f., 194*a*; *Euthyd.* 275*c–d*, etc.

[8] *Phaedo* 67*e*, f; cf. *Rep.* 439*d*, ff. [9] *Phaedo* 81*a*; *Gorg.* 470*e*; *Laws* 734*d*.

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his chief powers to his chosen work. It also urges him to refrain from meddling with the work of his fellow-citizens who are undertaking other functions, either by direct interference, or indirectly by undertaking a multiplicity of functions and setting himself up as a competitor.[10] With most men, social virtue is a matter of habit and social pressure, but it is possible also to guide one's social activities by direct philosophical insight into the rationale of group life, and to regard the work which one does as a citizen as definitely one's chosen activity, the free and joyous realization of one's own potentialities as a citizen of the ideal community envisaged by the intellect as the goal toward which progressive actual communities are trying to work their way. This intelligent development of his potentialities for community service on the part of the individual himself includes both resolution of character and restraint or self-mastery and constitutes justice in the full sense.[11]

Thus understood, justice or social virtue is very closely connected with happiness. The just citizen not only realizes his own potentialities in a harmonious way and is thus at peace with himself, but also enjoys the comradeship which links together all good men, and is at peace with his fellows. That is to say, he not only lives the kind of life which he has freely chosen, but, if he is thoroughly at one with the ideals of his fellow-citizens, he also enjoys the undeniable pleasures which belong to the social side of life. He is at home in the actual, no less than in the ideal universe, and, so far as these tend to coincide, he succeeds in living the naturally happiest and fittest of the lives which are humanly possible.[12]

Social happiness is always dependent upon justice or social virtue. Some men attempt to live an anti-social, individualistic life, giving no positive service themselves, and robbing the community of some of the contributions of its other citi-

[10] *Rep.* 397*e*, 462*a*, ff.; *Laws* 847*a*. [11] *Rep.* 590*e*, ff.; *Laws* 631*c*.

[12] *Sympos.* 188*d*; *Rep.* 618*e*, f.; *Laws* 662*d*, f., 829*a*.

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zens. This is injustice. If, now, social pressure, e.g., in the form of legal condemnation and punishment, succeeds in restoring to such a man his value-sense, so that, after making atonement, he devotes himself to the positive duties of citizenship, he too attains to a measure of the happiness enjoyed by the perfectly righteous man. To precisely the same level he can never attain, because the consequences of his former misdeeds inevitably place him in a different position toward himself no less than toward the community.[13] If, however, he succeeds in maintaining his position above the law, and succeeds in escaping punishment and repentance, such an individualist lives an unhappy life. With the forces in the community which make for orderly and constitutional government he is necessarily in a state of permanent warfare. His only friends are the other anti-social elements in the community and his foreign mercenaries, in whom he can repose no real confidence. And finally, he is not at peace with himself. The elements within him which make for law and order are kept down by the *force majeure* of some powerful appetite, and he is headed straight for psychological, as well as for moral, chaos. Alienated from himself, no less than from his fellow-citizens and from the ideal realm which is the only source of abiding satisfaction, his life, even though he may conceivably succeed in overcoming each external obstacle as it arises, is, as a whole, a complete failure, and he is necessarily, not happy, but supremely miserable.[14]

In the fourth place, holiness or a sense of religious values constitutes an integral portion of the good character. This, like justice, is a social excellence, expressing man's relation, however, not so much toward his fellow-men as such, as toward spiritual beings generally, and particularly toward the community representatives of the spiritual life, such as the gods of the established religion. At the same time, the religious attitude of worship and service is clearly extended to in-

[13] *Gorg.* 473*b*, f., 478*c*, f. [14] *Rep.* 576*e*, 579*e*, 580*c*, 589*c*, etc.

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clude national heroes who lived and died in the service of the community ideals, and even certain living men, such as parents and "divinely inspired" persons such as poets, prophets, lawgivers, and priests.[15] And further, in view of the fact that most civil and criminal offenses in the model community are associated with specific punishments for impiety in addition to the civil penalties, it appears that the religious attitude, in the City of God, is intended to cover the observance of law generally, and that all occasions of life, including not merely birth, education, marriage, sickness, and death, but commercial, judicial, and social relations, are, for the Platonist, within the scope of the religious value-judgment.[16] It is thus hardly correct to define platonic holiness as a part of justice, i.e., the part concerned with the gods as distinguished from the part concerned with one's fellow-citizens, justice in the wider sense being understood as complete social virtue.[17] The general position of the *Laws* is rather that religion is the more inclusive concept which applies to all the relations of life, while justice is rather a civic support of the religious value-judgment, enforcing with the organized power of the community the decrees which the religious man naturally accepts and which it is impious to disobey. It is thus more correct to regard justice and religion as closely allied. Justice, i.e., social virtue resting upon the organized power of the community, passes over into religion when the community is regarded as the earthly reflex of the ideal pattern laid up in heaven, and religion, i.e., the attitude of acceptance and worship of ideal powers, passes over into justice when it becomes necessary to deal with men

[15] *Cratyl.* 398*a*; *Rep.* 427*b*, 469*a*, 540*b–c*; *Laws* 717*b*, f.

[16] *Laws* 745, 885*b*, f., 887, etc.

[17] Auermann's thesis (*Platons Cardinaltugenden vor und nach Abfassung des Euthyphron*, Jena, 1876)—that holiness, as a "cardinal" virtue disappears after the *Euthyphro*, being included in the concept of justice or righteousness—while accepted without question in the later literature (e.g., by Hans Meyer, *Gesch. d. alten Philosophie*, 1925), is not consistent with the general position taken in the *Laws*. His definition of "service of God" as *Selbstveredlung und Menschenbildung* (p. 27) is also far too narrow, when compared with the *Laws*.

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who refuse to recognize the religious sanctions of the unseen world.

How is the religious attitude connected with happiness? The religious man regards himself as the servant of God in all his thoughts, words, and actions, and endeavors, as far as in him lies, to assimilate himself to God, to develop the divine element within him until it dominates his whole nature, and he becomes as like God as a human being can.[18] In so doing, he fulfils the function assigned to humanity in the divine plan, co-operating with God in applying the idea of good to the idealization of his limited environment. The divine plan applies the idea of good to the whole, realizing for each part its maximum of positive well-being in relation to the other parts and to the whole, and so far as man fulfils the function assigned to him, he attains his maximum of positive well-being, i.e., attains to as much of happiness, both here and hereafter, as a human being well can.[19] The impious man may seem for a time to be successful here below, but he is not at home in the ideal realm, and ultimately has no part or lot in the ideal whole toward the realization of which all things which have a share of positive reality are gradually working together, whereas the righteous soul becomes more and more adapted to its true, ideal home, and dwells eternally, as Plato puts it, in the company of the gods, secure of happiness.[20]

Finally, wisdom or philosophical insight forms an ingredient in the good character. This is the most divine element in man, the eye of the soul which develops, not by bodily *askesis*, but by intellectual exercises which gradually liberate it from all bodily interferences, whether from the sense organs or from the emotions, until it envisages, as clearly as may be, the intellectual realm of the ideas from one end to the other, and rises to the contemplation of the principle of ideality itself, as

[18] *Theaet.* 176*b*, f.; *Laws* 716*d*, f.

[19] *Rep.* 500*e*; *Laws* 664*b*, 732*d*, 903*b*, ff.

[20] *Apol.* 40*e*; *Phaedo* 81*a–b*; *Phaedr.* 250*b*; *Tim.* 90*b*, f.; *Laws* 905*b–c*.

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the principle of realizing, in every concrete situation, its maximum of significance and value in relation to the whole. Grasping the finality of this principle, and its identity with the divine principle in accordance with which the cosmos is created and ordered, the wise man devotes himself to making over his habitual ways of thinking and acting, until the pugnacious dispositions which characterize his organism develop into ideal fortitude and resolution, his dispositions toward quietness and avoidance of excitement develop into ideal temperance and self-moderation, his social dispositions develop into ideal justice, his instinctive feelings toward superhuman forces develop into the ideal religious attitude, and his instinctive inquisitiveness develops into ideal science and philosophy.[21] When all the dispositions inherent in his organism have thus become enlightened and raised, as nearly as possible, to the ideal level, his whole life, in detail as well as in principle, becomes gradually instinct with wisdom, not only in relation to his own organism, but also in relation to his social and physical environment. In every situation which arises, whether in his public or in his private relations, he brings to bear a group of action-tendencies which have been so developed as to produce the ideally most suitable and most valuable reaction of which the circumstances admit.

Thus understood, wisdom is very definitely related to happiness. The so-called goods of life, viz., wealth, noble birth, health, good looks, power and honor in the community, are apt to confuse our judgment and make us think that they are good in themselves and that we cannot have too much of them. The wise man, however, after due reflection comes to the conclusion that in themselves they are neither good nor bad, but that, human nature being what it is, not only too little of such "goods," but also too much is an evil, and that, as is obvious in the case of eating or drinking, in all external goods the

[21] For a more minute discussion of the evidence upon which the above rests, cf. this *Journal*, XXXIII, 38 ff.

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mean state, something between the two extremes, represents what is best for us, if we are to live a happy life. Further, the use of such goods, even in such moderate amounts, must always be controlled by wisdom, and this is true, not only of external goods, but also of all moral and mental qualities.[22] It follows, that ultimately the wisest and the happiest lives coincide in all respects, wisdom consisting in so living as to extract from all the elements which enter into our experience their maximal value, and happiness consisting precisely in the life of maximal well-being, i.e., the life which realizes the greatest possible quantity and quality of true value.

The type of the ideally happy man, for the Platonist, is the philosophic guardian, i.e., a member of the "golden" class living and working in the ideal community depicted in the *Republic* and approved in the *Laws*. Born under eugenically as well as morally ideal conditions, and so trained from the moment of birth as to develop all his faculties, physical, aesthetic, moral, religious, and intellectual, in the service of a community which is envisaged as patterned upon the divine model, the philosophic guardian becomes the human embodiment of the idea of good, the channel through which this divine principle molds both individual and community into the semblance of divinity and thus makes real upon earth the kingdom whose pattern is laid up in heaven. The life which such a man lives is a human pattern of the happy life, and the legislation in which he gives concrete expression to his insight into the ideal principle serves as a human standard, both for judges who administer that legislation and for private citizens who are seeking the way of happiness.[22a]

The superhuman pattern of happiness closely resembles this human model, with its two sides of philosophic contemplation and administrative guardianship. The good man who, after bodily death, is translated to the abode of intermediate

[22] *Euthyd.* 281*e*, f.; *Meno* 87*e*, ff.; *Rep.* 618*c*, f.; *Laws*, 691*c*, f.

[22a] *Polit.* 305*b–c*; *Laws* 627*e*, f., 728*a–b*, 880*d*, f.

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spirits—goes aloft to rule a star, as Plato puts it—carries on the same function of administrative guardianship. Freed of the sensuous haziness and emotional confusion of earthly experience, his vision of the ideas is more clear and more sure. Contemplation, however, even of the idea of good, does not content him. He proceeds, as before, to apply this idea in the sphere of activity suitable to his state of existence, and in proportion to the improvement in his powers of insight, his administrative guardianship shows improvement. On earth, his control over motion was uncertain and irregular. In his new sphere, his control over stellar motion is certain and regular, so regular, in fact, that these motions furnish a pattern to guide and correct the irregularities of spirits who are still earth-bound.[23] His happiness, like his activity, is thus still the happiness of a philosophic guardian. And if we look higher, at the life of the gods depicted poetically in Plato's pages, we find it a further extension of the same ideal. The lesser gods are represented as essentially ministers appointed to apply the idea of good to some particular section of the cosmic system. Their powers of contemplation of the eternal ideas are, no doubt, greater, but what they learn in such contemplation they apply to doing "each his own work" of administrative guardianship.[24] Full justice is done to the administrative side of the divine activity in the further demonstration that the gods do not live an idle life, neglecting the spiritual universe which they have helped to create, and even in the case of the entity represented in Platonic literature as *Deus summus*, i.e., the demiurge of the *Timaeus*, there is no question that his activity is fundamentally administrative, the application of the idea of good to the cosmos in general, the details being left to his ministers.[25] The blessed life, then, in which gods and men share, consists in applying the principle of ideality to the

[23] *Tim.* 41*d*, f., 47*b–c*; cf. *Laws* 747*e*.

[24] *Phaedr.* 247*a*, f.; *Polit.* 271*d*; *Critias* 109*b*; *Laws* 903*b*.

[25] *Tim.* 28, ff.; *Laws* 904.

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gradual elevation of the less ideal elements in the environment until they, too, are fitted to take their appointed place in the ideal plan which realizes the greatest possible quantity and quality of value. The happy life is, in brief, the principle of "the good" in conscious, self-directed activity.

One difficulty remains to be explained. In certain moods, Plato writes as though the two aspects of (1) contemplation and (2) administrative guardianship were diverse, and it cannot be denied that the expressions of this mood have worked themselves into many characteristic platonic passages. Thus it is the external enforcement of the community which is said to induce the philosopher to leave his beloved seclusion and apply himself to the ungrateful task of educating the beasts in the den into some semblance of humanity. His sense of justice accepts their verdict, but only because he owes his education to the community.[26] If he had somehow succeeded in obtaining his liberating education by himself, or by the aid of his family or of some teacher, independently of community assistance, it is very directly implied that he would have been justified in refusing the position of administrator, or that, at best, his motive in accepting would have been in order to avoid being misgoverned by someone not adequately educated in political science.[27] The many passages conceived in this general spirit are logically inconsistent with the depiction of the divine nature and goodness as devoid of envy and as of itself so acting as to make the rest of the world good, like itself. The spirit of goodness of course overflows into good actions.[28] So too, they are inconsistent with the demonstration, in the *Laws,* that the gods are not idle and neglectful of human concerns, living a life apart. What one would expect, after studying the logic of the platonic position, is that insight into the idea of good would, of itself, lead to the idea working itself out in action, and would thus bring about an acceptance,

[26] *Crito* 50d–e; *Rep.* 520.

[27] *Rep.* 347c; cf. *Polit.* 301e, f.

[28] *Tim.* 29e, f.; cf. *Rep.* 335c, f.

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freely and from self-determined motives, of the tasks of administrative guardianship. An educated man, in so far as he is educated, inevitably spreads education around him. To do so is the free, self-determined expression of his nature. To withdraw into selfish seclusion, and to use his powers for the good of the community only upon external compulsion or when appeals are made to his economic or political interests, is to fall short of the ideal of education. Like Achilles sulking in his tent, he makes one doubt whether he has really beheld the vision, and one can understand his position only by assuming the presence of certain "human" weaknesses, i.e., certain still unidealized elements, in his character. A completely ideal guardian would of course act ideally, and would not withhold his services.

By platonic happiness, then, we shall understand the logical consequence of the platonic position as a whole, i.e., the life which devotes itself, freely and joyously, to the maximal development of the value-potentialities in itself and in the environment, in accordance with the ideal vision. The philosophic vision is a dialectical apprehension of the principle of value, as the principle of bringing to light, in every concrete situation of life, its maximum of value in harmonious, consistent, systematic unity with the other values of life. For the application of this vision to the actual details of empirical living, experience is needed, an experience partly sensuous,[29] but chiefly, for Platonism, an experience which, by the processes of analysis, comparison, and standardization, has been raised to the level of scientific psychology, both individual and social. Such situations as are involved in low birth, or in high birth, in a typical Hellenic community, such situations as are involved in robust health, or in chronic invalidism, such situations as are involved in the possession of great wealth, or in subjection to actual poverty—these, and a hundred other

[29] *Rep.* 408*e*, f.; 539*e*, f., 582*a*, f.; *Phileb.* 62*a*, f.; cf. *Laws* 951*a–c*; cf. *Epist.* 322*d–e*.

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typical situations are separated out by analysis, and their consequences for the development of the soul are carefully considered, both in isolation and in circumstances involving combination with other similar situations. The general conclusion from such a study is that, in the case of all natural and acquired gifts of the soul, the extremes of excess and deficiency are to be avoided, and the mean state is to be pursued: for this is the way of happiness.[30] Excess in such natural gifts, physical, moral, and intellectual, leads almost inevitably to insolence, self-importance, and an arrogant assumption of superiority which, as in the notorious case of Alcibiades, culminates in disorder and downright injustice,[31] with their usual harvest of contentions and hatreds. Deficiency in such gifts leads, on the contrary, to meanness and a quasi-slavish poverty of spirit, from which nothing of genuine value is to be expected.

Psychological determinations, however, while important in their place, viz., in connection with working out the concrete details of the happy life, do not, of themselves, explain the principle of that life. The search for pleasures which are constituted out of organ-satisfactions, as such, is of merely subjective significance, empty and meaningless when out of touch with that reality which alone gives meaning and value to the functioning of our psychophysical mechanisms. The life of philosophical guardianship, on the other hand, is rich in satisfactions which are throughout controlled by contact with objective reality. This life attains to reality in the fullest sense, and derives its own reality and value from the idea of value, the ultimate principle which enables the human guardian to bring out the value-aspects of all elements in his own character and in the social and physical milieu in which he has been stationed by the Divine Guardian. In this "blessed" life, pleasure is indeed an element, but not a constituent ele-

[30] *Rep.* 402*c*, f., 618*b*, f.

[31] *Rep.* 494*b*, f.; *Laws* 691*c*, 728*e*, f., 792*c–d*.

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ment, as such. In Aristotelian terminology, pleasure is an inseparable accident (or even a property) of the blessed life, but does not constitute its essence. Its essence is constituted by the idea of good, the ultimate principle of value.

Platonic happiness is thus primarily of metaphysical, rather than psychological, significance. It remains to ask in what sense it is of ethical significance, in what sense it constitutes a "highest" good. The answer to this question consists in showing (1) that nothing else, such as possessions, pleasure, or power, can be conceived as an essential constituent of the ideal life, and (2) that the blessed or happy life just considered represents the good life par excellence, the best and finest life which our thought can construct, a life which is the idea of good itself, so far as this can be realized in our psychophysical mechanisms, and that, in idea, the "blessed" life and the ideal life coincide in all respects. The ethical life, e.g., seeks to realize value; but what could be more valuable than the life which consistently realizes the maximal value-potentialities of its organism, and applies the principle of value itself in all its thoughts, words, and works? The ethical life seeks a firm basis in objective values; but what life could be more firmly based than the life which rests upon the principle of ultimate reality and forms itself entirely upon the nature of the world which is real in the deepest sense? So too, the ethical life seeks spirituality; but what life could be more spiritual than the life which assimilates itself reverently but persistently to what reason reveals as the nature of the divine, and thus enters, as directly as may be, into the divine life itself? Whatever point of view one takes, one finds that the "blessed" life depicted by Plato satisfies the demands of the ethical ideal, and the final conclusion which we reach is that platonic "happiness" and the ethically ideal life are completely coincident.

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PAST AND FUTURE: AN ETHICAL PERSPECTIVE

ERNEST HATCH WILKINS

I

One of the highest-surging moments of my youth was that in which there came to me, as I stood on the summit of Vesuvius, the sense of the reality of the past.

I was not unprepared. For I had knowledge of the past, though not the sense of its reality—a knowledge gained through eager boyhood reading of history and of historical romance. Yet the past, for all its fascination, seemed but a treasure of the modern printed page. The time of my own life was real to me, and a dimmer reality touched the decades of which I had heard my elders tell—as though the figures of an old canvas should turn and move and then resume their place —but beyond lay only patterned surfaces.

And I had known that quickening of the spirit that comes as one gazes out over the world revealed from a New England mountain-top: unending and infinitely different uplifted masses of earth's majesty; profound valleys, their slopes clad here in lighter, there in darker green; swift streams, now seen for a flashing instant, now traced where the descending tree-lines meet. But the drama thus surveyed, moving though it be, is the drama not of humanity, but of birth and change and death that are infra-human; of myriads of trees upreaching and of mysterious undergrowth, peopled alike with voiced and restless life; of rapid and cascade; of enfolding cloud; of wind and sun and swiftly passing shadow.

Thus I had had past without mountain, and mountain without past. Vesuvius, first, through mountain dominance over a historic scene, gave me historic vision.

I remember the long slow drive from Naples, under a clouded sky, through squalid suburbs, then, higher, between walled vineyards with hard white dwellings by their gates; the unpleasant, sharp ascent in the funicular; the curious

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gray climb over springy ashes to the crater's edge; the abyss, filled with baffling, menacing smoke; and then the turn to the marvelous view.

Sunlight, now, revealed and defined the intense forms and colors: the plains and mountains of Campania, dotted with villages, the irregular white crescent of the city, clinging to hill and shore, the living blue of the bay—sails and smoke-pennons of its tiny craft scarcely astir—the strange beauty of the islands, the paler sea beyond, the dark tree-mass and the white cliffs of the peninsula, the nearer heights, the deep immediate valley—and at our feet, far, far below, Pompeii.

The sun shone full upon its broken walls, into the little roofless pits that had been homes, upon the open spaces bared of their long burden of ashes. There life had stopped, in sudden terror, two thousand years ago—*but there, down there, right down there, two thousand years ago, life had been!*

And with that thought the sense of the reality of the past broke over me in a great wave of revelation. That life, the life lived down there, with its making and its bartering and its ways of idleness, with its stirring of bright garments in busy streets, with its sounds of excited talk, its shouts, its tears, its laughter, with its wonderings and its faiths, its cruelties and its loves—that life was as utterly real as my own. And if that life, then all life that has been lived by man.

Such intense consciousness of the reality of the past is indeed the gift of many a high place in Italy. It has come to me repeatedly, since that first day—most powerfully, perhaps, on the site of Tusculum, overlooking Rome and the Campagna, and at Fiesole, above the Arno valley and the storied loveliness of Florence. That spiritual height from which Dante surveys time and eternity was gained, I believe, not without such experience. Carducci, pre-eminently the poet of the past, speaks again and again from a like vantage point. The coming of inspiration is to him an ascent:

> Io salgo de' secoli sul monte—
> I climb the mountain of the centuries.

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Never, since that hour on Vesuvius, has the sense of the reality of the past gone from me. At first it seemed that the life of Greece and Rome, though real, was indeed ancient. Reality of life began with the beginning of recorded history. And my own time, though no more real than the preceding centuries, was something final toward which they had been moving. We were indeed the heirs of all the ages.

Then, as later years brought knowledge of earlier civilizations and of the very beginnings of civilization, the scope of the real past widened, gradually and easily, and its proportions changed. The life of Pompeii, now, seemed very near; and the twenty-five thousand years that take us back to the Neanderthal seemed no longer than the Christian era had seemed before. And in the new perspective my own time stood less securely ultimate.

II

The sense of the reality of the future grew, for me, as a logical projection of the sense of the reality of the past. But its permanent fixation came—again from Italy—through words of an Italian friend. We were talking of the conflicting interests of labor and capital; and he said: "We shall have a hard time of it for the next hundred years or more, but I think the adjustment will have been made within two hundred years."

He spoke with perfect simplicity, almost casually, as though such dealing with the future were the most natural thing in the world. To him, indeed, it was completely natural; for his sensitiveness to the significance of his Italian background had made him inevitably conscious of the succession of the centuries—a succession which, presently leaving us behind, will be going on and on and infinitely on. His mind beheld *sub specie aeternitatis*.

The sense of the reality of the future is harder to win and to develop than the sense of the reality of the past—not only

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because it is necessarily derivative in character, but because the specific content of the future is unknown. The past is a matter of record; the future seems rather to belong to the realm of dreams. Genealogical interest may search far back through the generations; but the corresponding forward look scarcely reaches beyond our grandchildren. Yet it takes but a resolute change of tense: *there will be life,* as the centuries run, identical in its human essence with our own, no matter how its habiliments may change. There will be toil and rest; there will be ugliness and beauty, invention and routine, meditation and passion; there will be suffering and delight.

The future is indeed more real than the past in that it summons to action, while the past is silent. The past is unchangeable, the future is plastic; for the past we have no moral concern, for the future we are responsible; the past is a matter of record—the future belongs to the realm of will.

III

With this conception, the ultimacy of our own time vanishes. There is nothing peculiarly honorable in our chronological position. We are still the heirs of all the ages that have gone, but we are no less truly the ancestors of all the ages that are to come. And our progeny will be infinitely more numerous than our ancestry.

Indeed, if thought range freely and courageously in a realized past and future, there results a new perspective, astounding in its implications, of the course of human civilization and of our place therein. For civilization runs back some twenty-five thousand years; and it runs forward . . . . how far?

There is, of course, the possibility of man-made disaster, and there is the possibility of terrestrial catastrophe. Barring such Roman or Pompeian tragedy, we have before us, as the time of our dwelling upon earth . . . . a thousand million years, according to the estimate of my colleague, Professor Forrest Moulton.

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Let us accept that estimate, for a moment, and try to grasp something of its meaning. The numbers are easily written, easily uttered; but to bring them to the point of imaginative reality one must be ready to put forth exhausting effort, must win some share of the relentless power of Dante's penetrating vision:

> . . . . mill'anni—ch'è più corto
> Spazio all' eterno, che un mover di ciglia
> Al cerchio che più tardi in cielo è torto—
>
> A thousand years—which, to eternity,
> Are briefer than the twinkling of an eye
> To the slow wheeling of the utmost star.

Consider the contrast: on the one side, twenty-five thousand years; on the other, a thousand million years. Mathematically, then, the course that civilization has already run is one forty-thousandth as long as the course it has still, potentially, to run. If you should represent the past as a single inch, it would take a line two-thirds of a mile long to represent the future. On the scale of a life of threescore years and ten, we are just entering the afternoon of our first day.

Change the terms, if you will. Take a lower estimate for the future of the race. Carry our past back beyond the beginning of civilization to the point of the physical differentiation of man. The length of the time to come is in any case so vast that the essential force of the results remains unaltered.

We are most literally in the infancy of the race. We are, by the ultimate standard, primitive man.

IV

With this realization there comes first of all, I think, a profound sense of humility. How can we know, how can we expect to know, more than the least part of what mankind will ultimately know, more than the tiniest fraction of ultimate truth? How can we think that any antiquity of ours, however

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hoary, can suffice to justify forever any institution, any creed?

And there should come therewith a readiness to accept change, or to cause change. If we cannot claim ultimacy in social and economic relations, in government, in education, in religion, we should be ready to modify or to surrender that which is not ultimate, to put away, children though we are, the things that are seen as childish, to welcome all that seems worthy as hypothesis or as experiment.

Yet the same vista that suggests change implies in its vastness that our today scarce differs from our yesterday, and that yesterday's thought is not necessarily inferior to our own. Much has been learned; and though infinitely more remains as yet unlearned, we have the right to treasure all that which we indeed possess. Change, then, should be reasoned change —something more than the absurdity of infantile rebellion; and in hypothesis and experiment there should be no place for arrogance.

The differentness of other men and of other lands loses, and gains, in import. It becomes less schismatic, if the new humility leads us to realize that we are not so likely, after all, to be uniquely and completely right. It mounts in power, if the new humility leads us to look beyond ourselves for help. Yet a reasoned humility does not by any means imply abject surrender. It does imply co-operation.

There is nothing peculiarly honorable in our chronological position—yet our own time *is* our own time. And in the long perspective we of the present day seem closer to each other. We share the same temporary conditions of life—conditions unlike those of our grandfathers, unlike those of our grandchildren. We have in common our own traditions, our own excitements, our own limitations.

Thinking thus, one gains a stronger and stronger sense of the comradeship of all of us who are alive together in just this world. As college classmates meet at a reunion with a deep-

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ened, clinging sense of the ties that have bound and bind them, with a loss of boyish jealousies, with a new welcome for men they had scarcely known before, so—if it be not too whimsical—one may imagine that in some fancied reunion of the centuries there might be, among us, a deepened fellowship, many a handclasp now unforeseen, many a cry: "Well, old man, you were of the twentieth century, too, weren't you?" We are in time to carry back that fellowship into our present day.

What of the value, in such perspective, of one single life? Does not the individual become so microscopic as to lose significance? So one might think, at first; but reflection leads to a very different view. The relative importance of a single life is indeed less, but its absolute importance is far greater than we had supposed. For the future is plastic, is of our own responsibility, is within our will—and the future is immensely longer than we had realized. The ripples of a cast stone cannot go beyond the shore. If the pool be small, they are soon ended—but in a lake the impulse carries afar, spending itself quietly in gradual diminution. If the world were to end in a hundred years, it would make little absolute difference whether we give our children taint or vigor, whether we move toward war or peace. But if the ripples of our influence are to go on through so endless a transmission, it matters infinitely whether they be for good or ill. Every word and every deed impinges on and modifies other life. Whether we will or no, we live not unto ourselves, not unto our comrades only, but even unto the multitude of the unborn.

V

The new challenge to conduct, then, bids us live neither in easy reliance on accepted sanctions, nor in scorn of what we have won thus far, but on the basis of a merely incipient knowledge, yet with resolute vision—as loyal comrades in the stress and joy of coexistence and in the great adventure of the direction of a quasi-eternal human destiny.

UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO

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ON THE DECLINE OF AUTHORITY

R. DEMOS

Historical progress has been said to consist in the rise of freedom. Our epoch prides itself on its rediscovery of the right of private judgment, which had long lain buried in the vast, dim consciousness of the Dark Ages. In matters of scientific belief we have shaken off allegiance to authority, no matter how venerable, and trust to experiment; in matters of religion and philosophy we proclaim with increasing emphasis the right of each person to accept an opinion only in so far as it commends itself to his unaided reason; and in art and in conduct, and throughout the breadth and length of life, the hold of tradition seems to grow steadily weaker, and the individual to emerge as the master of his spiritual being. The inner light of personal experience is outshining the outer light of racial experience. We are facing the decline of authority, and we are facing it not only with no regret, but with elation.

Authority is a general type of power of which sovereignty is a particular case, and it extends over the miscellaneous fields of belief, feelings, custom, action, and religious attitudes. We speak of "authorities" in the fields of history and of science, of industry, and of administration. The expert is an authority just as much as the government is. The pope is an authority for many in matters of religion; the classical tradition even today provides authoritative standards to the artist; the Prince of Wales and Monsieur Poiret are authorities on the question of men's and women's clothes, respectively. To consider authority adequately one must study it in its broadest sense, beyond its narrower manifestation in the political field.

Undoubtedly, authority is a form of power, and the state of being under authority is different from that of being free.

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What is less realized is that authority is no less different from the state of coercion; authority exists only where it is accepted by the will of the person on whom it is exercised. As Professor Roeloffs has put it, mere *de facto* power is not enough. If you coerce me into doing your bidding, I am but your slave; you have authority over me only in so far as I choose to obey you, or "recognize" your authority.[1] The relationship is reciprocal, shared in by both parties: you contribute the power, and I, the will to obey it. And so the state of being under authority lies midway between subjection and freedom, taking something from both; like the first, it involves control, and like the second, the use of the will. Consider authority in the sphere of belief. An expert becomes my authority on any given matter only because I recognize him to be such. He may be as wise as any man can be, but unless the public "adopts" him as its expert, he will not be an authority. And to recognize one as an authority in matters of opinion is again to strike a medium between the freedom of private judgment on the one hand and submission on the other. In so far as I take your opinion I refrain from thinking for myself; but in so far as I use my judgment in choosing you as my expert I preserve the integrity of my reason. In order to employ an expert I must be both ignorant and wise—ignorant enough to need him and wise enough to choose him. The psychological attitudes which accompany the recognition of authority are respect, or reverence, trust, and confidence. Of these there are obviously varying degrees, and, correspondingly, authority may be complete or relative, wholehearted or tentative.

The authority of an expert or of tradition is derivative, not primary. You are an authority in science because of your expert knowledge of the field, or you are a religious leader because of your exceptional insight into spiritual truth. Essentially, experts or prophets or sages are mediators between the

[1] Cf. H. D. Roeloffs, *The Nature and Function of Authority*, a stimulating work to which I am also indebted for the generalized conception of authority.

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truth and the public, and the total situation may be analyzed into a relation of interpretation between the expert, the layman, and the realm of validity, with the expert interpreting the truth to the layman. And the interpretation itself may require interpretation. In some sects of the Christian religion Jesus is regarded as the interpreter of the divine will, the New Testament and the sacred Fathers as interpreters of Jesus, and the church or the pope as the interpreters of the sacred authorities. But not all authority is derivative by relation to an objective realm. In a crisis we appoint a dictator, not so much because he is wiser than the rest, but because it is necessary that some one person should have authority to decide; and even in more normal circumstances, when we go out on a picnic or a longer expedition, we appoint a leader on whom the responsibility of decision is made to rest. It is authority for the sake of authority, not authority which claims assent because of any superior insight. Of this type, probably, is the authority of the state over its citizens. Living together as we do in a natural group, with our interests constantly overlapping, we stand in need of an authority with the power to decide about any matter involving our common interests in a critical way; hence the state. The existence of government removes hesitation and brings certainty into human relations in the sense that it enables people to know what to expect in a given situation. The authority of the various agencies of the state—as distinguished from the state itself—is derivative; the police exercise authority in so far as they interpret the ruling of the judiciary; the judiciary must interpret the law, and the legislature, in its turn, must interpret the spirit of the constitution. And if there is any meaning to the conception of the right to revolution, then the authority of the state must, to some extent at least, be derivative. If it is true that the state cannot violate the fundamental principles of justice or the elementary rights of man without forfeiting its authority, then it must be that political power is based

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partly on the fact that it embodies and interprets to the group an ideal of social justice. And perhaps the essence of the contractual theory of the origin of the state is the point that the authority of the state is ultimately not intrinsic, but refers beyond itself to principles which it must translate into action.

The reasons which make meditated authority necessary may be roughly divided into two. In the first place, we have authority by reason of the operation of the principle of the division of function. Let us say that I am a doctor; then, I have neither the time, nor perhaps the ability, to specialize in law also, and so I engage another person who has made a specialty of the subject, and trust to his judgment on all legal matters involving my interests. Even within the same field, within science, for example, one expert will take the word of another on any experiment; it would be a waste of time and effort to repeat one another's observations. So in mathematics, I use the table of logarithms without checking it up for myself. And beyond the field of expert knowledge we rely upon authority continually with reference to the routine of daily life —for example, on the question whether a certain play is worth seeing, whether the train leaves in the morning or in the afternoon, or whether so and so is a good man. Exchange is as universal in the sphere of intellectual goods as it is in the sphere of economic goods. The use of testimony or expert judgment makes vicarious knowledge possible in any group forming an organic unity. It is a form of authority which in no way impugns the dignity of the person who employs it. For, potentially, every layman is also an expert in some one field, and thus serves as an authority for the very person in relation to whom he stands as a layman. We have an impartial distribution of power within a society of equals.

The other type of authority involves recognition of the intrinsic superiority of one person or group. In religion, custom has always recognized oracles and prophets, individuals gifted with extraordinary insight and wisdom, who, by the force of

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their superiority, became the leaders of the masses. The dominating figure, the pioneer, the "wise man," the Messiah, the overpowering genius in art and thought, are features of any normal society, so impressing their personality upon the group that the public spontaneously turns to them for guidance. And in its enthusiasm the public makes heroes out of them and invests their declarations with the halo of divinity. Authority of this kind is anticipated in the relation of parent to child, and, among backward countries, in the relation of a paternal government to its subjects. It rests on the definite inequality of individuals, resulting in an asymmetrical organization of society, in which there are superiors and inferiors, leaders and led, like a territory which includes both hills and valleys. And just as an individual may lead the group, so may the group lead the individual. Of this sort of authority, tradition is the pre-eminent example, as illustrating the influence of the spirit of the race and of history upon the individual.

Authority, whether in the form of the superior individual or of tradition, manifests itself in different ways. It may embody itself in an organized institution which proclaims the truth as a dogma and claims absolute assent for it. The church, the Bible, Aristotle in the Middle Ages, any official doctrine, are cases in point. Or it may embody itself in custom and in unconscious opinion which, for all their being unorganized, exact implicit obedience in no less degree; witness the force of custom in matters of conduct and etiquette. Or it may express itself informally and tentatively, inviting criticism rather than resenting it. Of this more will be said later.

Today we are inclined to denounce authority—whether of the expert, or of the prophet, or of tradition—as incompatible with the democratic ideals of equality and freedom. The individual is encouraged to regard himself as being as good as anyone else, that is to say, as competent a judge as anyone else, on any matter under the sun, and the instinctive feeling of reverence for wisdom as embodied in the social inheritance

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or in the views of qualified experts is being weakened. The spirit of the age interprets independence as inconsistent with respect for tradition or with discipline of any sort: "I will do this in my own way and I will listen to advice from no one" is the motto of the extreme individualist. The prevalent attitude is that of the "man from Missouri" who wants to be shown. The trouble is that the man from Missouri—in other words, your average layman—lacks the proper qualifications for passing judgment upon most matters, so that, when he sits as an expert, either he misses the truth altogether—as happened with Mr. Bryan and the residents of Tennessee over the question of evolution—or, what is worse, he gets it in a diluted, vulgarized form, the truth having been toned down in order to be made acceptable to his inexpert mind.

What I mean can be illustrated in various ways. Whenever the student enters the classroom without an initial love of wisdom or respect for those who would persuade him of its importance, and without the attitude of aiming beyond his immediate grasp, but rather expecting the material of thought to be brought down to his actual level of interest and intelligence, the teacher is tempted to talk down to the student and to become sensational and cheap. The higher institutions of learning in the United States often find themselves in serious predicaments owing to the fact that the public, which pays for their support, insists on calling the tune and dictating their educational policy. And the universities, in order to obtain contributions from the public, are compelled to erect larger and larger stadia, grander and grander buildings, to the detriment of the subtler and more important interests of education. In the Old World, at least in older times, the public—that is to say, your wealthy merchant who left his money to the university—would not think of offering advice on policy, but would trust to the expert judgment of the authorities. It is impossible for the public to be adequately and correctly informed on such matters in detail; and where judgment is absent, preju-

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dice creeps in. The only way is for the public to feel proud of its educational institutions and, while actively supporting them, agree not to interfere with their considered judgment. Then only will it be possible for our colleges and universities to strike new ground in the field of social and religious thought, keeping ahead of the public and leading it on, instead of merely mirroring its mind, as often is the case. I do not mean to decry the intelligence of the public, but the fact remains that the public *qua* public lacks expert judgment. Nor do I intend to suggest that its tastes are cheap; I do mean, however, that there is a difference between giving the public what it wants and giving it what it aspires to. The question is whether society will conform to the prejudices of democracy or to the ideals of democracy. The decay of respect for tradition and for experts induces a certain moral entropy, analogous to the degradation of energy in the physical world, whereby ideas and ideals are leveled down to the masses, when, on the contrary, the masses might be lifted up to them; and the consequences are disastrous for the theater, literature, the press, and religious thought. It is foolish to suppose that the attitude of reverence for leaders is detrimental to the spirit of democracy; a leader is the guardian of the standards of the community, and by keeping these before its eyes he holds the public up to its best efforts.

What is the way to improve matters? Today we lack leaders of the type of the old-fashioned prophets—dynamic personalities who might gather up the slow and diffuse forces of the public and voice its aspirations; and more than that, who would be ahead of the public, jolting it out of its lethargy and lifting the whole moral tone of the community. No matter how much worried one may be over some particular social evil, one often cannot do more than resign oneself to a passive hope, because the leaders, who are the instruments of social therapy, are lacking. What is the cause? Take the United States. Is it because it is a huge sprawling country which has

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not yet been organized into a structural whole, or is it that its cult of aggressive democracy creates an unfavorable environment for the appearance of the leader? Many of our wise men, rather than cheapen the quality of their spiritual wares, have preferred to withdraw into their ivory towers, leaving the public to the mercies of the first charlatan. For it is true that if the scholar will not lead, then someone else will, probably the half-educated and the quack. Democratic theories to the contrary, there is a deep-rooted impulse in man to follow a leader; witness the facile way in which persons with hardly more than elementary qualifications are referred to as "authorities" in the press or from the platform.

One solution suggested is that the public be educated into the intricacies of science and culture, so that it may be able to judge for itself. But this is a hopeless plan. In some sense, no matter how much progress universal education might make, the public will always be with us. The common tasks of life are too insistent, and the task of knowledge is too laborious and extensive, to permit of anything more than a tiny fragment being mastered by any single individual. The only alternative is for the layman to form the habit of respecting the recognized authorities and let himself be guided by their judgment and standards. There is a certain modesty in acknowledging one's own limits which it would be well to cultivate. But how is the layman to recognize the right leader? To put this question is to call attention to the value of general education. In the earlier epochs, a leader proved himself by means of signs and miracles, official titles, or garments. But supernatural marks and external signs have outlived their usefulness. The public must rely upon knowledge in order to distinguish the expert from the quack, and it can secure this knowledge best by means of a general liberal education. In fact, general, as distinguished from professional, education may be defined as that education which trains the layman to recognize the expert, or the public to choose its leaders. And

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the more intelligent the public, the better the leader, and the less will he be tempted to relapse into smug second-rateness. The expert can benefit from contact with his public as much as the public from contact with the expert. The abdication by the scholars of their function of social leadership has damaged not only the public but the scholars themselves. The experts have tended to become too narrowly professional, to proceed according to abstract inflexible categories, to know much, but not well. The effect of bringing the expert nearer the public will surely be to humanize him and to ventilate his mind with the refreshing and genial air of common sense.

I am not arguing for a return to medievalism. During part of the Middle Ages, authority was enshrined in rigid organizations imposing absolute submission; the dicta of Aristotle ruled supreme in the sphere of scientific thought, and those of the church in the field of religion. The Reformation can hardly be said to have altered matters. For an infallible pope it substituted an infallible Bible; and by its doctrine of justification through faith as well as by the Calvinistic theory of predestination, it further stressed the unimportance of the individual. Now, authority which is unquestioned hardens and ceases to grow. No single formulation of the truth should be regarded as final and absolute; no single individual can claim a monopoly in interpreting the truth, whether secular or sacred. The universal overflows any one particular, and the manifestation of the ideal in history is continuous and endless. Some concrete situations are more adequate expressions of the ideal than others, some individuals represent the type more fully than others; indeed, some do so supremely well, but there is no unique and final embodiment of the ideal in the temporal.

But if we cannot sympathize with authority which claims finality, neither should we condemn all forms of authority whatsoever and enthrone the individual as another absolute. The limitless exaltation of the individual is no more to be

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commended than the limitless exaltation of authority. Today, in art, a work is supposed to justify its existence, no matter what its content, provided that it is the sincere expression of an individuality. Honesty is a virtue, to be sure, but if the individual lacks depth, the more honest he is, the more trivial will be his product. It is not so much a question whether I am expressing myself in the work of art as whether I am worth expressing. But individuality is supposed to atone for all sins. We hold, nowadays, that no man should adopt an opinion unless he sees it thoroughly for himself, assuming tacitly that to rely upon authority at all is to derogate from our intellectual dignity. A moment's reflection would show this to be a sheer assumption, and one very difficult to substantiate. Why, indeed, should one rely wholly upon one's own reason—is not reason a human thing, frail and halting like all human things, subject to the innumerable distracting influences of instinct, and passion, and bringing up, which surround life on this planet? The doctrine of non-reliance on tradition is itself a tradition which we have inherited from Descartes and his times; and I cannot see that the dogma of the infallibility of private judgment is on any different level from the dogma of the infallibility of the pope or of the sacred Scriptures. One might even say that it stands on less solid ground; it is inconsistent with itself, for it involves the uncritical affirmation of the right of criticism. Nothing on this earth is absolute, and the best we can do is to multiply our tools of thought so that they may act as checks on one another.

Of course, it is impossible to dispense with private judgment altogether; even if you propose to submit yourself to authority, you must first select it, and to that extent invoke your judgment. But it would be a delusion to think that you can rise above tradition, either. As a child you have been nourished on the intellectual inheritance of the race, and the instrument with which you now proceed to criticize tradition has been forged in its workshop. Pure reason is a pure fiction.

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Tradition is an unescapable factor, and to refuse it recognition is merely to send it into the recesses of the unconscious, whence it operates in the form of custom, or subtle prejudice. What an irony, indeed, that our age, with all its preachings of individualism, should be so saturated with the spirit of conformity in its ways of thinking and acting, and, more concretely, in the manner with which it constructs its cities and organizes its industries, that, for example, our own manual workers should be occupied with processes which are so highly regimented that individual initiative is reduced to a minimum, whereas the laborers in the benighted Middle Ages were craftsmen after all, devoting a lifetime to the building of a cathedral, and expressing their individuality in their work!

Science, which prides itself on having driven the ghost of authority from its home, bag and baggage, is harboring it unawares in the shape of its general presuppositions. When the topic of authority in science is raised, the advocates of the former make much of the fact that a scientist must rely on the testimony of the experts concerning their observations, to which the enemies of authority reply that the scientist accepts authority provisionally, reserving the right to carry out the experiment for himself at any time. Both sides miss the point. Authority invades science from the angle, not of specific observations, but of the fundamental scientific principles, as, for example, the principles of the independent existence of the external world, of the mechanical explanation of all things, and of the uniformity of nature. All these are clearly hypotheses in need of proof—not wrong, necessarily, but just hypotheses. Yet no medieval monk held to the dogmas of his church with more uncritical tenacity than does many a scientist to his fundamental presuppositions; for the most part, his attachment to them is as naïve as his intolerance of all alternative views is pronounced. He obtains his principles unconsciously from the modern tradition; they enter into what has been designated the climate of opinion, in which he has been reared.

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The contrast between the modern scientific tradition and that of the Middle Ages is striking. If one dips into medieval or earlier books one finds just as many general propositions assumed without proof, but all of them of an absolutely different character. There we find God and purpose taken as granted, whereas the scientific hypotheses of a physical world and of mechanism are regarded as either doubtful or false. No matter what the defects of institutionalized tradition, at least this can be said for it, that it is frank and unabashed. So we return to our point that tradition is part of the natural equipment of the mind, and the only way to keep it from falling into the level of prejudice is to recognize its existence and utilize it with eyes open.

It may be objected that we have misstated the underlying presuppositions of individualism; that, in fact, in arguing for the right of private judgment one is in no way assuming the perfection of human reason; one is simply maintaining that only by the exercise of one's own powers may one grow. Though not distrusting tradition in any way, one must turn one's face away from it and, somehow, make one's own way in life, if one is to become a person rather than a smoothly running automaton. As someone has said, one should have the privilege of making one's own mistakes. And then too, experience makes human beings suspicious of tradition, so often has it been used to cloak humbug and to parade, as though alive, the corpses of discredited theories.

The answer to this is that all depends on the tradition and the individual's attitude toward it. Organized tradition tends to crush personality, but informal tradition—tradition whose only embodiment is the agreement of the minds of men—to vitalize it. The former claims absolute acquiescence; the latter, provisional and tentative acceptance. What we need is not blind adherence, but respect such as belongs to the opinions of sages and of men of insight and candor who have wrestled with the truth. We should use authority critically, calling

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as much upon tradition to justify itself before reason as reason before tradition. In short, we need an attitude which combines employment of authority with active employment of reason. If, for example, we find ourselves differing from wise men like Spinoza or Confucius, we should be worried, and feel that the burden of proof is on us. Surely, reverence is not incompatible with the critical spirit. We must, above all, avoid assent that is mechanical—I mean assent which consists in dutifully filing, as it were, the opinions of the experts in the records of the mind. The dictum of authority must be met with the full energy of the intelligence.

And tradition, when criticized by reason, will become a living thing, flexible and informal and tolerant, knowing neither dogmas nor heresies. It is divorce from the life of the individual that hardens tradition into orthodoxy; the need is for a constant interplay between reason and tradition, a testing of each by each. Then tradition will guide without dominating; by presenting the mind with new alternatives it will enlarge its horizon and make it critical of its own ideas. Without the moderating influence of tradition, individualism is apt to lapse into the cult of eccentricity; tradition is the House of Lords of the mind, making for stability when judgment would be carried away by the fashions of the moment. Moreover, the individual is apt to get entangled in his own devices; tradition represents the extension of the individual beyond himself into the experience of humanity throughout history, and, by getting in touch with tradition, one is enabled to come out of one's own skin, so to speak, and measure one's insights by an objective standard.

Probably we can all recall experiences of having been thrilled by ideas which later proved worthless; reason is apt to be dazzled by its own splendor, and it is practically impossible to tell at the moment whether the sense of illumination is genuine or not. Humbug can parade in the guise of reason no less than in that of tradition. With time come perspective and

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objectivity. Over and above the test of experience there is the test of endurance, of survival amidst the varied circumstances of the climate of opinion, that each idea must meet. And this test is supplied by tradition. We are inclined to scorn tradition as the relic of a vanished past; essentially, tradition represents not what is past, but what has survived the past and is advancing into the future. To the familiar classification of perception, reason, and intuition as the sources of belief we must add tradition and authority in general as sources on the same level. It may be objected that tradition is not an original ground of knowledge, depending as it does on the other sources. Neither are these last independent; reason draws from perception, perception from reason, and both from tradition. In actual practice we draw our opinions as much from authority as from other sources; we constantly take the word of one or read the report of another on matters of everyday life. Letters, books, testimonies help to swell the volume of authority. In its aspect as a form of knowledge, authority may be defined, as we suggested earlier, in terms of Royce's conception of interpretation, namely, as a situation in which one individual or group interprets to another the world of fact or of value.

Taking the word in the general sense in which I have defined it, I should now like to ask whether authority is a good thing in itself. This is quite different from asking whether it is good under the circumstances. True enough, in our present state we find authority useful, but does not its value spring from our lack, and would not the fuller development of personality mean the ability to dispense with authority altogether? Does it not compromise the dignity of man that he should have to invoke authority? Were we gods, creating a world and limited by nothing, would we make a place for authority?

To rely upon authority is to accept an idea not quite proved or explained to our satisfaction; it is for reason to

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come up against brute fact. Now, man is always in the midst of circumstances, some of which his will must recognize as final; reason itself, even when guided by its own insight, has to submit to an absolute datum in the sense that it must make a stop at some stage of the process of explanation and adopt some premises without proof. These are all phenomena of limitation; logic expresses the limitation of the intellect by the principles of validity, and authority, its limitation by other intellects or wills. Is such limitation a good thing in itself? The query brings us into the obscurest regions of metaphysics. In some sense, limitation lies at the root of things, entering into the very definition of being. Nothing in reality is wholly self-determined; each event in nature is limited by the community of other events, and all together, by the general laws of nature. Limitation canalizes activity and thus makes it effective; in art form limits expression and gives it force. Man imposes limits upon himself when the external conditions do not impose them upon him. To play a tennis game is not to be free to throw the ball anywhere we please, but to devise rules, to set up a net, to draw up lines, and to circumscribe in a variety of ways our freedom to deal with the ball. Some limitation of the individual by other individuals seems therefore necessary—whatever the degree of his perfection—for the proper realization of his potentialities.

In authority, the individual reaches beyond himself into the life of the whole; self-limitation is only the other side of self-expansion, in the same sense in which the feeling of resistance is really our consciousness of an external world. The question again recurs: Is it not a defect in the individual that he should not contain the whole in himself? No—to be self-contained is itself a defect. This has the appearance of paradox, but only the appearance of it. Life is full of occasions when we would do anything to escape ourselves; we plunge into work or into play or into the crowd because we feel the atmosphere of individuality stifling. Self-sufficiency is a de-

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ceptive ideal; it means a life without surprise and without achievement. People will take up duties, and even drudgery, in order to escape the responsibility of ordering their own lives completely. No matter how perfect the individual, there is something essentially imperfect in the state of being an individual, which drives the person beyond himself. And in appropriating tradition, or in following a leader, the individual is simply overflowing beyond his own boundaries and fusing with the wider world of humanity and of history.

HARVARD UNIVERSITY

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ETHICS AS METHOD

A. P. BROGAN

I

The main interest of ethical thinking has usually been in formulating an ethical standard. This standard has been described as a rule to be obeyed or as a good or highest good to be attained. Serious attention has seldom been given to the question how this standard is to be applied to specific problems in morality. Indeed, it has frequently been held that the standard is too pure and noble to be realized in this world. So ethics is not to be concerned with the trivial details of practical decision, but must formulate a moral standard or ideal. In this tradition ethical method means the method, whether intuitive or deductive or inductive, by which one philosopher refutes all other ethical standards and proves that his chosen standard is indeed the only truth in ethics.[1] Afterward the philosopher may give some attention to the applications of the standard, but these applications are relatively unimportant and may be entirely omitted.[2] The standards are often so remote from life that the most opposed standards seem equally consistent with the one moral tradition in which the philosophers have been reared.[3]

In opposition to this traditional formulation of a standard it may be suggested that ethics should be primarily concerned with a method for solving ethical or moral problems. A moral

[1] H. Sidgwick, *Methods of Ethics* (7th ed., London, 1907); H. Spencer, *Data of Ethics* (London, 1879), chap. iv; S. E. Mezes, *Ethics* (New York, 1901), pp. 14–17; J. Seth, *Ethical Principles* (12th ed., New York, 1911), introduction, chap. ii; H. W. Wright, *Self-Realization* (New York, 1913), pp. 16–27; T. de Laguna, *Introduction to the Science of Ethics* (New York, 1914), chap. ii; G. S. Fullerton, *Handbook of Ethical Theory* (New York, 1922), chap. v. No doubt many other illustrations could be found.

[2] Illustrations are so numerous and so well known that they need not be named.

[3] Compare L. Lévy-Bruhl, *La morale et la science des moeurs* (6th ed., Paris, no date), chap. ii.

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method[4] will be a technique for investigating those problems in morality which need careful consideration. It will be the specific logic of reasoning about moral affairs. If one is in doubt as to what is right or wrong, if one wants to deal with conflicting interests, if one is concerned with any real moral problem, how should one go about the task of thinking the matter through? Surely this is the primary task of ethics. Ethical theories, principles, standards, rules, goods, or what not, are important only as they are presupposed or implied in the actual process of investigating moral problems. They are incidental to the moral method. The moral method is not an introduction to them or an afterthought as to how to apply them. Ethics is the moral method and what the moral method involves. To say this is not to deny the importance of a systematic elaboration of a set of ethical doctrines or principles, but these doctrines or principles are ethical because they are involved in the moral method. It should be added that ethics, as treated in this article, is not to be identified with the general theory or philosophy of value. No doubt a complete discussion of ethical principles involves a general theory of value, but moral value is only one part of value.

II

I shall first state in some detail what I think the moral method should be. Then some antecedents of this method and one notable contrast to it will be discussed. It is convenient to distinguish five steps in the moral method.

1. *Explanation of problem.*—If there is need of ethical investigation and decision there must be some situation which creates a problem in conduct. The first step is to explain why there is a problem here. Is there a conflict of rules, habits, customs, or laws? Or is there a demand to violate or change some prevailing rule? Or is there a new situation which demands treatment? Or are there clashing interests which must be re-

[4] Since the phrase "ethical method" has been used for the method of proving ethical standards it is perhaps best to use the phrase "moral method" for our process.

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strained or modified or reorganized? Our first step is to be sure that we have explained to ourselves the exact cause of the present conflict or problem. Then we shall be prepared to go ahead with its study and solution.

2. *Survey of alternatives.*—The next step is to make a survey of the important alternatives. What practicable alternatives shall we consider? By practicable alternatives is meant those various possibilities any one of which can be realized if we make the appropriate effort. We must exclude those proposals which would be practicable only in an ideal world, or only if this world were different. This is not meant to exclude the planning of one action now which will lead to another action later. But the future possibility is to be considered only in connection with those present lines of action which lead to it.

An alternative is not important unless it is practicable. But some practicable alternatives are not important. Some are trivial or absurd. Some are not within the range of our available knowledge. On the other hand, we must avoid the narrowness that comes from what may be called the "either-or" mistake. We often falsely assume that there are just two lines of action open to us, one right and one wrong. Our task is to make an inventory of all the important practicable alternatives of action in our present situation. For this survey we need all the experience, imagination, and science that we can possess.

3. *Analysis of alternatives.*—Our next task is the study and analysis of each of the alternatives. First we must understand the antecedents of each alternative. If it is a new plan of action, how can it be brought about? What are the causal or genetic factors which must be produced in order to reach the proposed solution? Have similar plans been tried in the past, and have they succeeded or failed, and why? Or, if one alternative is to continue an existing practice, what is the history of that practice? How did it grow up, and what light does

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this knowledge throw on the practice? After the study of the historical or genetic aspects of each alternative, our next step is to study the exact nature and the knowable consequences of each alternative. We must understand the nature of the alternative throughout its development and we must be able to estimate the relative values involved. What are the desirable and what are the undesirable aspects of each alternative according to the knowledge available to us at the time of choice? We must consider both the comparative values involved and also the relative probability of each value.

4. *Consideration of moral influence.*—One part of the consequences of each alternative is the influence of that action on our general morality. But this consequence is so intangible frequently that it deserves separate treatment. Usually we are inclined to consider only the immediate and obvious results of our actions. Yet many actions have very important influences in strengthening or weakening a moral rule or principle, in setting a precedent, in forming habits and traditions, and in raising or lowering our entire set of moral ideals and valuations.

5. *Choice of better alternative.*—We are now ready to make our choice. Which alternative is better than the others for all the interests involved and in the light of the available knowledge? If one alternative stands out as the best of that set, then that one is the acceptable action. Occasionally two or more alternatives may both seem equally as good as possible. Then either one is acceptable. The process of investigation is now finished temporarily and life can advance in the accepted direction.

III

Various criticisms may be aimed at the moral method as it has been formulated. Some may say that the method is too long, and should be shortened. Others, on the contrary, may say that there should be a sixth step involving the verification of the chosen alternative. Finally, some may attack the

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ethical assumptions which are at the basis of the method as it has been formulated.

It would be very easy to reduce the method to three steps. The explanation of the problem could be included as part of the genetic study in the analysis of the alternatives. This change would be a simplification, but hardly an improvement. Then the consideration of the moral influence of an alternative could be included under the study of the consequences of each alternative. This again would sacrifice emphasis for simplicity. As thus simplified, the moral method would consist of three steps: (1) survey of alternatives; (2) analysis of alternatives; (3) choice of better alternative. These three steps may be the important logical divisions, but the longer method, with its five steps, seems to be more useful in the actual teaching of ethics. Of course, a sensible person will know when any one or more parts of the method are so obvious that they do not call for much attention. Different moral problems have different needs for their adequate discussion.

It might be suggested that our entire method is incomplete because no provision is made for further study and verification of the adopted alternative. It is doubtless true that there are some problems in which new interests are so constantly arising that continuous study and readjustment are necessary. But here we have simply a continuous application of the moral method. More frequently the choice of the better alternative marks the temporary end of the process of moral investigation. Life then goes its way until a new problematic situation demands new investigation. If action along the lines of the adopted alternative seems satisfactory there will seldom be ethical criticism or discussion. If developments come as expected they may be called verifications of that part of the moral method that analyzed the consequences of each alternative. But whether the chosen alternative is really better than the other alternatives cannot usually be put to direct verification. To do this would demand the realization of all the alternatives under controlled laboratory conditions.

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In this short paper no attempt will be made to explain or defend all the assumptions or presuppositions that may be connected with the present formulation of the moral method. They constitute an entire ethical theory. Here the point may be made that those who object to this moral method on account of its assumptions should show in detail how their assumptions and theories can be embodied in a definite moral method.

IV

In the history of ethical thought there have been a few formulations very similar to the present moral method, and one formulation of a method sharply opposed to it. As these discussions occur in well-known writers I shall content myself with very short references.

If the moral method here formulated might, in general terms, be called melioristic, the method of Plato in the *Republic* might be called perfectionistic or utopian. According to the perfectionistic or utopian method there are two steps in ethical thinking.[5] The first step is the discovery or description of what is perfect or best. The second step is the consideration as to how far this best is practicable or possible. Usually it is added that the best is only a model or pattern laid up in heaven, which will never exist in this world.[6] First see what is perfect, and then see how close we can come to it. This utopian method is almost the exact reversal of the melioristic method, which starts with a discussion of what is possible or practicable, and then chooses the better practicable alternative.[7]

[5] Plato's *Republic*, marginal paging, 466*d*–73*c*.

[6] *Republic*, p. 592*b*; also pp. 472*d*–73*a*.

[7] It is hardly necessary to insist that the above account is not intended to be a complete discussion of Plato's ethical method. It is one aspect, however. The dialectical method for discovering the nature of goodness is admirably characterized in *Republic*, p. 434*bc*. It would be difficult to list all the instances of perfectionistic method in modern thought. An extreme illustration may be found in S. Ward, *The Ways of Life* (New York, 1920), p. 72–73.

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Modern antecedents of the moral method are to be found mainly among English realistic writers and among American Pragmatists. A fairly clear statement of it may be found in Richard Cumberland's *Laws of Nature*.[8] In recent English ethics the best statement is in the *Principia Ethica*, by Mr. G. E. Moore.[9] Among the American writers, Professors Dewey and Mead have insisted on the importance of the problem in ethical and in other forms of thinking.[10] Professor Dewey's famous analysis of a complete act of thought may be both compared and contrasted with our moral method.[11] The application of Dewey's theories has called forth much important material in recent ethics.[12] One of the most interesting developments has been the formation of a technique for group discussion.[13] Perhaps the most careful discussion of the process of moral judgment is to be found in the writings of Professor Tufts.[14] In every one of these writers there are valuable suggestions for a moral method, but in none of them is there

[8] Translation by J. Maxwell (London, 1727), pp. 42, 47, 180, 201. I am indebted to my former student, Mr. C. M. Perry, for calling my attention to Cumberland in this connection.

[9] *Principia Ethica* (London, 1903), pp. 149–54. Compare Bertrand Russell, *Philosophical Essays* (London, 1910), pp. 49–57; also H. Rashdall, *Theory of Good and Evil*, Book III, chap. v. A different approach by an idealistic writer may be found in B. Bosanquet, *Some Suggestions in Ethics* (London, 1919), chap. vi.

[10] J. Dewey, "Reflex Art Concept in Psychology," *Psychological Review*, III, 357–70; G. H. Mead, "Suggestions toward a Theory of the Philosophical Disciplines," *Philosophical Review*, IX, 1–17.

[11] J. Dewey, *How We Think* (New York, 1910), chap. vi; Dewey and Tufts, *Ethics* (New York, 1908), chap. xvi.

[12] H. W. Schneider, *Science and Social Progress* (New York, 1920), especially pp. 44–48.

[13] Perhaps the most stimulating recent application of Dewey's account of thinking is in the little pamphlet entitled *A Co-operative Technique for Conflict*. It is published, without the name of the author, by the National Conference on the Christian Way of Life, New York, 1924. Apart from the last two pages it is an application of Dewey's principles to the problem of group discussion. For its purpose it is very good. However, it is more concerned with the dissemination of knowledge and mutual understanding than with a method for acquiring knowledge or for investigating moral problems scientifically.

[14] J. H. Tufts, "The Moral Life," in *Creative Intelligence* (New York, 1917), especially pp. 357–72, 407.

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exactly the formulation of the moral method given above. Perhaps it is better to let this moral method be judged on its merits without controversy.

V

It should not be necessary to insist that the moral method is not intended to be a cure-all. It contains neither an answer to all the perplexing problems of ethical theory nor a certain solution for many vexing problems in contemporary life. But it does show us what aspects of ethical theory are important practically, and it helps to keep thinking and living in fruitful relations. It tends to make ethical thinking practical rather than academic. It abolishes the deadness of casuistry. It gives a method for reasonable thinking about all moral problems. If one observes both educated and uneducated persons discussing moral problems one will have little doubt as to the practical value of any careful method for moral thinking. Its influence on students in ethics courses is unmistakable. Finally, the moral method is theoretically important as furnishing a center for ethics. Ethics may well be interpreted as the moral method and the implications of the moral method.

UNIVERSITY OF TEXAS

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THE LOGIC OF IDEALS

E. T. MITCHELL

Much has been written in praise of the ideal; much also in depreciation of the ideal as contrasted with the real. Is it not worth while to clarify our minds as to just what we mean by the term, and under what conditions, if any, the ideal plays a constructive and necessary rôle in life? Perhaps there may be as genuine a logic of ideals as of scientific concepts and hypotheses. Let us consider then the definition, the function, and the control of ideals.

I. DEFINITION

Both in technical and in popular discussions there exists a certain confusion in the use of the term "ideal." As the adjective form of the noun "idea" it means that which is mental, spiritual, or rational, e.g., in the theory that the world is ideal rather than material. Or it may mean that which is a matter of human ideas rather than of physical existence, e.g., the ideal (ideational, conceptual) circle. Or the adjective "ideal" may be derived from the noun "ideal," meaning that which embodies an ideal, e.g., an ideal commonwealth. What is ideal in the latter sense is also ideational and mental, but it is something more, for it signifies superior or superlative value in the object designated, and popularly implies perfection. The adjective "ideal" came to have this connotation, no doubt, because of the specialization given to the word "idea" by Plato. His "ideas," or types of perfection, existing in a supersensible world, have become the ideals of literature, retaining the notion of perfection, but dropping the notion of their existential reality.

These three adjectives—ideal meaning spiritual, ideal meaning conceptual, and ideal meaning perfect—are distinct. What is spiritual might be actual instead of ideational, and

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evil instead of perfect; what is ideational might be either spiritual or material, perfect or imperfect; what is perfect may or may not be spiritual and ideational. Nevertheless the three meanings seem frequently to be confused. Idealism, which is founded on the conviction that the world is at bottom mental or spiritual, is usually also committed to the proposition that it is adapted to mind, or rational. This, as Bertrand Russell rightly contends, does not follow unless it is proved that like knows like and that like is adapted to like. Many idealists are also convinced that the world is ideal in the sense that it is the embodiment of ideals, that it is the revelation of perfect goodness and beauty.[1] It is argued that evil is irrational, but we know that the world is rational, and we know that it is rational because it is understandable or adapted to mind, and it is adapted to mind because it is spiritual or mental. This confusion of logic arises, I believe, in part at least, from the fact that the same adjective, "ideal," covers all three attributes which they ascribe to the world.

The noun "ideal" and the adjective derived from it are also ambiguous. Philosophical discussion contains two distinct, though related, uses of the term. Ideals in some discussions refer to the aesthetic and ethical categories, the instruments of valuation and analysis, especially those concepts which have a eulogistic connotation, as justice, beauty, truth. These are genuine universals in that they function by transferring and retaining experience, and by analyzing and classifying the data of a problem situation. Since they are wholly

[1] Bosanquet, for example says:

"It is not 'doubting the reality of evil' to say that both in actual progress, by sight, and in the whole by faith, we are assured of its subordination to good, and of the absorption, if we could see the whole, of both, together with our finiteness which is the cause of their antagonistic existences, in perfection" (*Some Suggestions in Ethics*, p. 125).

"Evil is evil; once more, you are not to palter with this truth; but at the same time it can be overcome; not at a distance, but now and here; and the secret of overcoming it is to feel that it is overcome, and to treat it practically as a conquered thing" (*Some Suggestions in Ethics*, p. 105).

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analogous to the universals of other sciences there seems no reason for using the special term "ideals" to denote them. They are simply the universals, concepts, categories, values, standards, limits, virtues, and vices, etc. How these concepts arise and how they function are questions that have been discussed at length by Dewey, Bosanquet, and many other recent writers.[2]

It would seem more appropriate to reserve the term "ideals" for what Kant calls "ideas *in individuo*," that is, for those constructs of reflection and imagination which picture an object or a state of affairs regarded as highly valuable and desirable. They are ideals because they embody highest values, and because they are individual conceptions rather than universals. In some respects they meet the requirements of Bosanquet's "concrete universals," in contrast to his "abstract universals," though they are not strictly universals at all. "Virtue and human wisdom in its perfect purity are ideas," says Kant, "while the wise man (of the Stoics) is an ideal, that is, a man existing in thought only, but in complete agreement with the idea of wisdom. While the idea gives rules, the ideal serves as an archetype for the permanent determination of the copy."[3] These ideals, Kant thinks, have no creative power, and the attempt to realize them is apt to discourage rather than to assist a person, but yet they have practical power as regulative principles. They give the right direction, and should be regarded as limits rather than as objectives.

A somewhat similar distinction is developed by Bosanquet with respect to the relation of idea and ideal, and he gives a more adequate account of the function of the ideal. He shows how by social inheritance we acquire our concepts of goodness, beauty, duty, etc., and our maxims, proverbs, and fables.

[2] Dewey, *Logical Conditions of a Scientific Treatment of Morality*, "Decennial Publications of the University of Chicago," 1903; Bosanquet, *Some Suggestions in Ethics*, chaps. vi, vii.

[3] Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason*, translation by Müller (London, 1881), II, 450.

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Values "descend upon persons," and, "There is a distinct and interesting communal life which seems rather in fact to absorb individuals and provide them with purposes and values than to be itself deducible. . . . ."[4] But these values, as given or found, these universals, maxims, and precepts, are all more or less abstract. We do not determine what to do, if we are wise, by deduction and casuistry. "But moral and religious life is a business, if we speak logically, corresponding to the creative step in induction; that for which, admittedly, no rules exist; that in which a set of facts, hitherto merely grouped in time and space, is bound together by a newly contrived conception or hypothesis. Or you may say it is an artistic creation; it is all the same."[5] General concepts and maxims may give the framework of morality, but the situation to which they apply is always unique and original. It is always a complex whole in which rival claims must be adjusted and qualifying circumstances must be taken into account. The result is a creation which is individual. "No mind but your own can strike the decisive balance of values and resources and appropriateness to your scheme of life."[6] This individual construct, which Bosanquet calls a hypothesis, and Kant, an idea *in individuo,* is what I shall call an ideal.

G. E. Moore[7] says that we may mean any one of three distinct things when we speak of ideals. There is, first, *the ideal,* the *summum bonum,* the best state of things conceivable. To this class belong the heavens of religion, since they are conceived of as absolutely perfect. Then there is the ideal in the sense of the best state possible in this world. To this class belong the utopias of political dreamers. Again, there are ideals in the sense of organic wholes which are intrinsically good in a high degree. The beauty of art and poetry, for example, when intelligently appreciated and enjoyed, constitutes an organic

[4] Bosanquet, *Some Suggestions in Ethics,* p. 35.

[5] *Ibid.,* p. 150. [6] *Ibid.,* p. 156.

[7] G. E. Moore, *Principia Ethica,* chap. vi.

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whole which is intrinsically good, and therefore ideal. Heavens and utopias get their value from the fact that they are made up of such ideals.

The existence or non-existence of these organic wholes, these utopias, and these heavens is not essential to their ideality. The important thing is that they embody values, that they could be judged good even if they existed alone. What G. E. Moore has done in this chapter, as he himself tells us, has been to define roughly the class of things among which we may expect to find great goods and great evils. In other words, he has given us the ideas by which we may find or construct ideals, rather than a set of ideals. There must, for instance, in an organic whole which is ideal, be cognition of the object, and there must be appreciation and pleasure on the part of some conscious individuals; and there should, for highest value, be physical existence rather than thought only. These are the rules for the identification or for the construction of ideals; any existing organic unity corresponding to these specifications will be ideal; any construct of the imagination conforming to them would be an ideal. It is not necessary, for purposes of this paper, to enter into a criticism of the conception of intrinsic goods that G. E. Moore adopts. For practical purposes it is necessary to make a distinction between instrumental and intrinsic value, and ideals are always regarded as ends rather than merely as means. Whether this distinction is ultimate or relative is another matter.[8]

William James gives the following account of what he understands by an ideal:

> An ideal, for instance, must be intellectually conceived, something of which we are not unconscious if we have it; and it must carry with it that sort of outlook, uplift, and brightness that go with all intellectual facts. Secondly, there must be *novelty* in an ideal—novelty at least for

[8] For discussion of ends and means, see Dewey, *Human Nature and Conduct*, chaps. ii, v, vi; Bosanquet, *Some Suggestions in Ethics*, chap. vi, pp. 132–33; Mead, "Scientific Method and the Moral Sciences," *International Journal of Ethics*, Vol. XXXIII, No. 3.

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him whom the ideal grasps. Sodden routine is incompatible with ideality, although what is sodden routine for one person may be ideal novelty for another. This shows that there is nothing absolutely ideal; ideals are relative to the lives that entertain them.[9]

This characterization is one that applies appropriately to the type of thing we have been describing, namely, a projection of the imagination conceived of as embodying highest value. It may be an ideal projection of the self, which T. H. Green thinks is necessary to morality, or an "organic unity" which could be judged good even in complete isolation, or a utopia, or merely what Bosanquet has called the hypothesis in which we adjust the values and data of a problem situation.

We have before us the main features of an ideal. Logic, however, as the science of how we think when we think effectively, is interested in the question of how ideals function in a problem situation. It would seem proper to define our term with reference to its function. Thinking becomes effective and controlled when it is centered on a problem, and we are interested in finding whether ideals have a place in the resolution of difficulties, both theoretical and practical, or whether they lead astray into the pursuit of vanities and delusion. Finding, as I do, that the use of the imagination in the creation of ideals is not only useful, but essential, in the problem situation, particularly the ethical problem, I shall propose the following definition: *An ideal is a construct of the imagination embodying a situation which, if actualized, would mean the solution of our problem.*

Since it projects a specific situation and is constructed according to the specifications demanded in a solution, it is the idea *in individuo* of Kant, and the hypothesis of Bosanquet. Since value is relative to needs and demands, the ideal contains those intrinsic goods of G. E. Moore. Since it is a product of the imagination, and closely bound up with our actual life demands, practical, intellectual, and aesthetic, the ideal

[9] William James, *Talks to Teachers*, p. 292.

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will have that novelty and emotional character emphasized by James.

II. FUNCTION OF THE IDEAL

Confronted by a situation involving conflicting interests, unsatisfied demands, obstructed activities, the reflective individual reframes the situation before him till the conflict is resolved, the demands satisfied, the activity resumed. But this is in imagination, so what good has been accomplished? This at least, if the imagination is a creative one: that he now has before him, clearly and definitely indicated, the specifications which the solution demands. The specifications alone, however, do not constitute the solution, but they must be organized and integrated into a complete picture, a whole, into which the requirements are made to fit. This step calls for creative and inventive ability of the highest order. Thirdly, having the ideal completely constructed, the individual can examine it critically, or expose it to the criticism of others, in order to test its utility. Is it, after all, good in all respects, does it really satisfy the conditions set by the problem, would its other consequences be desirable? Finally, assuming the ideal to be sound and desirable, he may now work backward from the solution to the means by which it is to be realized and the conditions and limitations implied.

This is not the only way of attacking a practical problem, nor would I argue that it is always, or even usually, the best method. But it does seem logically sound and highly valuable. The main point at issue is whether it is wisest to examine possibilities and choose the alternative which seems best, or to picture an adequate solution and then examine its possibility. Plato considers this question in framing his *Republic*. Socrates, with mock humility, pretends to be losing heart, and asks of the company the favor of being allowed to feast his mind on the dream, as daydreamers do. "First of all, then, if you have no objections, I will endeavor with your help to consider the advantages of the measure; and hereafter, the question of

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possibility."[10] We may be sure that Plato believed the method to be sound, or he would not have been at such pains to explain the point. The incalculably stimulating value of the *Republic* throughout its twenty-three centuries of existence may be cited as some evidence that Plato was not mistaken.

The use of the ideal corresponds to the analytical method in mathematics, and to the hypothesis in pure science. Plato is said to have invented this as a conscious method, and it is described as follows:

> On the formal side Plato rendered a further service to mathematics by his creation of the analytic method. This consists in assuming the required problem to be solved, and working backward step by step through the presumptions involved, until a premise is reached the truth or falsity of which is known. In this way it is discovered whether the problem is soluble or not, whether there are any limitations (conditions of possibility) to the solution, and what path the solution must follow.[11]

We are familiar with this method in the algebra and geometry of the high-school level, and it is precisely the method in which the ideal functions. Assuming the problem solved by some specific situation, we work back step by step till we find whether or not the solution involves elements which are incompatible with themselves or with available resources, and, if possible, what are the conditions and limitations, and what are the steps to be taken. Socrates and his companions come to the conclusion, after an analysis of this kind, that the ideal republic is impossible "until philosophers shall be kings, or the kings and princes of this world have the spirit and power of philosophy, and political greatness and wisdom meet in one. . . . ." Similarly, when the educational reformer knows what changes in content and method he wishes to introduce, and when he has worked out in some detail his ideal school system, he can then deduce what changes are involved in buildings, equipment, and staff. He may now be able to foresee

[10] Plato, *Republic* 458 *A*.

[11] Heiberg, *Science and Mathematics in Classical Antiquity* (London, 1922), p. 34.

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whether the change can be introduced at once or only gradually, and whether an adjustment of present conditions is all that is required, or whether a profound change of social attitude must be accomplished. An interesting comparison might be made in this connection of the educational idealism of Rousseau, Pestalozzi, and Dewey.

The practical use of ideals differs from the analytical method of mathematics in that both resources and ideals are infinitely more flexible than in the mathematical analogy. The mathematical problem can usually be proved soluble or insoluble, and the matter is settled. The inventor, on the other hand, never gives up his search for means which shall make his dream come true. If existing materials will not serve his purpose, he turns his genius to inventing a material that will. If existing society is too selfish, or too set in its ways of thinking, for his ideal commonwealth, then he begins a campaign of education in order to alter the human material at his disposal. He may, like Rousseau, write a novel or, like John Stuart Mill, a textbook in logic. Not only are materials flexible, but there is nothing absolute about the ideal. Provided it embodies the requirements set by the problem the details offer endless opportunity for change. Nor is human nature so fixed that needs and demands are unalterable. When we cannot satisfy our wants it is often possible to modify our natures so as to reduce or change these wants. Thus, by manipulating resources to accomplish the ideal, and modifying the ideal in view of the available resources, the bridge between the real and the ideal is constructed.

The practical question now arises as to what can be done, when, on analyzing the ideal, it is found to be entirely impossible of realization. Shall it be discarded as worthless, or cherished as something precious? In the first place there is something wrong with an ideal which is so remote from reality that it can be declared to be hopelessly and unqualifiedly impossible. Problems arise out of actual conflicts within a real

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world, and the solution is always some modification within that world. The demands set by the problem may be conflicting, but the ideal is the situation in which those demands are reconciled and adjusted. Gyges' ring, Aladdin's lamp, and other forms of magic have no part in an ideal, for the simple reason that magic omits certain important details, whereas an ideal is, to borrow from Bosanquet, a "concrete universal," whose business it is to give a unique and complete picture. To say that a situation is ideal, and yet that it is intrinsically impossible, is to contradict one's self.

What we mean, then, when we say that an ideal is impossible, is that means are lacking for realizing it forthwith. We must choose from amongst possible alternatives, and it frequently happens that the ideal is not amongst these possibilities. We choose, then, the best practical alternative, but the best is relative to the ideal. The best is not ascertained by counting up how many thrills of pleasure it will yield, nor how many demands it will satisfy, but by trying out how well it fits into the ideal before us. This is what Kant meant when he said that the ideal has "regulative" value, and what Dewey meant when he said that the ideal is the "limiting" concept. Nevertheless the above account implies that normally ideals are genuine objectives. This is particularly true of the more transient ideals of a day. The ideals of a lifetime or of the ages are not different in kind, but in range, and are probably mainly regulative.

III. THE CONTROL OF IDEALS

Scientific method entered upon the highway to success when it became conscious of the need of controlling its hypotheses and devised methods for securing this control. The hypothesis differs from the ideal in this point only, that while the hypothesis is a mental construct in which facts find their explanation, the ideal is a mental construct in which needs find their fulfilment. This means that a hypothesis is to be verified

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and an ideal is to be realized. Both grow out of the incompleteness and unsatisfactory character of things as experienced; both lead the imagination to complete the situation by a construct which compensates for what is wanting; both are proved, i.e., tested, when, by acting upon the implications of the imagined construct, we find the satisfactory results anticipated. The hypothesis is made *true,* the ideal is made *real.* If truth and reality are one, then there is no significant difference between the hypothesis and the ideal. It will be noted in passing that the hypothesis has an ideal element, and the ideal has a hypothetical element, but common language, as well as logical analysis, makes a difference between the two.

The close analogy between hypothesis and ideal suggests an analogy between the methods of control, and such an analogy can readily be seen. The following three controls might be suggested: (1) it should contain more than a mere restatement of the problem; (2) it should be guided by the principle of parsimony; (3) it should have implications which can be traced out.

1. While it is necessary in the reflective process to set before ourselves the conditions which must be fulfilled if our problem is to be solved, we have not achieved an ideal until these are integrated and embodied in a real construct. How much detail to include depends upon circumstances, but however sketchy the specifications may be, they must be organized into a whole. Each element by itself might be perfectly possible, but the main problem is to get them fitted into a single picture, model, or plan. Every element of definiteness which can be incorporated makes the possibility of failure or disappointment that much less. Some elements, of course, are much more imperative and inflexible than others. It has been noted that an ideal is much more specific and individual than an idea or concept. My ideal house is more specific than my idea house; my ideal of truth is a more definite thing than my general concept of truth.

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2. A most important canon of science is the principle of parsimony: of two or more hypotheses which might account for a set of facts, that is to be preferred which involves the fewest assumptions. The corresponding canon for ideals might be stated thus: Of two or more ideals which might equally well contain the conditions for a complete solution of our problem, that is to be preferred which involves the least assumption. Without this limitation there is no check to the imagination in its tendency to frame agreeable pictures. Heavily worked and underfed people will imagine a heaven in which there shall be no noonday heat, where there shall be no labor and no pain, and where there shall be no more hunger; condemned to poverty and squalor, they imagine a city whose streets are of pure gold and whose walls are of jasper; condemned to sow what others reap and to earn what others spend, they imagine a utopia in which there is perfect equality and men have all things in common. But these ideals are not controlled by the problem. What man needs is rest when he is tired, food when he is hungry, shelter when it is hot. The remainder is gratuitous assumption and uncontrolled imagination. He does not know that it would be good to escape all labor, all heat, all hunger; he does not know that gold would make a good paving material, or that jasper would make an excellent building-stone; he does not know that a world in which all men were equal would be an interesting or a desirable world. These ideals go far beyond the solution of the actual problems which face men, and involve assumptions which we have no means of testing. Worse than this is the fact that they postpone the use of the resources which are at our disposal for the solution of the actual problem before us. If we wait for golden streets we shall never have competence; if we wait for equality we shall never have democracy.

3. The third canon suggested is akin to the above. We should be able to work backward from the implications of our ideal to the conditions and limitations of its realization. We

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can readily see that the heaven of Revelation, where there is no more hunger, or the hell where the guilty burn in endless fire, demand conditions which are impossible in the world as we know it. Thomas Jefferson's ideal democracy demanded a uniformity of occupation and a homogeneity of population which the more penetrating insight of James Madison saw to be impossible. Both these ideals have this virtue: that they are clearly defined and accurately specified, and hence they admit of analysis. Whether we accept or reject them we know that they are impossible in the world in which we live. If we accept them as embodying the solution of our real problems, then we know that our problem is insoluble and we can turn our attention to the best practical alternative. If we reject them as involving assumptions which we have no means of testing, or as involving elements which we know to be bad, then we can reframe them more in accordance with our real needs. It is not the false ideals which are to be condemned, so much as the vague, sentimental ideals which defy analysis.

The foregoing account has aimed to explain the logic of ideals, and hence to show how they function in problem and solution. Very little account has been taken of certain psychological aspects. We have omitted all discussion of the tremendous stimulating value of ideals, the extraordinary emotional accompaniment, the enthusiasm and devotion which some ideals have inspired. We know also that the emotional relief and intellectual satisfaction which imagination yields is often fatal to action and achievement. There is a compensatory quality about a state of affairs achieved in imagination which takes the place of the actuality. The psychology of compensation, however, does not belong in this discussion.

A final word may be said in appreciation of the idealist. His task requires the highest human powers, and his contribution has been incalculable. To analyze a problem, particularly a complex social problem, and to specify the conditions which a solution demands, requires unusual ability. But to work

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from these requirements to a concrete picture embodying them is the work of highest genius. He who does this is the inventor, the artist, and the prophet. Philosophy has always had its share of these creators; indeed, I would regard the emblazoning of ideals as the highest task of philosophy. Religion is mainly conservative, preserving the values of the past; science concerns itself with things as they are, limiting itself to description and prognostication; philosophy alone attempts to tell what ought to be, what with human effort can be, and what, with the will of good men, shall be. Argumentation and reasoning has developed its logic of rationalism or deduction; empiricism has achieved its logic of induction; idealism is still largely uncontrolled, and its logic has not yet been written.

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ETHICAL PRINCIPLE AND HUMAN RELATIONSHIPS[1]

F. A. M. SPENCER

Surely one of the greatest needs of the age is the presentation of the primary moral law or laws in concrete and practical form. It is two generations since John Stuart Mill wrote: "As between his own happiness and that of others, utilitarianism requires him to be as strictly impartial as a disinterested and benevolent spectator" (*Utilitarianism*). More recently Mr. G. E. Moore has defined moral obligation in these words: "The assertion, 'I am morally bound to perform this action' is identical with the assertion, 'This action will produce the greatest amount of good in the universe.'" This implies that we ought to aim at the greater good of a stranger in preference to the lesser good of ourselves or of our relations or friends.

Yet who does? I have never yet heard of anyone who attempted to share alike with the multitudes dying of hunger in the famine areas of Russia, so that he reduced his own family to partial starvation in order to rescue ten times as many from complete starvation. To demand such a thoroughgoing application of the doctrine of ethical impartiality, however logical, would be felt to be unnatural and inhuman. In Aristotle's phrase, ὑπερέκτεινει τὸ ἀνθρώπινον, "it is beyond the powers of human nature." On the other hand, any thoughtful and sympathetic person who knows the facts must be painfully aware that there is much suffering in the world that could easily be alleviated but for the selfish and self-indulgent use of wealth.

In order to elucidate the problems which I have just indicated I set down some of the reasons or excuses that I make

[1] For the bearing of the moral teaching of Christ on this class of problems in practical ethics may I be allowed to refer readers to my book, *The Ethics of the Gospel* (Allen and Unwin)? I have discussed therein the possibility of expressing Christ's ethics in a utilitarian form.

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to myself for not giving all, or nearly all, I have to save the starving and destitute from undeserved sufferings and untimely death:

1. I have my own family to maintain.

2. I have my work to do, my service to the community, for the sake of which I must maintain my health and efficiency.

3. Others could give all that is needed without impoverishing themselves or their families.

4. I am willing to contribute my share, which is all that could legitimately be required of me.

5. For those of moderate means to stint themselves in order to keep the starving alive is likely to be dysgenic. It would tend to make the feebler stocks multiply at the expense of the superior, which would be against the interests of the race as a whole.

Against these excuses the following replies come into my mind:

1. Proximity to, and distance from, me do not affect the importance of the welfare of other members of the race. As a rational and moral being I must always aim at the greater, rather than at the lesser, good.

2. The starving have also their work to do, their contributions to make to mankind. Is my work more valuable than that of the people whom I might save?

3. Yes; others ought to give, but they do not. I have to do the best with my resources under the circumstances, one of the circumstances being the refusal of others to do their part. If the abundance of wealth available for feeding the hungry is not applied to their relief it neither diminishes their pangs nor my duty to succor them.

4. If we refuse to save the lives of the destitute on the ground that the destitute are probably of inferior stock to ourselves we seem logically committed to the perhaps less cruel program of killing off the weaker strains. Our eugenics must take a less barbarous form. But in any case the victims of

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famine and the refugees expelled in consequence of war are in distress, not, for the most part, through indolence or vice or natural incapacity, but through the mistakes of their governments.

Is there then no escape for me as a moral agent? Must I reduce the scale of living for myself and family to the minimum required to keep body and soul together in order to keep as many bodies and souls together as possible among the perishing thousands left by the wrack of war and revolution?

At this juncture I reply that I cannot. However right it may be to do this, and wrong to do otherwise, even if I am assured that hell yawns to receive me for my selfishness and callousness, it is impossible. I could not treat my own children so. And then I proceed to reflect that human nature is not constituted so as to perform such feats of pure altruism. It is not natural to be as distressed over the death of a thousand by flood or volcanic eruption in a distant land as over the death of one's own, or even a neighbor's, child. It would be inconvenient and disabling if one were. But since one is incapable of feeling the fortunes and misfortunes of strangers as acutely as those of kith and kin it is impossible to act as if they were as important. And yet I cannot avoid, as a rational being, seeing that they are as important, and that therefore, as a moral being, I ought to treat them as equally important. What is the solution of this antinomy?

We must probe deeper into the values of life. What is the issue in the case under consideration? On the one side, the continuance in the body of a number of human souls; on the other side, the trust and affection of my children toward me, which would be sorely tried if I withheld from them the sustenance which they regard as their right. What is the most desirable object in the world? Is it that people should live their full term of years? No doubt this is important for the sake of soul-development. But the kind of character that is developed in the lifetime, long or short, seems more important. Is not

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love more precious than length of days, and is not wounded love turning to hatred more awful than the death of children? The greatest tragedies and sorrows in the world are not those of short lives and untimely bereavements.

We can affect most vitally those who are nearest to us. We can do them more good and more harm. Materially, externally, in relatively unimportant ways, we may be able to benefit or injure almost as much those of the human race that are more distant, whether in space or in interests; but far less in the things that matter most—in moral character, in spiritual development, in love. For that reason we cannot apply the law of impartiality in any rough-and-ready manner. We can still assert that the right action is that which "will produce the greatest amount of good in the universe," but we must discern that the apparently lesser good of one near and dear to us is in reality immeasurably more than the apparently greater good of others far away. For that reason, not only the care of one's children, but also the fulfilment of responsibilities in doing one's work, may have to be preferred to the urgent calls of missions and charities. Mutual affection and mutual trust are of inestimable worth, and their violation by cruelty or unfaithfulness engenders woe and misery past telling.

But having made this clear we must confess ourselves guilty both individually and nationally of having left such vast areas of misery and destitution unalleviated. Money is lavishly spent and energies are idly dissipated, whereby the sick might be made well, lives saved, homes of squalor and despair made clean and happy, discontent and sullenness transformed into good will and friendliness. There are, so to speak, many running sores and malignant growths in the body of humanity—human life trickling away because of destitution and horrible conditions (as among the refugees in Macedonia and the Near East) and greed and self-indulgence and the cruelty of contemptuous indifference. These ailments necessarily react upon the general health and well-being of mankind, causing sundry evil humors, fevers, fantasies, internal

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conflicts, inability to grapple with, and carry through, great tasks.

Even when all the claims of affection are amply satisfied and all obligations of trust and profession are fulfilled, there remains an abundance of wealth and capacity for service unutilized, and potentialities of devotion and self-sacrifice stale and sour from lack of outlet. The ties of friendship and trust which are the nerves of human society are far from complete in their ramifications. The millions of needless deaths in Europe during the last few years are sufficient evidence of this—not to speak of stunted and disappointed lives in this country and all over the world. If we see clearly the sacrosanctity of the bonds and fellowship that are already in existence, then we can boldly endeavor to put into effect the ethical principle of impartiality: "As between your own happiness (or welfare) and that of others, be as strictly impartial as a disinterested and benevolent spectator." As rational and moral beings we are bound so to order our lives as to aim at "producing the greatest amount of good in the universe," and therefore not to give a lesser good to self, or even to friend, at the cost of not giving a greater good to another. For a practicable and workable method of applying this principle we may take the words of Jesus: "All things whatsoever ye would that men should do unto you, even so do ye also unto them."

We may express the matter thus: the world is suffering from dissociation. Suffering unrelieved when it lies within another's power to relieve it is an instance of dissociation—the appeal on the one side, the virtual cruelty of refusal to respond on the other. It would not be advisable to impair to any great extent the existing associations of family and social relationship in order to repair the breaches. But there are enough wealth and power hoarded and bottled up, or vainly dissipated, to overcome the dissociations and to consolidate and unify humanity. A forcible insistence on the primary and elementary moral laws, on the part of both ethical philosophers and exponents of religion, is urgently called for.

OXFORD, ENGLAND

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IS THEISM A HELP TO SOCIAL SERVICE?

MARTIN KAYE

In observing that human society is sick, one is observing nothing new: human society has never been well. The question, then, to ask is not whether social life may be regenerated, but whether social insanity is inevitable, a question which is all the more difficult because society seems, prima facie, self-contradictory.

From one point of view it must appear exceedingly strange that there should be the fact of human conflict, since in virtue of their common humanity it might have been expected that all men would appear as brothers manifesting a principle of unity. Yet from another point of view the stressing of human oneness must appear indicative either of mere ignorance and foolishness or of gross intellectual dishonesty, in so far as it is exceedingly obvious that human history is qualified profoundly by scandal, libel, robbery, and murder. Human society, indeed, seems to reproduce on a small scale the appearance of reality in its entirety; it appears as a universal certainly, but as a universal expressing itself inexplicably in a multitude of warring particulars.

It is indisputable that incompatibility implies a relation, and that a relation must be grounded in a unity in which the terms related live. But logical compatibility must be distinguished from, since it is not necessarily sufficient for, ethical compatibility, and it is the latter compatibility which is the object of man's demand for complete satisfaction. It is in man's power not merely to contemplate what is, but to imagine what actually is not; from the contemplation of what is there may be derived a profound intellectual satisfaction, but for the possibility of yielding satisfaction to one's being as a whole one needs, in addition to contemplating the actual, in

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some manner to transform it so as to render an actuality what is not actual as yet. The relations that are actual manifest a logical compatibility that is complete, but an ethical compatibility that is incomplete; it is the latter compatibility that man needs to actualize if he is to attain that blessedness for which his nature craves.

It is the rational man's belief that wheresoever there is experience there is value, with the consequence that whatever appears as an obstruction to the duration and development of experience must appear, *ipso facto*, as a disvalue. Moreover, for the possibility of experience there must be experients, and experients are not mere repetitions of one another; conceivably each has the power to contribute to experience conceived universally a novel quality that must strengthen and enrich it; each, therefore, must be appreciated as an intrinsic value. In so far, then, as the reality apparently actual appears to destroy experients it cannot appear conducive to the complete welfare of values; it manifests relations ethically incompatible; but just in this manner appears that part of reality which is human society.

The injunction "live and let live" is an old one, and even the injunction "live and help to live" is not new; yet men have generally sought in the past, and generally seek in the present—and, moreover, suggest to their children that they should seek in the future—to effect of others a complete annihilation. To serve human society rationally and ethically, then, must mean to endeavor so to modify its conflicting particulars as to achieve that ethical compatibility which is to be realized in social harmony, and it is now to be determined whether such an attempt at social service may be reinforced by an acceptance of theism.

Of theism there are different kinds, but its essential connotation, apparently, is that there is a personal god who is the creator of all things. This definition must be briefly examined. To say that God is a person is to imply that he is a self-con-

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scious experient, and to say that he is the creator of all things is to imply that he is absolute, comprehending in his experiential act all things that are possible. God, then, must embrace in his view the totality of logically compatible relations, and since these relations are the product of his unimpeded activity, and since, also, a self-conscious experient who is unimpeded realizes what may satisfy him completely, for God the relations which are logically compatible must be ethically compatible not less. Thus the products of God's activity must be conducive to his infinite satisfaction: we must regard the deity as contemplating his work and finding it good.

But if God is absolute, then part of his work is human society, whence it must follow that human society in its actuality is in essence ethical and of a nature satisfactory to God. But if so, what meaning can there be in the attempt of the theist to make society better? Surely the amelioration of society must be impossible; while even if it were possible—which it obviously cannot be—surely it cannot be demanded by God, who experiences his work as satisfactory just as it is?

This manner of questioning is not, perhaps, altogether unsuggestive, but were one to conclude that it is sufficient in itself to reduce theism to absurdity, in so far as it seems manifestly indisputable that human society, as was observed at the beginning, has always been, and is still, most seriously sick, one would be guilty of rashness; for it is to be noticed that human society as it is actually includes not only the sick, but endeavoring physicians, wherefore it may be inferred that the cessation of the labors of these physicians to ameliorate the condition of society as it appears to finite vision would most probably be detrimental to, or rather impossible from the point of view of, that social perfection which is actual fundamentally, and which is obvious to the vision of God.

Thus the object of God's approbation is not some particular part of his work, but his work in its completeness; the criminal and the judge, war and peace, the sick and the physi-

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cian, poverty and charity, ugliness and beauty, hate and love —in each case the antithesis is as necessary to the thesis as is the thesis to the antithesis; the perfection of God's work, its absolute satisfactoriness, resides not in a part, but in the whole, "for He maketh his sun to rise on the evil and on the good, and sendeth rain on the just and on the unjust"; whence it will be apparent that in its relation to ethical value, theism has an implication essentially identical with that of absolute idealism: for both, reality as it is fundamentally is a reality that is completely perfect.

It is necessary to stress this last point, because theists often ignore it. They would contend that the deity is absolute, and the creator of absolute perfection, and yet at the same time they would maintain that man is voluntarily vicious or sinful, and because of such sin, profoundly displeasing to God. They would urge that the loftiest conception of sin is that which regards it as an offense against God—against that very God from whom the sinner has received so much good. But such a position as this appears completely illogical: it cannot be accepted by philosophy; for if we grant the existence of a God who is absolute—and there are not many theists who would be willing to subtract from God's absoluteness—we seem logically compelled to concede further that though man may indeed be vicious, his vice is still not sin, and cannot be offensive to the deity who has generated all things, and who has thus generated the evildoer also, as essential for the life of absolute perfection. Thus, from an ultimate point of view, the God who is a person must be as absolute as the idealistic universe, and he and his world must be as absolutely perfect.

Theism, then, implies the existence of a world which in its actuality is the product of, and is absolutely satisfactory to, an absolute experient. But man is not absolute; his comprehension is most markedly finite; so that what the universe is in its entirety it is not for him to grasp. He *is* aware, however, that though the universe may be completely and inevitably

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perfect from the standpoint of the absolute experient who is responsible for its existence, so far as his own finite vision is concerned the universe does *not* present such an appearance of absolute perfection. On the contrary, it is the feeling of finite man that it is his duty to endeavor his utmost to fashion things much better than they appear; he feels it to be demanded of him that he should constantly endeavor to promote progress, to crush out of existence all manner of suffering, to render universal the experience of joy. He is sensible of the many great beauties of the world; he is sensible of its baffling might and grandeur; he feels profoundly the mystery of its very being; yet he is aware at the same time of seeming maniacal destruction, of nauseating brutality, of much nastiness and degradation, of apparently useless pain. To him, therefore, there appears much which ought not to be; how, then, will he be helped to distinguish between the good and the bad, between that which he ought to allow to remain as it is and that which in some manner he ought to make different, by his knowledge that in the view of the experient who is absolute there resides perfection in reality as a whole?

The position is this: From the point of view of theism, considered logically, it is doubtless quite right for the social worker to maintain that he is fulfilling the will of God; most certainly social service must be of a nature to contribute to God's satisfaction, to absolute perfection; on the other hand, why should it not be equally right for the vicious to maintain that he too, by his very vice, is fulfilling the will of God? For after all, the tendency to vice is not less universal than the tendency to social service. The theistic implications as to the existence of actual universal perfection do not cause social service to appear superfluous and absurd; but they also do not make it evident that social service must be more pleasing to God than social friction and insanity. If the universe be conceived under the form of time, then its process, as related to God's satisfaction, *may* include the ultimate supersession

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of social friction by social harmony, but there is nothing in human history, as it has presented itself hitherto, to suggest that such a realization of the social worker's ideal *must* be necessary for the possibility of God's satisfaction.

It would appear, then, that as a help to man's earnest efforts to serve society ethically, theism cannot be of any value which is great. This, however, is not to cast any reflection on the metaphysical soundness of theism; whether or not theism is sound metaphysically is a question which is here not being discussed. From the standpoint of the question as to what metaphysical considerations may be helpful to man's attempt at social amelioration, the problem concerning the metaphysical validity of theism fails to establish itself as strictly relevant: it fails to establish itself as strictly relevant not because metaphysical truth as such is irrelevant to social service, not because social service need not be grounded in ultimate truth in order that it should be fruitful practically, but because, even if theism be true, a merely partial apprehension of what its truth implies cannot but prove, in relation to man's ethical efforts as a finite being, a source of most serious confusion. From the concept of perfection which is actual for an infinite being it is not possible to extract a criterion of value which may be of service to the spatio-temporal activities of finite man. The concept must necessarily be taken as implying that, from the standpoint of the reality which is absolute, whatever is is right, and though it must certainly be conceded that reality, in its apparent actuality, includes not only the existence of evil but the efforts of man to overcome it, it remains that the concept by itself is quite impotent to suggest what must constitute the differentiation of the evil from the good; moreover, since the existence of finite evil has apparently been quite compatible hitherto with the existence of infinite perfection, the concept fails to extend to man any reasons for hoping that, in the process of time finite, evil will become a mere thing of the past.

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Accordingly, it may be suggested that as far as the practical social worker is concerned, he would do well were he to let the will of God alone, and to concentrate instead on the will of man. If an absolute God does exist in fact, then there is nothing which is not his will; hence by partially considering God's infinite work man cannot be helped to determine what ought to be his own finite work. Man has desires of his own: why then should he not regard them as themselves authoritative?

Certainly, however, it is not the purpose here to oversimplify man's essential ethical problem. It must admittedly be a matter of great difficulty to determine with exactitude what human desires are deserving of authority and what desires are not. But at any rate the men of widest vision do, as a matter of fact, feel it incumbent on them to help on the development of each person capable of enjoying, through co-operation with his fellows, the experience of a diversified world. And because these men who, in consequence, have the ambition to promote as far as they are able the cause of social progress are thus themselves usually of more than ordinary vision, they tend to argue that He who has a vision absolutely comprehensive must be more ambitious for social progress even than they. But, as has been observed, such an inference does not appear sound, in so far as the being who is absolute must be recognized as the generator not alone of social progress but also of social evil.

However precarious in fact, then, may be the authority of man's ethical demands, it cannot become greater and surer by basing itself on the implications of theism. The man who desires to feed the hungry, to heal the sick, to regenerate evil-doers, to transform slums into garden cities, to put an end to war, to crush out greed and blood, lust and sex-lust, to help his fellows to appreciate with vividness the far-reaching truth of the philosophical platitude that the greatest values are those which are not diminished by sharing—such a man need not hesitate to believe that his desires are fundamentally right and

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deserving of the fullest fulfilment, whether or not they are in conspicuous accord with the will of an absolute God. Because of his incipient rationality, because of his impulse to develop an experience which shall be assured in its duration and of a world most richly variegated, man cannot but feel regret when a life which might conceivably have contributed to such an experience becomes shattered by forces he quite fails to understand. But there is no reason for supposing that the being who understands all things must feel regret at the destruction of finite lives: for him the manifest evils of society —as, e.g., hunger, disease, prostitution, hate, murder—must assuredly be contributory to perfection. But if it thus follows from the principle of theism that God expresses himself in all things, it becomes difficult to appreciate what, exactly, one gains by terming divine the attempt at social service; for, so to speak, it becomes interesting and valuable to be told that a certain thing is white only when there are other things which are not white.

Let this be conceded: Theism as an aid to social service must be rejected, with the consequence that he who would further social progress must do so in the spirit of what Bertrand Russell would call a "free man." Man is actuated by an impulse to help his fellows, and this impulse appears as its own authority. But what if the impulse be disobeyed, what if a man allows his finer impulses to perish and he yields himself completely to a life of selfishness; must not theism prove valuable in a case like this, for must not all attempts to retrieve him prove inevitably fruitless if one neglects to persuade him with the thought of God's will and his punishment of those who disobey him? This question is certainly not unimportant, but if it presents itself as an argument for the utility value of theism one must notice precisely the fact to which it can refer. It cannot possibly refer to the person who takes his stand on logic, who refuses to be influenced by any existence which, while unperceivable, is also not inferable; it can

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only refer to the person who is impotent to reason, and who may be influenced by mere suggestion. But the primary concern of this paper is with those who are anxious to give to their efforts at social service the support of reasoned truth.

That the sanctions of theism have done much good work hitherto in the service of society is undeniable; most certainly many an individual has served society because his primary purpose has been to serve God. Moreover, by projecting his own ideas on to an eternal and omnipotent being, man has achieved for them a surer conspicuousness, an apparently more irrefutable cogency. "The Word is his name: that strengtheneth the spoiled against the strong, so that the spoiled shall come against the fortress. . . . . Seek good, and not evil, that ye may live, and so the Lord, the God of hosts, shall be with you, as ye have spoken" (Amos). "Bring no more vain oblations; incense is an abomination unto me; the new moons and sabbaths, the calling of assemblies, I cannot; away with it; it is iniquity, even the solemn meeting. Wash you, make you clean; put away the evil of your doings from before mine eyes; cease to do evil, learn to do well; seek judgment, relieve the oppressed, judge the fatherless, plead for the widow" (Isaiah). Such exhortations as these, it may be contended, strike one with a more tremendous force when they come as the utterances, not of mere man, but of the deity who is absolute. And yet, of course, actually they are the utterances of mere man—of man as he is when he appears most divine; it is man who becomes nauseated by hypocrisy; it is he who would have hate put away, and love universal take its place.

Of man as he is when he appears most divine. Yes; for though theism, from the standpoint of social service, must be rejected, the concept of divinity remains profoundly valuable: God is the good, and what most approaches to the good most approaches to the Godlike, to the divine. God must stand forth as the crystallization of man's ideal, a being of infinite

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love. But this is not to imply that as such a being appears the absolute god of the theist. And in relation to this terrene life of ours it would appear that the only god it may ever be in our power to meet with and appreciate must be a divine man. The universe appears infinite, and the infinity of reality is not to be compassed by the finite. Human knowledge appears mighty and amazing in its progress, but in respect of the universe it fails to appear profound. Most surely we now know, but as in a glass darkly, and what is problematic is only whether we shall ever know face to face. But just because man's knowledge is thus bounded, just because he is powerless to comprehend the absolute, it must behove him to search for help for his service of society not from an unknowable god of the universe, but from a god of man, a man become divine.

Now the god of man must be good, but he need not be omniscient, and he need not be omnipotent. To such a god there have been many remarkable approximations, and one such approximation, remarkable not merely for his goodness but for his eventual power, was certainly Jesus Christ. The life of Christ has had power among men, and Christ has been powerful because of his goodness; he was divine in his compassion, and for the many whom he loved he died. "This is my commandment, that ye love one another, as I have loved you. Greater love has no man than this, that a man lay down his life for his friends. Ye are my friends, if ye do whatsoever I command you. . . . . These things I command you, that ye love one another." And because his love was great, man, whom he loved, has come to love him, for though prophets are stoned, though they cast their pearls before swine, their nobility may shine through so intensely as to clarify the vision even of the brutish.

But though Christ has become influential among men—and even here, it is obvious, his influence is very limited—it would be entirely arbitrary to suppose that he has therefore become powerful in the universe as a whole. Christ, without

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doubt, approximated to a god of man, but if he ever concluded from this fact that he *ipso facto* approximated to the god of absolute reality, he most seriously, although perhaps pardonably, erred. For it is not impossible that our human scale of values occupies but a very insignificant place in the reality which is absolute. After all, Christ himself was crucified, and his personal immortality cannot be demonstrated apodictically. He lives in so far as by men he is remembered, but his personal experience—his acts of love, and his rage against the mockers of love—the universe, apparently, crushed.

If, then, workers for social amelioration need a leader, by looking in the direction of Christ they will not do very wrong, since the remembering of the life of Christ may inspire them to put forth a fruitful heroism themselves. If, however, they look toward Christ as an abiding metaphysical existence, omnipotent in absolute reality, then they do what logic cannot ratify. Hence, for the possibility of social service deriving a valuable reinforcement from Christianity it is necessary that Christianity should become divorced from the metaphysics of theism. As Christ's pretentions to metaphysical absoluteness become forgotten, so he will become more conspicuous in his genius for love; he will become more universally lovable; he will become more universally acknowledged as a man who approached most remarkably to the character of divinity or absolute goodness.

It is not, however, the purpose of this paper to contend that Christ stands alone in his close approximation to the divine; many men have lived appreciably divine lives since, in so far as looking to Christ as a pattern, they have sought to imitate his goodness; on the other hand, it is doubtless quite probable that there were many who approximated to the divine before the life of Christ. The question here, indeed, is one of history in general and of biography in particular, and it is not a question whose answer is very material to the practical work of social service. However, it is important to remem-

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ber that one cannot ameliorate society by merely repeating Christ's name, or by consigning the hungry and the sick and the dying and the dead to Christ's tender mercy. The repetition of Christ's name may be valuable, but it must be merely as a means to an end; it is valuable only as it stimulates the man who repeats it to go and do as did the man he remembers. On the other hand, the consigning of the afflicted to Christ's mercy can be valuable in no respect, for, as has been observed, the personal immortality of Christ is very doubtful, and his power in the universe, more doubtful still. The salvation of the afflicted is to be obtained—if it is possible that it should be obtained at all—only from the divine men who are their contemporaries and who have been made possible by the divine men who have preceded them.

The universe in its vastness is dark to us, and in its darkness divine men must work; moreover, from out of its darkness they seem to arise, to take their very being, and to derive the sustenance which is a condition of their duration. Yet though their origin and their basis are thus obscure, and though they are as lights which waver but for a moment and then are gone for ever, it is on them, and not on the universe in its absoluteness, that society must depend immediately for the possibility of its amelioration.

The urgent need of modern society is a concentration, by those who have its welfare sincerely at heart, on real essentials. The promotion of the social good is not to be furthered effectively by the giving to it a metaphysical sanction; it will be rendered possible only so far as individuals, striving after self-realization, are led to appreciate that selves can be realized fully only as they live in a rational society. One's life on earth—and the possibility that there may be a life elsewhere must not be too much stressed, must not be interpreted as a probability—is short at the best, but while it endures it may be a world rich in the diversity of its qualities, and beautiful in its harmony. Most emphatically, the protracted duration of

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values constitutes in itself a value, but even if values endure but for a moment, they are values still, and it is even thus that human life, though destined to be so exceedingly short, may yet be ineffably sweet. On earth must be man's heaven; on earth, of men, he must make his gods. What is in store for him after his terrestrial life has ceased it is not in his power to determine, but surely he may rest confident that if a personal immortality must be his inevitably, his future life will in no wise be sullied by his having lived well that stage which had to be passed on earth. Just as it is a platitude for modern educators to assert that the child must not only be prepared for future adult life but must be made joyous in his childish life, so it ought to be a platitude for modern social reformers that, however protracted must be each man's life in the universe, he ought to be made joyous in his terrestrial life. It is important that modern social thinkers and those who are ambitious to render practical service to society should powerfully emphasize that man should endeavor to live well, not because he is commanded so to do by the ruler of the universe, but because unless he does so he can appear as nothing but a fool. In the exercising of his body, in the enjoyment of the sounds and colors of natural and artificial beauty, in solitary speculation on the universals of reality, in conversation on high topics with others, in the endeavor to love, and help on the development of, persons rational potentially, man can find scope for activity that is valuable, and to be pursued just because it exists. The living in relation to a diversified environment is an intrinsic value not to be estimated; to the universe that makes it possible for him, man will not do ill to express the profundity of his adoration and his gratitude; moreover, since a value imposes on experients a definite obligation to ensue it, it must be compatible with man's rationality that he should feel it owing from him to the universe that he should live excellently that life which the universe makes possible. On the other hand, if man stresses his obligation toward the universe be-

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yond a certain point, he will land himself in confusion, in so far as it is apparent that the universe not only creates spiritual lives, but also destroys them.

It is necessary to stress the fact of *spiritual* lives. There is always a danger for the connotation of the spiritual to become vague, but it will lose its vagueness if the degree of spiritual experience be made to vary directly with the varying richness of the experienced environment. A man is spiritual to the degree in which he maintains relations with an environment that is comprehensive; he is spiritual not because his experience is elusive and emotional and mysterious, but because his environment is wide, and clear in its manifold distinctions; it is for this reason that a man who seeks for a clear-eyed view of the universe in its entirety must be accounted more spiritual than he who devotes protracted attention to the primary needs of the body. But even the first type of man, it must be noticed, has to live his spiritual life on earth: the spirituality which man really knows is the spirituality of finite terrestrial lives. But it is precisely this spiritualty which is appreciated by man to be an inestimable intrinsic value.

If, however, for the possibility of his living spiritually he must seek to experience a rich environment, how can it be an act of supreme spirituality to give up one's life, even though it be for the sake of another? For, after all, to yield up one's life, though it may mean an act of intense spirituality at the actual moment of the sacrifice, must still mean the loss of that value which resides in the continuance of valuable experience? And this without doubt is true: self-sacrifice does mean the loss of an intrinsic value, and in a heaven clearly conceived self-sacrifice can have no place. But in the life which we know on earth, man is aware that for the possibility of realizing the greatest experience which it is in his power to realize he must often sacrifice the life of one individual for the sake of other individuals. And it is thus that the sacrificing of one's life for the sake of society is quite different in value from that act of

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self-destruction for the sake of one moment of intense sensuous pleasure.

> Ah, fill the cup—what boots it to repeat
> How time is slipping underneath our feet:
> Unborn Tomorrow and dead Yesterday,
> Why fret about them if Today be sweet!

But because, indeed, the day can be sweet while it is actually lived, it is fitting as greatly as possible to prolong it, and just as the individual does in fact prolong it by living a life which is not crushed in a moment by a mad grasping of bodily pleasure, so there are occasions when he may be able to prolong it even more by manifesting a willingness definitely to terminate his own individuality in order that other individuals might continue in their development at once more surely and more successfully: in one case self-destruction must mean the impoverishing of life universal; in the other case it may mean its enriching.

Thus self-destruction can be justified only as it is conducive to the glorification of life in its universality. It cannot be justified as an act of service to the God of the universe, for it is difficult for finite man to understand why an omnipotent deity should render self-sacrifice a necessity. But it is appreciated as necessary by divine men who find in that rational life which must be partialized in many experients a value that is in itself categorically authoritative.

LONDON, ENGLAND

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DISCUSSION

ART AND THE UNCONSCIOUS[1]

HERBERT READ

It has been evident from the first that those theories of psychology which derive their main evidence from the interpretation of dreams would in time have a tremendous repercussion on the theory of aesthetic, for it has always been recognized that there is an intimate connection between the activities of dreaming and of artistic creation. Freud himself has attempted to define this relation, and has given it a particular application in his study of Leonardo da Vinci. But it seems that Freud and other psychoanalysts, like Pfister, always approach aesthetic questions with a special purpose, which is to extract from them additional evidence for their theory of the unconscious. What has not yet been done with any degree of thoroughness is to apply the new theory of the unconscious to the particular problems of aesthetics. Mr. Thorburn's book is a tentative step in this direction, and though far from exhaustive of the possibilities of the situation, does nevertheless by its suggestiveness and interest give some foretaste of what we may expect.

Mr. Thorburn, who is generally more sympathetic toward the school of Jung than toward that of Freud, begins by asserting his conviction that the concept of the unconscious does mean something real, and that the dream is the basal fact in any theory of the unconscious. He then goes on to point out the strong analogies that exist between art and the dream, and having established the validity of this analogy, he proceeds to formulate the *differentia* between the two activities. He suggests, for example, that "in art the artist must somehow preserve for himself a conscious standpoint which the dreamer cannot do," and in this connection he introduces the important concept of medium. "Art is that kind of dream which expresses itself in some material medium." He seizes on the essential fact that "the problem of medium is the key to the problem of art"; and by his insistence on this fact he makes his book distinctive. We feel sure all the time that Mr. Thorburn is dealing, not with an abstraction, but with the seen and felt objects of art. That is a very rare quality in an aesthetician.

[1] *Art and the Unconscious: A Psychological Approach to a Problem in Philosophy*. By John M. Thorburn. London: Kegan Paul, Trench, Trubner & Co., 1925. Price, 10*s*. 6*d*. net.

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The chapter on the "Nature and Origin of the Imagination" is one of the best in the book, and makes a real advance in our understanding of the aesthetic process. The whole problem of the imagination is envisaged through the antithesis of percept versus image.

> Where perception—or, more generally, sensation of any kind—takes place freely and without let or hindrance there is no need for images. Images arise when we cannot perceive or cannot effect an immediate sensational contact. There would be a good case, then, for viewing images—of whatsoever kind—as indicating sensational or perceptual failure.

This is about as far as the Freudian interpretation of art will take us, and, as Mr. Thorburn observes, it is a purely negative attitude. But the universal import of the word "imagination" is one of value, and it is whilst in search of some psychological justification of this concept of value that Mr. Thorburn encounters Jung. The work of art becomes the embodiment of racial myth—a positive value inhering in such traditional and typical forms as religion and its expressions. At this point Mr. Thorburn makes use of one or two dangerous and ill-defined terms, like "beauty" and "instinct." It is not every psychologist that will admit that "instinct has always been known and admitted as a matter of external observation." But on the other hand, we must acknowledge the force of the following remark:

> Too long our culture has been content to build its structures upon ideas of physiological transmission on the one hand and upon ideas of history and tradition on the other. Both ways of viewing the transmission are real enough, but until the significance and the vitality of the idea of psychical or psychological continuity is realised and utilised, there will remain in our culture a barrenness and sterility from the disability of which we cannot free ourselves.

Mr. Thorburn then goes on to discuss the artist's freedom and his limitations. He deals with the interesting question, so ably raised by Mr. Edward Bullough, of the function of "distance" in aesthetic effect. He describes the relation of the artist to his medium—the primitive sensuousness or sensuality of this relation. The antithesis between imagination and perception is further developed in a chapter on "Vision and Convention," and the attitude of the artist toward his medium is made the basis of a new distinction:

> The more the medium is of such a nature as to lead the artist's vision outward to the object, the more he tends to endow with life the object that he sees or thinks he sees; and the more the medium is of such a nature as to darken or blur or obscure the artist's vision of the object, the more he tends to deprive the object of its life. In other words the representative movement or orientation in art tends to vitalise the inorganic, while the formal or rhythmical move-

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ment or orientation tends to devitalise the organic. In still other words, the more the artist's interest is absorbed in an external object, the more he "sees" it living or endows it with life; while if the outer object only serve as a means of initiating his interest which, in its development, flows back more and more to his own mind or soul, the less life he sees in the object, the more he deprives it of its vital qualities.

This distinction derives from Worringer ("Abstraktion und Einfühlung") but here it is perhaps given an individual application hardly warranted by Worringer's theory and hardly in accord with the facts. The movements or orientations in art which Mr. Thorburn speaks of are the dominant facts in the distinction he draws between vital and conventional art, but the movements originate, not in the aggregation of individual attitudes, but in the submission of the individual to the mass of those climatic and historical factors which determine the material environment. Individual art is only romantic art; psychology should also envisage those communal expressions, such as Gothic architecture, which sweep up all merely individual talent in their superhuman manifestations. In this sense, Mr. Thorburn hardly does justice to the fertility of Worringer's aesthetic, especially as developed in "Formprobleme der Gothik."

One of the most refreshing independencies in Mr. Thorburn's book is his insistence on the validity of the distinction between representation and design in art. He discusses the non-representative character of music and architecture and emphasizes the significance of Schopenhauer's views, from which so much that is of value in modern aesthetics derives. He suggests that in music "the religious experience of our western world has most nearly come to its own and has achieved what its religion without music would never have achieved." "In Bach's organ music, in the 'Mass in B Minor,' in certain passages in Wagner's 'Tetralogy' or in 'Parsifal,' this strange correlation of inwardness and social unity is rendered in a way that is most integral with, and that perhaps does most honor to, the essentials of Western culture."

There follows a chapter on art as the relation of outer and inner, and here we get the completest statement of Mr. Thorburn's analysis of the aesthetic process:

We shall continue, therefore, to speak as if we could distinguish between the experiencing artist and the object of outer nature which stands over against him; and as if within that distinction there fell also the medium and such part or aspect of the artist's own experience—the mood or the emotion—upon which it is conceivable that his attention is, in some sense, directed. Let us call, for simplicity's sake, the two possible foci of his attention, the outer object and the subjective emotion. Both foci are discernible, or are illumi-

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nated, in every kind of artistic experience; but according to the relative increased brightness or intensity of the outer or the inner, we have the orientation characteristic of painting, etc., on the one hand, and of music, etc., on the other. Can there be those limiting cases in which the illumination discernible in each focus is of equal intensity? Again, I raise the question; but again, I incline to answer it in the negative except in so far as it shows a transitional and unstable phase of a more specific and stable orientation. This quasi-mathematical way of generalising the problem would, however, have the advantage of giving us, so to speak, a perfectly general equation that, by change only of the constants, would be applicable to every kind of art, or to every aspect of the whole artistic process.

In the second part of Mr. Thorburn's book we get the application of his theory to particulars, and it is a pleasure to see the author treating of the art of glass-painting, the poetry of Milton and Dante, the music of Bach and Palestrina, with equal sureness and ease. He has acute things to say, especially about Milton, but instead of repeating these it would perhaps be of more purpose to advance one or two general strictures. In the first place, Mr. Thorburn is too apt to take at its face value the facile contrast of East and West. In matters of art there are many fundamental links between the arts of the Mediterranean West and the Far East, and likely enough both cultures spring from a common origin. A much more suggestive contrast may be drawn between the arts of the North and South, and this contrast not only has important justifications of a materialistic kind, but also historical justifications which have been elucidated by Professor Strzygowski. The second point concerns Mr. Thorburn's division of the arts, along the lines of "outer" and "inner," into more or less precise categories: music and architecture, for example, being inner subjective arts, painting and poetry outer objective arts. It is doubtful if the division can be pressed schematically across the arts in this way: it ought much rather to be applied in periods of art history; for it is quite possible, as we now begin to see, to have a subjective orientation in painting, and there is a sense in which poetry may be composed not in perceptual images of outer objects, but in the plastic medium of unrelated images. The image—any image—becomes the object and in a sense the medium. The result is dangerously near the dream fantasy, but differs fundamentally in that it is consciously and purposively controlled. But the aesthetician may well plead that he is not to be expected to deal with phenomena until they appear in sufficient force to compel general attention. It is the merit of Mr. Thorburn that he would never think of making such a plea; and that is why it is to be hoped he will one day bring into the scope of his observations the modern manifestations of the aesthetic impulse to which I have referred.

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BOOK REVIEWS

MORAL PHILOSOPHY: THE CRITICAL VIEW OF LIFE. By Warner Fite. New York: Lincoln MacVeagh, The Dial Press, 1925. Pp. vi+320.

When Solomon said, "of making books there is no end," he did not stop to define "books." We may take him to have meant the average run of books, the books that are the product of industry rather than genius. Of the plenitude of such books we in our day have more reason to complain than he could possibly have had. The writer of Ecclesiastes lived before the vogue of card catalogues and the pressure to produce. All the greater our joy when we come upon the exceptional work that enshrines, so far as writing can, the living experience of a gifted wayfarer on this planet. Chaste and dignified in argument and expression, Warner Fite's *Moral Philosophy* is nevertheless the precipitate of an adventure in living. The reader is aware of a background of struggle and defeat and victory, of laughter and tears, of pride, scorn, and love.

Philosophical points of view, as the author suggests, are inevitably personal. Criticism may be no less so. And speaking for myself I am bound to say that the book pleases me immensely. There is here and there a slight after-taste of something bitter, the exact flavor of which I have not defined; but the work taken as a whole strikes me as an estimable contribution to philosophical literature, informing, stimulating, and graceful. I propose to give some reasons for this estimate.

The pivot around which Mr. Fite's moral philosophy turns is his definition of morality. This is given in the opening pages, but the reader is recalled to it in every chapter. "What is it to be moral?" he asks; and he answers, "Morality is the self-conscious living of life." To be moral is to live "not by habit and instinct, but by judgment and choice." Life so lived is called by him "the examined life," and given the examined life, we are told, you have the moral life. Nothing more is needed. The unexamined life may be useful, or in perfect harmony with "the eternal standard of right," but it cannot be moral. One is moral "so far as he aims to do what he *thinks best*—according to ideas of his own." In my opinion this is a view which needs emphasizing, and I believe no one can read Mr. Fite's argument without feeling the force of his contention that it is the "power of sympathetic imagination—the power of seeing others as they see themselves and ourselves as others see us—that measures one's capacity as a moralist and also constitutes one's own morality."

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Mr. Fite presents a telling destructive analysis of the concepts of morality that rest upon conformity with an ultimate standard, whether this be conceived to be God, Nature, a moral sense, the good of society, or anything else. He points out that "too many standards are suggested for the integrity of 'the moral standard.'" There are race-moralities and class-moralities, each purporting to represent morality as such; and moral ideals vary with the special conditions and occupations of life. Each has its type of good man and its brand of moral philosophy. "It will be admitted," thinks Mr. Fite, "that they are all good men though not all equally pleasing to each individual taste. Every moral philosophy is *moral* if once you grasp the point of view. Yet to resolve them into a system of good men based upon a universal standard of classification, seems quite hopeless." Since morality is the self-conscious living of life, "morality is criticism of authority rather than deference to authority, and choice rather than duty." Its essence is responsibility not coercion.

It is a further merit of Mr. Fite's philosophy that, according to him, morality, in distinction from business and science, stresses the significance of persons and the appreciation of the variety of their feelings and convictions. He does not invoke the judgment of the supposed disinterested bystander or the expert moralist. He contends that "moral justice presupposes a personal acquaintance with the parties concerned." A hint of this attitude may be conveyed by two characteristic sentences from his somewhat incidental remarks on reverence, and a paragraph from a discussion of the demands of labor:

> Putting it more academically, I should say that reverence is the belief in significance and the search for significance. It is reverence to thirst to understand what goes on behind the countless faces that pass us day by day, and to believe that something does go on there; and it is lack of reverence—at least an assertion that reverence is unmeaning—to believe that nothing of any consequence goes on there (p. 74).

> How the rights and obligations of the situation [the demand of the labor world for participation in the direction of industry] are to be analyzed, how they are to be adjusted, it is not my purpose to inquire. My interest here lies in the motive and conception of morality. Hence it will suffice to point out that this assertion of rights on the part of the workers, or, the masses, so far from marking "the decay of reverence" deplored by worshippers of the ordered society, marks a significant extension—perhaps the most significant in the history of the race—of the territory of the moral world (p. 94).

In this hop-and-skip way we have reached scarcely the middle of the book and our time is just about up (a manner of speaking which I hope may pass, since we are permitted to think of space as a form of

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time). We cannot consider the provocative chapter on "The Ordered Society," in which Mr. Fite takes this position: "To get things done is one consideration, to get them morally done is quite another. In this issue the ideal of the ordered society stands not for humanity but for utility." Which sounds as if he implied that utility were of no concern to humanity, and which is not what he means. Nor can we discuss "The Unity of the Spirit," a chapter in which, while declaring his general agreement with Benedetto Croce's philosophy, he confesses to being dismayed by Croce's division of the realm of the spirit into "four seemingly separated 'forms' of aesthetic, logic, economic, and ethic; such that, it seems, nothing that is in any of these forms, or departments, of the spirit can at the same time be in any other." Moral value is not one value among others. "Morality is everywhere."

Then there is the author's analysis of "The Pragmatic Method." As he understands John Dewey, "morality does consist precisely in the constant sacrifice of the past—to the future or to the present. And this is the essence of the pragmatic attitude." Pragmatism conceives life under the limitation of "the modern business man's point of view." Mr. Dewey, however, has expressed such convictions as this:

> The best we can accomplish for posterity is to transmit unimpaired and with some increment of meaning the environment that makes it possible to maintain the habits of decent and refined life. Our individual habits are links in forming the endless chain of humanity. Their significance depends upon the environment inherited from our forerunners, and it is enhanced as we foresee the fruits of our labors in the world in which our successors live. (*Human Nature and Conduct*, p. 21.)

I realize that this does not settle the matter, and I understand, of course, that I am not commissioned to rescue Mr. Dewey from any predicament into which Mr. Fite's criticism might be thought to place him. I wish merely to confess that the chapter was a teasing temptation which the reviewer was forced to turn his back upon.

Finally—although I would fain say something of the excellent form given the book by the publisher, and although it is hard to omit entirely any reference to nine of the seventeen chapters, each rich in material and independent in treatment—finally one word of doubt must be squeezed in. I cannot for myself reduce morality (as Mr. Fite does, if I understand him) to intellectual appreciation of the ramifying aims and ideals of men. Few people concerned to make what they can of life can speak from the vantage point indicated by this remark: "I am sitting before my study fire in the darkening hours of an early December after-

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noon before the lamps are lighted, and my cocker spaniel is on the rug before me." Therefore, a little devotion, if you please, to the task of ameliorating the conditions which, for the mass of men, obstruct the realization of the life they crave, in other words, a touch of the meliorism which the author eschews. Mr. Fite seems to me somewhat too ready to dismiss this aspect of the problem by saying: "How the rights and obligations of the situation are to be analyzed, how they are to be adjusted, it is not my purpose to inquire." Alas, much as we need vision, we need not only vision, but ways and means.

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A Grammar of Politics. By H. J. Laski. London: G. Allen & Unwin, Ltd.; and New Haven: Yale University Press, 1925. Pp. 672. Price, in England, 18s. net; in America, $6.00.

This is a most valuable and interesting book. It contains a full statement of political principles which are generally accepted nowadays and, although in this part of its contents it does not pretend to be original, even here it brings a fresh light to bear upon old issues. The first part of the book discusses sovereignty, rights, liberty, property, nationalism, and federation. Of course the general view of the state as "a public service corporation" or as only one among the many institutions which are the instruments of civilization, is still controverted. Mr. Laski cannot assume that the theories with which his name has been hitherto connected have won general acceptance; but there is no doubt that the discussion as to the nature of the state takes place nowadays upon a new basis. Our assumptions today are quite different from those of Spencer or of Hegel: and these assumptions are largely the results of work done in psychology and in economics, of which Mr. Laski has been able to make full use. The state is "for" something which can be rendered in terms quite unfamiliar to the older writers. Thus Mr. Laski turns from the discussion of rights and liberties to the discussion of property—the outstanding instance of the peculiar composites of psychological superstition and economic bad habits by which the life of our time is governed.

The second part of the book deals with political institutions—representative assemblies, industrial organizations affecting political life, and the judiciary. The last chapter describes existing international organizations. The constant references to details and to facts of contemporary experience make Mr. Laski's work in this part of his book exceptionally valuable. The experience referred to is largely English, but there is some

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material drawn from the United States, Canada, and France. One of the most interesting problems of democracy is the connection between "the people" and the administration. So far, political theorists have tended to concentrate attention upon the legislature; but Mr. Laski sees the increasing importance in modern circumstances of the skilled administrator. He goes so far as to suggest reforms of detail which if they are carried out will eventually make this part of his book obsolete in proportion as it has been successful. Similarly, the many suggestions he makes as to economic reorganization make the book very much "alive" and interesting; but they make the reader also think that a general statement of principles cannot be easily combined with a detailed program of reform. However, criticism of this or that section of the work or criticism of the form of the whole book would be misleading, if it made anyone hesitate to read the book for himself. Mr. Laski has certainly performed a most difficult task with great skill and an astonishing ability to accumulate detail and use daily experiences. It is not too much to say that this is one of the most important books recently published. It will be very valuable to students at the universities, to any politicians who happen to be able to think, and to specialists who, in the social sciences, tend to underrate the importance of comprehensive views.

C. DELISLE BURNS

LONDON, ENGLAND

PUNISHMENT HUMAN AND DIVINE. By W. C. de Pauley. New York: The Macmillan Co., 1925. Pp. 212.

The first half of this book contains five essays on the theories of punishment in the philosophies of Plato, Plotinus, Augustine, Thomas Aquinas, and Grotius. These essays may be useful to some students of ethics who wish to read introductory surveys of the problem of punishment in those classical thinkers. But the reader must not expect profound scholarship or critical philosophy. The chapter on Plato may be taken as an example. The author seems to have collected most of the important references in Plato about punishment. Apparently he used Jowett's translation, though he gives no references to editions here or elsewhere. The vast body of Platonic scholarship is left almost entirely unmentioned and apparently unused. He does not seem to be familiar with the excellent essay on Plato's "Straftheorie" in Otto Apelt's *Platonische Aufsaetze* (Berlin, 1912, pp. 188–202). The work of Apelt, which was ten pages shorter and thirteen years earlier, than the essay by Mr. de Pauley, is very much better both in exact scholarship and in philosophical inter-

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pretation. Apelt has seen clearly that Plato's doctrine, from the earlier treatments in such dialogues as the *Gorgias* to the final discussions in the *Laws*, is a union of reformation and deterrence. Mr. de Pauley admits the partial truth of such an interpretation of Plato, but he insists (p. 24) that Plato's theory is "implicitly the theory of Hegel." According to this view, Plato's theory of punishment is primarily retributive, and has reformation and deterrence only as "uses" for this ultimate doctrine of retribution.

Unfortunately, our author is not very clear about the meaning of retribution. He seems to like the word, but wishes to empty it of much meaning. He says that according to Plato "punishment may be retributive, in that it asserts the Idea of Good in the very face of the soul that disregards it." (P. 7.) Again punishment is retributive because it is the "inevitable condition of the wrong-doer" and is a "self inflicted evil" which is "proportionate to the character." (Pp. 15–16.) This attitude is typical of much Neo-Hegelian ethics, but it does not seem very definite to the reviewer. If any man ever tried to insist that punishment is justified only because of its betterment in reforming the wrong-doer or in deterring others, that man was Plato. The skeptical reader will find abundant evidence for this assertion in the essay by Apelt to which reference was given above.

The last four chapters in the book are mainly theological and contain little material of interest for ethics. In chapter vi the author argues more systematically for retribution as the basis of punishment. He adds nothing to the doctrines of Hegel, Bradley, and Bosanquet. Chapter ix discusses the state and punishment, and here he explains that the reformative and deterrent theories need a "transcendental partner" which is the retributive theory. Chapters vii and viii deal with Grace and Atonement. The aim is to defend the traditions in theology, with no suggestion that any tradition could need vigorous ethical criticism.

A. P. BROGAN

UNIVERSITY OF TEXAS

CONTEMPORARY BRITISH PHILOSOPHY: Personal Statements by James Ward, E. B. Bax, D. Fawcett, G. Dawes Hicks, R. F. A. Hoernlé, C. E. M. Joad, G. E. Moore, J. A. Smith, W. R. Sorley, A. E. Taylor, J. Arthur Thompson, Clement C. J. Webb. Edited by J. H. Muirhead. London: G. Allen & Unwin, 1925. Pp. 365. Price, 16*s*. net.

This is a second series of philosophical "confessions." The authors of the different sections, whose names are given above, take very differ-

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ent lines in expressing their views; some of the statements are biographical and psychological; some are more general views of the world. Among the latter there is again a contrast. Ward's essay is a summary of his well-known views explained by reference to the historic development of philosophical thought. Moore's essay is distractingly detailed: he calls his opinions or conclusions "common sense," which may be true, but his chief interest seems to be in those respects in which his view differs from that of other philosophers. Nevertheless, his view is one of the most valuable to others, precisely because of the exactness with which he knows whatever he claims to know. Professor J. A. Smith entitles his essay "Philosophy as the Development of the Notion and Reality of Self-consciousness," which "gives him away" more completely than he generally allows. Professor A. E. Taylor and Professor Webb give us the evidence for what would be called "religious" beliefs which may form part of a philosophy; and Professor Arthur Thompson gives a "synoptic" view colored by biological investigation, which appears to be the raw material of a philosophy. These are but the briefest indications of the varied and interesting material contained in the book. The old controversies appear in most of the contributions. The newer attitude appears still to be called "realism"; but "idealism" still means almost as many different things as there are philosophers who use the word. The editor's preface is a very striking summary of the present position of philosophy, estimated by reference to the leading interests of the philosophers of today. The book is certainly valuable in giving an impression that philosophy is "alive"; and that many minds are at work on its problems with a freedom and originality as great as that of any other age. There is a refreshing absence of the sense of "schools of thought" or "orthodoxies." Ability seems to be enlisted in entirely different tasks and with naturally divergent results; but that is all to the good. The defect of our own time, if one may conclude from the evidence here presented, is that each philosopher is working as an isolated individualist. There is no such joint work in philosophy as is to be found in the sciences. However, that may come. Professor Muirhead is to be congratulated on the success of his effort to give us an impression of the vitality of British philosophy.

C. DELISLE BURNS

LONDON, ENGLAND

THE WAYS OF KNOWING, OR THE METHODS OF PHILOSOPHY. By William Pepperell Montague. London: G. Allen & Unwin, Ltd.; and New York: The Macmillan Co., 1925. (Library of Philosophy). Pp. 427.

Three features of this book enforce its serious study upon every live student of philosophy. First, it presents the long pondered reflection of

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Professor Montague on a philosophical problem with which he has always been vitally concerned. Second, it is exceedingly timely. Our age has produced an essentially novel philosophy with a method fundamentally different from any previously dominant in the history of thought. This fact has made us realize with a fresh challenge the continued lack of any accepted method in philosophy. Third, Professor Montague attempts, in the light of this newly perplexing situation, nothing less than the task of the greatest classics of philosophy from Aristotle's *Organon* to Hegel's *Logic*, namely, the fusing of rival claims and points of view in methodology into a harmonious and consistent synthesis.

The work embodying this ambitious task is divided into two main parts. The former of these deals with logic, considered in its broad sense of "the search for the ultimate criteria by the use of which our beliefs can be validated and true knowledge be attained." The second offers a solution of the time-honored puzzle of epistemology: "To what extent, if any, are the things and qualities of the world dependent upon their being related as objects to a knower or subject?" It concludes with a dialogue in which the epistemological discussion is repeated in informal conversational guise.

How far, now, does the book carry us toward these highly important ends? Most readers will surely reply: Professor Montague's analysis has broken the way into the jungle—the trail ends, however, at a point that will not satisfy many besides the author himself.

Let this general evaluation be made the text for a brief criticism of the main result reached in each of the two halves of the book. Is not the outcome of the logical discussion, after all, merely eclectic rather than soundly synthetic? Like a judge on his bench, the author adjudicates the rival claims of authoritarianism, mysticism, empiricism, rationalism, and pragmatism, by assigning to each an absolute title to a certain field or type of problem, while skepticism, like a sheriff on horseback, is to roam about among them enforcing the *pax Montiguana*. Here is splendid tolerance and a keen legalistic ingenuity, but how far has it really got us? Most of our thinking processes reveal in intimate union many or all of these aspects which Professor Montague would brusquely sunder from each other and stake off as mutually exclusive areas. Is it not precisely this fact that poses the profounder task of logical analysis—the problem that must be solved if a genuine synthesis is to be achieved? Our present perplexity, for example—to determine how far his own conclusions are valid—we can hardly break up after the fashion he outlines nor can we get thus a real criterion of truth. It certainly involves all the factors which he discusses individually with such penetration—dependence on

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the past, value-intuition, empirical fact, logical continuity, and future reference—but it involves them not in sheer juxtaposition but in vital conjunction. We cannot determine their real logical nature and validity by piece-meal dissection alone; for that it is imperative to grasp a single ultimate criterion underlying them all, the source of their meaning as logical principles. In failure to see the necessity of such a single inclusive criterion lies the incompleteness of Professor Montague's study.

The epistemological discussion may be similarly characterized as an illuminating analysis suddenly terminating before reaching its most important consequence. By shearing away those portions of the realist, idealist, and dualist positions which express simply their own prejudiced emphasis, the author succeeds in demonstrating that at bottom they are saying exactly the same thing. This residual kernel he sets up as a solution of the epistemological problem. The high significance of an influential realist of our day frankly championing such a reconciliation may dispose us to forgive him for piously insisting that this is a properly "realistic" outcome. Such an easy pacification, however, of the epistemological battle by a little logical jugglery, provokes further musings. Does it not indicate that there was really no meaning in the question at issue—that in the form traditionally discussed it contained a false and misleading assumption? Is there, in fact, any more sense in talking about the relation between mind and an object of knowledge than there is in discussing the relation between space and a material body? There is no relation, is there, properly speaking, between a body and space? Space is itself a kind of relation between bodies, which in that relation reveal a peculiar character called distance. Nor is there any relation between an object of knowledge and mind. Is not mind itself a kind of relation between whatever things can be thought about, which in that relation have also a unique quality, namely consciousness? Once one views the matter from the standpoint of these considerations the whole epistemological puzzle dissolves, to the great gain of clear and fruitful thinking.

Yet let the final impression be that of the first paragraph of this appraisal. While others seem content to sidestep the primary and fundamental task of philosophy, Professor Montague has attacked it with directness, boldness, and a wealth of illuminating suggestion. If he has not solved the problem, at least without his help those who follow would find it much more difficult to attack with hope.

E. A. BURTT

UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO

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LIBERTÉ—ÉGALITÉ—SOLIDARITÉ. By Adrien Naville. Lausanne: Librairie Payot & Cie, 1924. Pp. 124.

This small work undertakes to analyze the concepts indicated in the title. Liberty is divided into freedom of the will and liberty of execution. The author affirms his belief in freedom of the will but asserts his interest in discussing liberty of action, which presupposes freedom of the will and consists of not being prevented from doing what one wishes. There are two kinds of liberty of action, the first depending upon ability to control exterior means and the second depending upon the extent to which essential or persisting desires are integrated and included among the select few of desires that can be translated into efficient volitions. A man may have freedom of the will but yet not have psychic freedom if his will fails to include desires which demand satisfaction. Physical freedom and psychical freedom vary in amount and depend upon various factors. The control that science gives us over external things is a pure gain in liberty. In the political state, democracy procures the maximum amount of liberty. In international politics, federalism results in more liberty than does imperialism. In society, an increase of liberty in one place is accompanied by a decrease in another place; but as in the abolition of slavery, the increase may be larger than the decrease; and the total amount of liberty is increased by the increase in sympathy, intelligence, and desire to be just. There are relations among the various factors affecting liberty. The organization of society affects man's liberty as dependent upon control of physical means. It also affects his social liberty. And finally it affects his psychic liberty, since social constraint exercised by the family or by the state may result in a co-ordination of an individual's desires that will decrease the number of enslaved desires or interests.

The analyses of equality and solidarity proceed in a corresponding fashion. No strikingly new results are obtained but the analyses are penetrating and on the whole convincing.

C. M. PERRY

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ESSAYS IN METAPHYSICS. University of California Publications in Philosophy, Vol. V. Edited by George P. Adams and J. Loewenberg. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1924.

This volume contains the papers read before the Philosophical Union of the University of California in the second half of the year 1923–24, and the annual Howison Lecture in Philosophy delivered by Professor Arthur O. Lovejoy in March, 1924. The volume is a substantial one and constitutes an important survey of some of the more fundamental problems of contemporary philosophy.

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Four of the essays, broadly considered, may be said to fall under the heading of method in metaphysics. These are: "The Character of Metaphysical Inquiry," by John Laird; "The Method of Metaphysics," by William R. Dennes; "The Idea of the Ultimate," by J. Loewenberg; and "Reason and Experience," by George P. Adams. For Professor Laird "Philosophy is the attempt to discover facts and principles which can withstand any possible criticism; and, having discovered these, to follow them whithersoever they may lead" (p. 9). And he holds (rightly, as I should contend) that the differentiation between critical and speculative philosophy is provisional only and in no sense fundamental. Dr. Dennes discovers that the one method which is not irrelevant or endlessly regressive "would seem to be that defined by Alexander as the attempt to give a systematic account of those fundamental facts about reality which our characteristic experiences declare to us of themselves" (p. 77). One cannot forbear remarking upon the striking resemblance of this view of method and that of Bosanquet. According to Professor Loewenberg "everything depends upon whether the ultimate in cognition, whatever form it may take, it [*sic*] is to be viewed as the logical source of the ultimate in reality, or whether it is to be regarded as its logical offspring" (pp. 106–7). The acceptance of the former alternative, he thinks, lands us in a solipsism, from which escape "lies in the surrender of the cognitive and in the recognition of the ontological ultimate" (p. 109). But, following this lead, we are ushered into a skepticism concerning the reaches of knowledge. Thus "our choice in regard to the ultimate seems to come to this: either absolute knowledge, but knowledge of nothing more than the specious present, or else a transcendent reality, substantial and self-contained, but perennially shunning our close cognitive embraces" (p. 111). The disjunction here resulting from Professor Loewenberg's keen analysis may perhaps be allowed to stand; but it is by no means clear that the latter horn of the dilemma leads to any untoward skepticism unless one identify certainty with the sort of insight which, as Professor Adams clearly sees (pp. 152 ff.), is characteristic of reason in only one, and that perhaps the least significant, definition of it. The two other interpretations of reason brought out by Professor Adams' analysis are: the pursuit of continuity of structure, and the organization of the data of experience "so that our meanings and our nature are portrayed in the structures which we acknowledge as significant and as real" (p. 166). It is the last interpretation which to Professor Adams seems best to describe the method of philosophy, and in this he would appear to be on surer ground than is Professor Loewenberg.

In "The Philosophy of Nature in the Light of Contemporary

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Physics" Professor Lenzen undertakes to outline some of the factors determining the development of a new philosophy of nature. This development, he thinks, looks in the direction of the conception of statistical laws, the electrodynamic conception of nature, the discontinuity of natural processes, and the objectification of theoretical physics. One important point in connection with the theory of relativity, too frequently overlooked in discussions of its philosophical bearings, is the consideration that the theory of relativity "replaces the two absolutes of the classical theory by a single absolute, the space-time interval between point-events" (p. 45).

Professor Prall's discussion of "Metaphysics and Value" presents three fairly distinct theses which, one could wish, he had treated separately. They are: (*a*) that aesthetic value is to be described primarily in terms of a non-cognitive experience called by him "intuition"; (*b*) that all value is in last analysis aesthetic; and (*c*) that value is neither "objective" nor "subjective" but "synthetic" (that is, both). The last thesis, it may perhaps be allowed, follows from the other two; but I do not see that either of the first two is proved. There is doubtless a very real sense in which aesthetic experience is non-cognitive, but surely not in the sense that it excludes cognition or is not enriched by it. While we are engaged in cold analysis of the object we are not enjoying it as beautiful. The fact still remains, however, as Professor Prall himself admits (p. 129), that analysis may materially aid later enjoyment; and it seems quite probable that the actual enjoyment involves something strikingly like analysis. The only proof which Professor Prall offers of his second thesis seems to beg the question; certainly it does if I am correct in my feeling that the proof lies in the assumption that all value is reduced to "intuition"—I can make nothing of the distinction drawn in this connection between instrumental and intrinsic moral values (pp. 135 ff.).

In his closely packed Howison Lecture, Professor Lovejoy considers "The Discontinuities of Evolution." He narrows the issue to the question whether laws of nature relating to the movements of material things have evolved in an "emergent" sense. He argues keenly and at length in support of this hypothesis, maintaining that "when bodies or particles moving uniformly in a given manner reach certain novel 'junctures' . . . . they thereupon begin to move in accordance with new laws that are logically discontinuous with those which their motions previously exemplified" (p. 185). The "juncture" which Professor Lovejoy here presents as crucial is the appearance of human bodies.

G. WATTS CUNNINGHAM

UNIVERSITY OF TEXAS

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THE MORAL STANDARDS OF DEMOCRACY. By Henry Wilkes Wright. New York: D. Appleton & Co., 1925. Pp. ix+309.

This book will leave more than one reader with a touch of sadness because he cannot recommend it unreservedly. As an exposition of the general ethical ideal that democracy has come to stand for and of the more general standards by which social life is to be judged, the book is excellent. The center of the democratic aspiration is taken to be neither liberty nor equality, but fraternity. Democracy as an ideal envisages "a society of free persons in which the supreme moral values of *truth* and *power* and *beauty* are realized through processes of personal intercommunication." Human experience conceived thus as spiritual intercourse takes three forms: the sharing of ideas—*discussion;* the sharing of activity—*co-operation;* the sharing of emotion—*imaginative sympathy.* Political life illustrates the first; industrial life, the second; and "social" life, the third. The moral standards of democracy, derived from the foregoing ideal, are mutual understanding, co-operative endeavor, and intelligent sympathy.

But thus to state the ideal of democracy, however felicitously, is merely to restate the problems of democracy. Professor Wright is sensitive to, not to say nervous over, the increasing number of mere restatements; and he, not without overt apology for sterile idealism, proposes to do something more. The more which he actually succeeds in doing suffers, however, from the influence of a certain metaphysical background. He is indeed not without gestures toward the concrete; he does indeed particularize. Political activity, for example, can measure up to the moral ideal only through a more generously conceived and a more generally disseminated education; industrial activity, only through greater community of purpose, team play in method of organization, loyal devotion to existing organizations; and "social" life, through the sublimation of egoistic impulses by aesthetic means.

The book does thus represent an honest, if not highly effective, attempt on the part of historic idealism to come to terms with modern life and current thought in the interest of a better social order. Idealism meets behaviorism in the recognition that it is, respectively, the organs of speech, the free hands, and certain other concomitants of the upright posture that make possible the three types of sharable experience already mentioned. Men thus, in their behavior through specifiable organs of adaptation, contribute to, and partake of, a good that is genuinely common. But in spite of this fruitful observation it grows progressively more evident as one reads that the *rapprochement* with an organismic

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psychology is merely methodological. Behaviorism represents the behavior of mind, not mind itself. When the problem raised by the title of the book is squarely faced the standards *for* cannot be found *in* associated life except upon the daring, even if traditional, assumption that our poor human contacts possess a value that is at once "objective and absolute." Discarding in time the biological instruments through which they are born this sacred trinity of "Truth, Power, and Beauty" "come to be recognized as the supreme good for which natural existence and social organization afford but the means and occasions."

The dominance of this background would not alone vitiate, even for alien souls, the fine social fervor of the volume; nor perhaps would the doctrine of instincts, even though it be almost innocent of recent weighty criticism. But both these taken together and reinforced by a disinclination to come too closely to grips with current economic injustices greatly impair the availability of the book for social scientists who are not at the same time idealistic philosophers. A predisposition to emphasize rationality in social evolution makes it difficult for the author ever to champion the cause of just the empirical individual that social science wishes to deal with. In the event of conflict between individuals and institutions, the motto seems to be: choose both if possible; if impossible, choose the institution.

True, the author deprecates the inhumanity of industrialism; and yet he finds no adequate space in which to demand in the name of moral standards a redistribution of wealth or wages. A suggestion that industrial *esprit de corps* might be maintained by a wise use of every sort of prestige symbols—badges, medals, titles, cups, banners—except the substantial symbol of money, is likely to strike many a realist as ironical in a world where 2 per cent own more than 60 per cent of wealth. True, he is for democratic equality, but of the spiritual variety best described by the term "community." True, he pleads for justice to women, but to his mind "accumulating experience proves with increasing certainty that for the wife to undertake a separate career in industry, business, or profession is to create a division of interest in the family which prevents it from fulfilling its purpose as a co-operative enterprise." True, he is for democratic freedom, but interest in birth control would be wisely directed if spent in "combatting the *use* of such methods by our well-to-do classes, to the detriment of the social order to which they owe their wealth and their opportunities."

If it is true, as our author believes, that democracy rests upon the family, and further true that the family must remain essentially patriarchal, as he appears to prefer, then indeed must the outlook for democ-

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racy be somewhat gloomy, as he concludes. But may it not well be that a democracy that suffers from a decline of the traditional family should be made of juster, if not of sterner, stuff? It is not impossible for democratic trust to foresee a partial democracy and the patriarchal family decline together for the lasting good of men. And the realist might suggest, without a trace of irony, that the faith which enables our author to prescribe aesthetic surroundings as an adequate means for sublimating the sexual impulse until the late hour when civilization permits the ambitious to marry, that this mountain-moving faith might, with Christian nurture, grow to accept whatever domestic substitute the fitful generations find satisfactory to themselves. At any rate, where gloom is gratis, why not dispense optimism at cut rates?

T. V. SMITH

UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO

SHORTER NOTICES

SINS OF SCIENCE. By Scudder Klyce. Boston: Marshall Jones Co., 1925. Pp. 432.

Some three years ago, in *Universe,* Mr. Klyce undertook to indicate various fundamental errors in modern thought. Finding that "intellectuals," unlike worms, cannot grow new heads, he now addresses his message to the man in the street, brands as incompetent, scientists, philosophers, theologians, and teachers, and proposes to state the conservative principles that common men live by—contending among other things that Jesus is probably a myth and that immortality as survival of separate individuals is plainly illogical. Let us hope that Mr. Klyce is not a gregarious soul, for it seems certain that he is doomed to be a voice crying in the wilderness. This is not to say, however, that he does not deserve to be heard. As an observant mind outside of the academic tradition but by no means ignorant of recent developments in science and philosophy, he has many keen insights which should be interesting and valuable not to the common man but to the "intellectuals" whom he is criticizing.

His fundamental doctrine is that words are gestures indicating something that exists in the environment, that there are three types of words, and that the basic errors in thinking come from use of one type of word as another type of word. First, there are "one" words which point to the world as a continuous affair. Second, there are "many" words which discriminate parts of the continuous universe. Third, there are "relationship" words which indicate that the discriminated things are related. The whole of knowledge comes under the general form "The related many equals the one" and consists of discriminating aspects of the world and expressing the relations between the various aspects. Obviously, we never grasp the entire universe. Consequently we always use a "standard one" in place of the "one." It is just here that most of the errors of science and theology arise. If we are conscious that our finite knowledge is dealing with a selection and unification within an indefinite number of dynamically related things, and that for practical purposes we ignore for the time being the infinite regress of relations surrounding our object of knowledge, then our procedure is sound. But if we regard our standard one as an absolute one or universe, then we are talking nonsense. The assertion of absolute or

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exact electrons is an example of this error. A converse error is the use of our limiting concepts or "one" words as "many" words or discriminated aspects within the universe.

Mr. Klyce applies this fundamental logic, and a fair store of supplementary knowledge and analysis, to all branches of thought. Probably the worst fault of the book is the author's insistence that his formula, "the related many equals the one," is the key to the entire universe, as when he contends that value, life, religion, intoxication, love, are all examples of consciousness of the related many as equal to the one. There is much dogma and nonsense in the book but there is much keen thinking on important problems. Our reaction to some of his apparently foolhardy criticisms of scientists may be somewhat tempered by the discovery that in spite of a difference in vocabulary a large part of his philosophy of science seems to be in line with the trend of the doctrines expressed by Whitehead in his *Science and the Modern World.* (Compare, for instance, Klyce's criticism of the exact or absolute electron with Whitehead's criticism of the conception of endurance as "undifferentiated sameness throughout the life-history concerned.") And if we are struck by absurdities in the book, we may be sure that Klyce's absurdities stand out the more for not being enunciated by the occupant of a recognized niche in the intellectual world and for not being the absurdities to which we are accustomed.

C. M. PERRY

THE SOCIAL THEORY OF GEORG SIMMEL. By Nicholas J. Spykman. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1925. Pp. xvi+273.

Deploring the bewildering confusion of methods at present prevailing in the field of sociology, Mr. Spykman proposes with this study on Simmel to reopen a methodological discussion. Essentially an expository essay on Simmel's social theory, the book is in no sense a critical study. As such the volume may not be without some value in conveying to a larger circle of students the thought of a German philosopher whose pre-eminent importance among social theories lies in the fact that he detected and demolished the remaining survivals of mysticism and anthropomorphism which still attach to so much of contemporary study of society. Doubtless the most valuable portion of the volume is that which deals with Simmel's distinctions between sociology and the other social sciences. Simmel sought to erect a secure methodological basis for a science of sociology as distinct from social psychology, social philosophy, and the philosophy of history. He conceived of society, not as something concrete, but as the sum of interactions between individuals. Social philosophy and the concept of historical law thrive in altitudes fit for metaphysical speculation, but they can never be considered under the head of scientific law. Not that Simmel would exclude the historical method entirely from social studies. He rather desired an alternate employment of the historical method and the method which aims at general timeless laws. The historical investigation, at least so far as sociology is concerned, is a means to the end of arriving at the discovery of a general correlation which is the aim of science. There is point to Simmel's argument that during the nineteenth century social studies were too exclusively dominated by the historical viewpoint to develop a science of sociology. With Simmel, sociology, breaking the chain of its dependence on the historical dimension, becomes a special and limited science whose task is the study of what Spykman in an unhappy phrase calls the "forms of socialization," by which he means a social process, or a number of interacting processes. These "forms of socialization," says Simmel, are the legitimate province of the sociologist.

W. L. DORN

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NEW ASPECTS OF POLITICS. By Charles Edward Merriam. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1925. Pp. xvii+253.

Professor Merriam presents in this small volume an unusually clear-eyed inventory of contemporary political science—its problems and its techniques for meeting them. Conceiving the objectives of politics as "the elimination of waste in political action" and "the release of political possibilities in human nature," the author combs psychology, statistics, biology, eugenics, and geography for insight and guidance. For the present, psychology and statistics seem to be most promising aids to politics; for the future, eugenics and critical education bulk large. He returns again and again to the incompatibility between "jungle politics" and "laboratory science"; but while social guidance and control grow into a science, political prudence must be exploited to keep the already achieved control of nature out of the hands of medievalists.

Canvassing agencies of research, outlining promising problems of the moment, inviting co-operation from every quarter, Professor Merriam faces with reasoned optimism "a world of unceasing reorganization and adjustment." With education universalized, health bettered, leisure vastly increased, communication amazingly facilitated, eugenics advancing—the race imperatively needs men who know enough to govern it. Perhaps in no other volume available today can one find so clear a recognition in all its bearing of the dangerous lag between natural science and political acumen, or so foresighted a survey of the scientific possibilities and promises of wholehearted devotion to social research.

T. V. S.

FREE NEGRO HEADS OF FAMILIES IN THE UNITED STATES IN 1830. Pp. lvii+296. Price, $5.00. FREE NEGRO OWNERS OF SLAVES IN THE UNITED STATES IN 1830, TOGETHER WITH ABSENTEE OWNERSHIP OF SLAVES IN THE UNITED STATES IN 1830. Pp. viii+78. Price, $1.00. Both volumes by Carter Godwin Woodson. Washington: The Association for the Study of Negro Life and History, 1925 and 1924 respectively.

Both these volumes are statistical collections transcribed from the Census of 1830. They contain the names of the heads of families, with the age of the head and the number in the family, by states and counties. The former reveals something like a half-million free negroes in the United States in 1830, this being about one-seventh of all the colored population. The latter reveals more than two thousand free negroes owning, usually though not always for philanthropic reasons, more than seven thousand slaves. Introductions to the statistical tables of each volume have, particularly for the first-mentioned volume, valuable general analyses of the problem of the negro in America before the Civil War.

T. V. S.

THE TRAGEDY OF WASTE. By Stuart Chase. New York: The Macmillan Co., 1925. Pp. 296. Price, $2.50.

Written from a sympathetic appreciation of industrialism, this volume nevertheless constitutes a veritable indictment of modern capitalism. Starting from the favorably criticized assumption that though the world-war withdrew into non-productive work one-fourth of American man-power, the standard of living for both productive and non-productive workers during the war at least held its own, the author goes on to analyze under the concept of waste the whole productive and distributive processes of our day. Of the two things that can be wasted—man-power and natural resources—he feels that through idleness, manufacture of vicious or useless things, and bad technical methods in

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production and distribution, perhaps half the man-power of America counts for nothing on this basis of analysis. And in spite of the conservation movement, Mr. Stuart finds that the waste per year in coal is 750 million tons, in oil a billion barrels, and in other natural resources to match. "By and large, the pioneer and his methods remain the masters of the nation's ever declining store of natural resources." That all such figures describing waste represent estimates is, of course, clear, but one who follows his growing interest through the colossal mass of statistical data here presented is likely to feel that the estimates are not wild. There have been already too many estimates from conservative sources within industry itself for one to be able to go away unimpressed by this staggering summary of the case. The appeal of the book is popular, the style is brisk, but the method is careful. Mr. Stuart conceives the conditions described not as some gloomy eventuation, but rather as such a challenge to the ethical and industrial conscience as will prevent just this eventuation.

T. V. S.

LABOR RELATIONS IN INDUSTRY By Dwight Lowell Hoopingarner. Chicago and New York: A. W. Shaw Company, 1925. Pp. xvi+553. Price, $4.00.

Approaching the subject from the standpoint of "industry as a whole, of the state, and the relation of industry and the state to each other," our author proposes "to give a basis for developing a general point of view on labor relations," "to make an analysis of the major problems involved," "to indicate the major trend of development of policy and organization in the respective fields," and "to offer in each case constructive suggestions of a fundamental nature for the handling of administrative problems arising out of these relations." Though written from this general point of view, the book will be of primary interest to those who are closely connected with the management of industry. There is, however, constant insistence upon the human equation in every phase of industrial activity. Indeed, the author goes so far as to say that "the most practical thing that industry needs today is an industrial philosophy that is human, and, being human, is most efficient." The book closes with the optimistic assurance "that after all capital and labor have an ultimate community of interest transcending any momentary differences and that together, in one way or another, they very largely comprise the public whose rights are to be respected."

T. V. S.

THE RELIGION OF THE MANICHEES. By F. C. Burkitt. Cambridge: The University Press, 1925. Pp. 129. Price, 6s. net.

In March, A.D. 242 a young man of twenty-six known as Mani, began to announce a new religion in Ctesiphon. He was executed when he was about sixty; but his religion had spread over the Roman world and for about one thousand years there was some doubt whether the Manichean religion would not dominate what we now know as Christianity in the East of Europe. Dr. Burkitt's small book is an illuminating statement of the history and character of this old religion. The religion had its martyrs, but persecution in this case succeeded and now there are no Manicheans. The value of the theories they held, however, is undoubted, especially for those interested in moral philosophy. Dr. Burkitt has given us the latest results of scholarship; for the recent discoveries of fragments in Asia have added considerably to our meager knowledge of the teaching of Mani. The book is indispensable for any student of religion or of the history of morality. The central theory is that the religion of Mani was, in fact, a version of Christianity at least in part, and not an anti-Christian movement.

C. D. B.

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INTERNATIONAL LAW IN ANCIENT INDIA. By S. V. Viswanatha. New York: Longmans, Green & Co., 1925. Pp. x+214. Price, $3.75.

With interest aroused by the Occident's denial of international right in the Great War, our oriental author sets out to study the international law that prevailed down to A.D. 500 between nations inside what we call India. After a preliminary justification of the assumption that there were national units in early India and a consideration of the sources of international law in India, our author proceeds to a detailed exposition of what the rules actually provided during both peace and war. The study appears to be thorough and careful. Many of the footnotes are in Sanskrit, and there is a bibliography at the end.

T. V. S.

FRENCH PHILOSOPHIES OF THE ROMANTIC PERIOD. By George Boas. Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1925. Pp. xi+325. Price, $2.50.

The author here attempts "to study the philosophic background of one of the most interesting political and cultural periods in French history." He does not seek to criticize, but to describe; and he "has no moral purpose." The book is addressed "not only to students of philosophy but to students of civilization in general." The topics discussed are "the philosophical situations after the revolution," "the fortunes of ideology," "the neo-Christians," "the introduction of foreign thinkers," "the rise of eclecticism," and the "rise of positivism." Though the print is fine, the page is pleasing, and the volume is an attractive example of what the numerous university presses in America are doing in the way of book-making.

T. V. S.

INTELLIGENCE IN EXPRESSION. By Leone Vivante. Translated by Professor Brodrick Bullock, with a Foreword by Professor H. Wildon Carr. London: C. W. Daniel & Co. Pp. 205. Price, 10*s*. 6*d*. net.

This book, together with *Sopra la originalità del pensiero*, gives the main thesis of Dr. Vivante, an idealist of the school of Croce. The former book contains, besides the translation of the author's earlier work, a translation of the first section in the second book named above. Vivante's thesis is that consciousness, by which he appears to mean all the activities usually classed as mental, is original; and actual thoughts are not caused by other thoughts or by material conditions. The meaning of the phraseology is explained by metaphors drawn from the practice of the arts, chiefly poetry. Thus the most important element in Vivante's philosophy is perhaps not the conclusion but the nature of the evidence on which he relies and his use of that evidence. Metaphysics has been so long dominated by science and scientific metaphors that perhaps a new outlook may be obtained by reference to the arts. Vivante follows the idealist tradition in the use of the words "infinite" and "universal" and "concrete." There is very little reference to moral issues and moral ideals.

C. D. B.

AMERICA AND WORLD PEACE. By John H. Clarke. New York: Henry Holt & Co., 1925. Pp. vii+145. Price, $1.50.

We have here by a former Justice of the Supreme Court of the United States a frank plea for an enlarged co-operation upon the part of America in the existing agencies for world peace. The book is composed of the Colver lectures, at Brown University, for last year. They deal with the general American interest in world peace, with the high importance of the League of Nations as an agency to fulfil that interest, and with the Protocol for the Pacific Settlement of International Disputes as "a goal toward which all friends of world

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peace should strive." The lectures are frankly and earnestly apologetic for world peace and for the moral necessity of an enlarged American participation in all existing efforts toward it. The volume is very attractively bound.

T. V. S.

COMPARATIVE RELIGION AND THE RELIGION OF THE FUTURE. By Alfred W. Martin. New York: D. Appleton & Co., 1926. Pp. 121. Price, $1.50.

This small volume presents in very simple form what the author conceives to be the chief ideas in the great historical religions. An attempt is then made to indicate the ground common to all of them. What has been most common, perhaps, is the belief of each that it possesses unique authority. The religion of the future, entirely innocent of such an assumption regarding either itself or any other religion, will be free to inculcate the common ethical insights of all systems, religious and otherwise. Its doctrine of salvation will depend upon such grace as flows from the formula of Brunelleschi—"practice teaches what the next step to be taken shall be." What ought to be a truism to students of ethics, but is not, is here submitted to the popular reader.

T. V. S.

DETERMINISM IN EDUCATION. By William C. Bagley. Baltimore: Warwick & York, Inc., 1925. Pp. 194.

In this book the author brings together several papers previously published with certain papers of more recent investigations. It deals with the old problem of heredity *vs.* environment, as it relates to education, and is a presentation of Professor Bagley's side of the discussion which started with his paper on "Democracy and the I.Q.," read at the Chicago meeting of the Society of College Teachers of Education, in February, 1922. The discussion precipitated was vigorously carried on in the journals, chiefly with Professor Whipple and Professor Terman.

The author is concerned with that sort of determinism which he feels is assumed by the advocates of intelligence tests when they attempt to classify public-school pupils as having different amounts of "native" intelligence, and because of this classification, submit them to a differentiated training. Such a view, Professor Bagley believes, asserts that a child is by nature determined in intellectual status and his life pursuit. Opposed to this view, he does not accept the "I.Q." as a fixed, unchangeable index. The individual is responsive to various "pressures" brought upon him by the social and the school environment, and his intelligence is the index of this response. He contends that by education the facility of this response may be increased, and as a consequence, the I.Q. changed. Good education, by which he means good teaching, of the people universally, will result in a "balancing up" of the inequalities of intelligence found among pupils and people at large. The only determinism he will admit is that due to physiological structure, but even these differences in "native" intelligence, he believes, may be largely counteracted by systematic schooling.

The author believes there exists a close correlation between the level of education attained through universal education of the people of a nation and the relative freedom of the nation from "war, revolution, demagogy, despotism, degeneration"; and, that the influence of mass-education on "moral" controls of conduct (if it be of the proper quality and of sufficient quantity and extent) will bring a like freedom from moral evils. There is nothing in the native endowment of the individual, so Professor Bagley contends, that will prevent the attainment of democracy in all its forms of expression. The attainment is to be brought about by means of universal education, i.e., the provision of educational opportunity equally for all the people.

O. F. MYERS

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THE CONSCIENCE OF THE NEWSPAPER. By Leon Nelson Flint. New York: D. Appleton & Co., 1925. Pp. x+470.

Only in the broadest sense is this book on journalistic ethics. It is rather, as the author says, "an attempt to present American journalism as it is and as it seems destined to become if its finer possibilities are realized." The first part of the book deals with actual problems as they are presented to an editor. A generous selection of actual cases has been gathered through the co-operation of American editors. The problem is briefly presented, the editor's decision is given, and our author adds his comments upon the principle involved or upon the results of the decision. This section is highly concrete, and has an interest by no means confined to newspaper men and to students of ethics. The second part of the volume surveys journalism as it exists in America, summarizing the principles involved as they relate to the public. The third section is concerned with the trend in journalism as revealed in the analysis of our present press. Assessment is made in successive chapters of the influence of codes and professional standards, of the influence of law, of professional training, and of miscellaneous factors. An appendix contains all the codes in which associations of newspaper men have expressed the present standards for the conduct of the press. The case method is used wherever possible, and on problems that do not lend themselves to its use contrasting opinions are presented. In this way a balanced view is preserved upon problems that are too alive to be dogmatized upon.

T. V. S.

SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY: A Textbook for Students of Economics. By R. H. Thouless, lecturer in psychology in the University of Manchester. London: The University Tutorial Press, 1925. Pp. 376. Price, 5*s*. 6*d*.

This book is intended primarily as a textbook to be used for the examinations in London University for the B.Sc. (economics), and it is the very best kind of textbook, for it covers the ground and is very clearly and interestingly written. But it is more than a textbook. It is the sort of introduction to social psychology which will be most useful to the general public of readers and writers who ought to be acquainted nowadays with the recent extension of psychology in the study of social problems. The author gives a very good account of the generally accepted views of authorities. He is, of course, very much dependent upon McDougall's work. The theory of the instincts plays, as usual nowadays, the leading part in the analysis of social facts; but Mr. Thouless gives more weight than has recently been given to reason. The latter part of the book deals with morality, and this should be very useful to students of ethics; for our ethics tends to be still too greatly influenced by the obsolete terms and ideas of the Utilitarian period in psychology. Economic terminology also is criticized in part of Mr. Thouless' book, especially the terms connected with "diminishing returns."

C. D. B.

ETHICS IN THEORY AND APPLICATION. By Horatio W. Dresser. New York: Thomas Y. Crowell Co., 1925. Pp. xviii+509.

This book is a companion volume to the author's *Psychology in Theory and Application*. The reader's attention and interest are vigorously awakened by the opening words of the Preface in which the purpose of the work is explained. "Moral issues, always subject to change and calling for fresh estimates, have passed through an unusual upheaval since the outbreak of the World War, and the moral situation has enlarged in scope." Psychology especially and other recent practical tendencies have opened up new problems and

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new facts about human nature hitherto not understood, and these considerations challenge the attention of the ethicist. In short, ethics is on trial, and it can justify its fundamental place among the social sciences only by taking cognizance of these new facts and by grounding its theories in these facts instead of forcing them into ready-made abstractions. The book is addressed, moreover, to the general student of social problems, though it is primarily intended to serve the uses of college classes in ethics.

When the reader turns to the author's actual method of procedure, he finds the book conventionally divided into three parts, the first dealing with the basis of ethics, the second with goodness and freedom, and the third with the moral life; the first two being concerned with moral principles and the last with applications. A serious effort is made, how successful is debatable, to construct an ethical idealism which will preserve as far as possible metaphysical and religious values while at the same time safeguarding the scientific and empirical office of ethics. Most exceptional is the manner in which this double-edged purpose is carried out. Into the compass of a single volume is brought a massive array of quotations from most of the standard ethical works. In the large amount of agreement among ethicists as to fundamental principles the author finds hope for the solution of our social problems and for the commanding importance of ethics as a scientific technique. It is assumed, presumably, that general agreement as to principles assures the applicability of principles to fact. The eclectic comprehensiveness of the book, exhibiting an unusual command of ethical literature, and the painstaking fairness, on the whole, in giving diverse views a hearing fall short of their purpose because of the oppressive and disjointed effect of the machinery on the thought.

For the most part, the author steers a middle course apparently resolved to stress the importance of agreement on many fundamentals. The better course would be to hew to the line and let the chips fall where they may; the scientist is not concerned with the problem of agreement. In so far as the book follows a distinctive ethical principle, it argues the thesis of self-realization. Something ultimate and inner, not to be resolved into social relationships, is found in personality. Palmer's ideal of the ethical organism is given prominence. In this belief in the ultimate character of the self the reader will find a means of reconciling the presence of a chapter on "Ultimate Values" in Part III (these values being regarded as religious values) and the occasional references to the "eternal values" with the oft-repeated insistence that ethics is logically independent of religion and is concerned with the changing values of the social order. Incidentally, the reviewer was surprised to find on page 491 the statement "It is significant that some of these writers are still trying to be hedonists, in the face of the long array of arguments against it." Equally incredible in so recent a book is the statement on page 490 that the student of ethics "probably will not be satisfied with mere pragmatism, namely, the notion that an ethical conception suffices if it 'works' in application to this life as just now presented."

D. A. PIATT

HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY. By Alfred Weber (translated by Frank Thilly) with Philosophy since 1860 by Ralph Barton Perry. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1925. Pp. xiii+605.

Professor Perry in this new presentation of Weber's well-known *History of Philosophy* brings the account up to date, in a hundred and thirty added pages. This added treatment is grouped around the following topics: "Naturalism, Materialism, and Positivism," "Spiritualism and Idealism," "Vitalism, Voluntarism, and Pragmatism," and "The Revival of Realism." The American

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figures emphasized are: Royce, Howison, Bowné, and James. Teachers of philosophy will welcome this volume. It is of convenient size and is readable in spite of great condensation of subject matter. Notes and references furnish both suggestions for and guidance in further reading, and a very serviceable index completes the whole.

T. V. S.

MODERN IMMIGRATION. By Annie Marion MacLean. Philadelphia: J. B. Lippincott Co., 1925. Pp. xii+393.

This volume appears in the "Lippincott Sociological Series," edited by Edward Cary Hayes. It presents a view of the immigration problem at present from the points of view of the chief immigrant-receiving countries. Specifically it considers the United States, Canada, Australia, New Zealand, South Africa, Brazil, and Argentine Republic. In appendixes are presented complete texts of the United States immigration acts since 1917, together with naturalization laws and regulations.

T. V. S.

SPECULATIONS (Essays on Humanism and the Philosophy of Art.) By T. E. Hulme. New York: Harcourt, Brace & Co., 1924. Pp. xvi+267.

Hulme objects to the humanist attitude which has prevailed since the Renaissance. It postulates life as the source and measure of all values, and regards man as fundamentally good. He thinks the religious attitude is the right one, that man is radically imperfect, able to apprehend perfection, but not to incorporate it in himself. Perfection belongs to the plane of the non-human; human relations are blurred when perfection is introduced among them, and the real nature of ethical values is distorted by deriving them out of essentially subjective things like human desires and feelings. Humanism is an anthropomorphization of the world leading to an art founded on the pleasure to be drawn from vital forms. Since classical and modern art both have this basis we have looked upon them as art, regarding the arts of other periods as archaeology or ethnology. Hulme thinks it significant that we are just lately coming to understand these other arts, and asks if the change of sensibility in a region like aesthetics, a bypath in which we are, as it were, off our guard, may not be some indication that the humanist tradition is breaking up. Whereas our art has been based on "a happy pantheistic relation between man and the outside world," "the dead form of a pyramid and the suppression of life in a Byzantine mosaic show that behind these arts there must have been an impulse, the direct opposite of that which finds satisfaction in the naturalism of Greek and Renaissance art." It is the tendency to abstraction, based on the feeling of disharmony between man and nature, resulting in the creation of "a certain abstract geometrical shape, which, being durable and permanent shall be a refuge from the flux and impermanence of nature. . . . . In the reproduction of natural objects there is an attempt to purify them of their characteristically living qualities in order to make them necessary and immovable." Hulme is finally confirmed in his theory that the humanist tradition is breaking up by his observation in modern art of this tendency away from delight in vital forms toward the abstract and geometrical. The book is compiled from the papers which Hulme left behind him. There is a good essay on Bergson's theory of art. And there are the delightful notes for a personal philosophy in allegorical form, the essence of which is that the world has no unity. He says: "I shall call my philosophy the 'Valet to the Absolute.' The Absolute not a hero to his own valet."

V. M. AMES

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ALEXANDER, S. Art and the Material. Manchester: The University Press, 1925. Pp. 32. Price, 3*s.* net.

BAGLEY, WILLIAM C. Determinism in Education. Baltimore: Warwick & York, Inc., 1925. Pp. 193. Price, $2.20 plus 10c postage.

BOAS, GEORGE. French Philosophies of the Romantic Period. Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1925. Pp. xi+319. Price, $2.50.

BROAD, C. D. The Mind and Its Place in Nature. London: Kegan Paul, Trench, Trubner & Co., 1925. Pp. 674. Price, 16*s.* net.

BURDICK, JENNIE ELLIS (Editor). The Young Folks Bible. New York: The University Society, 1925. Pp. xxi+468. Price, $3.50.

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CHASE, STUART. The Tragedy of Waste. New York: The Macmillan Co., 1925. Pp. 296. Price, $2.50.

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MONTAGUE, W. P. The Ways of Knowing or the Methods of Philosophy. London: G. Allen & Unwin, Ltd., 1925. Pp. 427. Price, 16*s*. net.

NEEDHAM, JOSEPH. Science, Religion, and Reality. London: The Sheldon Press, 1925. Pp. 396. Price, 12*s*. 6*d*. net.

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Studies in the Problems of Norms. University of California Publications in Philosophy, Vol. VII. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1925. Pp. 206. Price, $3.00.

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NOTES

THE SIXTH INTERNATIONAL CONGRESS OF PHILOSOPHY TO BE HELD IN THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA AT HARVARD UNIVERSITY (SEPTEMBER 13–17, 1926)

First notice of the provisional program for the Sixth International Congress of Philosophy.

The following program has been adopted, subject to minor changes.

The attention of those who wish to offer papers is called especially to Section 4 in Divisions A, B, and C, designated as "open sections." A limited number of papers can be accepted also in Sections 1–3 in Divisions A–D. The titles and brief descriptions of voluntary papers should be submitted at an early date to the Chairman of the Program Committee (Professor Ralph Barton Perry, 447 Widener Library, Cambridge, Massachusetts, U.S.A.). Abstracts (not to exceed 300 words) of accepted papers should be sent to the same address not later than May 1. The time limit for sectional papers is twenty minutes. All papers must be presented at the Congress by their authors in person.

A. SCHEDULE

Monday evening, September 13: Opening Meeting. Brief addresses of welcome. Reply by a representative of the foreign delegates. Presentation of foreign delegates. Informal smoker.

Tuesday, Wednesday, Thursday, and Friday, September 14–17, Mornings, 9:30–12:30: Simultaneous section meetings in all four divisions.

Tuesday afternoon: Excursion.

Tuesday evening: General session, Division A.

Wednesday afternoon: General session, Division D.

Wednesday evening: No session.

Thursday afternoon: Business meeting.

Thursday evening: General session, Division C.

Friday afternoon: General session, Division B.

Friday evening: Dinner or reception.

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B. SESSIONS

Division A: Metaphysics. (Philosophy of Nature. Philosophy of Mind, Philosophy of Religion)

I. General session: The hypothesis of emergent evolution, its meaning, and the present state of the argument concerning it

II. Sections

1. Physics and metaphysics with special reference to the problem of time
2. Philosophy of religion with special reference to mysticism in East and West
3. Philosophy of mind, with special reference to the nature of community between minds
4. Open Session. Suggested topics, Relation of Biology and Metaphysics, Realism and Idealism, Value and Existence, Concept of Personality

Division B: Logic, Epistemology, and Philosophy of Science

I. General Session: Continuity and discontinuity among the sciences

II. Sections

1. The status and relations of sensa and scientific objects
2. The doctrine of subsistence and essence in current logic and epistemology
3. The bearing of the distinction of judgments of value and judgments of existence upon logic and epistemology
4. Open Session: Suggested topics: Synthetic Judgments a priori; Memory, Its Significance for Epistemology; Logic of Probability and Theory of Induction

Division C: Ethics and Theory of Value, Social Philosophy, Aesthetics

I. General session: Philosophy and international relations

II. Sections

1. The basis of objective judgments in ethics
2. Aesthetics
3. The philosophy of law
4. Open session: Suggested topics, Philosophy of History, Political Philosophy, Philosophy of Education

Division D: History of Philosophy

I. General session: The rôle of philosophy in the history of civilization

II. Sections

1. Ancient philosophy. The Socratic and Platonic elements in the doctrines of Plato's *Dialogues* (or some similar issue)
2. Medieval philosophy. Vitalism and mechanism in medieval philosophy

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3. Modern philosophy. Neo-Scholasticism—a discussion of the value of scholastic philosophy in terms of the present. Kant. Latest researches in Spinoza. Pascal or Descartes
4. Contemporary philosophy: Reports on contemporary tendencies

For the Program Committee,

RALPH BARTON PERRY,
Chairman

Questions concerning the Congress on matters other than the program may be addressed to Professor John J. Coss, corresponding secretary, Columbia University, New York City.

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THE INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF ETHICS

Volume XXXVI JULY 1926 Number 4

RELIGION AND EXPERIMENTATION[1]

GUY ALLAN TAWNEY

The age of the writing prophets of Israel is also the age of Confucius and Laotsze, Gautama and Zoroaster, Thales and Aristotle. In that age modern history began, and in that age no animosity existed between true philosophy and true religion. The great intellectual experiments of the founders of modern institutions were conducted for the most part in the name of both the gods and men. In Plato, philosophy and reverential conversation with eternal ideas are synonymous, and he asks, "Can a man help imitating that with which he holds reverential converse?" The philosopher-rulers of *The Republic,* who busy themselves with making and remaking the constitution "until they have made the ways of men, as far as possible, agreeable to the ways of God," are first of all worshipers. In this age that, more than any other, witnessed the transition from ancient to modern times, philosophical conceptions and religious beliefs mingled and fused with natural freedom. There was self-conscious opposition between the false and the true, and even between conservatives and progressives, but there was no self-conscious opposition between religion and philosophy. The Greek dualism of nature and supernature, the Greek doctrine of the Logos, the Platonic idea of immortality, and the conception of a Pleroma, for ex-

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ample, were taken up by the apostles and used as vehicles for conveying the teachings of Jesus without the slightest consciousness that they were man-made and worldly. The narrowly nationalistic message of Judaism did not become a world-message until touched by the spirit of Greek philosophy during the great synthesis that followed the Greek and Roman conquests. And when the Christian movement at last became self-conscious it was thought of by both Christians and non-Christians as a rival of Stoicism, Scepticism, Manichaeism, neo-Platonism, Gnosticism, and other religio-philosophical movements of the time. Indeed, the cordial unity of religion and philosophy in which Christianity was born continued far into the Middle Ages. Plato's distinction between knowledge and opinion, the Hindu distinction between *vidya* and *avidya,* and the Gnostic distinction between faith and knowledge were both intrareligious and intraphilosophical. In the Middle Ages the confession of one churchman, *Credo ut intellegam,* was answered by other churchmen, *Intelligo ut credam.*

How all this has changed since about the year 1200 A.D.! With the ecclesiastical reorganization of Europe out of the crumbling political machinery of the Roman Empire, and with the multiplication of church councils, the intellectual climate of the Western World changed. The fathers of the church elaborated a theology around the conceptions of Christian philosophy and the decrees of church councils. A comprehensive and powerful church polity was modeled after the government of Rome. A religious ritual that touched every hour of the day from the cradle to the grave, and far beyond the grave, appeared. The civilization of Europe was definitely founded on a supernatural basis. Temporal princes became the military and political agents of the papal see. Faith was consciously opposed to reason; a will-to-believe of non-rational sort, a will-to-believe from which experimental reconstructions and verifications were almost completely absent, was in-

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sisted upon. The scholastics did not doubt that they held in their hands the intellectual instruments for constructing a perfect and final world-order based on the dualism of nature and supernature. By the thirteenth century nearly all the leaders of Arabian, Jewish, and Christian thought distinguished between rational and supra-rational truths, while some went so far as to maintain that what is true in theology can be false in philosophy and what is true in philosophy can be false in theology. The idea was promulgated that the church universal, seated deep in the foreordination of eternal ideas, never changes. The church universal was absolute: the predestined body of Christ and the instrument of the salvation of men. If any man would be saved it was before all things necessary that he become a member of the Catholic church.

Then came Humanism, with its enthusiastic interest in ancient literature, its translations, its manuscript collections, and its literary imitations of ancient dialogues and meters. It swept like a conflagration over Europe, filling every lonely scholar's heart with fiery enthusiasms. The hope of a new age of productivity in literature, art, and philosophy was in it. Church officials, even some of the popes, were early leaders of it, and practically all the humanists were churchmen of one rank or another. But the movement revived the ancient leadership of philosophy in intellectual matters and developed a tendency to run out of bounds by questioning the metaphysical status of universals, the creation of the world, the trinity, and the immortality of the individual soul. The reading of Aristotle's *Physics* was prohibited in 1209, and the *Metaphysics*, a few years later. And then, when the teachings of the original Aristotle came to be better understood, about 1230, he was spoken of as *praecursor Christi in naturalibus*, as John the Baptist was *praecursor Christi in gratuitis*. Natural theology was recognized as distinct from revealed theology and, about 1250, lectures on philosophy apart from those

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on theology were permitted in Paris. But every effort was made to control both the teaching and the practice of philosophy. To that end Aristotle was made an authority of the church. In St. Thomas' colossal synthesis theology appears as the queen of the sciences, the capstone of human learning. The method of the special sciences of nature was described as empirical, in the profound belief that true science and religious truths revealed through the church and its Scripture could not conflict.

Aristotle's *Physics,* with its predominantly organic conceptions of nature, had practically become a part of the authoritative creed of the church when the new mechanical conception of nature, with its emphasis on the mathematics of empirical procedure, began to take shape in Italy. The Pythagorean astronomy, with its heoliocentric world-order, was quietly revived and taught to the young men of Europe who came to Italy to complete their education. Galileo unostentatiously climbed the steps of the leaning tower to discredit the Aristotelean law of falling bodies. In 1623 appeared his *Il Saggiatori,* boldly distinguishing between the primary and secondary properties of things, and laying the foundations of modern physics in the space-time properties of things. Copernicus, still a prebend of Frauenburg Cathedral, returned home to Poland to apply the mechanical principles of the Pythagorean astronomy to the real and apparent motions of heavenly bodies. Kepler undertook to show that mathematical relations exist among the motions of the planets and their satellites such as to produce a harmony of the spheres heard only by the sentient soul of the sun. Vesalius and Harvey and Gilbert and Newton prepared a new anatomy, a new physiology, a new physics. The triumphs of nominalism in logic and of individualism in social philosophy sealed the doom of Dominican realism that still dominated the church. A new intellectual technique thus quietly, almost secretly, developed within

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the very cloisters of the church, and was practiced by men who knelt at her altars; and the church, or her most trusted representatives at least, scoffed and pitied and condemned. They thought they saw her ancient creed being flouted, her spiritual hegemony being superseded, her solemn ritual of other-worldliness becoming *passé;* and that within her own walls and in the hearts of her own children. The progressive and conservative parties within her leadership naturally joined issues, and unspeakably tragic conflict ensued.

Might the church have revised her creed, reorganized her polity, and reconstructed her ritual so as to keep the life of Europe moving within them? Granting that the church triumphant, the transcendental church of our dreams, never changes, is it possible that the church militant might have abandoned her old armor when gun-powder was invented? Is it possible that she might have emphasized salvation by faith with the reformers, accepted the Copernican astronomy and Newtonian physics, and still kept her faith in herself, while steadily ministering to the human need of encouragement and self-respect? The Elizabethan literature would have shone brightly in her crown. The Scholastic emphasis upon the dignity and abiding worth of the individual person that produced the Age of Chivalry was now producing an age of political and social democracy; and those bloody revolutions—might they have been mitigated, or wholly averted, if the church had moved with the spirit of the time and sought to effect by peaceful means the ends of revolution and reform? Ah no! The hairy beast in human nature would not have permitted it. The vested interests, the love of privilege in the hearts of those in power, the natural conservatism of ignorance and stupidity, the ponderous inertia of established custom would all have been opposed. In the light of history and the little we know of human nature we are bound to say that such a course on the part of the church would have been miraculous. And

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yet, is religion, rather than the hairy beast, to be blamed for the rupture? Is not religion rather to be praised for all the wonder and worship and enthusiasm that carried Europe out of the ages of bondage and into the age of self-conscious freedom?

The coming of Protestantism did not materially change the attitude of the church toward science and philosophy. The leaders of the Reformation, such as Luther, Melanchthon, and Calvin, condemned Copernicus and his followers along with witches and black magic. The new learning was to them simply another head of the many-headed monster of ignorance and vanity. Some men like to indulge in such exhibitions of their ingenuity, but it is perverse of them to ignore the plain teaching of the Bible that the earth is still. A man's chief end is to glorify his Maker, not to glorify himself. The supernatural world-basis of Scholasticism, its great body of metaphysical formulas, the ideal of a civilization relating the individual through Christ to God, were taken over by the Protestant churches. Especially in the minds of Swiss reformers these conceptions were so phrased as to provide a metaphysical basis and divine sanction for civil liberty and liberty in the field of church polities and rituals; but the lines were drawn against experimentation in the field of philosophy and science. Toward the latter the Protestant churches have been as timid, as suspicious, and as patronizing as the church universal was. Having placed an authoritative Scripture that admits of diverging interpretations in the arbitral position of the authoritative church of the Middle Ages, Protestantism has been even less clear and confident in its attitude toward new developments in science than Catholicism. Indeed, it is inherent in the logic of absolutism that experimentation should be regarded as a more or less reprehensible weakness. And this means that science, literature, classicism, and philosophy have been alternately used by representatives of the churches as

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materials of propagation and condemned as species of vain and wanton worldliness.

The spiritual forces of society were thus divided. The authoritative exposition and promotion of what purport to be the ultimate ends of life were separated from self-conscious organized adventure in the promotion of life here and now. Great groups of men and women in whom wonder and worship and service are most vivid and vital walk in ways unsanctioned by the traditional sponsors of religion. And thus it happens that the medieval conflict between the liberal and conservative parties within the church has become in our own day a conflict between the liberal and the conservative forces in the spiritual life of the world. There are minds, both within and without the churches, for whom self-conscious adventure in the creation of values, whether in the name of art or politics or science or morality, is extra-religious, if not anti-religious. There are minds for whom the conservation of the real interests of man is possible only by closing the eyes to the problems of life here and now; and there are minds for whom the only alternative to metaphysical pessimism is preoccupation with a life to come and a world beyond. Such hold it to be the business of churches to specialize in what they call "religion," leaving science, and business, and art, and industry strictly to themselves.

Such conceptions of the function of the church would limit it to a special interest in the final destinies of men, in complete abstraction from the means of realizing such destinies; salvation is of faith, not of works; and doubtless many churchmen —priests and lay members—are trying so to limit it. We hear from them not infrequently of a synthetic body of theological postulates and deductions as recondite and self-containing as any branch of mathematics. In sermon and catechism they make infrequent reference to science and philosophy for the purpose of censoring them. They preach salvation from an

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abstract principle of evil called sin; they preach salvation by faith and loyalty to the church; they preach salvation to a life of blessedness in the great beyond. They sing of the beauty of absolute beauty, the power of unlimited power, the beneficence of infinite love. All history, they hold, is either a preparation for the introduction of Christianity into the world or a method of establishing and maintaining the Christian church. Life is filled with mysteries, but it is sinful to be very much disturbed by them. Philosophy, from which many of the metaphysical and methodological conceptions of theology were originally drawn, is criticized without friendliness. For the most part the churches of our own country are as unable to assimilate to their creedal standards and forms of worship the spiritual heroism of modern life as was the church of the sixteenth century. In this respect we Americans still live in the Renaissance.

There is probably no self-conscious body of men and women, no community, in the modern world where reverence and honesty and the spirit of loyal service are more pervasive than in the community of scientists; and yet the church is reserved, suspicious, often hostile to it. We do not here deplore the recurring tendency of zealous churchmen to criticize the methods and results of experimental research—that is a tendency that no man of science objects to in competent critics—but rather the general lack of sympathy and understanding between the church and the academy. It is not the readiness of each to instruct the other, or even the fact that this trait is much more evident in churchmen than in men of science, that we would note, but rather the fact that there is no common ground of friendship on which the good wills of the two groups can interpenetrate and reinforce each other.

Meanwhile, let us note an obdurate fact. The destinies of men, the ultimate ends of life—values, ideals, and norms—cannot be so defined as to function effectively in the control of

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action without taking the media of their realization into consideration. Ends in abstraction from the means necessary to their realization are highly recondite principles, such as the good, the wise, and the beautiful. Principles are indispensable instruments of analysis, points of view from which to attack situations with which one has to deal; and it is something to have named them and so to have made them self-conscious. But if they are the utmost of our accomplishment, if they represent the substance of our good intentions, then our good intentions are assuredly good for very little that is significant for life generally. Ends and the means of their realization cannot be defined apart from each other: it is a treacherous abstraction. The abstract definition of a principle, prior to, and apart from, its application to the concrete situations covered by it, is purely speculative and mathematical. The abstract singular noun, "goodness," and the concrete singular totality, "the good," are alike definable only denotatively, if at all.

Religion is concerned with such conceptions. Whatever else it may be, it is a consciousness that those singular totalities—the Just, the Good, the Beautiful—are and are real. To believe that problems are solvable, that obstacles can be overcome, that the world is compatible with beauty and joy, and to live accordingly is the very substance of vital religion. Such faith is evident in all wise, courageous, and creative persons. Without ostentation and without despair such persons contrive to live in an ideal world that, in spite of everything, in spite even of themselves, is good and beautiful. Wholesomeness, health, and happiness are in the atmosphere of their world, and beyond the blackest night that ever broods over it are stars.

Such living, however, is not possible without deliberate effort. Such personality is a rôle of the great drama of life, deliberately selected and played. Few if any individuals are

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born under such benevolent stars as to live thus without self-conscious effort on their own part so to live. The choice involved is not egotistical; the rôle is not within the self, but without it. It is there objectively, there as a possibility, there to be played; and the individual's self-consciousness functions in it only as he deliberately identifies himself with it and so makes it his rôle. Hearts made sore by many wars find new strength in the reflection, "There *is* peace!" Eyes grown dim with gazing at the pilot stars brighten again with the thought, "There *are* stars!—and this my blindness is not essential either to me or to the universe!" *Über allen Gipfeln ist Ruh!* Such is the form of religious experience; and since a definition will prove helpful: Religion is thoroughly self-conscious participation in a great life that is the very substance of values.

When we confront any problem, the first step in reflective action is one of analysis for the purpose of ascertaining what are the indubitable facts and what the imagined meanings of the situation; and whenever the problem happens to concern the self in any way, whenever the problematic situation contains the self among its data, the self becomes a control in the further moments of the reflective act. There is one way in which the self and the self-thought are involved in all problems, problematic situations, and reflective acts, namely, as a point of reference and presupposition of them. Neither facts nor meanings exist except to a self that is assumed to be distinct from them and related to them. Mere acquaintance with facts and meanings is not enough: knowledge about them is necessary and that is possible only to a self that distinguishes itself from its problem. Back of all scientific thinking is a more or less explicit self-consciousness of the thinker, and not infrequently the success of one's thinking depends on the clearness of one's consciousness of his own "personal equation," i.e., of one's self.

But there is another class of problems than those dealt

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with scientifically, problems in which self-consciousness is less specific and fragmentary, problems in which the self is consciously one of the data of the problem itself. I refer to problems in value and valuation. Is the Wagnerian opera worth while? And is it more worth while than the opera of Mozart or Bizet? Is the *Ninth Symphony* the greatest of musical compositions? Any answer depends on the self-reference of the consciousness of the music. That is, it depends on the extent to which the listener succeeds in finding himself in the music, so that he consciously loses consciousness of himself in his consciousness of the music.

But the part played by the self in a problematic situation is greatest in reflective religious experience, for in the religious problem the Whence and the What and the Whither of the self are precisely at issue. I believe there is no strictly intellectual or scientific way of considering such a problem. The purely scientific treatment of such a problem is anthropological or psychological or biological or—and so forth—it is not religious. The religious question relates precisely to the self constituted by the present consciousness of itself, and self felt, if you please, as either happy or miserable, as in harmony or discord with its world. Here it is not the personal equation that is important, but the self as a whole, including its relations to the physical and social not-self of which it is a part. As a whole the self is beautiful or hideous, good or bad, happy or unhappy, and this is religious consciousness. In the religious consciousness one reacts to the self as an object.

It follows that the method of religious living is worshipful experimentation, the deliberate cultivation by the individual, in himself and his community, of a sense for, and an experience of, value, a will to build up and conserve boundless respect for values in general and at the same time to promote sane judgments as to differences of value in objects. To be religious is to be thoroughly conscious of being willy-nilly a

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being of ends and purposes. Everyone is religious who goes out, not knowing whither he goes, seeking a city that hath foundations whose builder and maker is God. And let no one hesitate to affirm that in relation to each particular creative task God is fixed and complete. No one accomplishes anything by aiming at value in general. Practical effectiveness in the creation of values depends upon clear and distinct ideas of the end in view. So far as the task of the present hour is concerned there must be no vagueness in the controls of procedure. All absolutes are practical, as Ames has shown before this very body, their absoluteness being itself, consciously and for practical purposes, decreed.

On the other hand, so far as the great life is concerned, it must be said that it is not a *totum simul* of all values. On the contrary, it is a life, an activity, a procedure. Literally speaking, a *totum simul* of all values is a self-contradictory expression; and yet, so far as any particular creative task is concerned, the values contemplated must be clear and definite if effort is to be fruitful. The particular practicalism of the Scholastic church is closely related to the absoluteness of the supernatural world-order it affirmed. Only a supernatural and supra-rational world-order could appeal to all races and conditions of men; and a certain unanimity of beliefs and sentiments is necessary if men are to sympathize with and understand one another, if they are to co-operate with one another in the presence of a common enemy. Since the thirteenth century a comparatively small, defeated, and impoverished white race, driven by Mongul and Turk out onto the European peninsula extending into the Atlantic has contrived to dominate the globe; and can anyone, in the light of that achievement, doubt the relative efficacy of the world-view and life-program it then heroically constructed, propagated, and lived?

In so far as worship is a conscious and deliberate identification of one's self with a certain rôle in the drama of life,

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worship is a mystical experience; and since this is true a certain mystical moment is involved in every effectively constructive activity. In so far as it involves a careful examination of the meanings of persons, institutions, customs, and cosmic phenomena it is an intellectual experience; and every demand for exactness, system, and completeness in the analysis of the given is comprehended in it. It is a moral experience in so far as it tends to suspend the urge of habits and inspires an effort to create a chosen future out of a given present. There can be no question as to the fact that genuine worship thus tends to emancipate and empower the worshiper. It is essentially a will to create; and it never doubts that ends can be achieved, that the tasks life imposes life can fulfil, that *in rerum natura* the problems of today can be solved tomorrow. It is the suspension of judgment so indispensable in research, it is the objectivity of effective planning and resolving, it is the self-reliance of all courageous decision and perseverance, it is the σοφία of all virtues. Worship is like a breathing spell in a long and arduous foot race, or the hour of roll call in a prolonged and hard-fought battle: it is the will-to-values defining itself and, by its clear self-consciousness, multiplying its effectiveness. As a self-conscious adventure in the creation of values, as an experience of discovery, invention, or sheer patient industry, religion is essentially experimental and essentially demanded of life. Wherever life is concerned the cessation of growth is the beginning of decay: the mere conservation of value, in the sense of its mere preservation, is quite impossible. The only effective conservation of value lies in its conservative reconstruction. From a methodological point of view every thoroughly self-conscious adventure in the creation of value involves an act of worship directed to the great life which is value as a living, vivid reality.

Rituals, liturgies, and confessionals at their best render religious worship sane, impressive, and beautiful. Symbols

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play as large a part in it as in any other reflective experience in which many unite in a common task, but probably no larger part. Man is par excellence an imitating, suggestible animal. We who study philosophy are subject to the illusion that he is a rational animal. Fully nine-tenths of all the human individual is and does is customary, unreflective, and neither rational nor irrational. The imagination of the average person lacks the power to think straight and avoid dupery; and a little reflection is a dangerous thing. Especially in the field of religion, a little reflection not supplemented by a large amount of wise suggestion is a dangerous thing. And then, even the strongest imaginations are often helped by appropriate symbol and ritual, and a man's conviction gains enormously in the midst of worshiping multitudes.

The recall and recital of historical persons and their acts, the heroes and great events in the spiritual career of man, even cosmologies and ontologies help to portray the worshipful life, clothe it in august beauty, and illuminate the problem of the hour. The natural importance of religion in life necessitates an organization devoted to the education of people in worship; and it may be that the definite separation of ecclesiastical from vital religion that occurred during the renaissances of the Middle Ages was simply one more step in the reflective differentiation and specialization in values that has been going on steadily throughout the period of recorded history. It may be that in the end the spiritual life will prove the gainer therefrom. I, for one, sincerely wish and almost hope it will be so. The function of worship is important enough—indeed it is altogether indispensable to sane and wholesome living—it is important enough in life to warrant the erection of classical temples and Gothic cathedrals. It is indeed so important that one finds one's self sometimes wondering how any of us can afford to do anything but educate ourselves in this art. Indeed, in the deepest sense of the word all educa-

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tion misses its proper goal that does not develop the fine art of worshipful experimentation in persons.

But rituals, liturgies, and cosmologies, these means of promoting worshipful life easily become ends in themselves; they tend to foster the thought that they are religion and the only religion. Then they function as empty forms that rather defeat than promote spirituality. Then they tend to foster a sort of departmentalization of life such that their zealot can feel very devout at times and yet meet the actual problems of life with a steady bovine stare. How often the fine enthusiasm of young men and women for whatsoever things are true and honest and lovely degenerates into a merely partisan enthusiasm for an institution, a cosmology, or a ritual. How often the very media that ought to foster the brave, wondering spirit of childhood sear the souls of men and women with senility or encourage a morbid sentimentalism in them.

Indeed, there is but one way in which the church can avoid this result, and that is by reviving and promoting the original form of religion as a life of adventure in the conservation and expansion of values. The question of which ritual, creed, and ecclesiastical polity is best depends upon such personal traits as taste, intelligence, and responsiveness to the appeal of value, and upon such circumstances as the occupations, the home life, and political institutions of the community. The question which church is best can be answered only in the light of experience, and that is to say in the light of experiment. That one is best in the end that most effectively empowers people to perceive and realize the great life. Not all the dialectics in the world can absolve a church of that acid test. It works slowly through the centuries, but it is as much a law of nature as is the self-consciousness of life itself.

When the historian of the future describes the life of the present he will no doubt mention two things as distinctive of it. These are crowds and machines. The ceaseless ferment of

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the cities and the ever increasing burden of machinery with which civilization is loading itself have created an array of relatively new problems such as never confronted any other age in the same numbers and perplexity. We do not fear spiritual suppression by Persians or Mohammedans; we Americans do not fear as much as we should the contempt of Europe and the Far East; but we do fear the personal losses that tomorrow's shift of circumstance may entail; we do fear what the newspapers may say about us; we have some reason to fear the crowds. Men do not now fear condemnation in a life to come so much as they fear poverty and social neglect here and now. Can the ideals of a civilization founded in a supernatural world-order and devoted to the task of saving individual souls from hell solve the problems of the time? In place of relative economic security has come widespread economic precariousness; in place of simple instruments of production, understood by everybody, have come complicated systems of machinery requiring highly technical knowledge; in place of small family groups and small towns widely scattered have come great masses of humanity that tremble at a rumor and passionately huddle together like sheep in a storm. Are these traditions of serene contemplation, individual detachment, and boundless respect for personality the keys that will yet unlock the gates of progress for us? Nearly all the charm of people is lost today in the breathlessness of hurry and the irritation of haste. Can the concepts of leisure and meditation and chivalry restore us?

Let us put the question another way. Suppose we say of Scholastic philosophy what James said of Herbert Spencer's philosophy, that it resembles nothing so much as a rickety Adirondack shack knocked together out of cracked hemlock boards; are we ready, is the world ready, to turn away from it and pass on? Our customs and institutions are grounded in it; even our sciences and philosophies, as to their problems

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and methods at least, are largely prefigured in it, and millions of men and women have today no other spiritual temple. It founded our schools and universities; it bequeathed to us, recut and reset, the precious jewels of ancient Judea and Greece and Rome; it armed the white warrior who is conquering the world for intelligence and industry and spiritual achievement; it largely motivated the discoveries of science and the invention of machines. What shall we say then? Is it to be, nevertheless, put aside?

The thing is inconceivable; and yet, unless churchmen can more cordially experiment, more reverently adventure, in the future than in the immediate past, the church's contribution to the civilization of the future will be far less than its Lord would have it be. About the year 1250 the dominant religious institution of Europe consciously and resolutely abandoned the method of worshipful experimentation in the pursuit of values. Brave, wondering hearts that continued to follow that method were officially denounced. With the result that the religious life of Europe and America has ever since been divided, discordant, and disturbed by internal discrepancy. The state became what the church had been: the chief organ of civilization. The family and the school ceased to exist under her solitary control. Philosophy became suspect, and science, hostile to "religion." Today even the social worker feels himself a stranger and an alien in the church. The clashes of spirit have become so distressing to large numbers of those consciously devoted to the life of worshipful adventure in the creation of values that, in the interest of both their own and the social peace, they withdraw from both pulpit and pew.

Experimental method in religion seeks first of all to prevent the incrustation of reflective experience by creed and ritual. It stands ready to keep these in the relation of means to the end of religious education and achievement. It stands ready to modify them to meet the needs of life, and that is to

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say, to meet the discoveries of religiously minded investigators and thinkers as well as the inventions of industrialists and the congestion of crowds. Experimental method in religion, as everywhere else, is procedure under the control of ideas for the purpose of testing them, and with the deliberate intention of reconstructing them in the light of results. The claim that any given creed or ritual is absolute is utterly at variance with that method. Consequently, the religious leader, like every other person, must be a mystic, accustomed to adventure in identifying himself with the spirit of value; but he must know the natural limitations of mysticism in the spiritual life. He must be trained in science and history, acquainted with the universal life of man. Wherever the life of man moves toward the city that hath foundations the religious leader must be engaged as to his sympathies and his understanding.

In the light of that ideal how sadly patronizing and even hostile his actual interest in the creative life often appears to be! Young men preparing for the ministry usually abjure the rigorous studies that might acquaint them with the teeming life of the world. They dawdle and daddle through their courses. They think of reason as suspected, of philosophy as condemned, of wisdom as the pride of man in his own achievements. Later they preach to congregations obsessed with the value of science and its applications to life and wonder that they find their hearers preoccupied and cold. Is it any wonder that they are compelled to resort to emotional appeals and crowd psychology to impress or move them? The lack of sympathy and understanding between the church and the academy in the presence of social problems demanding the utmost possible unity of effort is sadly deplorable; but the active antagonism between them, such that an honest teacher of science cannot hold a position in some schools, and an honest preacher can make no effective appeal to many of the most intelligent members of his community, is simply stupid. The

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waste of economic resources should give us pause, if no more spiritual losses concern us. But the matter is more serious than that. A literal reign of terror exists on the streets of many cities. Among its deeper causes is the lack of effective co-operation between the churches and the other spiritual agencies of society. The appeal to force alone to stop it, so long as divided worship continues, is as futile as the command of the fabled king who, after moving his throne to the shore to give solemnity to the farce, ordered the waves of the sea to be still. Community life cannot get on without religion, and the discordant councils of the religiously minded today provide both opportunity and encouragement to the destructive impulsiveness of human nature.

Should it now be asked whether the worshipful life here described is not itself an overemphasis on the end of endeavor in abstraction from the means of accomplishment, the question should cause us to pause. Is it not simply the religion of other-worldliness in slightly modified phrases? The charge is made against American idealism in general, that when we have formulated the abstract principles of procedure we, as a nation, are wont to feel that our task is fulfilled. The charge reminds us of a very wise saying: "Those who can, do; those who cannot, teach." Are we Americans a nation of teachers—and preachers? There are those abroad who do not hesitate to say so. The charge may not be just, but it is significant that it should be made; and there are those who trace this national character to the very worship of precepts and principles we would here deplore. The preliminary task of abstractly defining our end having been performed, we sometimes revert to our ancient partisanships, our organized habitual procedures, and start a mortal controversy over the first actual steps toward achievement. We agree "in principle"; we believe that it is good to pursue the Good, but with that concession our capacities of effective co-operation seem too often to be

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exhausted. We are still in the Renaissance, we Americans who ride in airships and talk to our neighbors half-way round the world. Now, as then, those who can experiment find themselves confronted by an organized and self-conscious majority who at best only teach.

It is precisely the graveness of this criticism upon American idealism that the experimental method in religion meets and refutes. Not the other-worldliness of abstract mathematical postulates, but actual concrete values are its ends. It holds that the Great Community can be, and must be, promoted here and now; that in that community every man consciously aims so to live as to help others to be happy and, if possible, beautiful; that in that community no one is prostituted to the status of a mere tool of someone else; that in that community each finds opportunity and heroic encouragement to be and to do his best. There is a difference between the religious and the scientific aspects of experimentation just in respect of this clear consciousness of the community and the self as wholes. To be effectively a person and thereby help others to be persons is the sum of the abiding satisfactions of life. Worship in the sense of this aim is natural and necessary, and in the Great Community all mature men worship. Its objectives are not absolutely fixed as to their content. It knows that not everything is known as to the ends for which men live. It is grounded in the confidence of men of good will in one another; it expresses the rugged sort of hope that goes along with health and sanity. Who will show us the way to such a community?

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THE THEORY OF THE RATIONAL GOOD

OLAF STAPLEDON

I. FEELING AS THE GROUND OF GOODNESS

The ethical theory that Professor Hobhouse gave us in his book, *The Rational Good,* is essentially a development of idealist ethics. But from that orthodox system it differs seriously by insisting that "good" is meaningless if it has no relation whatever to pleasure. "In judging an experience good," says Professor Hobhouse, "so far as the judgment is truly our own, and not a recognition of the judgment effectively passed by someone else, we express toward it a mode of feeling which may generally be called favorable; that is to say, it has the generic character of pleasure."[1] And again, "If an end is genuinely conceived as good it means that we have at least some feeling for it."[2] And it is this feeling that disposes us to action. In the first instance, then, that is good which is felt to satisfy impulse.

We must not, of course, abstract the feeling from the whole "object felt," and suppose that what is good is pleasure alone; for thus we should fall into the snares of hedonism. But, on the other hand, we must not ignore feeling and suppose that objects can be good in themselves; for such a statement is (we are told) meaningless. We do, indeed, in ordinary thought project our feeling into the object and speak as though goodness were strictly a quality of the object. But such language is inaccurate. Goodness is a quality neither of objects alone nor of feelings alone, but of wholes, which consist of object and feeling. Or, more accurately, by the term "good" the individual "signifies something which, in the connection in which it is applicable, moves feeling, and through feeling disposes to action."[3]

[1] *The Rational Good,* p. 75. [2] *Ibid.,* p. 66. [3] *Ibid.,* p. 67.

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Thus the judgment that something is good is not only a judgment. It is also "an acceptance which may be expressed in the most general terms by saying that something fits in or harmonizes with, a mental disposition."[4] When the child's exploring fingers encounter the candle flame the effort of exploration is broken in upon by an unexpected experience. "There is disharmony between the effort and its end,"[5] and in the moment of disharmony, and essential thereto, pain. "Pain characterizes the feeling involved in disharmony and the mental attitude concerned in the process of checking and canceling effort."[6] On the other hand, if the explored object turns out to be a sugar plum there is harmony of effort and result, and the feeling is pleasant and culminates in satisfaction. "By harmony is meant, in the last analysis, a form of mutual support. Generally speaking, it is that relation of parts in a whole in virtue of which they maintain and (if they admit of development) further one another."

II. THE NATURE OF CONATION

Such is the foundation of Professor Hobhouse's theory of goodness. I suggest that it implies a false view of conation, and that, consequently, his ethical system is subtly vitiated throughout. For, in spite of his protestations, his theory fails to disentangle itself from hedonism. He assures us that feeling alone does not constitute goodness; what is good is an object felt as pleasant. Yet by "good" the individual is said to mean something which "moves feeling." Objects are said to be good *in that* they afford feelings. For feelings cannot as a rule be obtained without objects, and so objects are necessary to goodness. But they are good only in so far as they give feelings. And if feelings of pleasure were possible without objects, they themselves alone would be good.

He is led to this view by his belief that it is essentially through feeling that we are disposed to action. This is only

[4] *Ibid.*, p. 68. [5] *Ibid.*, p. 67. [6] *Ibid.*, p. 69.

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superficially true. It is never feeling, in its own right, that disposes us to action. On the contrary, pleasure and unpleasure are in principle merely consequent on the success and failure of behavior tendencies. We are pleased when our activity is unhindered; displeased when it is thwarted. The ground of conation is not feeling, but something that is prior to feeling.

Of course, it is true that in many cases we do shun pain and seek pleasure. But the states which we then seek are pleasurable and painful *because* they are, or have been, symptoms of success and failure. Physical pleasure and pain, indeed, are often sought and shunned for their own intrinsic characters, independently of any expectation of benefit or damage to the organism. But there is good reason to think that their intrinsic characters have become pleasant and unpleasant through their significance as symptoms of benefit and damage to parts of the organism. On higher levels of experience it is more obvious that pleasure and displeasure are but symptoms of success and failure. So far from being the ground of conation, they presuppose conation. Failure is grievous *because* we have striven for success.

But if it is untrue in principle that feeling disposes us to action, what is it that does so? Every act of conation seems to involve some objective tendency whose fulfilment it is that is conated. It may be a tendency of the individual's own body or person, or a tendency of his environment. It may be a tendency which really exists, or one which he erroneously believes, or one which he merely postulates. But in every case the tendency whose fulfilment is conated is objective to the conative act itself. It is a tendency which is cognized, and, through cognition, gives rise to conation. There cannot conceivably be conation which is not essentially the impulse to fulfil some such objective tendency or other. In the simplest case, namely, the conation of bodily activities, conation is derived, not from the pleasurableness of these activities, but from tendencies of the organism itself. The impulse to sneeze is the felt

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drive of the body toward sneezing; and the impulse to eat is, in the first instance, the felt drive of the body toward the acts of eating and digesting. But equally, in the most complex cases, conation presupposes tendencies (organic, personal, social, or other) objective to the conative act, tendencies which, entering within the mental content, give rise to conations.

All cognized tendencies, perhaps, not only innate tendencies of the organism, but tendencies of other existents, when they are cognized within the mental content are accepted as grounds of conation. Thus, if one watches an hourglass and sees the sand get jammed in the narrow neck he may experience an impulse to assist it by shaking the glass; and when the flow begins again, he is pleased.

But though, perhaps, every cognized tendency is, in isolation from conflicting tendencies, necessarily a source of conation, yet tendencies cognized within a complex mental content do conflict. Then the rational desire would favor the greatest possible harmonious fulfilment of cognized tendencies. But, unfortunately, that which behaves and wills is necessarily an organism, having in its own nature automatic behavior tendencies which it inherits from its earlier self and from its ancestors. And these automatic tendencies of the organism often resist control. The organism behaves as it is "set" to behave, and wills compulsively and irrationally.

Essentially, what is good is not what pleases, but what is conated. And what is conated is not pleasure, but fulfilment of tendencies objective to the psychic act of conation. Further, what is good is not good because it is the goal of conation; it is the goal of conation because it is the fulfilment of an objective tendency that has been cognized. That is to say that it is good simply in being a case of fulfilment of tendency, whether anyone conates it or not.

But let us for the present waive this basic objection to Professor Hobhouse's theory of the nature of goodness and study his account of *the* good and of moral obligation.

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III. PRUDENCE

In calling anything "good," he says, we "express toward it a mode of feeling" which has "the generic character of pleasure."[7] Now a man's pleasures are often incompatible; or rather, the objects which afford pleasure are often incompatible. In such a conflict three courses are possible. First, now one and now the other object may be sought, according to the alternating strength of uncriticized impulses. Or, secondly, one impulse may permanently conquer the other, not, indeed, succeeding in annihilating it, but preventing it from gaining satisfaction. Or, finally, some activity or some object may be discovered which will satisfy harmoniously both impulses. Thus neither, perhaps, will attain the crude and direct satisfaction that it demands, but the sum of satisfaction will be the greatest possible in the circumstances. Such "integration" of conflicting impulses in harmonious satisfaction is the way of prudence and the "rational" solution of conflict. And in every conflict of impulses it is true that, whatever course is *judged* to be best, there is one course which would *as a matter of fact* afford the greatest possible felt satisfaction in the long run. This, within the economy of the individual's interests, is the prudent course.[8] It is prudent because it is rational. If you seek impulse-satisfaction it is rational to take that course which will satisfy as many impulses as possible and deny as few impulses as possible.

As to the nature of rationality, we may accept Professor Hobhouse's account of it.[9] A rational judgment, he says, must be internally coherent; it must be grounded in the rest of our experience; it must not be based on any subjective attitude, but must deal with the objective order.

IV. THE RATIONAL GOOD

Thus far we have considered only the individual's interests without reference to the interests of other individuals. Rationality, which is seen to be the principle of harmony in

[7] *Ibid.*, p. 75.

[8] Cf. R. B. Perry, *The Moral Economy.*

[9] *Ibid.*, p. 64.

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this sphere, applies also, we are told, as between the satisfactions of different individuals. Rationality is essential to the nature of the good, and turns out to be the ground of moral obligation. "The rational good must be a consistent scheme of purposes interconnected by universal relations in which subjective disturbance is eliminated."[10] To be rational, purposes must not conflict. If they do, harmony must somehow be found. Further, that which is good must have a universal ground. If it is good in given conditions, it must be good in such conditions always, wherever and in whomsoever found.[11] But further, self-evident principles which are the grounds of value-judgments will themselves require grounds; and their grounds will consist in "the fact that they sum up and generalize more specific and concrete ends so far as these are mutually consistent." Thus interconnection is itself the rational principle. The rational good must form "a connected whole in which no part is isolated but in the end every element involves every other."[12] In order to be universally grounded it must be objective. It must not depend on any individual's peculiarity. Thus a double harmony is involved. For, in the first place, there must be an internal harmony of feeling with feeling within the mind itself; and secondly, there must be a harmony of the mind with the world. The rational principle cannot rest with a narrow harmony; it must embrace the universe.

In order that the ideal may be achieved, many impulses will need to be modified.[13] Satisfaction will have to be given them in objects and acts which do not conflict with the satisfaction of other impulses, or at least with the organized satisfaction which is the rational goal. For there is "a distinction between something radical in our impulses and something relatively superficial"[14] and alterable. Thus, in the developed personality sex impulses may be fulfilled in behavior very dif-

[10] *Ibid.*, p. 6, Contents.
[11] *Ibid.*, p. 78.
[12] *Ibid.*, p. 79.
[13] *Ibid.*, p. 99.
[14] *Ibid.*, p. 99.

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ferent from that which alone satisfies the crude animal instinct. In the rational good, then, it is essential that all our deepest impulses should be satisfied; for only so can we have permanently the feeling of satisfaction. But the precise manner of the satisfaction of these deepest impulses will depend on their interrelation in a harmonious system.

The ideal is, therefore, said to be the continuous development of personality in society, or the harmonious fulfilment of vital capacity as a whole.[15] The good is not simply harmony, any sort of harmony; it is essentially "harmony with some disposition of mind," a "harmony of mind with itself and with its object."[16] In short, the good is described as "happiness in the fulfilment of vital capacity in a world adapted to mind."[17]

V. FEELINGS NOT MEASURABLE

Now there is a serious difficulty at the outset in this account of the rational good as the completest possible system of felt satisfactions in all minds. For, on this theory, in order to know what is good we must have some means of measuring one satisfaction against another, so that if they are incompatible we may know which to sacrifice. And indeed, apart from our knowing, satisfactions must *be* in fact commensurable if there is to be any such rational good at all. But it is hard to see how feelings of satisfaction can, as mere feelings, be compared, even in theory.

Within the experience of one individual his satisfactions are, in practice, evaluated not according to intensity of feeling, but in relation to the ideal of personal fulfilment. We approve not simply the most intense pleasures, but those satisfactions which are felt in activities "enlarging to the personality." It is difficult to give a precise meaning to this phrase, but it certainly includes not only intensity of feeling but a reference to something objective. Personalities are "great" or

[15] *Ibid.*, p. 114. [16] *Ibid.*, p. 116. [17] *Ibid.*, p. 117.

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not quite apart from the individual's own feeling on the subject. Further, we often distinguish between feelings which are grounded in reality and those which are based on mere fantasy. We incline to condemn a life of mere fantasy, however rich and delightful.

But the most serious difficulty occurs when we try to compare the felt satisfactions of different individuals. By what right can we say that Jones's joy in a good meal is more than, or equal to, Smith's? In practice, even if we attempt such a comparison, we base no final value judgment on it. Rather we evaluate, not felt satisfactions, but the activities which afford them. And we judge those activities best which favor, not any vague ideal of felt harmonious satisfaction in all minds, but some tendency which we judge to be the supreme demand of our environment, whether the objective fulfilment of society's capacities, or the fulfilment of the nature of the universe, or the fulfilment of "God's will." In every such ideal we imply a reference to reality. Even a society would be condemned in which the goal of all activity were the undisturbed delight in mere fantasies.

VI. MORAL OBLIGATION

But let us for the moment waive these objections to the account of the good in terms of feeling. Admitting its validity, in what sense can the ideal be said to have a *claim* on us? Why *ought* we to strive to realize it? What of the consistent and unashamed egoist? I may feel that an essential element in the goodness of anything is that it is *mine,* a fulfilment of *my* impulses. I may set as my ideal, as my good, an internally consistent system of *my* judgments, *my* actions, *my* feelings.[18] Here, however, we are told, the principle of rationality intervenes. I must admit that *you* may set up a similar egoism of your own. Our systems will conflict. Both cannot be universal. But the good, to be rational, must be universal. If I am to

[18] *Ibid.*, p. 82.

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prefer my own good to yours, what is the universal ground of my preference? There is none; and so egoism fails to be rational.

But what if I do not accept the principle of rationality? What if I have no desire to make my life externally and internally harmonious? I may be content to seek my private ends and damn the public consequences. If I choose thus, what claim has the rationality of the ideal over me? Am I in any sense under a moral obligation to be rational in my choice of ends?

The rationality of the ideal is itself, we are told, the ground of moral obligation. In the case of prudence we saw that a certain course is in fact prudent, whether I think it so or not and whether I adopt it or not. In adopting the prudent course I am constrained by objective circumstances. Similarly, in the moral sphere a certain course makes for the rational good, whether I think so or not and whether I incline to take it or not. Its goodness and its claim on me are constituted by its own nature, not by my inclination. The rule of morality is as objective as the rule of prudence. Yet "How," it may be asked, "can anything practical hold 'of' me if no impulse, no desire, no volition of mine urges me to it?"[19] It has been argued that all voluntary actions arise from feeling; in what sense then can a man be expected to act in a certain manner if he has not the feeling which alone can induce him to act? What meaning can there be in saying that he "ought" to do so and so although feeling does not dispose him to do so?

To such questions Professor Hobhouse answers only that the rational good is a fact whether I admit it or not. Just as a danger concerns a man whether he knows it or not, so moral obligation concerns him whether he feels it or not. Even when it does not hold *for* him, it holds *of* him. In missing it, "he misses what is really good, the goodness that stands the test of

[19] *Ibid.*, p. 86.

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rational examination."[20] If this seems to reduce the matter after all to egoism and prudence, we must remember that "the principle which I accept as binding must be one that appeals to me as a decisive ground for action, that is, one that overcomes other grounds for other actions, it being just this supremacy which the term 'binding' expresses."[21]

VII. CRITICISM OF THE THEORY OF OBLIGATION

In this account of the good and of obligation there is a subtle attempt both to have the cake and to eat it. Goodness, we are told, is founded in feeling; yet the ideal, the rational good, is said to be the good whether anyone likes it or not. We may imagine a world in which, though the greatest possible harmonious satisfaction were attained, yet each individual would gladly sacrifice this state for one which gave less joy to all but more joy to himself. In such a world the "rational good" would be realized, though no one commended it. And, though no one were pleased with it, it would apparently have a moral claim over all.

Of course, those who accept the theory answer that though the rational good is the good whether anyone likes it or not, yet it is *constituted* by the sum of pleasant feelings which it would afford in all persons. Pleasure is essential to it, though no single person's pleasure in it is essential to it. *My* pleasure is not the ground of the good, but pleasure is.

Now, waiving the difficulty of measuring feelings, let us grant that there is a certain possible course which would, as a matter of fact, give the greatest possible harmonious felt satisfaction to all minds, and that this ideal does not depend on anyone's opinion about it. The question is, In what sense, if any, does the existence of this possibility constitute a moral claim over us? Why, and in what sense, *ought* we to strive to realize it whether it pleases us to do so or not? Professor Hobhouse says that morality concerns a man whether he feels its

[20] *Ibid.*, p. 87. [21] *Ibid.*, p. 84.

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claim or not, just as danger concerns him whether he is aware of it or not. But, according to Professor Hobhouse's theory, danger only concerns a man *because* it threatens him with pain or other unpleasant feelings. True, it threatens him whether he judges the situation dangerous or not; but, on the theory, its dangerousness depends on the fact that what it promises is feelings of pain. Were he anaesthetic or a masochist there would be no question of danger. Thus, if the end of behavior is feeling, there is after all no objectivity in the prudential ideal. A man may say (and how is he to be confuted?), "I *prefer* this moment's thrill, even though it cripple me, to a life of humdrum healthiness." You may tell him he will be sorry later; but perhaps he won't. Perhaps he will successfully console himself with a dream life based on the past ecstasy. If his goal is pleasant feeling, in what is he imprudent? In what sense is he missing the good?

In the case of morality, it is insisted, the good concerns a man even if he happens to be morally anaesthetic. But surely, if it is feeling that disposes us to action and if morality is really in the same case with danger, there is an inconsistency in holding that a social ideal has any kind of claim on a man who is insensitive to his fellows. It is beside the mark, though true, that he is missing the only kind of goodness "that stands the test of rational examination." For, *ex hypothesi,* he gets more pleasure out of egoism than out of altruism, in spite of irrationality.

Clearly, Professor Hobhouse's attempt to save obligation has split his theory into inconsistent theses. For while it is said that primarily things are called good, and sought because of the feeling that they can afford, it is also said that the ideal is good and ought to be advanced whether anyone feels pleasure in it or not. Now clearly the individual judges the ideal to be good before he is pleased with it. He judges it good for some other reason than that it pleases *him*. To say that it would please others is not to the point. In this supreme case

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the individual's value judgment is admittedly prior to, not subsequent to, the individual's feeling. He takes pleasure in the ideal (if he does take pleasure in it) *because* he judges it to be intrinsically good. He serves it because he judges that it has a claim on him. His pleasure is nothing but an attitude of acceptance, or recognition, or applause toward something which, he supposes, is demanded, not by himself, but by his world.

And if this is so in the judgment of the ideal, it is surely possible that pleasure is, always and essentially, not constitutive of value, but an attitude appropriate to value. It is possible that the feelings of impulse-satisfaction, out of which it is proposed to build the rational good, should be regarded as signs or symptoms of goodness rather than as little units of goodness itself, to be pieced together. And this is important. For if the goodness of the good is but a conglomeration of the goodness of its elements, it matters not what form the edifice be given, so long as we use as many bricks as possible and avoid unnecessary strains within the structure. But if feelings are after all only attitudes of the builders, we must beware lest, like acrobats, we build a pyramid of human antics, which must collapse with every change of mood.

It would seem, then, that we must either reject the view that goodness is grounded in feeling, or exonerate the individual from moral obligation and explain the curious illusion of duty in terms of some such mechanism as is offered by the psychoanalysts.

VIII. ALTERNATIVE VIEW OF OBLIGATION

But if feeling is consequent on, not prior to, conation, and if conation itself is the outcome of objective tendencies embraced within the mental content—if, in fact, what is intrinsically good is not felt satisfactions, but objective fulfilments; if conation is essentially, and in its very nature, a kind of disinterested loyalty to the nature of objects—then universal

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fulfilment has a very real claim on all conative beings, whether they are aware of that claim or not. For, on this view, fulfilment is *intrinsically* desirable. The conativity, so to speak, of every act of conation simply is the cognized thrust of the objective tendency.

It follows, in the first place, that, within a given mental content, there is an objective ideal of the greatest possible fulfilment. This is intrinsically the most desirable goal within the universe of discourse of the particular mental content. If, owing to weakness of intelligence or the impetus of the organism's innate or acquired behavior "set," this ideal is not desired, it is yet intrinsically desirable, and any conation which rejects it is conation distorted from the essential end of conativity. And in the second place, beyond the limits of each private mental content are tendencies as essentially conatable as those within. Therefore, there is an objective ideal of "world-fulfilment" which is intrinsically the most desirable of all desirables. It is the intrinsic desirability of this ideal which, in its own right, imposes a moral claim on all conative beings.

This objectivistic account of obligation certainly calls for a detailed defense; and no such defense can be attempted here. But the foregoing summary may serve to indicate the starting-point for a theory which, while it accepts the view that "good" involves a logically prior need or tendency, describes that tendency as, in every case, a tendency of some *object* within the mental content.

WEST KIRBY, ENGLAND

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IDEALISM, REALISM, AND THE SOCIAL ORDER

VICTOR S. YARROS

A vigorous and sincere advocate of 100 per cent Americanism and ardent patriotism happened to attend a mass meeting in New York City addressed by admirers of the Russian communist and soviet régime. He did not hear a single sentence or phrase from the platform with which he could even faintly sympathize. All that was said by the speakers at the meeting was, from his viewpoint, shallow, paradoxical, false, and absurd. He wondered how intelligent men could believe such things. But in spite of himself he was profoundly stirred and greatly impressed by the faith, idealism, enthusiasm, exaltation, and zeal of the orators and their audience. Five thousand men and women spiritually and morally united, revealing a passion for righteousness, ready to make any sacrifice in behalf of a noble cause—noble in their eyes—assuredly the spectacle carried a significant lesson which upholders of the existing politico-social-economic order could not ignore or belittle.

"Why," asked the citizen in the throng who was not of it, "do not American citizens, young and old, exhibit like enthusiasm and fervor in defending *their* institutions and fundamental laws?" "Why," asks another moderately liberal thinker, "is not the present order worthy of as much ardent support as the radicals are willing and anxious to give to their untested doctrines and plans?" "A campaign," says the same writer, "is as often lost by reason of the vacillation, weakness, half-heartedness, of the defense as by reason of the force, dash, and perseverance of the attack." The existing order, we are told, is being insidiously undermined by admissions, apologies, silences, perfunctory pleas, and failures to issue or accept challenges in its behalf. The upholders of this

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order should have the courage of their convictions, should be as aggressive, as alert, as indefatigable in defense as its many foes are in attack; otherwise they may find it discredited, friendless, forsaken when, or if, it is called upon to fight for its very life!

The queries and perplexities of such writers and partisans as we have alluded to are decidedly naïve. What they are demanding, especially of the younger generation, is intellectually and morally beyond the bounds of rational expectation. The present system may still fit average human nature, but it does not satisfy the conscience, the moral sense, the right reason of the thoughtful, the forward-looking, and the evolutionists. It is full of maladjustments, of anomalies, of lame compromises. It violates too often the very principles to which it appeals for justification. It is a thing of shreds and patches. It is neither aristocratic nor democratic, neither individualistic nor socialistic, neither feudal nor modern. It is the mixed product of several revolutions and of obstinate survivals. It is idle to talk about overthrowing it by violence, for it does not rest on violence alone. It rests on habits, traditions, beliefs, fears, doubts, anxieties. It is possible to accept it; it is impossible to grow lyrical and exalted in lauding its virtues. We know it too well; we suffer from the evils it begets; we feel that there is much truth and sense in many of the criticisms directed against it.

Mr. and Mrs. Sidney Webb, in their little book entitled *Decay of Capitalistic Civilization,* make some pertinent observations on the contrast between the zeal and ardor of the extreme radicals and the rather indifferent attitude of so many of the upholders of the existing order of things. To quote:

> The capitalist does actually stand convicted of moral inferiority before the working classes, and neither the constitutional socialist nor the gunman-saboteur has any respect for him, or any belief in his necessity as a pillar of society.

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Thus the class war has come to be regarded as a holy war, not without strong grounds. To assume, as our capitalist statesmen and their journalists commonly do, that the proletarian combatants must know themselves to be criminals, and are mere looters of society without any conscientious sanction, can only lead to a most perilous undervaluation of the strength and persistence of the revolutionary forces at work in the world. . . . .

It is idle to blink or ignore the fact that the present social-economic order is on the defensive, and that many uphold it half-heartedly and on grounds they are far from feeling to be firm and stable.

"But," cries the conservative, or even the liberal, "the arrogant revolutionary socialists or communists can only destroy—they cannot build or improve anything, and their holy zeal or righteous indignation can only produce terror and sanguinary civil war. On what, then, is their claim to moral superiority based?"

The answer of the revolutionists and those who vaguely sympathize with them is this: Granted that the bitter foes of the present social-economic system are wreckers rather than builders, the wrecking operations are merely preliminary. The old and rotten structure must be torn down and removed before a new structure can be erected. And, if the wrecking and removal are accompanied by grave social disturbances and appalling human suffering, the blame for that calamity rests with the Bourbon defenders of a vicious system. It is, indeed, a commonplace with revolutionary radicals that violence and bloodshed as concomitants of social change are due to the fanaticism of the reactionaries rather than to the ferocity of the reformers.

Nothing, however, is gained by polemics of this sort. The fundamental and ultimate questions are these:

First, Is the existing order vicious, "rotten," morally indefensible?

Second, assuming that it is in need of far-reaching and drastic changes, is there good reason to believe—passion and

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bad temper aside—that such changes can be brought about peacefully and rationally?

In dealing with the first question we may disregard all the invective and rhetoric of the intemperate radicals. Let us even grant the rather arbitrary and ill-supported notion of certain psychologists that the radical is a disappointed, embittered, unsuccessful, unadjusted member of society whose failure is due to his own weaknesses and defects—of which weaknesses and defects he is dimly conscious. Let us interrogate the thinkers and students who have no personal grievances against the present order, whose success is indisputable, and whose opinions cannot possibly be attributed to any "inferiority complex." Let us interrogate prosperous, keen, practical men of affairs, men who have achieved power and wealth under the present system. Let us listen to the still small voice in churchmen, moralists, and other persons of cultivation and intelligence. What better tribunal is there to judge the present system?

Let us first recall the opinions of so hard-headed and unsentimental a savant as Professor Thomas H. Huxley, whose robust individualism no one ever called in question. It is impossible to forget his striking admission that, if he thought the present social-economic system the best of possible systems, he should pray for the collision of the earth with some "friendly planet" that would prematurely put an end to the former's career. The fervent, 100 per cent admirers of the present system might well ponder Huxley's remark and in its light answer their own question as to the faint-heartedness and lukewarmness of average bodies of men and women who are expected to rush to the defense of the present order when it is attacked by the followers of Lenin and Marx and Bakounin!

Professor Huxley, to use his own words, found no encouragement in nature, or in science, or in human history for "millennial expectations"; he had no faith in utopias; he did not think that pain and suffering would ever be eliminated. Yet

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here is what he said in his essays on ethical and social problems:

Any one who is acquainted with the state of the population of all great industrial centers, whether in this or other countries, is aware that amidst a large and increasing body of that population *la misère* reigns supreme. . . . . There is not a single large manufacturing city which is free from a vast mass of people whose condition is exactly that described, and from a still greater mass who, living just on the edge of the social swamp, are liable to be precipitated into it by any lack of demand for their produce.

Society is stable when the wants of its members obtain as much satisfaction as, life being what it is, common sense and experience show may be reasonably expected. . . . . Nothing really stirs the great multitude to break with custom and incur the manifest perils of revolt except the belief that misery in this world, or damnation in the next, or both, are threatened by the continuance of the state of things in which they have been brought up. But, when they do attain that conviction, society becomes as unstable as a package of dynamite, and a very small matter will produce the explosion which sends it back to the chaos of savagery.

I see no limit to the extent to which intelligence and will, guided by sound principles of investigation and organized in common effort, may modify the conditions of existence for a period longer than that now covered by history. And much may be done to change the nature of man himself. The intelligence which has converted the brother of the wolf into the faithful guardian of the flock ought to be able to do something towards curbing the instincts of savagery in civilized man.

That man, as a "political animal," is susceptible of a vast amount of improvement by education, by instruction and by the application of his intelligence to the adaptation of the conditions of life to his higher needs, I entertain not the slightest doubt.[1]

There is quite sufficient idealism in these extracts from the deliberate writings of a very critical and severe realist. A number of years ago Great Britain was wrestling with the strike-lockout problem in real earnest, driven thereto by a general and costly walkout of skilled workers. An enterprising newspaper, weary of commonplace and superficial comments on a grave situation, opened its columns to a national sympo-

[1] *Evolution and Ethics*, pp. 45, 85, 213–14.

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sium on the subject of industrial strife and succeeded in eliciting scores of thoughtful contributions from men of light and leading, including captains of industry, labor leaders of moderate views, sociologists, economists, psychologists, novelists, and dramatists. Significantly enough, the solutions proposed, in the last analysis, reduced themselves to this formula: *Replace the employer-employee relation, or the wage system, with copartnership or co-operation!* Whether the approach was ethical or practical, the conclusion was the same; it was felt that the present industrial system generated antagonism, suspicion, prejudice, and misunderstanding. It was felt that mere exhortation and propaganda would accomplish little for harmony, peace, and well-being. A radical change was perceived to be necessary—and feasible; and the change plainly indicated by various tendencies was one which gave the laborer a stake in the industry, the enterprise, which yields him wages and a living. If, it was felt, there was magic in property, a system which deprived millions of property and its magic was manifestly open to condemnation under its own principles and tests!

The logic of this position is irresistible, and, as a matter of fact, the actual course of events and industrial developments has brought fresh and significant proof of the soundness of the view under consideration. We may glance at some of the new symptomatic tendencies.

There is, to begin with, the movement among the corporations and public-utility companies themselves in favor of employee ownership of the stock of the concern for which he works. Certain corporations, though bitterly opposed to trade unionism and collective bargaining with the aid of "outsiders"—walking delegates, business agents, what not—have not only encouraged and facilitated the organization of "company unions," or shop unions, for purposes of conciliation and arbitration, but have assiduously promoted the sale of their stock to their employees. They are frank in saying that self-

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interest, the hope of peace and uninterrupted production and profit-reaping, is their principal motive in those efforts; but who can seriously maintain that only altruism begets social and moral progress? Certain schools dominant in the last century overemphasized the factor of "enlightened self-interest" in social relations, but it would be quite as grave a mistake as was theirs to belittle that factor. When "the stars in their courses" fight for a cause, support for it, conscious or unconscious, comes from a hundred directions. Despite the natural, if short-sighted, opposition of labor leaders to "company unions" and employee investment in the stocks of the firms they work for, these phenomena are distinctly progressive and hopeful. The next step must be representation of the stock-owning employees on the directorates; that, in turn, will further stimulate the acquisition by employees, collectively and individually, of "stakes" in industry, and all of that will make for the "peopleization" and democratization of industry which constructive radicals have been demanding.

Another beneficial and desirable tendency, from the viewpoint of forward-looking liberals and radicals, is that to "customer ownership." This phrase denotes a new practice—that of inducing the patrons of public-utility companies to become stockholders and bondholders of those concerns. The motive, again, is apparently selfish—to attract the good will of the customers, to make them feel that an attack by politicians or reformers on public utilities is an attack on their own pecuniary interests, and to discourage agitation for lower rates. But here, too, the unintended and indirect results may easily prove to be more important than the direct and intended ones. For customer ownership is manifestly a form of indirect co-operation. If the same persons who get the service of a utility and pay for it also get most of the dividends earned by the utility, the conflict of interests ceases. The objections based on "absentee landlordism" and "outside control," as well as on exploitation and "surplus value," lose force and

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point in direct proportion as the customers—and the employees—of a corporation acquire the actual ownership and control of it. And, obviously, the larger the number of stockholders and bondholders, the smaller the amount annually taken by persons who live solely or chiefly on income from investments—described even by conservatives as "unearned income"—or "the idle rich." To be sure, the scientific or theoretical question whether interest on capital in any form is morally justifiable, or compatible with justice in the economic order, is in no wise affected by the number, or position, or identity of the recipients of such interest. If interest be a form of exploitation of labor, none but labor is entitled to interest, and it would better be paid as wages. But from a practical point of view the difference between a system under which a comparatively small group of capitalists receives income from invested capital and a system under which hosts of workers, customers, and other persons of limited means get dividends from a concern is very material.

Still another significant contemporary phenomenon is the growth of labor banks and the participation by them in the floating and distribution of sound loans. Members of trade unions whose savings are invested in bonds and stocks, and who conduct their financial operations through the medium of banks directed and owned by men of their own type, may never become destructive "reds," but they are very likely to become advocates and promoters of socialized and democratized industry.

There is, further, the general awakening of labor to the opportunities for and possibilities of co-operative production under the direction of trade unions and even with their financial backing. The older unionism, especially in America, was indifferent to co-operation; the newer, one is glad to say, sees that the present wage system is destined to continue for many decades, if not centuries, and to be superseded very gradually and piecemeal. In logical conformity with this sensible view

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the belief in industrial democracy leads the more constructive and more cultivated trade-union leaders to draw the corollary that it would be unwise for organized labor to limit itself to criticisms of the present system and efforts at amelioration without striking direct and effective blows for the goal or ideal in view—the co-operative industrial system. If co-operation is feasible, it is feasible here and now, and even on a small scale. If small "capitalistic" business establishments can live and earn profits, well-managed co-operative establishments should be able to make larger profits by reason of superior efficiency, absence of employer-employee friction, and other factors. Funds largely wasted on strikes might well be invested in co-operative enterprises.

And there is yet another (though seemingly unimportant) phenomenon which, under intelligent encouragement, might ere long assume respectable proportions—the voluntary substitution by employers of co-operation, complete or partial, for the wage relation. In recent years several employers have turned their plants over to their respective workmen, with or without reservations or provisions for a certain return on the capital represented by the going concern. It is certain that the religious, ethical, and social movements of the last several decades have quietly effected a change in the mental attitude of capitalists toward property and labor. Many are asking themselves whether there is not considerable truth in the indictments of "surplus value," "unearned increment," monopoly profits, and like features of the present economic system. Many feel that reward is not proportionate to service; that greed, cunning, selfishness, and hard-heartedness often have more to do with success in business than have the much-stressed qualities of integrity, efficiency, industry, and vision. Men who do little or nothing are more and more conscious of their parasitic status and concede that society is entitled to demand a fair equivalent from them for the incomes they enjoy. The social atmosphere is becoming more

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and more uncomfortable for beneficiaries of special privilege. The spirit of democracy is undermining plutocracy and destroying the vestiges of feudalism and aristocracy. In these circumstances the employing class may be expected to furnish more and more converts to those social groups which stand for equality of opportunity, for equality of freedom, and for service as the only basis for membership in the body social. Such an attitude is bound to popularize the idea of industrial co-operation among the more forward-looking members of that class.

It is, moreover, highly probable that the healthy and progressive elements in the churches will increasingly feel the necessity of actively identifying themselves with the cause and movement of industrial and social democracy. Formalism, sterile dogmatism, and evasion of vital issues are alienating thoughtful and earnest men and women from the churches, and the latter are in danger of losing their spiritual leadership and their moral influence. They will have to take up the challenge of science, of philosophy, of life itself, and this challenge calls for deeds instead of words, for "fruits" instead of empty formulas. If the churches have nothing vital and significant to say, or lack the courage and independence to say what they think, the living world will cease to pay the slightest attention to them. They will be treated as dead and negligible. But there are heartening indications that the strong, self-respecting, and enlightened churchmen do not propose to abdicate and condemn the church to futility, servility, and impotence. Here are some of them:

Important groups of ministers, priests, and students in theological schools have been protesting against any active or passive support of offensive warfare on the part of the churches, and have been passing vigorous peace resolutions.

Several denominational and interdenominational bodies in America as well as in Great Britain have adopted, since the Great War, "reconstruction" programs in which industrial

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democracy or industrial co-operation is a leading feature. The following paragraph from the report of a committee of American Catholic bishops is particularly striking:

> The full possibilities of increased production will not be realized so long as the majority of the workers remain wage-earners. The majority must somehow become owners, at least in part, of the means of production. They can be enabled to reach this stage gradually through co-operative productive societies and co-partnership arrangements. . . . . However slow the attainment of these ends may be, they will have to be attained before we can have a thoroughly efficient system of production or an industrial and social order that will be secure from the danger of revolution.

In the religious press, approval of the principle of industrial democracy, as well as of practical steps toward the realization of that principle, is today the rule, not the exception. It is not extravagant to affirm that organized labor now commands the sympathy and support of the religious press and the more progressive clergy in respect of practically all its major demands.

Truly, with such facts and tendencies before anyone with eyes to see and ears to hear, how fatuous and naïve it is to sigh or hope for fervent defense and enthusiastic admiration of the existing social-economic order! The thoughtful person, even if conservative and severely skeptical, cannot help recognizing the certainty of changes, nay, the *fact* of change, in that order.

And here we may call attention to a fact in the course or evolution of social and economic reform which has not been sufficiently emphasized in histories and expositions of radicalism. It is this—that all the radical schools or movements of the last hundred years, or practically since the industrial revolution and the emergence of the capitalist system, despite their important differences, *have had one essential feature in common—and that feature is co-operation in industry.* Study St. Simon, Fourier, Robert Owen, Louis Blanc, P. J. Proudhon, Ferdinand Lassalle, Karl Marx, Rodbertus, the Chris-

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tian socialists, the Fabian socialists, the Guild socialists, the syndicalists, the communist-anarchists, the individualist-anarchists, the independent social radicals; study utopian socialism, revolutionary socialism, evolutionary socialism, opportunist and political socialism, voluntary socialism, and what proposition is basic and essential with each and all of them? The proposition that co-operation must, should, and will supplant the capitalist system or the wage relation!

Assuredly no one capable of serious thinking will deny or make light of the fact just pointed out. Assuredly, that fact warrants the hope of a scientific synthesis and a consensus of advanced and disinterested opinion in respect of the social-economic questions of our time. Taken in conjunction with the corporate business and other practical tendencies noted and commented upon above, the fact under discussion acquires even greater significance than purely academic thinkers would attach to it. "Solid," prudent men of affairs may sneer at utopian reforms, but they will not sneer at efforts of men of their own type to increase efficiency and productivity by steps and measures which avowedly or tacitly recognize the principle of industrial democracy. Instead of sneering at such efforts, they will study them, inquire into their objects and effects, and seek to profit by them. Such an attitude is devoutly to be wished by all humane and intelligent persons who abhor strife, class struggles, the horrors of revolution, and reaction. The old order is undergoing radical transformation; that transformation need not be attended by violence, hatred, and fury. The process can be made healthy and orderly. Those who expect enthusiastic support of or ardent devotion to the present order of things, or a vehement, strenuous opposition to changes in it in the direction of equal opportunity and democratic ownership and control—not necessarily in a socialistic sense of these terms—are simply incapable of reading aright the handwriting on the wall or of interpreting firm and clear tendencies.

HULL-HOUSE, CHICAGO

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THE NATURE OF AESTHETIC EXPERIENCE[1]

GEORGE H. MEAD

Man lives in a world of Meaning. What he sees and hears means what he will or might handle. The proximate goal of all perception is what we can get our hands upon. If we traverse the distance that separates us from that which we see or hear and find nothing for the hand to manipulate, the experience is an illusion or a hallucination. The world of perceptual reality, the world of physical things, is the world of our contacts and our manipulations, and the distance experience of the eye and the ear means first of all these physical things.

Physical things are not only the meaning of what we see and hear; they are also the means we employ to accomplish our ends. They are mediate in both senses. They constitute a meaning of all that lies between us and our most distant horizons, and they are the means and instruments of our consummations. They lie in this mediate fashion between the distant stimuli that initiate our acts and the enjoyments or disappointments that terminate them. They are the proximate goal of our sights and sounds, and they are the instrumental stuff in which we embody our ends and purposes.

Thus on the one hand they constitute the hard physical realities of science, and on the other the material out of which to build the world of our heart's desire, the stuff that dreams are made of.

It is perhaps the most striking characterization which one can make of the thinking of the Western world since the Renaissance, that it has separated these two essential aspects of the world, has indeed made them incommensurable. Science informs us with increasing exactness of the ultimate elements

[1] I have not made specific acknowledgments in the article to Professor Dewey, but the reader who is familiar with his *Experience and Nature* will realize that it was written under the influence of that treatise.

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of stuff or energy out of which the universe is made, and how they change. The world that rewards or defeats us, that entices or repels us, our remunerations and frustrations, our delights and distresses, what is finally significant and worthy of our effort, the beauty, the glory, and the dream, cannot be formulated in the language of exact science, nor have we found any common vernacular in which we can speak of the world of physical things and the values which after all they subtend.

This break between the definition of the things that constitute the means and the ends and values which they embody is not confined to the description of physical instruments and their uses, for it bisects the field of the social sciences as well. It has made economics the dismal science. It has mechanized and anatomized psychology. It has made ethics utilitarian, and aesthetics an affair of esoteric formulae.

It is not a break that can be healed by a new philosophic formula, though insight that is profound enough can exorcise metaphysical oppositions that have hardened into accepted realities, and exhibit the break as that which lies between the generalized technique of life and the ends and purposes which we have been able to formulate.

We are all of us engaged in complicated social activities whose accomplishments lie hopelessly beyond our appreciation. History later will lift out the ramifications of the unnumbered co-operative acts which have led up to what will be significant and desirable in human experience, but the individual experiences that have gone to make the achievement will never share in this significance. Closer at hand we see the routine and drudgery of countless uninterested hands and minds fashion in factories and mines the goods for which men give their wealth and themselves, and in the enjoyment of which men may be bound together in common interests which were quite divorced from their manufacture. Indeed, this is the definition of drudgery, the blind production of goods, cut off from all the interpretation and inspiration of their com-

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mon enjoyment. It is the tragedy of industrial society that division of labor can interrelate and exploit the social nature of men's technical production so far in advance of their common fruitions, that all the earned significance of the work of our hands is foreign to its elaborate technique.

It has been the inspiration of universal religions, of political democracy, and later of industrial democracy to bring something of the universal achievement, of the solemn festival, of common delight into the isolated and dreary activities which all together make possible the blessed community, the state, the co-operative society, and all those meanings which we vaguely call social and spiritual.

In this intersection of what Professor Dewey has called the technical and the final, this attempted grasping of the consummation of the complex efforts of men in society to infuse meaning into the detail of existence, aesthetic experience may be isolated as a separate phase. What is peculiar to it is its power to catch the enjoyment that belongs to the consummation, the outcome, of an undertaking, and to give to the implements, the objects that are instrumental in the undertaking, and to the acts that compose it something of the joy and satisfaction that suffuse its successful accomplishment.

The beatitude that permeates the common striving of men after an infinite God of their salvation, belongs to the cathedral. The delight which follows upon successful adjustment of one's body to the varied reactions to the elements of a landscape flows over into the landscape itself. The pleasure that imbues our bodily and social balance of reaction to a human form inspires the statue. The felicity that animates harmonious movements of men runs through the dance. To so construct the object that it shall catch this joy of consummation is the achievement of the artist. To so enter into it in nature and art that the enjoyed meanings of life may become a part of living is the attitude of aesthetic appreciation.

I have presented aesthetic experience as a part of the at-

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tempt to interpret complex social life in terms of the goals toward which our efforts run. The other parts are the religious, political, educational, hygienic, technical undertakings among others, which attempt to look into the future of our common doings, and so select and fashion the ends we want that we can direct and interpret our immediate conduct. These endeavors do not carry with them the satisfactions that belong to finalities. They are infected by the interest which belongs to the fashioning of means into ends, to the shaping and testing of hypotheses, to invention and discovery, to the exercise of artisanship, and to the excitement of adventure in every field. It is the province of action, not that of appreciation. Our affective experience, that of emotion, of interest, of pleasure and pain, of satisfaction and dissatisfaction, may be roughly divided between that of doing and enjoying, and their opposites, and it is that which attaches to finalities that characterizes aesthetic experience.

And the intellectual attitudes are as markedly different. In the fashioning of means into ends, in the use of tools, and the nice adjustment of people and things to the accomplishment of purposes, we give attention only to that which forwards the undertaking; we see and hear only enough to recognize and use, and pass from the recognition to the operation; while in appreciation we contemplate, and abide, and rest in our presentations. The artisan who stops to sense the nice perfection of a tool or a machine has interrupted its use to appreciate it, and is in an aesthetic mood. He is not interested in its employment, he is enjoying it. The statesman who turns from the construction of his speeches, the ordering of his statistics, the meeting of political opposition, the whole technique of putting across his projects for bettering conditions and life of children, to the picture of their healthful and joyous life, is for the time being no longer in action. He is savoring the end that he is fashioning into practicable politics. When one stops in his common labor and effort to feel the

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surety of his colleagues, the loyalty of his supporters, the response of his public, to enjoy the community of life in family, or profession, or party, or church, or country, to taste in Whitmanesque manner the commonalty of existence, his attitude is aesthetic. In the arts it appears in appropriate decoration, that which infuses the spirit of the meaning of the instrument into its structure and adornment, that which informs our equipment and mediate efforts with the significance and splendor of their accomplishments. It adds distinction to utility, and poetry to action, "the joy of elevated thoughts, the sense sublime of something far more deeply interfused" to our best and finest efforts. It comes in healthful pulses in the most strenuous enterprises, as we stop in climbing great mountains to gather not only breath and refreshment, but the charm and magnificence that each fresh étape reveals. From time immemorial men have dedicated them as festivals, and solemn concourses.

While this aesthetic attitude which accompanies, inspires, and dedicates common action finds its moment of ideal finality in future achievement, the material in which its significance and beauty is fashioned is historic. All the stuff with which the most creative imagination works is drawn from the storehouses and quarries of the past. All history is the interpretation of the present, that is, it gives us not only the direction and trend of events, the reliable uniformities and laws of affairs, but it offers us the irrevocableness of the pattern of what has occurred, in which to embody the still uncertain and unsubstantial objects we would achieve. We import the finalities of past victories and defeats into the finalities of the uncertain future. The solidity and definiteness and clarity of our undertakings are the donation of the past.

All this is healthful and normal. In its perfection it reaches the field of the fine arts, but it involves the creative imagination and aesthetic appreciation of the least artistically endowed of those who are fortunately engaged in the rewarding

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undertakings of life. But those that can import the aesthetic experience into activity must be fortunately engaged and engaged in rewarding undertakings. And this means more than the mere adaptation of means to end, the mere successful cooperative fashioning of the goods which are enjoyed in common. The enjoyment of its ultimate use must be suggested by the intermediate steps in its production, and flow naturally into the skill which constructs it. It is this which gives joy to creation, and belongs to the work of the artist, the research scientist, and the skilled artisan who can follow his article through to its completion. It belongs to co-ordinated efforts of many, when the rôle of the other in the production is aroused in each worker at the common task, when the sense of team play, esprit de corps, inspires interrelated activities. In these situations something of the delight of consummation can crown all intermediate processes.

It is unfortunately absent from most labor in a modern competitive industrial society. But the thirst for enjoyment is still there, and the imagination, deprived of its normal function. When the goal is too far removed in time and method of approach, the imagination leaps to the ultimate satisfactions which cannot be fused with the uninteresting detail of preparation, and day-dreaming supervenes and cuts the nerve of action. Normal aesthetic delight in creation is the recovery of the sense of the final outcome in the partial achievement, and gives assurance to the interest of creation. In day-dreaming it is the very lack of connection between means and the end that leads one to the Barmecide feast of an end that is not expressed in terms of means. In the aesthetic appreciation of the works of great artists, what we are doing is capturing values of enjoyment there, which fill out and interpret our own interests in living and doing. They have permanent value because they are the language of delight into which men can translate the meaning of their own existence. But prerogative fine art has never been the dominant language of men's hearts,

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and even before the industrial revolution and the introduction of machine production, drudgery occupied most men's hands, and reverie—the field of the day-dream—was the ever-present escape from its ennui. It is silly and inept to offer hopeless counsels of perfection, to undertake by the spread of so-called culture to replace the consummatory objects in men's reveries by the imagery of great artists, or to replace machine production by medieval artisanship. To be sure no one does baldly offer such programs, but so far as the aesthetic character of the reverie has been considered, and in so far as men have inveighed against machine industry as crushing out the artistic impulse such programs would be fair implications. From the standpoint of pathology, Freudian psychology has at least recognized the serious importance of the reverie as a field of escape, while organized labor has at least made evident that the factory organization of drudgery has put a social value into it which lifts it out of the field of mere painful effort.

Under the most favorable conditions, one cannot say under normal conditions, a man's work would be in itself interesting, and apart from the immediate interest in the operation, the sense of the whole that he is completing would grow with the advancing production, and give him aesthetic delight. The imagery which would provide this comes from the stream of reverie, but in the absence of these fortunate conditions, agreeable pictures of satisfied longings are apt to flood his mind, and they are likely to answer to the so-called inferiority complexes. It is true that just in so far as we can endow men with the gift of artisanship, creative impulse in any direction, and provide them with the opportunity of expressing it, in so far we will give them opportunity for aesthetic delight in the midst of their labor, but with humanity as it is and society as it is this is frankly impossible, though just in the degree to which it is possible to add creative interest to work, will aesthetic delight be added to labor.

On the other hand, in the words of Professor Dewey

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"shared experience is the greatest of human goods," and if out of the drudgery that men put through together there arises a social end in which they are interested, achieving this end will have its delight, and in so far as this end can involve the tasks themselves, the dignity and delight of the social realization will suffuse the tasks. This socializing of industry, of which the Guild Socialists have presented a rather impossible program, offers the ultimate escape from unaesthetic toil. Every invention that brings men closer together, so that they realize their interdependence, and increase their shared experience, which makes it more possible for them to put themselves in each other's places, every form of communication which enables them to participate in each other's minds, brings us nearer this goal. While we marvel at the new inventions which enable us to pass into the experiences of others, we perhaps fail to realize the unrecognized, unconscious pressure of the isolated individual in modern society. The isolated man is the one who belongs to a whole that he yet fails to realize. We have become bound up in a vast society, all of which is essential to the existence of each one, but we are without the shared experience which this should entail. The pressure upon the inventor will not cease until the isolation of man within society has passed.

Two of these mechanisms have spread the pattern of men's reveries before our outward eyes, the daily press and the movie film. With marvelous exactness they have copied the type of happening, and the sort of imagery, that run behind the average man's eyes and fill up the interstices of overt conduct, and they emphasize and expand what is needed to render the reverie vivid and concrete.

The newspaper has, of course, other functions. The most important of these is purveying the news. The theory of an acquisitive society is that news is valuable. One is willing to pay for it. Its value varies with its truth. Theoretically the newspaper which comes into the market with guaranteed

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goods will outsell its competitors, but this is to reckon without the host, or in this case without the reverie. There are certain limited fields, such as the stock market, and the results of the last election, in which the truth value of news holds absolutely. Outside of these fields, and the farther one gets away from them, the more does the enjoyability, the consummatory value, of the news bulk in value on the market. The reporter is generally sent out to get a story, not the facts. Furthermore, newspapers are organs—organs of certain fairly defined groups. They demand that the news shall take the forms which conform as far as possible to the results desired by these groups. It is this realm of the reverie—of imagined enjoyable results—which dictates the policy of the daily press.

Whether this form of the enjoyed result has an aesthetic function or not depends upon whether the story of the news, after being thrown into this acceptable form, serves to interpret to the reader his experience as the shared experience of the community of which he feels himself to be a part. The enjoyable imagery may hardly rise above unsatisfied animal impulses of gain, sex, or hate, but in so far as it has what is called the human appeal, or that of nation, town, or class, it serves to give the man the gratification of his experience as shared by the community to which he belongs. These forms are after all the determining forms which interpret his social experience.

It is evident that these forms will change and, if you like, improve, as the group to which the paper appeals realizes itself in the larger interests and undertakings of the community. It does not necessarily lose its peculiar individuality, but it becomes functional in the greater society in a creative sense. In this sense an intelligent newspaper management may lead its readers, but it can never get far away from the form of the news which their reveries demand.

The movie externalizes the reverie even more vividly than the daily press. It was foreshadowed by the picture sections

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of the press. And it has come with a peculiar appeal, for it intensifies a certain type of enjoyment of which the reverie is at best parsimonious. Our visual images are slight, incomplete, and not readily controlled. We do our thinking in the form of conversation, and depend upon the imagery of words for our meanings. It is only at favored moments that vivid pictures of the past throng the imagination. Visual imagery operates largely in filling out perception, as in reading or in the recognition of seen objects, rather than in satisfying the inward eye, which was the bliss of Wordsworth's solitude. When motion was added to the stereopticon, a certain sort of widely craved delight was flung at the community with open hands. But while this delight, of which nature has been somewhat penurious with us, is greatly exalted in the movie, the significant value of the imagery is minimized. It does not lend itself readily to shared experience. The movie has no creative audiences such as have been the inspiration of the moving speeches of great actors. Under the power of an orator one is in the perspective of the whole community. He sees the "picture" in his own perspective. The isolation of the members of a compact audience in a movie theater is in crying contrast with the shared response of those that, each at his own breakfast table, read the morning press.

It is reasonable, therefore, that it should be that which is more private and particular in the reverie that dominates the movie, that is, the escape values. For while the reverie provides us with the imagery of common values, the common consummatory experiences, it provides us also with the compensations for our defeats, our inferiorities, and our unconfessed failures. And what the average film brings to light is that the hidden unsatisfied longings of the average man and woman are very immediate, rather simple, and fairly primitive. And this is not without its consolations. The thus unwittingly confessed defeats of men are not of the wide and generous impulses. It is that which is rather primitive in us that is re-

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pulsed in modern society. At least, judged by this standard, it may be guessed that whatever defeats meet men's efforts to reach the larger social goods, the efforts themselves in their shared experiences have been rewarding. They do not give rise to inferiority complexes. The compensatory and escape values are not the only ones that find expression in the movie, but I think they are the dominating values, and in large measure fix the public's taste and, therefore, select the themes for most of the films.

One cannot without vivid curiosity watch the effect which the sudden release of this function of the reverie will have on the community. The man who finds sidesplitting humor in the near-disasters of Charlie Chaplin is presumably finding compensation for some repressed primitive tendencies to inflict suffering and pains upon his enemies. Does this discovery of a situation in which one may enjoy unreproved the terrors and fright of another quicken the old impulse and render him callous to the sufferings of others? I think not. I think the experience is rather a catharsis, in an Aristotelian phrase, than a reversion. Nor does the physically timid man become more courageous from watching with compensatory delight Doug Fairbanks annihilate a nest of bandits. But there should be a certain release, and relief from restraint, which comes from the fulfilment of the escape reaction with a richness of imagery which the inner imagination can never offer. If these escape reactions play any legitimate part in the economy of keeping house with one's self, and I think they do, the elaboration of them at just the point where the imagination fails should emphasize that function, and the enjoyed imagery is genuinely aesthetic.

Whether or not the escape reaction is a dominant interest in the movie public in determining the type of film, there is a vast number of them that do not answer to that motive. Some of them appeal simply to interest in a story vividly told in pictures, to a sympathetic love of adventure, and to the response

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to beauty in nature and to delight in picturesque and distant scenes. One captures something of the same values that he seizes in travel and adventurous outings. A genuine aesthetic effect is produced if the pleasure in that which is seen serves to bring out the values of the life that one lives.

In pictures whose attraction is their salaciousness there can be no aesthetic effect. They are sensual rather than sensuous. They are not the cause of finding meaning and pleasure in other things, nor are they informed with the meaning of that which leads up to their own enjoyment. They blot out all but the immediate response.

In closing I wish to refer again to this inchoate phenomenon of the human reverie, which the press and the movie have projected before us.

We are apt to consider it as a purely private affair with each individual, his desultory meanderings of idea and purpose and imagery, perhaps more gruesomely presented in James Joyce's *Ulysses,* than elsewhere in literature. It is, indeed, infected with privacy and therefore subject to disintegration. But it passes into the universal meanings of common discourse and co-operative effort, and out of it arise the forms of universal beauty, the intuitions of the inventor, the hypotheses of the scientist, and the creations of the artist. It is that part of the inner life of man which cannot be given its implicated meaning because of the incompleteness of social organization. It marks man's isolation within society. We have decried its vulgarity when the daily press and the movie films have stripped off its privacy. It is better, however, to live with our problems than to ignore them.

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BEAUTY AND GOODNESS: ART AND MORALITY

HERBERT ELLSWORTH CORY

If the art-lover had only to cope with the suspicions of the narrower Puritans who (according to Macaulay) hated bear-baiting not for the pain that it gave to the bear but for the pleasure it gave to the spectators, there would be no serious problems to solve. The worshiper of Aphrodite, Pan, and Apollo could choose between contemptuous silence and tolerant simple instruction. But the centuries-old tragedy of the issue is forced upon the most reflective and joyous by the spectacle of Plato passing from youth to maturity only to be torn by an inner conflict between the claims of morality and art, of Milton ever liable to lapse from the elevation of his greatest moments to the priggery of one extreme and the trivial hedonism of the other, of the ridiculous rebellion of Goethe's youth, and the ridiculous recantation of Tolstoy's old age.

This enduring confusion has two sources: (1) the loosely synonymous uses of goodness and morality, of beauty and art, (2) the more or less equivocal character of the various definitions of beauty and goodness. Every student of philosophy knows that the term "morality" is etymologically appropriate to the merely customary standards of living and that there is often more rivalry between enlightened goodness and sour, servile, stereotyped timorous morality than there is between enlightened goodness and joyous, free, adventurous aesthetic rapture. But it is easy for the initiated to forget momentarily. And it is easier, while remembering, to make light of the real disagreement which occasionally sunders the saint and the sinner. Since the collapse of the prestige of those pseudo-Aristotelians who narrowed their master's conception of imitation to make perfect their logic that nature cannot be beautiful, we

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now know that works of art are not the only embodiments of beauty. The romanticists have established the truth that nature also may often be beautiful. On the other hand, Roman pantomime, Rembrandt's picture of an old woman paring her nails, Rodin's statue of a withered courtesan, and Schönberg's *Drei Klavierstücke* (Opus 11) are typical of those compositions which have led us to wonder whether all works of art must needs be beautiful to be venerated as masterpieces. And even when the artist aims to express pure beauty, his work often falls short of his moods. Tartini's testimony that "the devil's trill" of his dream was far more beautiful than the violin sonata which he composed is but a whimsically legendary expression of the truth that an artist may experience beauty in his moments of contemplative reverie but embody little or none of it in that struggle with his stubborn medium which culminates as a work of art. Goodness and morality are not at all closely synonymous; neither are beauty and art. A work of art is an expression through some medium (either the artist's own body or something external to his body) of the beautiful sought and hoped for or realized or lost and remembered with sorrow or mirth.

Moreover, if we are careful of our definitions we shall be forced to conclude that goodness is not beauty. Yet it often happens that a beautiful work of art is a good deed. In the purely aesthetic experience our attitude involves vivid conations but of a yielding type; we save ourselves by losing ourselves in genuine mystical fashion. But when we try to embody our aesthetic experience in a medium inevitably more or less resistant, our aesthetic sentiment may be corrupted with a tinge of fear and wrath which tempers love, and our aesthetic conation may be replaced by will. Contemplation is not passive, to be sure. But here contemplation may give way to action more militant. And so in our attempt to bring, through technical manipulation, a recalcitrant medium into closer har-

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mony with ourselves and others, we may do a good deed while producing a work of art only fitfully beautiful.

What do we mean by the judgment, "He is a good man"? Unless we are sentimentalists we can hardly mean that a man is unblemished by a single foible. He cannot be in any literal and universal sense absolutely good. The more closely we define the ethical value situation, the more we are forced to the conclusion that the object valued is not a person as a whole and certainly never an inanimate object but always a deed or a series of deeds of a living being. If we keep this in mind and at the same time attempt to do justice to three great outstanding ethical doctrines, the hedonistic, the self-realization, and the Kantian, we may say that a deed is good if it arouses in one who does it or in one who plans to do it or in one who evaluates its doer a sentiment or symphony of emotions which centers in an equilibrium of self-assertion and self-denial and if it arouses in one who does it or in one who plans to do it or in one who evaluates its doer the conation which we call will, a kind of superconation which is a reconciliation of two conations otherwise conflicting.

On the other hand, unless we fall into the error of the pseudo-Aristotelians and limit the epithet beauty to "imitations" of nature, we are compelled to recognize that in the aesthetic value situation anything animate or inanimate, natural or artificial, deed or doer, may be the object. This consideration alone makes it clear that beauty and goodness cannot always, if ever, be the same. We may sharpen this contrast by rounding out a definition of beauty which does full justice to the adjectives "formal," "disinterested," "contemplative," "pleasurable," "reposeful," "emphatic," and "intrinsic"—in short, all the salient epithets incorporated in the rival aesthetic theories. We may suggest that anything is beautiful if it has a form which arouses in a contemplator a sentiment or symphony of emotions which centers in love in the most comprehensive sense of the word and which arouses

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a unique species of conations by virtue of which the contemplator strives to become like or become one with the object which he contemplates. Contemplation we may define as an attitude not passive but active, an attitude whose differentia is its non-possessiveness.

Despite the fact that will may be most satisfactorily defined as a kind of superconation which reconciles two or more otherwise conflicting conations and despite the fact that the most impressive deeds which are called good are often called just, i.e., fair to various conflicting rights and interests, the ethical attitude is more partisan than the aesthetic. The will may reconcile one's own inner conflicts but it involves choices between alternatives external to ourselves, the assumption of a partisan attitude. And even the most benignant and comprehensive justice cannot be emancipated from rejections as well as acceptances. We may illustrate this by contrasting the genuinely if unduly ethical attitude which an audience takes toward a melodrama and the aesthetic attitude which Turgenev fondly but vainly hoped his readers would take toward his *Fathers and Sons*. As an undergraduate, I often attended melodramas among which I remember especially a colorful play called *The Queen of the Highbinders*. The dramatis personae included a hero-detective, his heroine sweetheart, and her pathetic brother corrupted by opium furnished by the heavy villain and his paramour, the queen of the highbinders. After the end of the second act the actors crossed the stage in single file between the curtain and the footlights. Hero and heroine were clapped. The villain received his storm of hisses with an invincibly raucous laugh. The audience chose. They hated as much as they loved. The hero was perfectly good. The villain was perfectly bad. A very clearly defined moral attitude was the only attitude possible toward a play in which the separation between at least the evil characters and the audience was acutely emphasized. It is true that in an enlightened ethical attitude, since the object valued is not a per-

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son but a deed, we should not hate persons as a whole, we should confine our hatred to such of their deeds as are evil. The way then would be left free for us to love our fellows, as Christ urged, without loving their sins, and to hate their sins without hating them. But it is only too clear that moral training, whether of the kind called Christian today or not, is not an efficacious preparation for the attitude enjoined upon us by the Savior. Unfortunately, most people, highly cultivated, take the same partisan attitudes as did the audience at *The Queen of the Highbinders* toward much more subtly conceived characters which they unaesthetically abstract from the warp and woof of some great play or novel. Nor is this merely the malady of Puritanical Anglo-Saxons. Even the Russians, of Turgenev's day at least, took sides. The Nihilists sided with his Basarov and accused his creator of caricaturing their gospel of youthful revolt. The reactionaries were dissatisfied with the portraits of the gentle romanticists of the earlier generation. Turgenev, a student of actual individuals, mindful of frailties and powers of both fathers and sons, superbly disinterested, had expected his readers to become one with protagonist and antagonist alike. He expected his readers to take the aesthetic attitude. And it is the aesthetic attitude with which Christ evidently expected us to begin.

Turgenev's demand was reasonable. Yet just here we discern the truth in the Platonic-Puritan warnings. Does the experience of beauty make us too tolerant and so loosen and dissipate our ethical virility? There can be little doubt that man, if he were to remain incorrigibly aesthetic in this far-from-perfect universe, would cease, in due time, to perform any righteous deeds. But it is equally certain that his loss of rectitude would soon be followed by that fatty degeneration of his aesthetic susceptibility which we find exemplified in the confusions, the feverish posings, and the obsessions of the poetry of Marini in the sultry and languorous afternoon of the poetic renaissance in Italy. Goodness and beauty are not the same.

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But unless we pass occasionally from the aesthetic to the ethical attitude, we will find only a more and more limited range of objects beautiful. We may still admire a leg with a richly rounded calf and a tapering but perilously frail ankle. But we shall see no beauty in the severer curves of the leg of a fleet-footed Atalanta. Thus, decadent, non-moral aestheticism bans in its own way as many artistic pleasures as did those Puritans who slammed the theater doors in the faces of the fellows and followers of Shakespeare.

But if ethical Laodiceanism works such havoc with aesthetic versatility, it is equally true that Puritan art-phobia culminates in the degeneration of righteousness into the perverse morality of the prig, the slanderer, the superstitious bigot, and the misanthrope. Whether with Aristotle we think of magnanimity, or with Paul we make charity fundamental, or with Confucius we call it reverence, we find that the fountain of the eternal youth of goodness is love or tolerance. With Kant we find another basis in freedom. And with Kant we recognize that to do a good deed to a fellow-man we must treat him not as a means but as an end in himself, we must find in him a value which is ultimate, intrinsic, absolute. Though beauty is dangerous to goodness, it is also helpful to goodness. Though goodness is dangerous to beauty, it is also helpful to beauty. Goodness implies choice, choice implies some fear and anger even in the minds of the most judicious, and as fear and anger stalk through the door love flies out at the window. Thus goodness destroys itself and may be reborn only with a reawakening of the aesthetic experience which glows with that love, toleration, and freedom which is the fountain of goodness and which inspires that recognition of ultimate values which safeguards the would-be doer of good deeds from degenerating into a utilitarian exploiter of persons as means to ends or at best a timorous doer of merely prudent deeds. And when the aesthetic experience is carried out completely or partially in a work of art, though the struggle with

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the stubborn medium may in a measure disrupt the harmonious sentiment which purifies the soul to do good, yet artistic technique reinforces righteousness, for technique is the mastery of the art-medium. It is the treating of iron as iron rather than as smooth polished wood, it is the treating of vibrating strings as strings, of clay not as ivory but as clay. The negro sculptor's respect for his smooth black wood as a medium or matter with its own peculiar qualities and limitations corresponds closely with that respect for the autonomy of the individual which is indispensable to ethical behavior. To enjoy beauty, then, if we do not tarry forever in the mere enjoyment of beauty, is to lay the only possible foundation for strictly ethical valuation and achievement.

Now as we go on to consider the problems which arise out of our attempts to give expression to our experience of beauty in a work of art, we must realize that the dissonances of beauty and goodness have different degrees of possible resolution in the different arts. With pure design and with pure architecture we may have an aesthetic rapport which is very remote from the maddening conflicts that seek solution in ethical valuing. Sculpture, whether as the handmaid of architecture or as a distinct art, will provoke the appreciator to turn from the enjoyment of beauty to the recognition and practice of good and evil just so far as it attempts to be representative, and so remind the onlooker of something besides itself. Similarly a painting which is nothing but an arrangement of light and shade, of hues, of lines and spaces, will never be a trumpet to the will. But a painting which is concerned with truth (in the sense of correspondence) as well as with beauty will sooner dismiss the mind from its presence and set it adrift with associations which must lead at last to the making of strenuous choices. Music, because its rhythms often evoke a dance implicit or overt, may pass rather quickly, as the ancient Greeks and contemporary primitives have recognized, into socially ethical activities or the reverse. The dance itself,

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whether ecstatic or pantomimic, may remain joyously aesthetic or pass into an instrument for the propagation of traditional morality or serve to incite heroic or hateful or sensual deeds. As for literature, the lyric tends to remain purely aesthetic, but the epic and drama have sometimes been direct inspirations of ethical insight and fulfilment, and the essay and novel have at times become ethical treatises with consequent loss of aesthetic value, but with considerable gain for ethics.

Of all the kinds of works of art the tragedy appears to come the nearest to the reconciliation of goodness and beauty. Aristotle's doctrine of the catharsis clearly recognizes this. But his philological and philosophical commentators are in disagreement regarding both the meaning and the validity of his theory. Whatever Aristotle meant, it is clear that in tragedy to a very high degree, and to a decreasing degree in the epic, the novel, the dance, music, painting, sculpture, the lyric, architecture, design, and the essay, emotions may be experienced without the injurious effects of repression or the distinctive intensification of certain activities. Under such circumstances emotions may not only be expressed, but they may be understood by those who express them far better than if they were intensifying the deeds of practical or moral life. Insight thus gained may temper these emotions when they serve as drives in later overt activities. It is clear also that catharsis may have a loftier significance, as Schopenhauer realized when he asserted that "The head of the god of the Muses with eyes fixed on the far distance stands so freely on his shoulders that it seems wholly delivered from the body and no more subject to its cares." After an evening in which we have been absorbed in the tremendous sufferings of Othello or Antigone and we pass forth into the open air to review the vicissitudes of our own life, we find these paltry by contrast. Like the Stoics we rise above our circumstances as we stride on in the buskins we have borrowed from the tragic personages with

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whom we have shared such profoundly portrayed passions. As Hegel knew, a work of art may purify us by showing us both the depths to which we might fall and the heights to which we might rise.

But the climactic truth for all those who wish to make their peace with both goodness and beauty was recognized for all time by Plato when he was most loyal to his own highest hopes. The experience of beauty, he knew, gives us faith that in his universe the good is gradually prevailing over the evil. As George Santayana gracefully and cogently rephrases it: "Beauty is a pledge of the possible conformity between the soul and nature, and consequently a ground of faith in the supremacy of the good." The experience of beauty, more than any other experience, weds us to the universe which has made us. And at such times we are filled with such peace and joy and so much of the strength of the strong man about to run a race that we cannot believe that all is vanity. The forms which inspire us to elaborate them into superforms seem to assure us of a growing mutuality born of an immanent love that saturates the universe, a love, to be sure, that is not omnipotent, but a love that may well be omnipotential.

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ART, TRUTH, AND CONDUCT

CHARLES E. WHITMORE

The present paper makes no pretense to an exhaustive treatment of the intricate relations of the three words which form its title. The aesthetic interest is but one among many; yet the very multiplication of contacts which the growth of human experience has entailed makes it advisable, from time to time, to cast a glance over the field, and to remind ourselves of the underlying principles to which current (and recurrent) controversies have reference. The importance of the relations of our three terms throughout the history of aesthetic speculation is ample excuse for such a reconsideration of them.

I

The controversies that have clustered about the relation of art to truth are reducible to two possible standpoints. It may be argued, on the one hand, that art cannot get at truth, and on the other that it is not concerned with truth. The former contention is as old as Plato; the latter is a development of more recent modes of thought. The former is more self-contained; the latter ramifies into the second of our two problems. Hence both order in time and relative simplicity lead us to take up the Platonic view for first consideration.

Plato's argument, as set forth in the tenth book of the *Republic,* is in substance that works of art imitate reality at three removes, with a loss of truth at each; that their makers possess not even true opinion about what they depict, but have no higher standard than that of the ignorant multitude. The idea of beauty is completely sundered from its visible manifestations; the latter merely imitate it in a kind of play or sport, far removed from that principle of numbering and measuring which is the better part of the soul. Worse yet, since the emotional element—which Plato regards as irra-

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tional, useless, and cowardly—furnishes the greatest variety of objects for imitation, no ground is left on which the value of art can be defended.

It is clear enough that this view is quite as much the outcome of Plato's prejudices as it is of any tenable philosophical principles. It is not based on any careful review of the arts, to determine whether it really is equally applicable to them all; in fact, it relies almost wholly on evidence drawn from painting and sculpture. Moreover, it neither analyzes the notion of "imitation" nor proves that any such series as it postulates must necessarily grow more inaccurate as it proceeds. A drawing or a document may be a more or a less accurate copy, and a subsequent one may correct the errors of a predecessor. It is, therefore, not surprising that even thinkers who might in the main agree with Plato in his scorn of the emotions have yet hesitated to accept his conclusions as a whole. Plotinus, for instance, defends the arts against the charge of being merely imitative by declaring that nature itself imitates the ideas, that the arts may go back to the principles from which nature proceeds, and that they may consequently add to nature where it falls short. Their possession of beauty is not a mere borrowing, but an intrinsic property.

In this contention Plotinus is really reverting to an argument advanced by Plato himself in the first book of the *Republic*, when he declares that every art provides for its own advantage or interest, and needs no correction from outside, but fulfils its function by providing for some defect in nature. In a passage in Book III he suggests yet another line of defense, on the analogy of the process of learning to read. Just as we tried to make out the letters of the alphabet wherever they might occur, and as, when we had learned them, we could recognize even their reflections in water or in a mirror, so we should try to recognize the forms of temperance and courage and liberality and magnificence and all their kindred, and also their opposites, wherever they occur, slighting them neither in

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small things nor in great, but regarding them all as belonging to the same art and study. Had Plato cared to look for the manifestations of beauty here below in this spirit, not thinking any of them small or despicable, he might have effected some salutary corrections of his general attitude, and even have discovered that the arts have a function in the universe —a function which, following Plotinus, we might define as that of intermediaries between absolute being and sensory experience.

If, then, there are no solid grounds for maintaining that truth is naturally inaccessible to art, the next question is obviously that of the kind of truth at which art may or should aim. For Plato, as we have just seen, it would be the literal copy of a reality external to itself; but it is hard to make out either what that reality would be or how the copying would be effected. Plato's own illustration of the carpenter who copies the "idea" of a bed as if it were literally before him is not a thing which we meet in actual experience; and even the notion of the artist as "copying" an actual object cannot be taken as a full account of the matter. We can, indeed, conceive of a painter reproducing a scene or a person as accurately as possible; yet we know, on the one hand, that such reproduction often has little or no aesthetic value, and on the other that such value has often little or no connection with accurate reproduction of any perceptible object. Moreover, when we turn to literature or music, where are we to find, in the majority of cases, any specific model which the artist can be said to "copy"?

Certainly the road to a clear view of artistic truth does not lie in this direction; and as a result, a bold attempt has been made to elude the difficulty by asserting that art has nothing to do with objective truth—that it exists in and for itself, owing no allegiance to external standards. But since this view in its simplest shape also entails difficulties, it comes to be qualified in various ways. It is held, for instance, that art

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seeks to give a suggestion of truth without its substance, that its aim is not truth but "things like truth"—a notion which has sometimes been used to modify the notion of literal copying, or, again, interpreted in terms of conscious illusion or deception. We consent, it is argued, to regard a thing as being what it is not, because we derive pleasure from the assumption and we are not obliged to ask any further sanction. Art, on this view, is self-contained and self-sustaining.

We may well feel, in surveying these divergences, that we are confronted by a situation not unknown elsewhere in aesthetics—a situation, that is, in which several partial views are put forward as if they were mutually exclusive, when in reality they are applicable to some parts of the entire field and not to others. Moreover, we can scarcely avoid feeling that truth is a somewhat elusive term, especially in its applications to concrete experience. We may call a thing "true" because it accurately reproduces something else (as a copy of a document reproduces its original), or because it corresponds to something else in a determinate way (as a working drawing corresponds to the finished machine, or a map to the country mapped), or because it coherently unites a large body of otherwise unrelated items (as a scientific generalization). Now these are obviously very different senses, and if we apply them indiscriminately we are fairly sure to come to grief. A drawing may be accurate in linear perspective, and yet reproduce very distant objects with an unnatural clearness; a novel may correspond to the broad facts of life, and yet be in no sense a copy of any actual set of scenes and characters; and in what sense shall we call a Chopin prelude "true"? Clearly, we must analyze before we can proceed.

Our first step should, it seems, be a recognition of the part played here by the closeness of any given art to concrete experience. Where such contact is either very slight or very loose, there is apparently no point in raising the question of "truth" at all. A glazed Persian tile, for instance, either does or does

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not evoke an aesthetic reaction in an observer. If it does not, it is not for him an aesthetic object; if it does, the pleasantness of the reaction is a fact, but a fact which stands pretty much by itself, and requires no subsequent justification. Much the same holds of certain aspects of painting, of the greater part of music, and of such forms of poetry as are most akin to music. But where, in any form of pictorial art or of literature, there is explicit reference to an actuality external to the work itself, the center of that reference is obviously no longer in the work. If a painting depicts a well-known building or scene, it is idle to contend that its painter has absolutely no responsibility toward the things there visible; if a novel purports to describe a certain level of life, it is equally idle to contend that it can entirely neglect plausibility. The two factors at work here are, on the one hand, the unaesthetic character of uninterpreted unmodified fact and, on the other, the interest normally aroused by any sort of personal interpretation. Here, as elsewhere, there is a middle ground between the fact which resists artistic treatment and the treatment which is too scornful of the fact; and we have, indeed, another aspect of the suitability of a given piece of experience for aesthetic treatment at all. Certain facts, so far as we can see, admit of only one interpretation, and if that is not an aesthetic one, no more can be said; certain others admit of a variety of interpretations, and this variety may extend to their aesthetic possibilities. Several paintings, all equally satisfactory and all different, may be made of the same spot, several portraits painted of the same man, several novels based substantially on the same plot; and in all such cases the question of "truth" has shifted again, no longer resting merely on fidelity to presented fact, but now, in addition, on fidelity to the artist's intention.

The step to which this brings us is obviously that of asking how far we are prepared to surrender our own view of the facts, if we have one, to the demands of that intention. The

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crucial question now becomes, Is the artist's interpretation a widening of experience, or a departure from experience? If it seems to us the former, we shall yield to his guidance; if the latter, we shall dissent, to a degree, perhaps, which will abolish our aesthetic reaction, though we may still feel the interest of strangeness or of curiosity. But the only way to verify either conclusion is by our own reaction, with all the inevitable variations which may attend that process. What seems at first a mere personal whimsy may be found to be a new conception; what seems to be a fresh vision may at length prove to have no genuine root in experience. Who shall say in advance whether the body of facts which he uses as a touchstone is adequate to that end? And if we stubbornly refuse to accept the corrections which a wider experience would bring, how can our power of aesthetic response fail to become hopelessly atrophied? It is indeed true that the work of art chooses its recipient, and that the recipient must prove himself worthy of the choice.

It thus becomes clear that the question how far any work of art should aim at some form of "truth" must be subordinate to the primary need of maintaining conditions which will make possible the aesthetic reaction. In the simpler cases these conditions are secured by the nature of the given artistic process, and only in them can we properly affirm that such considerations as those of truth are wholly extraneous; for the greater the body of experience dealt with, the more complicated must be the relations which it involves. If the artist wishes to keep as far as possible from the implications of ordinary experience, he should select a form of art which will enable him to do so, and not one which forces him to a continual and fruitless struggle with both material and process. But the concrete case with its result must, as always, be the deciding factor. The new aesthetic value may emerge from unpromising surroundings, and when it has so emerged it can be estimated according to the relations which it bears to other parts of experi-

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ence; and if aspects of truth are included among these relations, they may claim their turn, but no more.

Where these questions of truth do come into account, the most profitable distinction for aesthetic purposes seems to be that between truth of impression and truth of scrutiny. Many aspects of the universe are less permanent than others without thereby becoming less genuine; and though they will bear less weight of testing and examination, they are yet amenable to artistic treatment. Effects of light and color under changing conditions of atmosphere and season, momentary blends of timbre in combinations of musical instruments, are obvious examples. A world deprived of mists and sunset colorings would be notably impoverished, and it is absurd to contend that because such features lack the solidity of a granite bowlder they are therefore unreal. And the same principle holds of aspects of the inner life, many shades of which can only be suggested, not held steadily before us, unless art intervenes to give them permanence in its sphere. The solid body of facts, which one can walk around and scrutinize, assuredly has its place and its importance; but the play of light and color over it, whether literally or in our apprehension, is just as truly present for the sensitive observer. Should we feel it an adequate account of the aesthetic value of a great cathedral to enumerate all its constituent parts, to record all its dimensions, to estimate its weight and its capacity, and to stop there? We should have truth of a sort; but not the whole truth, and certainly not the whole aesthetic truth.

Moreover, it by no means follows that truth of impression is easier to come by, or more trivial, than truth of scrutiny. It often depends on a degree of sensitiveness, or on a patience of observation, which scrutiny can hardly rival; indeed, it may count scrutiny as a prerequisite, to which it adds those effects of breadth and spaciousness which are its own peculiar contribution. Just as the sweeping view of a landscape makes up in sense of wider relations for what it loses in specific detail, so

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scrutiny must be supplemented by impression. Both in artist and in recipient a misdirected perseverance may prove hopelessly unable to reveal or to retain a genuine aesthetic value. The facts are there, and are insisted on; only, they are there to no aesthetic purpose. But attempts to arrive at a valid impression without preparatory labor are equally futile; they are like attempts to make attar of roses without rose-leaves. Rightly employed, both impression and scrutiny have their inalienable functions; wrongly employed, neither leads to any sound result, no matter how enthusiastic its partisans; and the kinds of truth accessible to each need to be kept carefully apart.

A right view of the place of truth in art thus depends on a right understanding of the double reference of fact. Sometimes the reference is to fact as fact, sometimes to fact as already interpreted and transformed by the artist; or, yet again, to the simple existence of the attractive object, in which case the question of "truth" need not be raised at all. The guiding clue in the whole tangle is simply this: art is not a substitute for experience, but a product of experience, and hence it need not, and often cannot, retain all the properties of the experience in which it originated. The painted fruit may momentarily deceive the birds; but it cannot otherwise replace the actual fruit, and to invoke some theory of "conscious self-deception" in the hope of showing that it can is to reduce art to the level of a sleight-of-hand performance. Truth is neither inaccessible to art nor a matter of no concern to it; but the particular kind of truth—whether conformity to a specific model or conformity to the traits and course of experience as a whole—must be manifested in the individual work, and nowhere else.

II

If we take "conduct" as an inclusive term which will cover ethical or moral considerations as well as those of simple activity, we find that it involves even more problems than does

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the consideration of truth. To make even a cursory inspection of the most disputable points which the course of speculation has revealed, we must employ at least three heads: the extent to which conduct is directly reflected in art, on the one hand, and the relation of the practice or the reception of art to artist and to recipient respectively, on the other.

Remembering Aristotle's dictum that "the good is always in action, while beauty is found also in motionless things," we may expect to discover that a class of aesthetic objects exists in connection with which the question of conduct is not raised, but also that this is not the sole class of aesthetic objects. The former expectation is fully satisfied by the group of simply pleasurable objects which, as we saw, did not raise the question of truth. A bowl of richly colored nasturtiums in nature, a richly glazed vase or tile in art, exist as sources of keen visual pleasure, requiring no further guaranty of truth than the recognition of that existence, and demanding no course of action. But there are works of art which seem to depict conduct, and others which seem to aim at exercising some influence over it. We cannot, without absurdity, say that no genuine form of art has any relation to conduct, for we should have at once to rule out at least a large part of literature, if nothing more; nor should we, without definite proof, assert that art can have no influence on the conduct of artist or of recipient. The latter statement may be true, but it is by no means self-evident. In practice, at all events, it seems very hard to keep considerations of conduct from creeping in, whether or not they belong there; and since artists have in fact not been content to keep art at the purely decorative level, we need not wonder that it should be so. The dilemma is clear enough: either restriction to arts and media in which the ethical question cannot be raised, or a frank meeting of the issue when it is raised.

It is raised most clearly, of course, in the forms of art which have chief reference to action—narrative literature

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(including drama), painting, sculpture. It is true that Greek theory, as reflected in Plato and Aristotle, assigned an important place to music as both portraying and influencing character, Plato even going so far as to assert that changes in musical modes produce important political effects. Modern opinion would hardly go so far in the case of music; but hostility to the drama and the novel on the one hand, and to painting and sculpture on the other, has long been rife, and is by no means extinct. The iconoclastic controversy in the early Middle Ages, the seventeenth-century debate on the immorality and profaneness of the stage, are but the higher points of a long range, which stretches through the history of art from the days of Plato to our own. Whether well founded or not, it is a state of mind which must be reckoned with.

Unfortunately for sober discussion, it is usually very hard to decide whether untoward developments in the arts are causes or effects. Sometimes what is at issue is merely a question of taste; sometimes objectionable products are obviously the outcome of general conditions, which they follow, not initiate. It would probably be a futile task, and certainly a very lengthy one, to work through all such controversies, in the hope of reaching some generally acceptable conclusion as to their basis and justification. A step toward analysis of the situation, however, may be made by pointing out that, just as we found that questions of truth were more or less relevant, according to the nature of the experience in which they were implicated, so we find questions of conduct more or less pressing according to the nature of the experience and to the attitude of the observer toward it. If the moral implications of a certain experience are irrelevant to the expression of an aesthetic value, they need not be brought in; if they are but slightly relevant, they can be kept in the background. But the difficulty comes in deciding whether they really are irrelevant; and since there are strong emotional motives on both sides, there is abundant ground for controversy and dissent. On the

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one hand, those who feel the imperativeness of moral considerations are led to depreciate or to attack the value of the aesthetic; on the other, those whose view of their relative importance is the reverse are led to argue that ethical considerations have no place in art whatever. Both attacks and defenses of this sort have probably done more to cloud the situation than to clarify it; and those who maintain both that standards change and that excessive divorce from life leads art to impoverishment and ultimate extinction need not be much concerned over these extreme positions.

There exists, however, a subtle attempt to evade such views, the counterpart in this field of the doctrine of verisimilitude in the field of truth, which does demand our attention. It is argued, that is to say, that in cases where a moral question is involved in a situation, the true aesthetic attitude is to disregard it, or, if possible, never to discover it. The aesthetic level, on this view, is one of primeval innocence, before the distinction of good and evil has intruded; and it may even be held that it is the aim and the service of art to restore us to that level, and to release us from the entanglements of reflection.

The obvious reply to any such argument is that in any case where a moral implication is genuinely present, it can scarcely be overlooked without maiming the full sense of the experience. The child's sense of a situation may be vivid at the same time that it is uncomprehending; are we therefore to say that it is better than the fulness of understanding? Indeed, one may venture to guess that the child's actual sense, could we get at it, might prove to be startlingly different from the adult's notion of it. The difficulty with all suppositions of a "state of innocence" is that we have little or no direct experience of such a state, and the effort to recover it (if recovery it be) may mean a disturbance of the whole mature personality. The very process of acquiring experience necessarily means a "loss of innocence," if we like to put it so; that is the

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very nature of finite experience, and a fact that has compensations as well as losses. If, then, issues of conduct are among the matters which the growth of experience reveals to us, ought we to maintain that a vigorous and genuine art should have nothing to say to them?

As a matter of fact, even the professed defenders of the divorce of art and conduct have seldom been content to rest their case on such grounds when it comes to concrete instances of controversy. They are much inclined to fall back on the assertion that the accepted moral standards are purely conventional (as they often are to some degree), and that the censured artists are really defending morality, or profitably widening the conception of it. Sometimes the plea is genuine, sometimes it is merely specious or cynical; but the fact that it is so often brought forward is added proof of the futility of contending that art and moral issues are wholly separate—even if we grant that in many of the controversies neither art nor morality appears to the best advantage, and that the true interests of neither are likely to be served by controversies of the sort.

It is clear, however, that we can make nothing of the relations of art and conduct "in general." Aesthetically speaking, such questions cannot arise until the issue has been raised by and in a specific work; and even then so much prejudice and confusion may accumulate as to make right decision difficult. It seems to be true that a work which offends some appears harmless or even profitable to others; how shall we settle the degree in which a work is responsible to those who take it in the wrong spirit? Again, just as a too conscious search for beauty may be found to end in failure, is it not possible that a too deliberate bringing out of moral values may defeat its own purpose? Certainly, in a good many cases the emphasis on a moral issue is not attended by a corresponding artistic merit; a tragedy, for instance, which carefully observes a conventional "poetic justice" is not thereby necessarily better than

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one that does not. It would seem that the artist must be allowed a tolerable amount of freedom to state his case, before the merit of the case can be determined; and it is important to note that some works which might exercise a corrupting influence are really bare records of fact, not properly aesthetic at all, so that artistic grounds cannot fairly be invoked in their defense.

Taking this, then, as what may most broadly be said about a very perplexed and perplexing topic, we may turn to the more specific questions of conduct as related to individual artists and recipients. It is important to note that the problem takes different directions in the two classes. As regards the former, we are concerned with the effect of previous conduct on the production and character of a work; as regards the latter, with the effect of the work on subsequent conduct; and in the case of the artist, after he has produced, we may ask how his subsequent conduct is affected by production. These aspects need to be kept apart in thought, but they also have elements in common. They are related to the variation in the width of the aesthetic response just as the problem of art and truth is related to the idea of the variation of closeness to experience in the several arts. The aesthetic response is demonstrably capable of wider or narrower range, according to the ability of its possessor to maintain its peculiar nature without a break. Consequently, any issue in action may be near to or far from the original aesthetic stimulus; or, to put it otherwise, a stimulus which would provoke action in one person need not do so in another. This principle holds of both artists and recipients, but with modifications in the two groups.

The relation of previous conduct to actual work in the artist is often hard, if not impossible, to make out; it is, indeed, only one aspect of the difficulty of showing how a given work of art comes into existence at all. Sometimes we can trace a fairly direct taking over of previous experience, and the working out of a fairly definite program; but in other

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cases we can see nothing of the sort, and the artist himself may be wholly unable to enlighten us. It would be feasible, though perhaps not very illuminating, to arrange a scale of artists along the line between these two extremes. In the same way, the ethical sensitiveness of an artist may not be directly related to the quality of his experience, or to his attitude toward it. A certain roughness or coarseness in the rendering of fact may co-exist with real moral soundness; and a discrimination that is highly delicate may yet exercise itself on matters which are really unfit for treatment. There is no guaranty that a marked degree of rectitude will produce good artistic results, or that the absence of it will be a fatal obstacle. Here, as always, the only safe ground for discussion is the actual case; and there seems to be little or no ground for supposing that the artist "as such" differs radically from other men in his moral outlook, or that we should expect to find conditions in him which are not equally exemplified in them.

For similar reasons, we need not expect to be able to set up any exact correlations between impression and action in a recipient; for in him too there will be the same possibility of a wide range in the extent of the aesthetic sensitiveness. Some truly sensitive persons yet seem unable to keep themselves and their interests out of the aesthetic reaction, others can do so to a marked degree. Some relate everything to their own experience, and are cold to what they cannot account for in terms of it, others can take keen pleasure in what is seemingly most remote from their ordinary life. Presumably both extremes, like the parallel extremes in the case of artists, express real factors in the aesthetic experience—on the one hand the need of contact with experience, on the other the need of widening it. Consequently, it may in one case prove possible to show that the reaction aroused by a given work has a definite issue in conduct, whereas in another any such connection cannot in the least be established.

But does this absence of exact correlation between art and

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conduct in so many cases imply that they are entirely unrelated? By no means. To point to the extreme instances of divorce—as in certain artists and despots of the Italian Renaissance—is to note only a portion of the facts; and it is equally true that such divorce is found elsewhere. Cases of it have not been unknown in religion, and it is indeed only one aspect of that strange contradictoriness of human nature which sees the better and follows the worse, as moralists have been telling us for centuries. Once more, it is absurd to emphasize in the field of art problems which are not at all its peculiar possession. However much partisan feeling on either side tries to set up the artist as a man apart, he remains a man none the less, and art remains a part of human experience. The effort to express or to respond to aesthetic experience as fully and accurately as possible is a line of conduct like any other; subject to the general conditions of conduct like any other, but, like any other, susceptible of discussion only on its own merits. The effort to keep art and conduct absolutely sundered is inherently absurd; but so is the effort to subject artistic activity to standards which would not be enforced elsewhere.

The root of the matter is admirably summed up in André Gide's statement that every representative of the idea tends to prefer himself to the idea which he manifests, and that the yielding to that temptation is his essential error. This applies equally to artist and to recipient. Overinsistence on the value of one's own experience will in either almost surely distort or falsify the discovery or the reception of the aesthetic value. In the artist, it will render him too disdainful of sober observation and attentive working out; in the recipient, it will render him obtuse to whatever does not at once approve itself to his humors and prejudices. As we have all along seen, the right adjustment of aesthetic perceptions to other considerations must be a delicate task, not to be accomplished by any rough and ready means. The intrusion of one's own person-

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ality out of due season will break the charm; whereas sincerity and modesty (ethical qualities, surely!) will preserve it. Once the aesthetic result has been achieved, it may be tested by considerations derived from other fields; but it must be achieved first, and the business of all concerned with it must be to encourage nothing which will interfere with its attainment.

What, in conclusion, is to be said of the specific effects of the aesthetic experience on the conduct of a recipient? They cannot, by their very nature, be broad and obvious. Indeed, the idea that beauty may be a stimulus to conduct (at least, desirable conduct) is one which many find it hard to accept. All men are in some degree responsive to the broader emotional appeals, but susceptibility to the finer promptings of beauty, being a less frequent trait, comes to be overlooked. Yet a few general results can be pointed to with some confidence. One is the invigorating effect of intensity, that usual accompaniment of a genuine aesthetic experience, which may react beneficially in giving us a heightened sense of the significance of life. Another is the opportunity to become familiar with new ranges of experience, with points of view not our own, leading to the development of insight and sympathy. A third is the general growth of sensitiveness and discrimination which will normally attend the weighing and scrutinizing of aesthetic values as actually embodied with full justice to the nature of the inciting experience and to the capacities of the medium employed. How far all these are realized for any individual recipient is for him alone to say. Nevertheless, they seem to argue for a possible effect on conduct in the large which deserves commending, and which is not discredited by any aberrations which can conceivably be brought forward. More than this it is not the business of any sane aesthetic theory to uphold.

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III

A candid survey of such problems as we have traversed in this paper may well lead us to think that what has chiefly confused the discussion of them is a tendency to treat beauty as a variable idea, whereas the ideas of truth or conduct by which it is to be tested are fixed and readily applicable. In fact, however, they are no less variable than beauty itself; and where allowance for that is not made, it is not strange that fallacies have resulted. We have to deal, not with entities which can be promptly and accurately measured, but with qualities of a situation which are thrown into a different perspective according as we shift our point of view. Some would hold that this means that we are thrown back on mere personal likes and dislikes, beyond the possibility of gaining or applying any definite standards. Before accepting such an opinion, however, it would be well to consider what standards are, and for what purpose they are actually framed.

A standard, whether of measurement or of procedure, is devised for the attaining of practical settlements. A standard of length is made in order to help us decide what a given length shall be held to be, a standard of coinage to help us regulate commercial transactions, and so on. It is established by the authority of general consent, because in its absence there would be no fixed point of reference in cases of dispute. Where the need of decision is not sharply felt, conflicting standards may exist, as with primitive weights and coinages; and strong habit, or strong national feeling, may keep up such divergences for a long time. Even civilized countries have not today attained either a uniform coinage or a uniform system of weights and measures. The impulse which leads to greater uniformity is simply the recognition of practical inconveniences, and the basis on which agreement is effected is either the widest current custom or some point of reference which occurs naturally. Why, for instance, do we choose the freez-

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ing point of water as a point of reference for measuring temperature? Obviously, because water is so widely diffused that its behavior is both readily observable and a matter of great practical importance. So, again, the length of a foot or a yard is obviously proportioned to the dimensions and the activities of the human body.

The application of a standard is easiest and most decisive in relatively simple cases. It is comparatively easy to measure a length in feet, or a weight in pounds; but the most accurate decision on such points may leave untouched others of great importance. Counting will tell us whether a given number of eggs is or is not a dozen, but not whether they are good or bad; a pair of scales will tell us whether a piece of butter weighs a pound, but not whether it is fresh or rancid. In other words, the most undisputed matters are the simplest; to deal with the more complex situations which we encounter with at least equal frequency, we need not only additional standards, but a far greater delicacy in the application of them.

How far, then, are standards either requisite or applicable in aesthetic matters? Standards of approval determined by the consensus of a large body of opinion are always bound to exist, so long as human minds are partially similar; but what part will they play, or what practical needs will compel their enforcement? Obviously their application to matters so complex as aesthetic reactions of a higher sort cannot be carried far; and few practical needs for enforcement appear on the surface. In one case, indeed, that of language, the need of prompt and unmistakable communication supplies such a compulsion, yet only in a broad and general way, compatible with a large amount of dialectical variation. No visible source of central linguistic authority appears to exist, unless it be such a self-perpetuating body as the French Academy; and the decrees of such a body, even within its own linguistic sphere, are valid only in so far as they are accepted. In the case of the other arts, the efficiency of academies seems still

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more dubious, and the necessity of objective standards even less.

There remains, however, the possibility of establishing points of reference for certain definite purposes in the shape of types. A type, in this sense, is simply a work which embodies as completely as possible some trait of its form or of its medium, with the smallest possible admixture of anything else. This does not mean either that the typical work is a kind of average, or that it sets up an ideal to which other works must conform on pain of failure. It must manifest its chief trait in a conspicuous degree; but it may be selected in pursuance of a particular interest, and have no application whatever to a different sort of case. Types, therefore, serve for particular conveniences of study, and to set them up as standards which may not be departed from is wholly to mistake their proper function. The ultimate test of the satisfaction derived from any given work is our own feeling, not any conformity with an outside standard, except in so far as such conformity indicates a general condition affecting the perception of aesthetic value—a condition, therefore, which does not bear on the essence of the particular case.

The upshot of this discussion is simply that all valid standards and types are derived from observation of artistic processes and results, and are not framed first and applied to the facts afterward. The way to ascertain the capacities of a particular form, the traits of a particular medium, is to examine what has actually been done, not to speculate on what might, could, or should have been done. In spite of what the Platonists have told us, it does not appear that standards of beauty are innate in man, or that art has an inherent power of its own which enables it to shape an otherwise intractable material. All aesthetic qualities must first be judged with reference to a concrete object, the work of an individual artist (or of artists in collaboration), all the arts being only the totality of such objects and such endeavors. Yet this position surely involves

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no relegation of the aesthetic to the realm of mere caprice; or, if it does, it is in no other sense than could be applied to the other ideas with which beauty is supposed to be contrasted. The effort to discover all the relevant manifestations of beauty throughout human history, and to react to them with perfect sensitiveness and with full recognition of their purport, is an achievement beyond the power of any individual; and no one who is capricious or irresponsible is likely to come anywhere near it.

If we understand by "logic" a continuity which can be held in thought, the various portions of which can be traversed in an orderly and coherent manner, we may speak of a logic of beauty with as much warrant as we do of a logic of truth, or a logic of conduct. The three circles, so to figure them, are not coincident, or even strictly concentric, at least in any individual; whatever may be the case with a more inclusive experience, it is for us only a pious aspiration to say that "beauty is truth, truth beauty." Yet in most men the three centers are fairly close together, the resulting circles more or less overlap; and for the adequate development of personality the content of each must be organized both in itself and in its relations to the others. It might plausibly be argued that in the central portion of a true personality they would blend, and that only at its outer portion could they be measurably independent; so that the divorces which we find in certain cases are an index not of true personality, but of its absence.

However this may be, it is evident that the observance of such a basic logic has much to do with the attainment of beauty, and that neglect of it lies at the root of many failures to achieve artistic success, where the surface conditions seem wholly favorable. The readiness to grasp the immediately occurring, the obvious, the facile; the impatience of restraint, the desire for swift and visible progress, the intrusion of personality at the wrong time—all these cannot fail to be ultimately fatal to real achievement. Theoretically, from a single

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perfect line, a single adequate impression, it should be possible to deduce a work of accomplished beauty; and the isolation of such glimpses in work otherwise mediocre or worse than mediocre is in large measure due to just the disinclination to master the bearings of the motive, and to give all its relevant implications full expression. This cannot be achieved by any mere passive waiting for inspiration, or by any temporizing with short cuts or makeshifts; it demands steady mental application both to the inciting experience and to the medium which is being handled.

If such an account of the process of attaining aesthetic values be correct (and for my part I am convinced that it is), it is easy to see that no extensive practice of it is possible without taking the problems of truth and of conduct into account. There are, to be sure, considerable tracts of experience in which mere immediate pleasantness is an adequate aesthetic criterion; but its limitation is shown by the very fact that art has never been content to remain permanently within them. Only a rather feeble aesthetic activity could be content so to remain; and fortunately there have always been both artists and recipients who have been more vigorous and more courageous. This does not mean that every effort to extend the aesthetic sphere has been crowned with success; it does mean that even the failures have sometimes been instructive, and that without the effort which led to them the highest successes of art would never have been gained.

UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN

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BOOK REVIEWS

THE YOUNG DELINQUENT. By Cyril Burt, M.A., D.Sc. University of London Press, 1925. Pp. xx+643.

This is the most valuable contribution to the psychology of childhood and adolescence which has been written in this country. As psychologist in the Education Department of the London County Council, Professor Burt has had unrivaled opportunities of studying the child life of London, and he here gives us the fruits of his labors. Although written in an easy style, the book is none the less the presentation of a piece of scientific research, and its findings have the value which scientific analysis alone can bestow. The present volume is the first of a series of three "designed to cover the main forms of mental subnormality to be met with among the young."

Treating delinquency as an effect, the author enters upon a psychological analysis of the conditions which can be regarded as causal of a conflict between the individual and organized society. "A child is to be regarded as technically a delinquent when his antisocial tendencies become so grave that he becomes, or ought to become, the subject of official action." Using two hundred consecutive cases of juvenile delinquency of which he possesses first-hand knowledge, Professor Burt makes a thorough investigation of each case with reference to five conditions: Hereditary, environmental, physical, intellectual, and temperamental. Statistical conclusions are arrived at only after comparison of the delinquent group with a control non-delinquent group. This control group is composed of four hundred children of the same age, same social class, often from the same streets, and attending the same schools as the delinquent group.

Hereditary conditions.—Under these are included physical, intellectual, and temperamental traits, e.g., tuberculosis, syphilis, mental deficiency, illiteracy, minor neuropathic symptoms, alcoholism, wandering, idleness. As many as four-fifths of the delinquents examined "could plead no history among their kindred of any definable crime." When the statistics of the delinquent group are compared with those of the non-delinquent group, the frequency ratio shows that hereditary conditions are found three times more frequently in the former than in the latter.

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Yet "the number of children who might be said to have criminal blood in their veins is after all comparatively trifling." "What has to be faced is no single disposition to crime inherited as such, but numerous underlying weaknesses of all degrees of gravity."

Environmental conditions.—The conditions of the home are distinguished from those of the school, of the streets, or of the place of employment. More than half the cases of delinquency are found in homes classed as "very poor" or "poor." Comparative tables show that delinquency is more closely associated with overcrowding than with poverty, while defective family relationships and lack of discipline in the home are even more influential than these material conditions. An interesting map shows the local incidence of delinquency in London electoral areas. In considering what can be done for the delinquent when home environment is the major causal factor in delinquency, the author gives his readers a succinct account of the institutions to which a child may be sent under the Children's Act of 1908. He concludes: "Removal, however, should always be a last, or a late, resource. After all, wherever it is feasible and wherever the child himself is not already beyond reform, to improve the child's own home forms a far better policy than to take the child away from it." Of the conditions outside the home the most important influence is that of companions of his own age and sex. The influence of the group on the individual is very great, but Professor Burt finds that it is rarely in itself the cause of delinquency. Given some predisposing cause, it is a powerful accessory. In this analysis he differs from Professor Healy, who regards the group as itself generating the impulses which lead to delinquency.

Physical conditions.—In the course of normal development adolescence is a critical period for the boy or girl, but there is not any conclusive evidence of a direct connection between adolescence and crime. It is a fact that the majority of habitual offenders commit their first offense in adolescence. In evaluating this fact it must, however, be remembered that the offense which brings them into conflict with society may not be the beginning of misconduct. Strain and lack of self-control make the period a difficult one, and treatment through what may be a temporary outbreak of delinquency is highly desirable. A plea is made for a more careful study of the individual before his commitment to a Borstal institution or to jail. The establishment of juvenile colonies would meet the needs of many, while a greater use might be made of fines and supervision by probation officers. Turning to definite physical defects, nervous complaints—such as chorea, sleepy sickness, and epilepsy—are shown to

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be predisposing causes for delinquency. So, too, is the irritation arising from even such minor defects as chronic catarrh and adenoids. Such illnesses are found one and one-quarter times more frequently in the delinquent than in the parallel non-delinquent group. Defective sight or hearing handicaps the sufferer in everyday life and cuts him off from some sources of interest and amusement. The efforts to cover up errors consequent on the disability may lead directly to deceit and lying.

Intellectual conditions.—"Mental defect is beyond all controversy . . . . a notable factor in the production of crime." Mental defectives are found five times more frequently in the group of delinquents than in the control parallel group of non-delinquents. Can one wonder that Professor Burt regards it as imperative that all young delinquents should be examined by intelligence tests? "Whatever additional evidence may be taken into account, such tests should always be applied." By the Mental Deficiency Act of 1913 it is the duty of local educational authorities to ascertain which children in their area are mentally defective. Were such children given sufficient supervision early, "then the number who bungle into crime would rapidly diminish." The defective cannot hold before his mind restraining motives: he does not clearly foresee the consequences of actions; he may be a tool in hands of another; he may be governed blindly by emotions and instincts. The type of crime committed by the defective bears some relation to the degree of his deficiency. The delinquency of the lowest-grade defective is wandering, cruelty, wanton mischief. Theft is committed by those of a higher grade, and sexual offenses are commonest among the highest grade of defective girls. Segregation, rather than sterilization, is advanced for the defective of immoral tendencies. His more rigorous demarcation of the class "mentally defective" is one reason why Professor Burt's figures here are less striking than those of some American investigators. From the mentally defective he distinguishes the dull and backward. Taking retardation as a basis of differentiation, children who are retarded by more than 30 per cent of their chronological age are judged to be defective, while children retarded by less than 30 per cent, but by more than 15 per cent, of their age are styled "dull." Among these latter children there are two main types: the aggressive, who are disobedient, mischievous; the apathetic, who are foolish, idle, badly kept. Both types need special classes to give them such training as they are capable of receiving. Lack of suitable interests and the degradation of their low position in the classes of an ordinary school increase the susceptibility of these children to bad influences. Not only the subnormal school child, but also the supernor-

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mal, may be found in the ranks of the delinquent. The boy or girl who is "too clever" may be tempted to crime if his occupation fails to give him full scope. Ability in itself is never the cause of crime, but when a motive is supplied any special ability may be turned to criminal account. The dexterous boy is aided by his neat-handedness in opening a till; the verbalist, by his persuasive fluency in begging. Study of the day dreams and fantasies of the delinquent throws light on the emotions and impulses which have influenced him. A vivid imagination and a persuasive tongue make certain courses easy: lying, calumny, and mystery-making. The account given of the anonymous letters written by an adolescent girl influenced by a stepmother complex is particularly enlightening.

Temperamental conditions.—These conditions require different methods for their evaluation from those employed in testing intelligence. Professor Burt made use of methods of expression and methods of impression. In the former the individual's response, whether reflex or impulsive, is taken as an index of emotional conditions. Under this heading fall the psycho-galvanic reflex, the pulse rate, and association reaction times. In the methods of impression the emotion is indicated by the character of the situation making an appeal to, or an impression on, the individual, e. g., his memory of pictures, his assessment of persons, or judgment of incidents. The book follows the classification of the emotional and instinctive tendencies given by Dr. McDougall. These tendencies fall into two main categories: sthenic, or strong instincts, and asthenic, or weak instincts. Examples of the former are anger, acquisitiveness, sex, assertiveness; of the latter, grief, tenderness, fear, submissiveness. On the whole the sthenic instinctive tendencies are more marked in the male and the asthenic in the female. It is the sthenic which supply the impulses that lead more directly to conflict with society, and it is the male population which is markedly more criminal than the female. Professor Burt follows the new psychology in recommending sublimation as the method of correcting dangerous instinctive tendencies. The worst temperamental defect is instability. Here, uncontrolled by any permanent interest or sentiment, the emotions are experienced with great intensity and in ever changing variety. "Among all the innate psychological characteristics of the delinquent, a marked emotionality is the most frequent, as it is one of the most influential" (p. 514). Treatment of the unstable must vary with the type. There are those in whom emotional stress is repressed and those in whom it is unrestrained. The building up of habits and the formation of permanent sources of interest may do much to bring control. The danger of repressed complexes is very great. The step-

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mother complex (a hate sentiment), the authority complex, the self-regarding complexes of inferiority and superiority are common types. A sympathetic confidant may discover the source of trouble which lies behind the impulse leading to delinquency and may help the individual to straighten out his complex. In some cases it is necessary to resort to psychoanalysis. The author, however, urges that this method should be used with great discretion in dealing with children of school age. "The psychologist will . . . . be wiser if he foregoes the uncertain benefits of a ruthless rummage rather than risk the surer perils that may arise when these turbulent interests are stirred up." About 10 per cent of the delinquents examined showed symptoms of a definite neurosis: neurasthenia, obsession neurosis, or hysteria. For such cases hospital treatment is needed.

Turning to the general conclusions which emerge from this exhaustive analysis of cases it is clear that both environmental and hereditary conditions are at work in producing the delinquent. Heredity works indirectly through such constitutional conditions as poor health, dull or defective intelligence, unbalanced temperament. Environment works through the conditions of the home and the social group, those of the home being more influential. Psychological factors, whether inherited or of the environment, are more important than material, and emotional are more influential than intellectual. "Crime is the outcome of many confluents" (p. 600). For the sake of emphasis it is worth putting together the chief reforms which the book shows to be urgent:

1. The establishment of psychological clinics for the efficient examination and study of delinquents.

2. A medical and psychological examination of all delinquents.

3. Greater discrimination in treatment: a greater use of supervision and of fines, greater use of boarding out. Consequently, (*a*) an increased number of properly trained probation officers; (*b*) the establishment of detention homes where children could be kept for short periods in order that they might be studied individually and helped effectively; (*c*) juvenile colonies for those whose offense does not render a reformatory desirable.

4. Improved after-care facilities for the mentally defective.

5. Hospitals for the temperamentally unstable.

6. Revision of the defining clauses of the Mental Deficiency Act of 1913 in order to meet the cases of the temperamentally unstable.

7. Special teaching for backward and dull, as distinguished from defective, children.

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The Young Delinquent will repay study by all who have any responsibility for children, whether as parents or guardians, as teachers, or as state officials.

BEATRICE EDYELL

LONDON, ENGLAND

PRIMITIVE MENTALITY. By Lucien Lévy-Bruhl, Professor at the Sorbonne. Translated by Lillian A. Clare. New York: The Macmillan Co., 1923.

This work is a sequel to the author's earlier book on the mental functioning of primitive peoples. That book stressed the primitive's participation in the mystic nature of all that surrounds him, the fact that he lives simultaneously in the seen and the unseen, and his indifference to logical contradictions. The present work enlarges upon these points and emphasizes the determinism and the persistence against evidence of the customary way of thinking. The presentation is marked by clarity of classification, directness of statement, and a great wealth of illustration. The method is that of selecting certain categories—such as the native's limitation to perceptual rather than conceptual experience, his restriction to a small number of objects, his indifference to secondary causes, his unreserved belief in mystic and invisible forces—and then illustrating these from various peoples. These principles are illustrated in successive chapters on dreams, omens, divination, ordeals, accidents and misfortunes, causes of success, dislike of the unknown, and the attitude toward the white man and the remedies of the white doctors.

Here is a treasury of illustrations of primitive behavior worthy to stand with the works of Frazer, Spencer and Gillen, and Boas. It is not concerned with the life of one people, but rather with the lower levels of culture as manifest in several regions. The survey is extensive, but it holds steadily to the phenomena illustrative of the principles under discussion, and while the method is empirical and inductive, the uniformity and solidity of these primitive attitudes almost make the reader wonder whether the selection of material has been influenced by the theories advanced. The final impression, however, is that the author is right in his insistence that the primitives live and move in a radically different system of ideas and emotions from those of civilized man.

Some almost random references will serve to indicate how interesting and illuminating the book is for the general reader as well as for the specialist. "There is no such thing as accident." It is always the work of

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mystic powers. If a tree falls it is the work of a witch, even if the tree were rotten or struck by a sudden gust of wind. Crocodiles and alligators are believed to be harmless, and even in a case where the anklets of two women were found in the stomach of a crocodile the natives would not believe that it had eaten the women, but only that it might have been bewitched to catch them and received the anklets from the witch as its perquisites! The natives do not die natural deaths. Death is due to magic, whatever a European might say of the effect of disease or gun wounds or poison. Moreover, the dead are not dead in the sense of being without animation. Apparently they live as long as they are remembered. A great chief thus lives longer than a common man because the rites and stories concerning him may be longer maintained.

The causes of success are not due to the sharpness or efficiency of weapons, although great care is taken in making them. There are charms for hunting, warfare, birds, fish, pigs, barter, the ground, thunder, lightning, rain; charms for wives, for dancing, for remedies, and for countercharms. An old fishing net, full of holes, which has been used successfully to catch fish is better than an unbroken one which has never been used successfully. Success in barter is not due to calculation, but to witchery. Women work successfully in the fields because they possess the principle of fertility. No matter how hard men might work at such tasks it would accomplish nothing. White doctors, after treating sick natives for weeks, have found that the natives expected the doctors to make them presents. It was a great inconvenience to be in bed so long, and the doctor brought in all sorts of alien influences. Besides, when a man is seriously sick or injured he is expected to die, and the spirits may be angered if he is brought back to life. The native feels therefore that the doctor should pay him a kind of indemnity.

E. S. AMES

UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO

FREE THOUGHT IN THE SOCIAL SCIENCES. By J. A. Hobson. London: G. Allen & Unwin, Ltd., 1926. Pp. 288. Price, 10s. net.

This book should mark a turning-point in the history of the social sciences. It is a criticism of the largely unconscious prejudices which have helped to produce many famous theories, in economics, politics, and ethics; and no future student of these subjects will be able to neglect Mr. Hobson's argument. Economics is given the fullest discussion, partly because it has been more fully developed than other social sciences in recent

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times. It is shown that the rise of political economy at the time when capitalist entrepreneurs dominated the industrial situation led almost unconsciously to a twisting of evidence or an omission of inconvenient facts so that this "science" could be made to support accepted practices. Mr. Hobson shows that the position of the neo-classical economists, with their mathematical calculus, is no less certainly, although more subtly, a defense of the established practices. A more technical chapter follows to show the mistake of "imagination." But "proletarian" economics, no less than "orthodox" economics, is shown to derive its most characteristic theories from prejudice: and similarly in politics the pretended science of governmental theory disguises a desire for "power" of a class or nation. The most important section of the book for students of ethics is the attack on the conventional use of unexamined ethical assumptions, particularly by such writers as Professor MacDougall, but also by the many politicians who adopt the gospel of "good will" in industry as a convenient refuge from the fundamental problems which they will not face. Mr. Hobson's criticism, however, is not entirely destructive. Indeed, the very existence of his book proves his belief that reason can survive even in the welter of prejudices and impulses which obscure the problems of the social sciences. He shows that thought, in fact, has continued to be free in part of its work; and he indicates that psychology, by dethroning ancient conventions, may strengthen reason to control even personal likes and dislikes. This is not, then, a case of the Cretan saying all Cretans are liars—the scientist saying all science is prejudiced —for Mr. Hobson argues that in proportion as we acknowledge the danger of prejudice, so we shall escape its power. The reading of this book should be made an obligation for every student of any social science.

C. D. B.

THE FABLE OF THE BEES. 2 vols. By Bernard Mandeville. With a Commentary, critical, historical, and explanatory, by F. B. Kaye. Oxford: The Clarendon Press, 1924. Pp. cxlvi+412, 481.

By contending that private vices are public benefits, that man's "vilest and most hateful Qualities are the most necessary Accomplishments to fit him for the largest, and, according to the World, the happiest and most flourishing Societies," and that "the Moral Virtues are the Political Offspring which Flattery begot upon Pride," Mandeville made himself a public nuisance and a scandal during a considerable part of the eighteenth century, in England, on the Continent, and even in the American Colo-

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nies. His work was condemned by an English grand jury, the French government, and the Catholic church, and he was damned from the pulpit, made the target of literary innuendo, and refuted at length by the ablest scholars of his day. In short, he accomplished in full what H. L. Mencken might dream of in his most ambitious moments.

Now, after some two hundred years have passed since the peace of the world was disturbed by the writings of a pen dipped in poison, Professor Kaye, aided by the Oxford Press, brings out a new edition of the chief work of this public enemy. On the mechanical side this edition is an example of artistic printing. On the editorial side it displays comprehensive and accurate scholarship. Professor Kaye gives an account of the life of Mandeville, a list of Mandeville's writings and reputed writings, a description of the various editions of the *Fable*, a history of the development of the text of the *Fable*, analyses of the principal criticisms of the *Fable*, a comprehensive list of references to Mandeville down to the present time, an account of Mandeville's sources, an analysis of Mandeville's thought, and a discussion of his influence. In the notes he indicates the variations in other editions, during Mandeville's life, from the text used, cites parallels and possible sources of specific doctrines, and gives other information too varied to mention. In other words, scholarly labor such as is rarely deserved and more rarely received by philosophical masterpieces is lavished on a man who was seldom counted a public benefit. If we must admire the manner in which Professor Kaye has performed his task, may we not ask whether the task itself is a public benefit or merely a private vice?

As a matter of fact, if we can for a moment neglect Mandeville's desire to shock and bait his opponents, we cannot but be surprised that his inconsistencies and exaggerations should have so effectively obscured his original and constructive contributions to the thought of his time. As Professor Kaye points out, beneath Mandeville's apparently shallow paradox that private vices are indispensable to public prosperity is the much sounder and more important doctrine that action in accordance with the motives prescribed by rationalism and religion is not found in the world and would be inconsistent with social organization. There is no doubt that Mandeville's able championship of this thesis, by forcing writers of his time to undertake in answer an analysis of human nature and society as they actually are, played an important part in the transition from theological speculation to empirical study. This negative polemic is, however, merely the beginning of Mandeville's contribution. So far Mandeville's doctrine was, as Professor Kaye remarks, essentially a

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vivid embodiment of conceptions already current; but in concentrating on Mandeville's thesis that all action is selfish, Professor Kaye has failed to emphasize Mandeville's positive doctrines.

In the first place, while both Hobbes and Mandeville analyze apparently moral actions into actions motivated by pride, Hobbes regards pride as an antisocial motive which leads to strife. For Mandeville, on the contrary, pride (which is used in a broad sense to include susceptibility to praise and blame), though doubtless wicked, is the primary socializing motive by means of which untaught animals solicitous only of their own pleasure come to act in such a way as to produce public benefits. This emphasis was a novelty, at least so far as English thought is concerned, and was deeply exploited later, as Adam Smith's theory testifies.

In the second place, Mandeville describes in some detail, from what might almost be called an evolutionary point of view, the process by which morality (which he insists is merely good manners) is built up. Whereas Hobbes showed that society is torn apart by selfishness and then blankly left reason to put it together again, Mandeville asserts that Hobbes does not prove that man is unfit for society by proving that man is originally unfit for society. He insists that the need for society is not sufficient to make men sociable, since men's passions cannot be controlled by precept, but must be controlled by stronger passions. In the original *Fable* he contends that lawgivers laid the foundations for society by cajoling men through their love of praise. In Part II, however, he explains that he was speaking figuratively, and goes on to discuss at length the gradual formation of society. The acquisition of good manners was as unconscious a process as is the acquisition of any other art. The beginnings of society are found in the rule imposed by the father upon his offspring. Because of common dangers a larger and larger society is built up from the original family organization. Finally, the invention of letters permits laws to be written and a stable organization to be established. In this entire process, men's love of praise and dislike of blame are the socializing motives.

Mandeville's third important contribution is twofold. During the eighteenth century explanation of human conduct was predominantly in terms of ends-in-view, and explanation of the universe postulated an invisible hand friendly to the interests of the human race. At both sorts of teleology Mandeville directed attacks. Most of his polemic involved the contention that the causes of men's actions are not the reasons they present to themselves and to other people—especially to other people—and

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also he explicitly attacks (cf. Vol. II, pp. 244 ff.) the idea that man is the end of all things.

The important question remains whether Mandeville merely exasperated his contemporaries by his paradoxes or succeeded in influencing the thought of the century by his positive doctrines. Certainly Mandeville had no avowed disciples of any importance. Professor Kaye, by citing a large number of criticisms of Mandeville, indicates that Mandeville furnished mental exercise to many important writers; and he shows fairly conclusively that Adam Smith was indebted to Mandeville for some of his economic doctrines. He indicates that Adam Smith was a pupil of Hutcheson, and that Mandeville was almost an obsession with Hutcheson. He remarks: "That it was Mandeville who furnished much of the specific stimulus toward the utilitarian solution of the paradox is demonstrated by the fact that in the case of at least two of the earlier utilitarian leaders—Francis Hutcheson and John Brown—their first statements of the utilitarian theory are found in those books of theirs which deal with Mandeville, and were evidently largely evolved through the controversy." Though this statement is of doubtful significance (since Brown apparently borrows his utilitarianism from Gay, and since the utilitarian aspects of Hutcheson's theory have complex relations to sources prior to Mandeville), it seems probable, for reasons which Professor Kaye does not adduce, that Mandeville had an extensive positive influence on ethical theory, especially on Hutcheson, Adam Smith, and Hume. To mention only the evidence that may be given in a few words, it may be pointed out that there are a number of passages in Hume's *Treatise* (e.g., pp. 500–501, 578–79, Selby-Bigge edition) that were evidently written with the *Fable* in mind, and that at least in his account of the artificial virtues, Hume was to some extent indebted to Mandeville; that when one looks below the surface of Adam Smith's theory of ethics, one finds that sympathy is subordinated to the desire men have to be praised, and that Adam Smith's addition of praiseworthiness (which has little place in his actual analysis) itself indicates that he had Mandeville's unrespectable theory in mind.

Though we have not mentioned Mandeville's wit, his keen observation, his enlightening remarks on various subjects such as military honor and the origin of language, we have said enough to indicate that, in addition to its satirical paradoxes, the *Fable* contains much able and original thought. And if this is not enough to justify Professor Kaye's thorough study, we may add that this study, through its comprehensiveness

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and accuracy, becomes an important source of information about the intellectual milieu which Mandeville shared with other, and doubtless greater, thinkers.

C. M. PERRY

UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO

CREATIVE FREEDOM. By J. W. T. Mason. New York and London: Harper & Brothers.

Something like a philosophy of self-consciousness and creativity rather suddenly makes itself evident in the field of metaphysics. Evolution is here not so much emergent as creative. If values are cosmic phenomena, and if mechanistic nature is an evaluation of selected moments of cosmic activity, why should we not have such a philosophy? Bergson's *Creative Evolution,* Dewey's *Creative Intelligence,* Bookstaber's *Creative Personality,* Brown's *The Creative Spirit,* and Mason's *Creative Freedom* are a few of the evidences of such a philosophy; and the last of these, although leaning somewhat on the first, is not the least of them. Mason's first two chapters are devoted to "Absolute Freedom" and "The Beginning of Existence." Of course this is cosmology, but the reasoning is already fairly familiar, thanks to certain excellent recent popularizations of the mathematical physics of the day. Extinction is separation of parts, and complete isolation is absolute freedom. Reversely, parts can be conceived to originate in pure spirit or absolute freedom limiting itself in quest of its own finite complement; and parts can be conceived to unite, or to be united, by a creative impetus that also originates in absolute freedom. The parts and their external (or mechanical) relations to one another constitute the mechanical system through which as a means the creative impetus works toward the utmost possible extension of creative freedom. The activity of creative impetus is the development of subconscious urge into self-conscious living, and creative freedom is Mason's name for such self-conscious living.

These somewhat cryptic phrases convey little idea of the effectiveness, as an instrument of analysis, of this dualism of mechanical impetus and creative impetus, both grounded in absolute freedom or pure spirit. The book discusses the spirituality of matter and the creative impetus' two ways of activity, namely, the subconscious and the self-conscious. The philosophy of Wang Yang-Ming, in which knowledge and action were identified 250 years before the time of Kant, is set forth in chapter v. There follow chapters on personality, heredity, and free will (in which

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free will is made relative to self-consciousness), Shinto and early man, modern man and the golden age of "innocence." The chapter on evil and nature's cruelties is immensely interesting: Evil is the predominance of mechanism over creativity, either in the mind or in the non-mental world. It is personality that we admire most in men: character is man's destiny and depends on himself.

The Magdalenian cave man inventing the fishhook represents a higher individual level of personality than idle moderns forcing others to fish for them. "How personality can survive after the dissolution of the material body is no more than a detail of organization." Not personality, however, but the utmost possible extension of creative freedom through the development of wealth and social organization, the creation of beauty, and the enrichment of knowledge is the ultimate goal of human life. Human beings must make their own values in terms of self-creative personalities if there is to be permanent progress. This particular self-consciousness is the basis of worship of the pure spirituality in which both matter and life originate, the pure spirit subconsciously known within and without ourselves. All genuine progress in religion is a movement toward adequate self-conscious recognition and interpretation of pure spirit subconsciously known. Man has developed the habit of periodic instead of perpetual worship because creative activity evolves better so, better at least in the direction of utilitarian productivity. The basis of spirituality in human life is man's intuitive understanding of his source in pure spirit. Art is not pure creativeness itself; it is only a symbol which reminds us of pure creativeness; it represents without being pure creativeness. Aestheticism symbolizes pure spirit. Without aesthetic sensitiveness, the inutile marsh or desert must be interpreted resentfully from the standpoint of mechanical impetus. The beautiful in art and nature is one of the indispensable delights of self-conscious creativeness; and woman aesthetically outrivals art. Woman is the living embodiment of spirit. The last chapter, on "Evolution of Love," interprets marriage, the sexes, and the family in terms of spirituality and creative freedom.

The author uses a technical language of his own that, although easily understood, nevertheless to some extent mars the subtle and suggestive qualities of the book. It is a very interesting, if not important, attempt to base a metaphysical *Weltanschauung* squarely on the results of recent historical research and the findings of mathematical physics, an attempt that owes much to the spiritual interests of the author.

G. A. TAWNEY

UNIVERSITY OF CINCINNATI

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THE ECONOMIC PROBLEM. By R. G. Hawtrey. London: Longmans, Green & Co., 1926. Pp. 417. Price, 10*s.* 6*d.* net.

Mr. Hawtrey is an official of the British treasury who has already published an important study on currency and credit. In this new book he reviews the whole of the principles of economics and their most important applications. The dominating idea of the book is that the production and use of economic wealth cannot be understood except in relation to other factors in human welfare. Therefore the book is largely concerned with moral problems, which are proper subject matter of ethics; but Mr. Hawtrey does not analyze or criticize ethical concepts or principles. He begins with a restatement of the old economic theories of the market, profit, and rent. Then he deals with institutions, chiefly the state, and with motives directly affecting economic issues. He throws the evil consequences upon "consumption" of the very unequal distribution of wealth; and, turning to world-politics, he finds that men in states are undecided whether to pursue chiefly power or welfare. There are two chapters, of general principle, on the export of capital and tariffs. On the latter question protectionism is shown to imply the policy of power, but its advocates try to show that it promotes welfare, which drives free-traders to show that, although their policy favors welfare, it can also be used to gain power. The final chapters discuss the characteristics of the British labor movement—strangely omitting details of non-British movements—and a very keen criticism is given of the program of collectivism and nationalization. Mr. Hawtrey appears to allow himself to be carried by the argument as far as we in England have gone in practical affairs toward public control of certain services; but he belongs to the "natural law" tradition which tends to underrate the capacity for change which institutions and even beliefs have shown. The book is a most valuable contribution to the discussion of moral problems within the sphere of economic life. There is a humane and enlightening attitude in the treatment and sense of administrative experience which is not common in books on moral or economic problems. The argument is never out of contact with actual life, but it has just that amount of abstraction which is essential for clear thinking.

C. D. B.

IDEALS OF CONDUCT: AN EXPOSITION OF MORAL ATTITUDES. By John Dashiell Stoops. New York: The Macmillan Co., 1926. Pp. xii+373.

The thesis of this book involves a simple application to ethics of some of the insights of Freudian psychology. Starting with the assump-

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tion that satisfactory living requires a continuous release of energy upon demand of the environment, Professor Stoops indicates in its various stages the results upon thought and culture of incomplete release. In the individual the process is observable at one extreme in the satisfactory functioning of an efficient habit; at the other extreme, in the delusion of grandeur that marks one type of insanity. Between these two extremes persons may be fruitfully classified by the relative degree of extroversionism or of introversionism they normally manifest in conduct. Dr. Beatrice M. Hinkle has recently, from the standpoint of medicine and of individual psychology, exploited this *fundamentum divisionis* in her book entitled *The Re-Creating of the Individual: A Study of Psychological Types and Their Relation to Psychoanalysis.*

Our present author has written this individual experience large: the thesis of moral objectivity is confronted with the antithesis of moral subjectivity until the two are to be synthesized in a life of practice touched to full richness by preparatory inner rehearsal. Pre-Socratic Greek life and pre-prophetic Hebrew life represent the first stage of morality; Socrates and Jeremiah mark the transition as agents of internalization, and the martyrdom of both Socrates and Jesus are tragic milestones on the way. At the center of the second stage stand Epictetus and St. Francis—"detached, through conflict, from objective organized interests, the will and the conscience build a kingdom within." In medievalism and Protestantism the inner ideal compromises with objective interests; and in the Renaissance it surrenders to make possible modern science and modern life. Much, however, remains to be done before the mind, the will, the conscience (that trinity of introversionism) become volatile enough to mark but functional stages whereby the natural and social world reconstructs itself for human need.

The dedication of the book to John Dewey perhaps suggests the author's greatest indebtedness. But there is here no slavish following of any model. The author has taken a point of view and has worked the whole history of civilization to make the treatment concrete. With a wealth of material, particularly from Homer and the Old Testament—a wealth so great as to be pedantic did the process not merit detailed elaboration—Professor Stoops has indicated as fully as possible the transitions from customary to reflective morality and from reflective morality to socialized conduct. The treatment lacks the geniality of its author's personal presence, but it moves forward in an atmosphere of high seriousness and hope that will almost surely dignify the study of ethics in the estimation of students. The volume is not identified as a text, but it will

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come to many teachers of ethics as a welcome supplement to whatever text may be used in teaching ethics. The description of philosophic idealism as a form of introversionism is almost certain to be more enthusiastically received by unspoiled students than by idealistic teachers. But even here there is a concession that common sense will call generous, for as introversionism has historically been a means of reaching a higher moral level, so may it still eventuate, if *eventuate* it will.

T. V. SMITH

UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO

SHORTER NOTICES

EVOLUTION AND OPTIMISM. By Ludwig Stein. Preface by Nicholas Murray Butler. New York: Thomas Seltzer, 1926. Pp. xi+241.

This volume promises two quite different things. Its title leads one to expect some criticism of the doctrine of optimism in the light of evolutionary thought; and every chapter heading (except the first, which is "Evolution and the American Spirit") but strengthens this expectation by enshrining the term "optimism," e.g., "Social Optimism," "Idealistic Optimism," "Realistic Optimism," "Pragmatic Optimism," etc. Eight of the fourteen chapters advertise themselves as being closely connected with certain well-known names in philosophy, i.e., the chapter on "Pragmatic Optimism" is connected with William James; "Vitalistic Optimism," with Count Hermann Keyserling, etc. Thus arises the second expectation of thorough exposition and seasoned criticism of particular philosophic systems.

Neither of these expectations is adequately realized. The volume is actually a collection of addresses delivered during the author's recent sojourn in America. Most of the addresses are popular in nature and, while few if any names in a dictionary of philosophy are omitted, there is neither well-rounded exposition nor mature criticism to be found. Of challenging observations, of stimulating passages, of sweeping syntheses, there are indeed very many. The motif of optimism does run loosely throughout all the lectures, but very loosely. No adequate rational basis is disclosed for the frequently repeated faith, though of another kind of foundation there is evidence enough. In the opening chapter the author declares, of optimism and pessimism: "Both have their roots in desire. Only with the pessimists imagination is turned backward; with the optimists, it is forward-bent." In the closing chapter, entitled "Religious Optimism," the author leaves no further room for doubt: "I cannot understand or conceive nature in its lawfulness without presuming or presupposing axiomatically God as its lawgiver." The volume, however, may be read with pleasure and not without profit, if one approach it with modest expectation.

T. V. S.

THE MAGNIFICENT IDLER: THE STORY OF WALT WHITMAN. By Cameron Rogers. Garden City: Doubleday, Page & Co., 1926. Pp. 312. Price, $2.50.

This is an impressionistic biography of the poet of modern democracy. Walt Whitman is presented in person rather than in the guise of his philosophy

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become flesh and blood. But how vividly the robust body, the placid, prophetic soul, rises out of the home life and the urban and cosmic environment! How central to the democratic enterprise the insight of this notorious idler is, the present biographer is not concerned to show. But he does succeed in revealing through Whitman's conduct a moral equalitarianism that will lead some to say that the hero was a case of arrested moral development, and that will lead others to inquire most seriously whether ethics must not frankly admit a differential morality for genius.

T. V. S.

LA SOCIEDAD DE LAS NACIONES Y EL DERECHO POLITICO. By Adolfo Posada. Madrid: Editorial Caro Raggio, 1925. Pp. 201.

Señor Posada is the author of a number of books and articles in politics and sociology. Moreover, he is a superliberal. The numerous essays making up the present book have been published in periodicals (one of them, in translation, in the July, 1924, number of this *Journal*). In most of them Señor Posada is primarily, but incidentally, concerned with the League of Nations, the formation, work, and prospects of which he discusses briefly in an informal but informed fashion.

Superliberalism, of which the late President Wilson appears to be one of the major prophets, is an attitude which results from an aspiration to imbue the life of peoples and nations with generosity, fraternity, justice, cosmopolitanism, and humanitarianism, and which aims gradually, and as opportunity offers, to embody itself in a legal system and political organization. Though the League of Nations has no international executive power, Señor Posada hopes that it may concentrate the efforts and opinions of the more intelligent and liberal men of each country, direct the resulting moral force to promote justice and fraternity both within and among nations, and result in a gradual expression of superliberal aspirations in appropriate political rights and social organizations. Since Señor Posada is only incidentally, though primarily, concerned with the League, his book is interesting chiefly as a well-written and intelligent expression of high aspirations.

C. M. PERRY

AN INTRODUCTION TO THE LOGIC OF REFLECTION. By Matthew Thompson McClure. New York: Henry Holt & Co., 1925. Pp. xviii+479.

This book for elementary classes emphasizes "the more directly empirical description of the procedure of reflection, rather than the rigorous discipline of formal logic" (Preface, v). A feature of the book is the large number of quotations bearing on logical analysis. After three preliminary chapters which deal, respectively, with the relation between logic and other disciplines, the meaning of reflection, and methods and examples, the author reaches his "starting-point." The life of reason may be approached either from the standpoint of imagination or from that of action—representing, respectively, the standpoints of introspective and of behavioristic psychology. It is primarily from the standpoint of action that Professor McClure interprets the life of reason. He follows here, in the main, the lead of Professor Dewey and the general course of the Chicago *Studies in Logical Theory*. In a "reflective" situation a distinction is made between data and meanings—a distinction made in order that thought may have a point of departure; reflection, something to work on. This distinction indeed yields both the materials and the means of reflection and, when generalized, "yields the distinction between physical and mental, objective and subjective, the real and the ideal" (p. 161). The author

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skilfully discusses the processes of observation, analysis, classification, division, and statistics as functions of data. His chapter on "Meaning" (chap. vi), is given over to a discussion of the origin of meanings, the nature of inference, and definition. Reflection is defined as the "elaboration of data and the further development of meanings in their relation to each other" (p. 211). The problems of induction, causation, generalization, syllogism, and scientific explanation are well developed around the fundamental notions of data and meanings and the elaboration of their relationship through reflection. A fairly wide variety of questions, illustrations, and exercises follows the chapters.

H. E. CUNNINGHAM

THE LAWS OF SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY. By Florian Znaniecki. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1922.

The author attempts in this volume to formulate the social-psychological laws of human behavior. Thirteen general laws are stated in careful scientific terms. A more popular and less exact form has been given to several of the laws. The problems are attacked from the point of view of natural science. The approach, however, is sociological rather than psychological. Culture and its influence is the constantly recurring theme. Indeed, no attempt is made to relate social conduct to specific inborn traits. In view of the present wide divergencies of opinion in this field and the rapidly growing body of data the formulation of general laws of social psychology is a very arduous undertaking. Behaviorists, psychoanalysts, experimental psychologists, sociologists, and social philosophers represent not simply different points of view. Their methods are fundamentally different; each defines the field of inquiry in a different way (frequently in terms of the range of data to which his methods are applicable), and each uses concepts which have not been made wholly clear to his brother scientists. The world of common discourse, therefore, is relatively small. A more serious difficulty, perhaps, lies in the fact that only a relatively small proportion of the data which a given method may be expected to produce is now at hand. Not only is it difficult to marshal such material in acceptable scientific fashion, but he who attempts it faces the objection that his generalizations are premature. Therefore, it is difficult, in such an enterprise, to avoid the appearance of metaphysical speculation.

In view of the difficulties inherent in the task, Dr. Znaniecki has succeeded remarkably well in systematizing a wide range of concepts now gaining currency in social psychology. He has utilized for the most part a series of more or less distinctly psychoanalytic concepts for purposes of social analysis. Repression, sublimation, idealization, inhibition, rationalization are treated as processes which appear in the behavior of the individual by virtue of experience in social situations. That is, the author explains the person as developing within, and interacting with, the social situation, and avoids explaining the social situation as a product of the "social nature" of the individual. The influence of the author's American experience, particularly contacts with Thomas and Mead, are evident. Unfortunately and unavoidably he has had few contacts with current American literature.

ERLE FISKE YOUNG

A SHORT HISTORY OF THE BRITISH WORKING-CLASS MOVEMENT. By G. D. H. Cole. Vol. I (1789–1848). London: G. Allen & Unwin and the Labor Publishing Co. Pp. 192. Price, 6s. net.

This is the first of two volumes dealing with the trade unions and political labor organizations in Great Britain. Mr. Cole is already well known as an

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advocate of guild socialism and a historian of various episodes in industrial history. This new book is brief and depends, naturally, upon the work of other scholars, but it is more than a summary. Mr. Cole has succeeded in giving us an illuminating interpretation of the working-class movement. It is not "propaganda" nor advocacy of any policy, but of course it is written from the point of view of the workers, as indeed any adequate history of their fortunes must be. In this first volume are included early or Owenite socialism, the first efforts at revolutionary trade-unionism, and the Chartist movement. The final chapter contains a very cogent argument showing that the improved position of the workers from about 1848 was not due to humanitarian feelings, but to a change in the process by which capital was accumulated and used. It is strange that this history still remains almost unknown to most historians of the nineteenth century, for it is the history of 90 per cent of the inhabitants of England, although it is not yet felt to be the history of England. The ethical categories of historians are still primitive.

C. D. B.

FOOL'S ADVICE. By Edgar A. Singer, Jr. New York: Henry Holt & Co., 1925. Pp. vi+194.

Fugitive papers read, for the most part, before this or that college group constitute this volume. It is happily entitled *Fool's Advice*. Not that the separate essays are hortatory, nor that the author is foolish, but rather that, under the whimsical guise of an oracle at play, a genuinely wise man has revealed his heart for the delectation of youthful hearers. From whatever far corner of facetiousness the author sets out, he seldom, if ever, fails before he ends to ring in high sincerity a call to the glory and the seriousness of the intellectual enterprise. The volume closes with a tribute, originally published elsewhere, to the author's old teacher, the late George Stuart Fullerton.

T. V. S.

FUNDAMENTAL THOUGHTS IN ECONOMICS. By Gustav Cassel. New York: Harcourt, Brace, & Co., 1925. Pp. 153.

This volume represents the collection of four lectures given at the University of London, and in these lectures the author has tried to do what he feels that every scientist who has written largely should do, i.e., gather up, in a short, simple summary, the various basic threads of his thought as a whole. The chapter titles will serve to suggest to the reader curious about, and somewhat informed in, economic theory—any other reader will hardly be interested —what Professor Cassel holds fundamental in economics. "Aims and Methods of Economic Theory," "Economics as a Theory of Price," "The Principle of Scarcity and the Conception of Cost," and "The Scarcity Theory of Money."

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